{"id": "1/2", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/", "site": "bradwardine", "collection": "book-1", "title": "De causa Dei: Book I, Chapter 2", "title_alt": [], "author": "Thomas Bradwardine", "languages": ["la", "en"], "source_edition": {"title": "Thomae Bradwardini archiepiscopi olim Cantuariensis De causa Dei contra Pelagium, et de virtute causarum, ad suos Mertonenses, libri tres", "editor": "Henry Savile", "place": "London", "year": 1618, "volume": null, "locator": "146A–168E", "scan_url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}, "source_text": "CAP. II. Quod Deus est omnium aliorum necessarius conseruator: habet Corrollarium habens tres partes.\n\nHActenus igitur in causa Dei contra diuersos Haereticos generali generaliter perorato, amodo in causa eius contra Pelagium speciali summi semper aduocati patrocinante consilio specialiter postulandum. Primo igitur ostendatur, quod Deus sit omnium entium necessarius\n\nconseruator, necessarius, inquam, ex suppositione, rerum videlicet supposita entitate; Nihil enim per se possibile esse et non esse habet esse, nisi ab aliquo per se necesse esse, a quo semper dependeat in essendo; Sed quidlibet citra Deum est per se possibile esse, solus vero Deus per se necesse esse: Hoc autem totum apparet ex virtute et connexione causarum ex prima suppositione, et 17a. parte corollarij primi huius. Nam omne existens determinate subesse, quod non per se sufficienter determinatur ad esse, per aliquid aliud determinatur ad esse: Omne autem existens per se possibile esse, et non esse, est existens huiusmodi; ergo per aliud. Illud autem aliud vel est per se necesse esse, et habetur intentum; vel est per se possibile esse et non esse, et tunc per proximam rationem sequitur ipsum per aliquid aliud determinari ad esse, et de illo alio fiat eadem inquisitio diuisiua, et cum per secundam Suppositionem in talibus alijs non sit infinitus processus, necessario deuenietur ad aliquod per se necesse esse; per\n\nquod omne existens per se possibile esse et non esse, determinatur ad esse; et haec est ratio in virtute Auicennae, et Algazelis, per quam hanc eandem conclusionem se reputant demonstrare; Auicenna 1. Metaphys. et 8i. multis capitulis: Algazel 2. Metaphys. 12. dicto suo. Vnde Auicenna 8. Metaphys. 3. ita dicit; Cum dicitur primum principium absolute, necesse est esse vnum: cum autem dicitur causa prima materialis, et causa prima formalis, et cum his non est necesse esse vnam, quemadmodum hoc debet in necesse esse: Nulla enim earum est causa prima absolute; sed necesse esse, principium etiam est istarum causarum primarum. Ex hoc igitur, et ex eo quod praediximus manifestum est, quod necesse esse, vnum numero est, et patuit quod quicquid est aliud ab illo cum consideratur per se, est possibile in suo esse, et ideo est causatum, et bene innotuit, quod in causalitate sine dubio peruenitur ad ipsum; Vnde quicquid est, excepto vno quod est sibi ipsi vnum, et ente, quod est sibi ipsi ens, est acquirens esse ab alio a se, per quod est sibi esse, non per se: Et haec est intentio de hoc, quod res\n\nest causata, scilicet recipiens esse ab alio a se, et habet priuationem quae certificatur ei in sua essentia absolute. Algazel quoque 2. Metaphys. vbi prius, sic ait, Quicquid est aliud a necesse esse, oportet vt perueniat ab illo, et habeat esse ab illo; ostensum est enim, quod necesse esse, est tantum vnum; ergo omne aliud est possibile esse, et dependet ab illo necesse esse. Et infra eodem, Ostensum est quod vniuersitas est possibilis, et eget causa, et omnes causae ex necessitate proueniunt a necesse esse, quod necessario est vnum. Dicitur ergo quod hoc est primum principium Mundi. Quare et Hermes de verbo aeterno 21. dicit, quod summa gubernatorum superiorum et inferiorum summo illi Domino paret Cuncta enim ex eo pendentia atque defluentia. Vnde et Boetius 3. de consolatione Philosophiae prosa vlt. ita scribit; Hic est veluti quidam clauus atque gubernaculum, quo mundana machina stabilis atque incorrupta seruatur. Aristoteles etiam 12. Metaphys. 38. sic dicit, Primum est necessarium, non contingens aliter, sed simplex. Ex tali igitur principio dependet caelum et natura et 9.\n\nMetaphys. 