De causa Dei: Book I, Chapter 21
Thomas Bradwardine, De causa Dei contra Pelagium (1344). English translation: Wroot Press, CC BY-NC 4.0; machine-learning use permitted with attribution (https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/rights/).
Source: Henry Savile's edition, London 1618, 228C–234D; Latin from EEBO-TCP A16626 (public domain).
Canonical: https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/21/
Status: draft translation, not yet reviewed.

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CHAPTER 21.

He raises objections and answers them, and distinguishes what is rational and just as being so by priority to the divine will, by posteriority to it, and by a mixture.

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Here, moreover, many objections can be raised against what has been said about the divine will, just as the preceding chapter raised objections against what was said about the divine knowledge; and they can be answered in a similar way. Besides, objection can also be made specifically against what has been said. For if prior things willed [n1] are the cause of the divine willing, the divine will has some cause, against the authorities of Augustine cited immediately before; and then God's will would not be the first and highest cause of all posterior things. For cognition and the prior things willed are a prior and higher cause of that cause, and hence of all that it causes. Again, the willable moves the will, and the appetible the appetite, as is plain in the books On the Soul, in the Ethics, and in many other places; and God wills and desires the posterior things willed. Again, every rational agent acts for the sake of some end, as is plain in Physics 2 and quite often elsewhere; and the end moves the agent, as Natural, Metaphysical, and Moral Philosophy frequently teach in agreement. Again, everyone who wills something wisely wills it for some reason; reason therefore moves the one willing to will in this way. Again, everyone who wills something justly wills it because it is just for him to will it so: this therefore moves the one willing, so that he wills.

To the first of these it must be said that this conclusion is not against the authorities adduced, because all of them speak of the posterior things willed, such as the creation of the world and the like, not of the prior things willed. For who would deny that God's will produces and causes his own willing, as is plain from 17 of this book?

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For the second, it must be said that there are two kinds of cause of things in God. One is the sufficient and necessary cause, by the positing of which the thing is necessarily posited; and in this way God's will is the cause of everything caused later, as the preceding chapters clearly show. Speaking of cause in this way, God's will is the first and highest cause of all such effects, and this is how the authorities objected are to be understood. The other is a partial, non-necessary cause, by the positing of which it does not necessarily follow that the thing is posited; and in this way cognition is a cause of these later effects, as is plain from the seventeenth chapter of this book. Cognition, however, does not of itself sufficiently and necessarily produce all things known: for God knows equally whatever non-beings he does not produce, just as he knows the beings he does produce; and the argument seems to conclude concerning a prior cause of that kind. As to the third, it is plain from the reply to a similar argument in chapter nineteen, on the motion of the divine intellect by things understood. For God's will is not moved properly by the posterior things willed, but metaphorically, perhaps all too much so [n2]; namely because it is moved by their likenesses or ideas, or by their cognition in the divine intellect; but these are in no way caused by the posterior things willed, as 15, 16, 17 and 19 showed more fully. Hence neither is God's willing caused by them.

For the fourth, it must be known that the end is twofold, as is plain in Ethics 1, 1 [n3] and in many other places: namely the ultimate end and the intermediate end. The ultimate end, for the sake of which God wills and works whatever he does, is himself, just as he himself is also the ultimate end of the action of any and every thing, as is plain in Metaphysics 12 and often elsewhere in Philosophy; and sacred Scripture agrees with it. Hence Proverbs 16: "The Lord has made all things for his own sake." And this is the chief final cause of the divine will and of any operation of it; for this reason also the saints often prayed to the Lord on this ground. Hence holy David in Psalm 24 [25]: "For your name's sake, Lord, you will pardon my sin." And the most holy Jeremiah, in chapter 14, prays to God, saying: "Act for your name's sake, Lord, for our turnings away are many." The holy Daniel also, in chapter 9, prays thus: "For your own sake, God, incline your ear"; and this is what the Truth himself plainly attests in Isaiah 43: "I am," he says, "I am he who blots out your iniquities for my own sake"; and further on, in 48: "For my name's sake I will put my wrath far off; for my own sake I will act, that I not be blasphemed, and I will not give my glory to another." And Ezekiel 36: "Thus says the Lord: Not for your sake will I act, house of Israel, but for my holy name's sake; not for your sake will I act: let it be known to you." Yet these things too can be understood of the efficient cause. For the end moves the will in a way and brings about the very willing; and the argument does not hold concerning that end, because it is not about the posterior things willed, but rather the prior. There is also, in a way, an intermediate final cause of the divine will, though very improperly: namely every creature for whose sake another is ordered by God. So man is the final cause of the whole of the rest of creation, at least the irrational, and of that divine willing by which God willed it and made it; for all of this is ordered for the sake of man, as is sufficiently established by the sayings of many Fathers. The Philosopher also agrees with them, Physics 2, 24, saying thus: "We use everything that exists for our own sake; for we also are in a way an end." And Scripture speaks in this way, 2 Maccabees 5: "The Lord chose the place," it says, "not for the sake of the place and the nation, but the place for the sake of the nation"; and Mark 24 [n4]: "For the sake of the elect those days will be shortened"; and Mark 2: "The Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath"; and John 12: "This voice has come not for my sake, but for yours." And 1 Corinthians 11: "Man was not created for the sake of woman, but woman for the sake of man." Such an end, however, does not move the divine will properly, but metaphorically, as was said in the reply to the preceding argument.