17. Quae ex necessitate sunt, ipsa quidem prima sunt; Nam si haec non essent, nihil vtique esset. Et 8 Phys. 52. Oportet, inquit, esse aliquid primum mouens immobile, et non secundum accidens, si debet, sicut diximus, in his quae sunt esse incessabilis quidam et immortalis motus, et manere quod est, id est, totum vniuersum ipsum in seipso, et in eodem. Principio enim manente necessario, necesse manere quod continuum est ad principium. Vnde dicitur Deum esse principium necessarium omnium tam essendi quam mouendi. Istam vero Philosophorum sententiam non absque debitis laudibus recitans Augustinus 8. de Ciuit. Dei 6. Viderunt, inquit, Philosophi, quos caeteris non immerito fama atque gloria praelatos videmus, omnem speciem in re quacunque mutabili, quae est, quicquid illud est quoquomodo,\n\net qualiscunque natura est, non esse posse nisi ab illo qui vere est, quia incomm•abiliter est. Et hanc eandem sententiā diffuse prosequitur 2. de libero arbitrio 28. ostendens quod omnia mutabilia ad aliquod immutabile reducuntur, quo formantur, et innituntur continue in estendo. Vnde et Philosophus inde causa motus Animalium, qui est 12. de Animalibus, in noua translatione 1. et 3. et quasi per totum, vult quod omne motum innititur aliquo fixo in mouendo; et illud idem dicit Augustinus 8. super Genesim ad literam 13. manifeste. Vnde et Ammonius Ermenus, in Recordatione in librum peri hermenias Aristotelis, super vltimum primi dicit; Dij vere existunt, et transmutationem ne que secundum intellectum est possibile suscipere; praecedere quidem necesse quod penitus impermutabile est, id quod qualitercunque transmutatur, vt et maneat quod transmutatur. Quare in dijs habentibus rationem principij ad entia, praeteritum et futurum considerari impossibile est. Fidelis insuper Abraham qui [et] Amicus Dei meruit appellari, et perductionem omnium rerum a Deo, et conseruationem\n\nproductarum ab eo, fideliter attestatur, Iosepho referente, sicut circa 35am partem primi plenius recitatur. Nonne et Apostolus ad Hebraeos 1. dicens quod Deus locutus est nobis in filio per quem fecit et saecula, qui cum sit splendor gloriae, et figura substantiae eius, portansque omnia verbo virtutis suae, etc. videtur tam factionem, quam conseruationem omnium tribuere ipsi Deo. Quare et Chrysostomus istud exponendo, homilia 2a sic ait; Ferens, inquit, omnia, hoc est gubernans; siquidem cadentia et ad nihilum tendentia continet. Non enim minus est continere mundum quam fecisse; sed si oportet aliquid audacius dicere, adhuc amplius est. Nam in faciendo quidem ex nullis existentibus rerum essentiae productae sunt; In continendo vero, ea quae facta sunt, ne ad nihilum redeant, continentur. Hic ergo dum reguntur, et ad inuicem sibi repugnantia coaptantur, magnum et valde mirabile plurimaeque virtutis indicium declaratur. Dicitque Augustinus in De diuinitatis Dei essentia, et de inuisibilitate, atque incommutabilitate, 1o sic de Deo; Proculdubio nullus est locus ab eius\n\npraesentia absens: Super omnem quippe creaturam praesidet regendo, subtus est omnia sustinendo atque portando, non pondere laboris, sed infatigabili virtute; quoniam nulla creatura ab eo condita per se subsistere valet, nisi ab eo sustinetur qui eam creauit; extra omnia est, sed non exclusus; intra omnia est, sed non conclusus. Iste autem libellus in quibusdam codicibus intitulatur Ieronymo, sed potius aestimo quod fuerit Augustini. Vnde et Gregorius 2. super Ezechielem Gregorius homilia 5a. Ipse est interior et exterior, inferior et superior, regendo superior, portando inferior, replendo interior, circumdando exterior; sicque est intus vt extra sit, sic circundat, vt penetret, sic praesidet vt portet, sic portat vt praesideat. Quare et Anselmus Monolog. 14. loquens de summa essentia; Liquet, inquit, quoniam ipsa est quae cuncta alia portat, et superat, claudit et penetrat. Huic autem dicto Apostoli concordat dictum Philosophi, in de Mundo vlt. vbi ostendit quod Deus cum sit vnus, est tamen multinomius secundum multitudinem eorum quae innouat, et quorum est causa;\n\net dicit, quod vocatur Iupiter, quare et non male dicitur in Orphicis, Iupiter est fundum terrae, et coeli stelliferi, Iupiter radix Ponti. Nonne et hoc est quod docet Sapiens Sapient. 11. sapienter, vbi loquens Deo sic ait; Diligis omnia quae sunt, et nihil odisti eorum quae fecisti: Quomodo enim posset aliquid manere nisi tu voluisses, aut quod a te vocatum non esset conseruaretur. Rurfus autem hoc idem per similem rationem, iterum confirmatur. Quodlibet siquidem demonstratum, vt Terra; vel est per se, vel per aliud et per accidens quodammodo: Si per accidens et per aliud, idem de illo alio est quaerendum, et cum sic non possit esse infinitus processus propter Suppositionem 2am aliquid est per scipsum vnum et primum omnium, quod est Deus, per quod caetera sunt quaecunque. Nec potest dici quod Terra per se existat, quia tunc semper necessario extitisset. Per se enim includit de omni, vt patet 1. poster. 4. De omni vero, vt ibi accipitur, importat vniuersalitatem temporis omniquaque, vt patet per Aristotelem ipsum definientem hoc modo; De omni quidem hoc dico, quod vtique est non in\n\nquodam quidem sic, in quodam autem non, neque aliquando quidem sic, aliquando autem non; sed de omni et semper. Pro hac autem ratione est Augustinus in glossa super illud ad Gal. 2. Ab his autem, qui videbantur esse aliquid, quales aliquando fuerunt, nihil mea interest, sic dicens; Ipsi non sunt aliquid, et si boni ministri Dei sint; Christus enim in illis est aliquid, non ipsi per se. Nam si ipsi per se essent aliquid, semper fuissent aliquid, sed aliquando peccatores et idiotae fuerunt. Haec etiam ratio iam praemissa, et quod per se temporis vniuersalitatem includit, patet similiter per Augustinum de immortalitate animae 13. sic dicentem; Haec autem vis, et natura incorporea effectrix corporis vniuersi, praesenti potentia tenet vniuersum; Non enim fecit, atque discessit, effectumque deseruit. Ea quippe substantia, quae corpus non est, nec, vt ita dicam, localiter mouetur, vt ab ea substantia, quae locum obtinet, separati queat; et illa effectoria vis vacare non potest, quin id, quod ab ea factum est, tueatur\n\net specie carere non sinat, in quantumcunque est. Quod enim per se non est, si destituatur ab eo per quod est, profecto non erit. Et non possumus dicere id accepisse corpus cum factum est, vt seipso iam contentum esse posset, etiam si a conditore desereretur. Quanquam si ita est, magis id habet animus, quam corpori praestare manifestum est, atque ita de proximo immortalis esse probatur, si potest esse per seipsum. Quicquid enim tale est, incortuptibile sit necesse est, ac per hoc interire non possit, quia nihil se deserit? sed corporis mutabilitas in promptu est, quod ipsius vniuersi corporis vniuersus motus satis indicat. Vnde diligenter inspicientibus, quantum talis natura inspici potest, ordinata mutabilitate, id quod mutabile est, mutabile reperitur; quod autem per se est, nec motu quidem vllo habet opus, omni copia sibi seipso existente, quia motus omnis ad aliud est, cuius indiget quod mouetur. Adest igitur species vniuerso corpori meliore natura sufficiente, atque obtinente quae fecit; quare illa mutabilitas non adimit corpori corpus esse, sed de specie in speciem transire facit\n\nmotu ordinatissimo. Non enim quaepiam eius pars ad nihilum redigi sinitur, cum totum capessat vis illa effectoria, nec laborante, nec deside potentia, dans vt sit omne quod per illam est in quantum est. Et cap. 16. ita scribit; Sed si quod nemini dubium, tunc est animus sapientissimus, cum veritatem, quae semper eodem modo est, intimetur, eique immobilis inhaeret, diuino amore coniunctus, et ex illa omnia sunt, quae quoquomodo sunt, ab ea essentia sunt, quae summe maximeque est; Aut ab illa est animus in quantum est, aut per seipsum est: Sed si per seipsum, quando ipse sibi causa existendi est, et nunquam se deserit, nunquam interit, vt supra etiam disputauimus. Nec potest quis dicere quod Terra per se est, nec tamen haec propositio est per se, Terra est, vt sic obuiet rationi praemissae: Nam secundum veritatem, et secundum Philosophum in praedicamentis; In eo quod res est vel non est, oratio vera vel falsa dicitur; Ergo ex eo quod res est, vel non est sic vel sic, oratio dicitur sic vera vel sic falsa. Vnde et 1. peri hermenias vlt. similiter orationes verae sunt quemadmodum et res. Adhuc\n\nautem et si quis aliquibus rationibus autoritatibusue innitens, omnino velit defendere aliqua citra Deum per se esse et manere; nullo tamen colore potest astruere, aliqua citra Deum esse per se aeque digne, prime, summe, perfecte, et aequaliter sicut Deum, sicut Suppositiones et partes Corolarij primi monstrant. Quinimo et si alia vtcunque dicantur esse per se, Deus tamen incomparabiliter magis, dignius, prius, atque perfectius dicitur per se esse: et constat quod omnium communicantium idem, nomen, illud cui nomen maius et dignius competit, est causa caeterorum, secundum quod communicant illud nomen: Per hoc enim probat Philosophus 7. Metaphys. 3 quod Substantia est causa essendi cuiuslibet alterius praedicamenti. Vbi et textus quem Auerroes exponit, Ex hoc quod substantia est dignior nomine entis quam caetera sic concludit, Manfestum est igitur, quod haec est causa essentiae cuiusslibet istorum, et ista sunt propter illud. Super quod Auerroes Comment 3. ita dicit, Cum hoc sit declaratum de substantijs, manifestum est quod substantiae sunt causae essentiae accidentium,\n\net accidentia non sunt nisi propter substantias; et hoc est necessarium. Quoniam cum declaratum est, quod hoc nomen ens, dicitur de decem praedicamentis, et dignius de substantijs, et est declaratum, quod cum plura communicant in eodem nomine, et quoddam dignius quibusdam, id quod est dignius isto nomine est causa caeterorum et dispositio caeterorum ad causalitatem, est sicut dispositio istorum in illo nomine. Ex istis igitur propositionibus concluditur, quod substantia est causa caeterorum praedicamentorum: Quare et Philosophus 2. Metaphys. 