For the fifth argument, one must inquire whether reason moves and directs the divine will. That it does has been argued, and it can be confirmed by that saying of Augustine cited from the seventh question to Orosius, chapter 19 [n5]: "In God, will cannot precede wisdom; therefore to be rationally wise is prior to rationally willing." And the same in the Questions on the Old and New Law: "God could have made all things at once, but reason forbade it." Again, the Apostle says of God in Ephesians 1: "who works all things according to the counsel of his will" [n6]; where the Gloss expounds thus: that is, according to his will, which proceeds from reason, as if to say: Why he chose us rather for the office of preaching or of the apostolate, we do not know; but yet he did it with counsel, not rashly. And it can be confirmed, since deliberation is a kind of discursive movement of reason, as can be had from Ethics 3, 7 and the following discussion; otherwise that unworthy and ridiculous line would be verified of God: "So I will, so I command; let my will stand for reason" [n7]. And his wisdom proves this, which reaches from end to end mightily and has disposed all things gently. Again, if God were to will anything well, and do it, without a prejudging reason, then by the same reasoning a man could do so, against the Apostle in 1 Timothy 5: "Do nothing without prejudgment" [n8], that is, without prior judgment; and Proverbs 4: "Let your eyelids go before your steps." And Ecclesiasticus 15 [n9]: "God from the beginning established man, and left him in the hand of his own counsel." The same is plain through the Philosopher, Ethics 3, on choice and deliberation. This reasoning is confirmed, because

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man was made according to the soul in the image of God, namely according to memory, understanding, and will. If, then, in God the will is led by reason [n10], so it must be correspondingly in man; for otherwise there would be no imitation, nor perfect likeness. Again, otherwise no one could dispute with God about any deed of his. For where there is no reason, there can be no disputation, against that saying of Job 13: "I long to dispute with God." And he does so, saying: "Why do I tear my flesh with my teeth? Why do I waste away in silence? Why do you hide your face?" And elsewhere he frequently puts forward many similar questions; hence also he says: "If I am judged, I know that I will be found just"; and further on, in 19: "Understand that God has not afflicted me with a fair judgment." Again, Ephesians 1: "He chose us before the foundation of the world"; and Romans 9: "That the purpose of God according to election might stand." Now election is a deliberative appetite, as is plain in Ethics 3, 6 and 6, 2: deliberation is therefore the cause of election and of the divine will. Again, Anselm, Why God Became Man 1, 10: "Just as in God any slight impropriety is followed by impossibility, so any slight reason, if it is not overcome by a greater, is accompanied by necessity." And he proceeds through that whole book showing in this way that it was rational for God to do or not to do this or that, and concluding by this that he did or did not do this or that. Hence in chapter 7 he says: "God's will ought to suffice us as reason when he does something, even if we do not see why he wills it." For God's will is never irrational: therefore reason moves the divine will and brings about his willing. And Peter Lombard says in Sentences 1, dist. 42, 1, that God's will is rational and most equitable.