4. Vnumquodque vero ipsum maxime aliorum, secundum quod et alijs inest vniuoce, puta ignis, calidissimus. Etenim est causa alijs hic causans; quare et verissimum, quod posterioribus est causa vt sint vera. Quapropter semper existentium principia semper esse verissima necesse est; non enim quandoque vera, nec illis causa aliquid ita est vt sint; sed illa alijs: Quare vnumquodque sicut se habet vt sit, ita ad veritatem; vbi textus Commentatoris habet expressius isto modo; Vnumquodque principiorum proprie est causa eorum\n\nsecundum quae sunt aliae res, quae conueniunt in nomine et intentione? Vbi Auerroes, Cum declaratum est, quod causa in quolibet genere entium est magis digna in esse, et in veritate, quam illa quorum est causa in illo genere, manifestum est quod si est hic prima causa omnium, vt declaratum est in scientia naturalium, illa est magis digna in esse et in veritate, quam omnia entia. Omnia enim entia non acquirunt esse et veritatem nisi ab ista causa. Est igitur tantum ens per se, et verum per se, et omnia alia entia et vera per esse et veritatem illius. Vnde et Augustinus 7. Confess. 15. Aspexi aliqua, et vidi tibi debere quia sunt: In te cuncta finita sunt, non quasi in loco, sed quia tu es omni tenens manu et veritate; et omnia vera sunt in quantum sunt, nec quicquam est falsitas nisi cum putatur esse quod non est. Quibus\n\nconcordat Auicenna 8. Metaphys. 6. dicens, necesse esse est veritas; veritas enim cuius que rei est proprietas sui esse, quod stabilitum est ei; ergo nihil est dignius esse veritatem, quam necesse esse. I am autem dicitur vetitas id, de cuius esse est sententia certa. Ergo nihil est dignius hac certitudine, quam id de cuius esse est sententia certa; et cum sua certitudine semper est, et cum sua sempiternitate semper est per seipsum, et non per aliud a se: caeterarum vero rerum quidditates non merentur esse, prout sunt in seipsis, nec considerata relatione earum ad necesse esse, sed merentur priuationem; et ob hoc omnes res prout sunt in seipsis, sunt falsae; sed propter ipsum est certitudo earum, et ob hoc omnis res perit, nisi secundum quod est versus faciem eius; et ideo dignius est, vt ipse sit necesse esse et veritas. Cui et concorditer Esaias 40. ita scribit; Omnes gentes quasi non sint, sic sunt coram eo, et quasi nihilum et inane reputatae sunt ei. Vnde et Iob 23. Ipse enim solus est. Super quod Gregorius 16. Moral. 14. loquens de Angelis et hominibus, coelo et terra, et alijs vniuersis; Sunt, inquit, haec omnia,\n\nsed principaliter non sunt, quia in semetipsis minime subsistunt; et nisi gubernantis manu teneantur, esse nequaquam possunt. Cuncta namque in illo subsistunt a quo creata sunt, nec ea, quae viuunt, sibimetipsis vitam tribuunt; nec ea quae mouentur, et non viuunt suis motibus ad motum ducuntur; sed ille cuncta mouet qui quaedam viuificat, quaedam vero viuificata in extrema essentia mire ordinans seruat. Cuncta quippe ex nihilo facta sunt, eorumque essentia rursum ad nihilum tenderet, nisi eam Autor omnium regiminis manu teneret. Omnia itaque quae creata sunt, per se nec subsistere praeualent, nec moueri, sed in tantum subsistunt, in quantum vt esse debeant, acceperunt; in tantum mouentur, in quantum occulto instinctu disponuntur: Ecce enim peccator flagellandus est de rebus humanis. Arescit in ardoribus eius terra, concutitur in naufragijs eius mare, ignescit in eius sudoribus aer, obtenebrescit contra eum in vndationibus coelum, inardescunt in eius oppressionibus homines, mouentur in eius aduersitate et angelicae virtutes. Nunquidnam haec quae inanimata, vel quae viuentia diximus,\n\nsuis instinctionibus, et non magis diuinis impulsionibus agitantur? Quicquid est igitur quod exterius saeuit, per hoc ille intuendus est, qui hoc interius disponit: in omni igitur causa solus ipse qui principaliter est, qui etiam ad Mosen dicit; Ego sum qui sum, sic dices filijs Issrael, Qui est, misit me ad vos. Quare et Plato 2. Timae. 3. inducit Deum sic alloquentem alios deos, scilicet Angelos isto modo; Dij, quorum opifex Paterque sum ego: Opera si quidem vos mea dissolubilia natura, mea tamen voluntate indissolubilia: Omne siquidem quod iunctum est, natura dissolubile est; at vero quod bonum ratione iunctum atque modulatum est, dissolui velle non est Dei. Quapropter quia facti generatique estis, immortales quidem nequaquam, nec omnino indissolubiles estis, nec tamen vnquam dissoluemini, nec mortis necessitatem subibitis, quia voluntas mea maior nexus et vegetatior ad aeternitatis custodiam, quam illi vitales nexus, ex quibus aeternitas vestra coagmentata at que composita est. Adhuc autem et coelum firmissimum corporum nequaquam sibi sufficit per se esse. Dicit enim Auerroes de Substantia orbis tractatu 2. Debes scire, quod corpus coeleste, quod est simplex, et intransmutabile\n\nab aliquo extrinseco, non indiget virtute mouente in loco semper tantum, sed etiam virtute largiente in se, et sua substantia permanentiam aeternam. Quoniam et si sit simplex, et non habens potentiam ad corruptionem, tamen est finitae actionis necessario, quia est finitarum dimensionum et determinatarum a superficie continente ipsum; et omne tale, cum intellectus posuerit illud existens per se, absque eo quod aliud largiatur ei permanentiam et aeternitatem; necesse est vt ita sit de finitate permanentiae suae, sicut est de finitate suae actionis; et ideo necesse est in intellectu potentiam hic esse largientem ipsi permanentiam aeternam, quemadmodum largitur ei motum aeternum. Vnde et Psal. 32. Verbo Domini Coeli firmati sunt, et spiritu oris eius omnis virtus eorum. Si igitur secundum Augustinum, Platonem, et Auerroem, nec animus, nec Angelus, nec coelum potest manere per se, sine conseruatione et sustentatione diuina, quid aliud poterit sic manere? Quapropter et Pater Philosophorum\n\nHermes de Verbo aeterno 38. Hic, inquit, sensibilis, qui dicitur, mundus receptaculum est omnium sensibilium specierum, qualitatum, vel corporum, quae omnia sine Deo vegetari non possunt. Omnia enim Deus, et ab eo omnia, et eius omnia voluntati, quod totum est bonum, decens, prudens, et immutabile, et ipsi soli sensibile atque intelligibile, et sine hoc nec fuit aliquid, nec est, nec erit. Omnia enim ab ipso, et per ipsum, et multiformes qualitates, et magnae quantitates, et omnes mensurae excedentes magnitudines, et omniformes species, quas cum intellexeris, o Asclepi, gratias acturus es Deo. Cui et concordanter Apostolus ad Ro. 11. Ex ipso, inquit, et per ipsum, et in ipso sunt omnia, ipsi gloria: Quem et quasi exponens 24. definitionum totidem Philosophorum de Deo 22a. sic ait, Deus est, ex quo est, quicquid est non partitione, per quem est non variatione, in quo est non commixtione. Vnde et Augustinus 1. Confess. 1. loquens Deo, sic ait; Non omnino\n\nessem nisi esses in me, An potius non essem, nisi essem in te? ex quo omnia, per quem omnia, in quo omnia? etiam et sic, Domine, et sic. Qui et super illud Psalmi 113. Omnia quaecunque voluit, fecit; In quibus, inquit, est ipse tanquam indigentia continet, non ab eis tanquam indigens continetur. Dionysius insuper de diuinis nominibus 11. Timotheo interroganti quid sibi vult quod dicitur Deum per seipsum esse, nunquid quod Deus per seipsum sit vita, aut sapientia, aut aliud quicquam tale? respondet; Hoc autem dicimus non est paruum, sed rectum, et simplicem declarationem habet. Non enim essentiam quandam diuinam aut Angelicam esse dicimus per seipsam essendo, essendi, quae sunt, omnium causam; Solummodo enim essendi omnia quae sunt, causam; tantum enim existendi omnia qua sunt, et ipsum esse superessentiale principium, et essentia, et causale, nec vitae parentem aliam de• tatem praeter super diuinam omnium quaecunque viuunt, et editae vitae causam vitam nec colligentem dicendum principales existentium, et creatrices essentias, et substantias, quas\n\nquidem et Deos existentium, et creatores promptos confestim perfecerunt, quos vere et proprie dicendum, neque ipsi formauerunt, neque existentes, neque patres eorum, sed per seipsum esse, et per seipsam vitam deitatem dicimus principaliter quidem, et delformiter et causaliter vnum omnium superprincipale et superessentiale principium et causam, participaliter autem editas ex Deo non participante prouidas virtutes, per scipsam viuificationem, (secundum aliam translationem essentificationem) et per seipsam delficationem, quas existentia proprie sibimet ipsis participant, et existentia, et viuentia, et diuina, et sunt et dicuntur, et alia similiter proinde, et primarum ipsarum optimus substitutor dicitur esse demde totarum earum, deinde particularum ipsarum, deinde totarum ipsarum participantium, deinde particulariter earum participantium. Et quid oportet de his dicere, quando quidem diuinorum nostrorum Magistrorum, et per seipsam bonitatis et diuinitatis substitutricem aiunt plusquam optimam, et plusquam diuinam per seipsam bonitatem et diuinitatem dicentes\n\nesse beneficam et deificam, ex Deo procedentem donationem, et per seipsam formam, per seipsam formificam fusionem, et totam formam et particularem formam, et vniuersaliter bona, et quaecunque alia, quae secundum eundum dicta sunt et dicentur, modum declarantia, prouidentiam, et bonitatem participatas ab existentibus ex Deo non participante prouenientes. Et infra 5. Omnia, inquit, ad semetipsam bonitas conuertit, vt principaliter congregatrix est dispersorum, vt principalis et viuifica deitas, et omnia ipsam vt principium, vt continentiam, vt finem appetunt; et optimum est, vt eloquia aiunt, ex quo omnia subsistunt, et sunt, tanquam ex causa perfectissima adducta, et in quo omnia constituta sunt, tanquam in omnipotente consulto custodita et comprehensa, et in quod omnia conuertuntur, sicut in propriam singula summitatem, et illud concupiscunt omnia. Et infra, eodem; Simpliciter omne on, id est ens ex bono et optimo est, et in bonum et optimum conuertitur, et omnia quaecunque sunt et fiunt, per bonum et optimum sunt et fiunt, et ad hoc omnia videt,\n\net ab ipso mouentur et continentur, et propter ipsum et per ipsum et in ipso omne principiū exemplatiuum, consummatiuum, intellectuale, speciale, formale, et simpliciter omne principium, omnis continentia, omne summum, aut, vt comprehendens dicam, omnia quae sunt, ex bono et optimo, et omnia quae non sunt superessenualiter in bono et optimo; et est omnium principium et finis, superprincipale, et superfinale, quia ex ipso, et per ipsum, et in ipso, et in ipsum sunt omnia, vt ait sacer sermo. Per rationem quoque iam factam ostendit Anselmus Monolog. 