For the contrary side it is argued in this way. If reason moves the divine will, that reason is not caused in God by any creature, as is plain enough from what has gone before, but is intrinsic and essential to him; therefore it is necessary; therefore God's will necessarily consents to it [n11]. Otherwise there could be conflict between will and reason in God; and hence also sin, knowingly and against a conscience rationally informed; and so God would necessarily act outwardly in whatever he does. Again, if reason moved the divine will, a greater reason would move more. Since, therefore, God could make everything better than what he makes, and this would be better and more rational if it were done, this moves his will more; therefore he so wills, and does it. Again, whatever God does, he could omit it and make something else equally good. There is therefore no reason why he omits this and does that rather than the converse. This is confirmed by a similar case about man. For if a man powerful enough to save only one man from death comes upon two who will die unless he comes to their aid, with parity supposed in every respect, he does well by saving either of them and leaving the other; and this without any reason preceding his will. For there is no reason stronger for this one than for that one; and the same holds of one who prefers one of two men equally suited to some dignity, and of one who gives a gift freely to one of many equally worthy, or even, among those unequally worthy, to the less worthy. Hence Luke 4: "There were many widows," etc., "and to none of them was Elijah sent, except to a widow woman in Sarepta of Sidon; and there were many lepers," etc., "and none of them was cleansed except Naaman the Syrian." And so did that Householder of the Gospel, of whom Matthew 20 says that he gave as liberally to those who worked in his vineyard for one hour as to others working all day, saying to each who murmured: "I wish to give to this last as to you. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?" He did not allege, as there was no need, any other reason. And this is what that saying of Job 34 seems to sound: "When he grants peace, who is there to condemn? When he has hidden his face, who is there to behold him?" On which blessed Gregory, Moralia 25, 14, says: "Let no one therefore ask why, while the Jewish people long stood firm, the Gentiles lay in unbelief; and why, when the Gentiles rose to the faith, the guilt of unbelief laid low the Jewish people. Let no one ask why one is drawn by gift, another repelled by merit. For if you marvel at the Gentiles taken up, when he grants peace, who is there to condemn? If you are stunned that Judea is lost, when he has hidden his face, who is there to behold him? Thus the counsel of the highest and hidden truth is the satisfaction of manifest reason." Hence in the Gospel the Lord, when speaking of the cause of a matter of this kind, says: "I confess to you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because you have hidden these things from the wise and prudent, and have revealed them to little ones; yes, Father"; and then, adding as it were a certain reason for the hiding and the revealing, he says: "for so it was pleasing before you." And further on in the same, 15: "Hence also, when rendering the wage to those laboring in the vineyard, though he made some workers, unequal in work, equal in reward, and one who had sweated longer at the labor sought more in wages, he says: 'Did you not agree with me for a denarius? But I wish to give to this last also as to you. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?' In everything, therefore, that is set forth outwardly, the open cause of the reason is the justice of a hidden will." So it seems that it is likewise in all the works of God. Hence Ecclesiastes 8: "I understood that of all the works of God man can find no reason for those things that are done under heaven [n12];

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if, however, there were some reason for the works of God, it could in some way be found by man, as it can be concerning God, who surpasses all his works by incomparable excellence. And Anselm says in Proslogion 11: "This certainly cannot be grasped by any reason: why, of those equally wicked, God by his supreme goodness saves these rather than those, and by his supreme justice damns those rather than these" [n13]. Again, Daniel 4: "He does according to his will, as among the powers of heaven, so among the inhabitants of earth; and there is none who can resist his hand and say, Why have you done it?" And Job 9: "Who can say to God, Why do you do so?" Hence even that profane Averroes says on Metaphysics 12, comment 51: "It has therefore been declared that there is some knowing being, of whom it is not lawful to say to him" [n14]. With these the Apostle agrees in Romans 9, saying: "Who will resist his will? O man, who are you, to answer back to God? Does the thing molded say to him who molded it, Why have you made me thus?" And he shows this by the argument on the indifference of reason among different deeds, as I argued above: "Or does the potter of clay," he says, "not have power to make, from the same lump, one vessel for honor and another for dishonor?" And there are many such things in Scripture.

To this someone could briefly reply and say that reason is twofold, namely uncreated and created; uncreated reason moves God's will, not created; and so the arguments proceed, each by its own ways, on either side. Yet that these things may appear more clearly, one must linger a little longer. For some rational things are naturally prior to the divine will, such as that God exists, that God is eternal, omnipotent, and the like; and these rational things, and the reason of them, can and do move the divine will, as was shown above in its like. Other rational things are naturally posterior to the divine will and dependent on it as on their cause, and none of these, nor the reason posterior to any of them, moves or determines this will. Rather, because God wills it to be so, it is rational that it be so, not the converse; just as it is also with a man who prefers one of two equals and leaves the other, in some one of the cases premised: for because the man prefers this one, it is rational that this one be preferred. And this is what the end of Gregory's authority, already adduced, says.

And besides these, some rational things appear to be in a way mixed from both, such as that this creature is subject to the Creator, and that God is Lord of this thing. For this is not rational necessarily and altogether absolutely, because then it would naturally precede the divine will and would always be so by absolute necessity; rather it is rational conditionally, or on a supposition, namely: if this creature or thing exists. And this conditional is rational simply and absolutely: if some creature exists, it ought to be subject to the Creator, and he to have lordship over it; and it is naturally rational prior to God's so willing, nor does its reason, or rationality, depend on that will. For there is some first reason in God, absolutely necessary and naturally prior to his will, as perhaps that God exists, or that God is truthful, or truth, from which many others follow necessarily; and these are, as I judge, all those things which are absolutely necessary. For from a necessary antecedent only a necessary follows necessarily; and every absolutely necessary thing is a first necessary, or is necessarily reduced to it and follows necessarily from it. For if it followed from it, but not necessarily, that is, through some contingent medium, such as the divine will, yet nothing that depends on a contingent and free cause is absolutely necessary; therefore all these things that are absolutely necessary are likewise absolutely rational. For if the antecedent in a necessary consequence is absolutely rational, the consequent will likewise be absolutely rational, not in any way depending on the divine will, since neither the antecedent nor the consequence depends on it; so neither will the consequent depend. This conditional, therefore, "If this creature exists, God is its Lord," is absolutely rational, and naturally prior to God's so willing; but the existence of the condition, namely that this creature exists, is caused by the divine will and depends on it; and it is rational that this creature exist because God wills it to exist, not the converse. For there was no stronger reason why he willed to make this one and to leave aside another possible creature equal to this in every respect, than the converse. So it seems that this proposition, "God is Lord of this thing," is rational in a mixed way, as has been said. For that God is Lord of this thing, if this thing exists, is simply rational prior to the divine will; but that this thing exists is caused by that will and depends on it, and therefore is rational posterior to such a will.

There is, moreover, still further to be observed, regarding the second member of these rational things, that there is a certain obligating reason, a certain preponderant, and a certain fitting and concomitant [n15]. An obligating reason is one that dictates that someone ought and is bound to do or omit this or that; one who has it and does not follow it sins; and such a reason is not in God with respect to the posterior things willed, but is frequently in us. A preponderant reason is one that dictates that it would be better to do this than that, or that it would be better to do this than to omit it; and such a reason neither moves nor constrains the divine will, nor determines it to act. For God could do better things than he does, and many good things

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which he does not do. A fitting and concomitant reason is one that dictates that it is fitting and good to do or omit this or that; and speaking of reason in this way, God wills rationally whatever posterior things willed; and so a man rationally wills to prefer, and does prefer, one of two equals, or perhaps the less worthy of two unequals, in some one of the cases premised. For if this is done, it is fitting and good; and such a reason does not bind or determine God or man, but only suffices for willing. For a man, however, it is always safe and holy to conform his will to a preponderant reason, wherever he can have one; and so perhaps the Apostle understood when he said, "Do nothing without prejudgment," namely where such a preponderant, or even obligating, prejudgment can be found. But where one cannot be found, as in the preferment of one of two equals, will suffices as reason, or at least the fitting and concomitant reason, as it has been described; and the authority mentioned could likewise be understood of such a prejudgment. God, however, cannot follow preponderant reason in all things, unless he made all possible things, and each of them infinite, which includes a contradiction, as has been shown elsewhere. In such matters, therefore, will suffices for him as reason, or at least the fitting and concomitant reason described above. With these things fully seen, the solution of all the arguments, for and against, cannot fail to be seen.