3. et capitulis alijs consequenter, aliquod esse ens quod solum est per scipsum, et per hoc vnum caetera cuncta esse, et quod ipsum est vnicum non habens aequale nec maius, quoniam quicquid est per aliud minus est illo. Quare concludit, omnium entium summe et maxime ipsum esse, et post per candem rationem ostendit ipsum omnia alia necessario continue sustinere. Vnde et capit. 13o. ita dicit: Constat ergo per summam naturam esse factum quicquid non est idem illi; Dubium autem non nisi irrationali menti esse potest,\n\nquod cuncta quae facta sunt, eodem ipso sustinente vigent, et perseuerant esse quam diu sunt, quo faciente de nihilo habent esse quod sunt. Simili namque per omnia ratione qua collectum est omnia quae sunt, esse per vnum aliquid, vnum ipsum solū esse per seipsum, et alia per illud: Simili, inquam, ratione potest probari, quia quaecunque vigent, per vnum aliquid vigent, vnum illud solum viget per seipsum, et alia per aliud; quod quoniam aliter esse non potest, nisi vt ea quae sunt facta vigeāt per aliud, et illud a quo sunt facta vigeat per se ipsum, necesse est, vt sicut nihil factum est nisi per creatricem praesentem essentiam, ita nihil vigeat nisi per eiusdem seruatricem praesentiam. Et subdit capit 14. consequenter, quod si ita est, imo quia ex necessitate sic est, consequitur vt vbi ipsa non est, nihil sit; vbique igitur est, et per omnia,\n\net in omnibus. Et infra; Liquet quoniam ipsa est, quae cuncta alia portat et superat, claudit et penetrat. Si igitur haec illis quae superius sunt inuenta iungantur, eadem est quae in omnibus est, et per omnia, et ex qua, et per quam, et in qua omnia. Amplius autem omne causatum causatur ab aliqua causa actualiter nunc causante, quod patet ex relatione mutua inter illa, et per Algaz. 1. Metaphys. et Auicen. 6. Metaphys. et 8. diffuse: quilibet autem citra Deum est causatum, et ipse solus incausatus; quilibet ergo praeter Deum aliquo modo causatur a Deo. Sed ista causatio saltem illorum quae non mouentur, neque nouiter producuntur, non nisi conseruatio necessaria dici potest, quod et patet per praedictos Philosophos dictis locis. Nec potest dici quod Deus ideo dicitur nunc causare aliquod causatum, quia prius causauit illud, vel causam quae illud causauit; hoc enim repugnat Autoribus allegatis; et quia tunc Pater diceretur modo causare filium actualiter existentem, imo et Pater mortuus filium nunc viuentem, quia causauit illum vel causam illius. Quare et Algazel. 1. Metaphys. vlt.\n\nostendit, quod nullum possibile esse habet esse nisi per aliud quod est factor eius; quod etiam Mundus etsi sit aeternus, potest dici factura Dei altissimi: et distinguens de factore subiungit; Factor autem intelligitur dupliciter: Primo qui extrahit factum de non esse, ad esse; secundo, vt sit esse rei per illud, sicut esse luminis est per solem, et videtur Sol factor luminis naturaliter. Quidam vero putabant, quod cum res haberet esse, non indiget factore, sed quamuis iste non sit, tamen factum suum non desinat esse; et fortassis praesument dicere, quod quamuis ponatur Deum non esse, non sequitur ex hoc mundum non esse, et conantur ostendere hoc exemplo et ratione; Exemplo sic, sicut fabricatori domus mortuo, remanet ipsa domus; Ratione vero sic, Quod non est, indiget datore essendi; sed quod est, non sic eget. Respondet ad exemplum, et dicit, quod fabricator non est causa domus nisi improprie, sed est causa motus partium domus dum mouetur ad formam domus; sed inducta forma domus, et cessantibus motibus causalitas eius cessat. Imo secundum eundem ibidem forma fundamenti\n\nparietis, et partium caeterarum sunt causae domus. Ad rationem vero dicit, quod illud quod iam habet esse non indiget datore, sed conseruatore, quod sic probat: Omnis factura dependet a suo factore, et hoc non secundum suum non esse, quod habuit, ergo secundum suum esse; et addit, Igitur quod coepit esse eget factore secundum suum esse tantum, quoniam secundum hunc modum est possibile esse. Et infra; Postquam autem non pendet factura ex factore, nisi in quantum habet esse, tunc quamdiu permanet in esse, indiget factore, et pendet ex eo secundum suum esse, et est propter ipsum, et cum ipso in omnibus suis dispositionibus, sicut esse diei est propter solem, et cum sole in omnibus suis dispositionibus. Algazel autem in hac ratione, sicut et in plurimis dictis suis sequitur Auicennam, qui 6. Metaphys. 