Now, however, for the sixth and last argument, it remains similarly to inquire whether justice moves or directs the divine will. That it does has been argued before, and it can be argued for and against, as was argued about reason and the rational. For every true reason seems to be a kind of justice, and every rational thing a kind of just thing. Besides, it can be argued specifically for the affirmative side from Augustine, in the Questions on the Old and New Law, who says: "God can indeed do all things, but he does nothing except what befits his truth and justice." Truth and justice therefore move God's will to act. Again, 2 Timothy 4: "There is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just Judge, will give me on that day"; and 2 Thessalonians 1: "If indeed it is just with God to repay tribulation to those who trouble you." And elsewhere in canonical Scripture, and in the Saints and Doctors, it is found very frequently that justice demands and requires that God repay each one according to merits, as he has acted. Hence also Proverbs 11: "A just weight is his will" [n16]. Again, not to be just is the cause why God does not will or do something; therefore, by the same reasoning, to be just is the cause why he wills and does something. For by this Abraham seems to have argued boldly against God in Genesis 18: "Will you destroy the just with the wicked? Far be it from you to do this thing, and to slay the just with the wicked, and the just be as the wicked; this is not yours: you who judge all the earth will by no means do this judgment." Again, otherwise God's will would be the first and highest justice, and whatever he willed would by that very fact be just; but this is plainly against Anselm, Why God Became Man 1, 12, who says: "What is said, that what God wills is just and what he does not will is not just, is not to be understood in such a way that, if God were to will something unfitting, it would be just because he himself wills it. For it does not follow, If God wills to lie, then it is just to lie; but rather that he is not God." Again, otherwise nothing would be just in itself, but only "just" as posited by the divine will; therefore nothing would be unjust in itself either, but only because prohibited by that same will. This seems to be against the Philosopher, Ethics 5, 12, who says: "Of political justice, one part is natural, another legal. The natural is that which has everywhere the same power, and does not consist in seeming or not seeming, that is, does not consist in the judgment of the legislator, in that it so seems to him or does not"; and he adds: "The legal is that which at the outset makes no difference, thus or otherwise, but when it is laid down, does; for example, that a ransom be a mina, and that a goat be sacrificed, but not two sheep." And something similar is found in the Canon, Dist. 1. That something is also unjust in itself, and not only because prohibited, is plain through Augustine, On Free Choice 1, 6, who says: "Adultery is not evil because it is forbidden by law, but it is forbidden by law because it is evil." And Augustine teaches in the Questions on Leviticus 62, and the Gloss on Leviticus 19 repeats it, that some things are unjust and evil because they are prohibited, others on the contrary, such as lying. Again, otherwise God's will would be the highest law and the principle of all justice; and this seems to be against Augustine, On Free Choice 1, 13, who says: "That immutable law, which must always be obeyed, is called the highest reason." It is not therefore will, because reason is in the Intellect. And further on in the same: "The eternal law is that by which it is just that all things be most perfectly ordered"; and this law, as it seems, does not depend on the divine will, but is immutably just in itself. The opposite side of this can also be urged by some considerations. For among the rules of justice, or of law, there is no infinite ascent, because of the second Supposition; but there is some highest rule of all and principle of the others. That cannot be in any creature, but is necessarily in God; and there is no reason, nor any necessary law in God, prior to his will [n17]. For there is no law or reason why, of two equal possibles, he wills and does the one and not the other, as was argued above;

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therefore that highest law and justice is necessarily will. Hence Anselm, Proslogion 11: "That alone is just which you will, and not just what you do not will"; and Augustine on that verse of Psalm 61 [62], "God has spoken once": "If you ask what is just and what is unjust, look to where God spoke once, and there you will find the fountain of justice." This could be confirmed by human laws, ecclesiastical and secular alike. For frequently in ecclesiastical laws the Pope says: "It has pleased us thus, or thus"; and by that very fact it is established as law and held to. Imperial laws also commonly have a similar foundation, whence they say: "What has pleased the Prince has the force of law" [n18]. But God is as free in making laws for governing his whole commonwealth as these men are for theirs. God's will is therefore sufficient as law, and is the highest law. Here, however, it can be answered in every respect, concerning justice or the just, as was answered above concerning reason and the rational; and as the rational things were divided there, so the just things can be here. For some things are just, naturally prior to the divine will, and do not depend on it, such as that God exists, that God is eternal, omnipotent, and the like; and these just things, and their justice, can and do move God's will to will. Others, however, are just things posterior; others again are mixed, as was said of the rational things. Legal things and laws are likewise divided; perhaps such as these are mixed: to reward the good and punish the wicked, and the like. And as in another genus there is some proper and first principle by which the rest are regulated, as the preceding chapters taught, so in the genus of legal and just things there is necessarily some first law and justice, which is the first rule and first principle, from which, or from whom, all other legal and just things that follow are originally derived and in all things directed. This proper principle, however, seems to be the infallible truth of the divine essence, on which, as on an immovable foundation, all judgments of justice rest. David, that eminent witness of truth, seems to attest this when he says: "The beginning of your words is truth; for ever are all the judgments of your justice," Psalm 118 [119]. Therefore also, from this principle the whole law is named truth, earlier in the same psalm: "Your law is truth." This first justice, however, is

just in itself, and first, necessarily and altogether absolutely, in no way depending on the divine will but naturally prior to it. From this first just thing many other just things follow necessarily; and they are, as I judge, all those that are absolutely necessarily just, not because they are commanded by God or by any man whatever. Their opposites also are absolutely necessarily unjust, which can be shown as a similar thing was shown above about the rational. And with these just or unjust things neither God nor man can dispense in the least, any more than he can change what is absolutely necessary or impossible. For these are not subject to the divine will, nor to man's in any way, any more than the antecedent is, or the consequence, from which and through which they follow most justly from that first just thing. Of such a kind are these: that a creature, if it exists, be subject to the Creator; that one who has received a benefit be bound to the benefactor, at least to God the benefactor; that no one ought to sin, and, as perhaps is the case, that no one ought to do anything against his own conscience or against the prejudgment of his own reason; and to lie is perhaps of this kind, as Anselm seems to want, where he was cited. For this seems to be contrary to some truth, and therefore to the first Truth, which is the principle of all law, and of divine justice alike with human; and without doubt it would be of this kind for God to lie, of which Anselm speaks in the same place. These, however, are natural rights simply, which are immovably founded in naturing nature itself [n19]. From this first rule of all legal and just things, many other legal and just things follow, not necessarily like the prior ones, but freely and contingently, since they follow through a free and contingent medium, namely through the divine will; and these are all the legal things temporally instituted. Hence Augustine, On Free Choice 1, 13, distinguishing a twofold law, namely the temporal or changeable, and the eternal or unchangeable, says that in that temporal law nothing is just and lawful that men have not derived for themselves from this eternal one. Hence also Hugh, On the Sacraments 1, 4, first part, speaking of the divine will, says thus: "According to it, what is just is just; which would certainly not be just if it were not just according to it. When it is asked, therefore, why what is just is just?"

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It is most fittingly answered: because it is according to the will of God, which is just. [n20] But when it is asked why that will is itself just, the sounder answer is this: for the first cause there is no cause from which it would be, of itself, what it is. [n21] This cause alone is that from which everything that is has arisen, and it has not itself arisen but is eternal. Hence also Wisdom 12: "Your power is the beginning of justice"; and Isaiah 51: "Attend to me, my people, for a law shall go forth from me, and my judgment shall rest as a light of the peoples." Some of the just things follow created nature necessarily, on a supposition, and inseparably: for example, that man is rational, that all men are alike in species, that the whole is greater than its part, and the like. This is natural law in the simple sense, belonging to created nature, and wholly necessary; neither God nor natural man can dispense from it so long as such a created nature stands. Other things follow created nature, but not altogether necessarily, only for the most part: things that nearly all people everywhere do by the instinct of nature, not by human constitution. Examples are that no one should do to another what he does not wish done to himself, and likewise in the negative form; love of offspring and their upbringing; repayment of benefactors; repelling violence with violence; keeping faith; and the like. In this way authors and laws speak frequently, and almost always, of natural law. From this natural law dispensation can be given for cause. For such natural things, according to the Philosopher in Physics 2, hold in one way always or for the most part, but sometimes fail in the lesser part. [n22] Hence Gratian says in the Canon, dist. 13: "Against natural law no dispensation is admitted, unless perhaps two evils press so hard that one of them must be chosen." [n23] For this seems to be one natural law: that no apparent evil is to be chosen. It is from this law that dispensation is given in a particular case, if someone must choose an apparent evil, greater or lesser; and this is the epieikeia of natural law, just as there is a similar epieikeia of positive, legal law, as is plain from Ethics 5, 16. [n24]

[234A–234D]
[Continuation of the text begun above at the foot of 233E; the sentence on natural law "for the most part" runs: "…which nearly all people everywhere do by the instinct of nature, not by human constitution; examples are…" and is translated in full in the preceding block.]