1. multum diffuse prosequitur eandem virtualiter rationem, vbi inter caetera ita dicit; Diuini Philosophi non intelligunt peragentem principium motionis tantum, sicut intelligunt naturales, sed principium essendi et datorem eius, sicut est creator Mundi. Causa\n\nvero naturalis non acquirit esse rei, nisi per motionem aliquam ex modis motionum; ergo acquirens esse in naturalibus est principium motus. Et infra eodem, fortasse putabit aliquis, quod agente et causa non est opus, nisi vt res habeat esse post non esse, sed post quam res habuerit esse, si destruatur causa, erit tamen res sufficiens in se. Igitur putabit, quod res non indiget causa nisi ad incipiendum esse, sed postquam incoeperit et habuerit esse, iam non indigebit causa. Causae igitur apud se erunt causae fiendi tantum, et priores eo quod fit, non simul cum eo. Iam igitur putauit falsum, sicut tu nosti: Esse enim rei postquam res facta est, necesse est vt sit vel necesse esse, vel non necesse esse; et ostenso diffuse, quod non est necesse esse per se, sed dependens a necesse esse per se, et in fine capituli ita dicit; Postquam patuit quod esse quidditatis pendet ab aliquo, in quantum est esse illi quid ditati, non in quantum ipsum est esse post non esse, tunc illud esse secundum hunc modum causatum est, et interim dum durauerit, sic erit causatum pendens ab alio. Iam igitur manifestum est, quod causatum\n\neget aliquo quod dat sibi ipsum esse perse tantum; sed incoeptio et alia huiusmodi sunt res quae accidunt ei, et quod causatum eget datore sui esse semper et incessanter, quamdiu habuerit esse. Quibus et concorditer Hermes de Mundo et Coelo 1. agendo de rerum principijs, explorans et inquirens quid sit summa et prima causa, et quid eius effectus, sic ait: Est igitur causa illa tu yta olbz, id est, fons habens seminarium vitae, ⟨gap: ⟩ quae dicitur plenitudo scientiae, bonum bonitatis diuinae clementiae quae per omne mundi corpus in modum circuli collocata, et nunc extrinsecus, nunc intrinsecus posita cuncta regit et componit, et ad procuranda et conseruanda omnia ignita et sphaerica, perpetuare non desinit agitationem, illic iungūtur in specie indiuiduali singularitate conscripta, quicquid hyle, quicquid mundus, quicquid mundi machina, quicquid tempus, quicquid in temporalibus parturiunt elementa. Illic textus operis, fatalis series, saeculorum dispositio, temporalium omnium meta summi digito\n\ndispositoris exarata, Illic nodus perpetuitatis. Mens itaque diuina nulla fatigatione officium deponit, sed seipsum et mundum, et omnia quae intra eum sunt, perpetua, et infatigabili vtilitate, seu alias stabilitate sui sustentare non desinit. Hoc idem et veritas ipsa verissime testatur, cum dicit, Pater meus vsque modo operatur, et ego operor Iohan. 5. quod intelligitur non de operatione, qua res tantummodo nouiter producuntur, sed de conseruatione necessaria productarum, sicut Auicenna et Algazel superius exponebant. Vnde Augustinus 4. Iuper Genesin ad literam 14. tractans quomodo Deus die 7o ab omni opere requieuit, et quomodo tamen cum hoc, Pater vsque nunc continue operatur, sic dicit; Potest intelligi Deum requieuisse a condendis generibus creaturae; deinceps autem vsque nunc et vltra operari eorundum generum administrationem, quae tunc instituta sunt, non vt saltem die 7o potentia eius a coeli et terrae, omnium que rerum quas condiderat, gubernatione cessaret; alioquin continuo dilaberentur. Creatoris namque potentia, et omnipotentis atque omnia tenentis virtus\n\ncausa subsistendi est omni creaturae, quae si ab eis aliquando cessaret, simul et illorum cessaret species, omnisque creatura concideret. Neque sicut structor aedium, cum fabricauerit, abscedit, at que illo cessante atque abscede•te stat opus eius; Ita Mundus vel ictu oculi stare poterit, si ei Dominus regimen sui subtraxerit. Proinde et quod Dominus ait, Pater meus vsque nunc operatur, continuationem quandam operis eius, qua vniuersam creaturam continet, atque administrat, ostendit, et quod scriptum est de sapientia eius, Pertingit a fine vsque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suauiter, de qua itidem scriptum est, quod motus eius agilior, celeriorque sit omnibus motibus, satis apparet recte intuentibus hunc ipsum incomparabilem et ineffabilem, et si posset intelligi, stabilem motum suum rebus eam praebere suauiter disponendis, quo vtique subtracto, si ab operatione cessauerit, eas continno perituras; et illud quod ait Apostolus, cum Deum Atheniensibus praedicaret, In illo viuimus, et mouemur, et sumus, liquide cognitum, quantum humana mens valet, adiuuat hanc sententiam qua\n\ncredimus et dicimus, Deum in his, quae creauit, indesinenter operari. Neque enim tanquam substantia eius, sic in illo sumus, quemadmodum dictum est, quod habeat vitam in semetipso; sed vti que cum aliud sumus quam ipse, non ob aliud in illo sumus, nisi quia id operatur, et hoc est opus eius quod continet omnia, et quo eius sapientia pertingit a fine vsque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suauiter, per quam dispositionem in illo viuimus et mouemur, et sumus. Vnde colligitur, quod si hoc opus suum rebus subtraxerit, nec viuemus, nec mouebimur, nec erimus. Claret ergo nec vno quidem die cessasse Deum ab opere regendi quae creauit, ne motus suos naturales (quibus aguntur, atque vegetantur, vt omnium