In this second way or the first, whatever has the stronger reason for it seems to be natural law, or the naturally just, since man by nature has reason as his natural rule. Hence whatever follows this reason also seems to be natural law; and the opposites of such things are forbidden because they are evil, not the other way round. There is, further, a certain just thing derived from the first rule of justice, not necessarily but freely, which is natural in neither of these ways: that is, before it is enacted there is no stronger reason for it than against it. Such is purely positive and legal law. Hence the Philosopher, in Ethics 5, 12: "The legal just is that which from the beginning makes no difference whether it be thus or otherwise; but when it is laid down, it does make a difference." [n25] So, for example, a lord might command a subject, between two altogether equal things, to do this first and that second: then it is just first to do it so, and not otherwise. All things seem of this kind which, in a case of equality and indifference, are appointed to be settled by chance, or are even simply permitted. [n26] Perhaps such was the command not to eat of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; and similar to these seems the rule that an appeal must be made within ten days. For no reason compelled more from the beginning toward ten days than toward eleven or nine; but some term was necessary, and so the lawgiver had to define a fitting term. All things of this sort seem to be evil for the reason that they are forbidden, not the other way round. In such matters that maxim of the jurists is true: "What has pleased the Prince has the force of law," and "So I wish, so I command; let my will stand for reason." It is likewise true in certain other matters, in which in truth there is a stronger reason for than against, but it is not clear to all that it is so. Therefore, lest anyone, following the fancy of his own head, should be able to invent a reason for himself and so make a law for himself, lest perhaps the shadow of reason should creep in under the appearance of true reason, it is expedient that all such things, although in truth they are of themselves reasonable and just, yet, because they are doubtful to many, should be cleared up by the discretion of the lawgiver and decreed just and certain by his authority. [n27] So it is that when the Prince has reasonably been pleased to enact something, it has a determinate and certain force of law, and before that it had only a doubtful and uncertain one. With such laws dispensation is made, as appears in each of the two laws. In such matters epieikeia moreover has a place more often, as Ethics 5, 16 attests. Furthermore, there is a certain justice that obliges, a certain justice that outweighs, and a certain justice that is fitting and accompanying, as was said above of reason. By these points and the others already set out, the answer to all the arguments is plain.

NOTES

1. Voluta / volutio. Volutum (pl. voluta), "a thing willed," is distinct from volutio, "willing," the act. "Prior things willed" are those objects of God's will that are naturally prior to his act of willing (his own being and attributes, as 231B makes clear); "posterior things willed" are creatures and events. The whole chapter turns on this distinction.
2. Forsan nimis. The print has "metaphorice, forsan nimis; quia scilicet…". I take nimis as "too much, excessively," an aside that "moved" is perhaps too strong a word even metaphorically. The Latin is awkward and no variant is offered.
3. Savile cites Aristotle by book and by the chapter numbers of the medieval Latin text. These do not match modern divisions, and I keep them as printed. By content: Ethics 1, 1 is EN I.1 (the good as end); 3, 6 and 3, 7 are EN III.3 (deliberation and choice); "6, 2" ("sexti secundo") is EN VI.2; 5, 12 is EN V.7 (natural and legal justice). The equivalences are by content, not checked against a concordance.
4. "Mark 24": the words are Matt 24:22 (the parallel is Mark 13:20). Savile's margin reads "Marcus," so the slip is Bradwardine's or his source's. The next reference, Mark 2 (2:27), is correct. Kept as printed.
5. Savile's margin gives both of these to Augustine. The "seventh question to Orosius" is probably the pseudo-Augustinian Dialogus quaestionum LXV; the Quaestiones veteris et novae legis (cited again at 232B) is not Augustine's but is the Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti of Ambrosiaster. I have not traced the wording of either passage.
6. Consilium: "counsel" where it translates Scripture or the Gloss (Eph 1:11; Sir 15:14), "deliberation" where it renders Aristotle's deliberative faculty (Ethics 3).
7. Juvenal, Satires 6.223 ("hoc volo, sic iubeo, sit pro ratione voluntas"), the words of a domineering wife. Bradwardine quotes it unflagged, as the type of will without reason.
8. Praeiudicium: the Vulgate of 1 Tim 5:21 has "sine praeiudicio," which Bradwardine glosses as "sine priori iudicio." I keep "prejudgment" (and "prejudging reason," "preponderant prejudgment") throughout the chapter, because "prejudice" would destroy the exegesis.
9. "Ecclesiasticus 15" is Sirach 15:14 (Savile's margin has "Ecclesiasticus"). The "Ecclesiast. 8" cited at 230E is Ecclesiastes.
10. Si ergo in Deo voluntas ducat rationem. Literally "if in God the will leads reason." The argument requires that reason lead the will, or at least that the will take reason as guide, and the next sentence ("Aliter … non esset imitatio") only works that way. I translate the evident sense. The Latin may be rationem ducat in the sense "takes account of reason," or a transposition for ratio ducat voluntatem. I have not emended.
11. Sibi: the pronoun is ambiguous (God, the reason, or the will itself). The sense required is that the will necessarily accords with that essential reason; hence "consents to it."
12. Savile prints "sub Caelo" with a variant "Sole" in the margin. The Vulgate of Eccl 8:17 reads sub sole ("under the sun"). The main reading construes, so I keep "under heaven."
13. Both the keyed text and the print read "hos magis saluet Deus quam illos … et illos magis damnet quam illos." The second illos is evidently a misprint for hos (Anselm: "hos magis salvet … et illos magis damnet"), and I translate "damns those rather than these."
14. The quotation is elliptical in the print ("de quo non est fas dicere sibi"). The sense is that it is not right to question or call to account such a being ("Why do you do this?"). Bradwardine uses it as a parallel to Job 9:12 and Dan 4:32 just before.
15. Ratio congruens et concomitans: "fitting and concomitant reason." I avoid "congruous," which is reserved for meritum de congruo, though the same notion of fittingness is in play.
16. The Vulgate pondus aequum voluntas eius means "a just weight is his delight." Bradwardine reads voluntas as "will" and uses the verse for the thesis that God's will is just.
17. The print has a question mark after "prior eius voluntate?", and the following sentence ("Nulla enim est lex…") is the reason for a statement, not an answer to a question. I translate as a statement and take the question mark as a misprint for a full stop.
18. Quod Principi placuit legis habet vigorem: Ulpian, Digest 1.4.1.
19. Natura naturante: "naturing nature," God as the creative principle (natura naturans), as against created nature (natura creata), which the next sentences go on to discuss.
20. Print: conuenientissimè; the keyed text has conuententissime, a keying error. The sentence is the end of Hugh of St Victor's reply, begun in the previous block (De sacramentis I, pt 4), and continues as Hugh's text through "eternal."
21. primae causae nulla causa est, cui ex se est, esse quod est. The relative clause is compressed. The sense is that nothing prior gives the first cause its being or its justice, so it is what it is "from itself". The translation follows that sense; the dative cui is awkward in Latin.
22. Aristotle, Physics II.8 (198b34 ff.): natural things happen always or for the most part. Savile cites "2. Physic."
23. Savile cites "Gratianus in Canone dist. 13", that is, Gratian's Decretum, distinction 13, in what is a Gratian dictum rather than a canon proper. Savile's wording "in Canone" is kept.
24. Ethics 5, 16 and 5, 12 (below) use the chapter numbers of the medieval Latin Ethics as printed by Savile. They correspond to Nicomachean Ethics V.10 (epieikeia, 1137a31 ff.) and V.7 (legal justice, 1134b18–24). Epieikeia is the correction of law where its universality fails, "equity"; it is kept transliterated.
25. The Latin is Bradwardine's paraphrase of Aristotle, not a verbatim quotation. Aristotle's own examples are the ransom of a prisoner at a mina and the sacrifice of a goat rather than two sheep.
26. Print: forte dirimi statuuntur, where the keyed text has sorte. As keyed, sorte would mean "by lot"; forte (ablative of fors) means "by chance" or "perhaps", and the translation takes the sense "settled by chance" for either reading.
27. serenentur (print). It is an unusual verb, from serenare, "to make clear". The sense is evident from the contrast with dubia ("doubtful"): doubtful things are made clear by the lawgiver's discretion.