naturae sint, et in eo quod sunt, pro suo quaecunque genere maneant) illico amitterent, et esse aliquid omnino desinerent, si eis subtraheretur motus sapientiae Dei quo disponit omnia suauiter: et ab hoc loco 277. propositio sententiarum Prosperi est excerpta. Adhuc autem et Augustinus 9. super Genesin ad literam 23. dicit, quod si Deus subtrahat naturae operationē intimam, qua eam substituit,\n\net facit continuo, tanquam extincta nulla remanebit. Et infra 23. dicit, quod formatio mulieris ex costa illo opere Dei facta est, quod non per Angelos, sed per semetipsum operatus est, et non demisit; sed ita continuantur opera, vt nec vllarum aliarum rerū, nec ipsorum Angelorum natura subsistat, si non operetur. Et super illud Psalmi 118. Manus tuae fecerunt me, sic dicit, Si operatoria Dei potentia rebus subtrahatur, intereunt. Qui et 8. super Genesin ad literam. 19 de Natura et Gratia 26. in sententijs Prosperi 131.285. sententiam similem huic docet. Anselmus quoque de casu diaboli 1. dicit, Quoniam non solum non est alia aliqua essentia nisi illo faciente, sed nec aliquatenus manere potest, quod facta est, nisi eodem ipso seruan•e. Cum ipse desinit seruare quod fecit, quod erat redit in non esse. Lumbardus etiam 1o sentent. dist. 37. recitat quosdam dicentes, Cuncta loca sunt Deo praesentia, et quae in eis sunt, nec in eis aliquid operari cessat; Nam et ipsa loca, et quicquid in eis est, nisi ipse conseruet, manere non possunt. In eis ergo per substantiā Deus esse dicitur, quia per virtutem\n\npropriae substantiae suae facit, vt etiam loca sint, et omnia quae in eis sunt, et hanc istorum Sententiam approbat, et confirmat. Praeterea nulla res habens causam formalem potest existere sine ipsa; sed Deus est omnium prima forma, sicut Suppositiones demonstrant, sicut etiam 2. Metaph. demonstratur; quoniam in causis formalibus non est infinitus processus, sed est omnium vna prima; haec autem est Deus. Duodecimo quoque Metaph. quasi in principio patet idem; Vnde et Auerroes dicit ibi comment. 6. quod et prius dixerat Alexander, quod Deus est omnium prima forma, primum efficiens, et similiter primus finis. Idem quoque Auerroes super de somno et vigilia dicit ita; Cum ista indiuidua habent determinatum esse, necesse est, vt nulla eorum sit intellecta apud abstractam formam, cuius proportio ad illam\n\nest, sicut proportio formae artificij ad artificiatum. Ipsa enim est omnium artifex sap. 7o. Hoc idem et Plotinus affirmat, de quo Augustinus 10. de Ciuit. Dei. 4. scribit ita; De prouidentia certe Plotinus Platonicus disputat, eamque a summo Deo, cuius est inintelligibilis atque ineffabilis pulchritudo vsque ad haec terrena et ima pertingere flosculorum atque foliorum pulchritudine comprobat, quae omnia quasi abiecta, et velocissime pereuntia decentissimos formarum suarum numeros habere non posse confirmat, nisi inde formentur, vbi forma intelligibilis et incommutabilis simul habens omnia perseuerat. Quapropter et Augustinus de Verbo Domini, sermone 38. Verbum, inquit, Dei est forma quaedam, forma non formata, sed forma omnium formatorum sine loco superans omnia, eminens omnibus, et fundamentum quoddam in quo sunt, et fastigium sub quo sunt. Quia enim Deus sub illo sunt omnia; verbum in se manens innouat omnia, ergo est forma omnium rerum, forma infabricata sine tempore, sine spacijs locorum. Qui et 83. quaestionum 23. dicit, quod ipsa similitudo\n\nPatris filius dicitur, cuius participatione similia sunt quaecunque sunt, vel inter se, vel Deo similia; et subdit; Ipsa est enim species prima, qua sunt, vt ita dicam, speciata, et forma qua formata sunt omnia. Chrysostomus etiam super epistolam ad Hebraeos homil. 2. dicit; Filium esse characterem proprium primae formae: quod et testatur Dionysius de diuinis nominibus 11o. superius allegatus. Sanctus etiam Ierotenus, Dionysio 2. de diuinis nominibus recitante, sic scribit; Omnium causa et repletiua Iesu diuinitas, partes vniuersitati consocians, saluans; et neque pars neque totum est, et totum et pars, vt omnem et partem et totum in semetipso coambiens, et supereminens, et excellens, perfecta quidem est in perfectis, vt perfectio principalis; imperfecta vero in imperfectis tanquam superfecta, et ante perfecta forma formit ans in informibus, tanquam forma principalis informis in ipsis formis, tanquam superformis essentia totius essentiae, [et] incontaminatas supergrediens, et superessentialiter omni essentia remota tota principia et ordiens, destinans, et in omni principio et ordine supercollocata,\n\net mensura est eorum quae sunt. Quorum non ignobilis imitator Robertus Lincolniensis Episcopus in quadam Epistola directa Magistro Adae Rufo quaerenti; An Deus esset prima forma omnium, ostendit, quod Deus est forma omnium, et etiam prima forma. Et primo supposito, quod sit forma, probat quod sit necessario prima forma, quia ante ipsum nihil; Ipse enim est primus et nouissimus; deinde probat quod sit forma per autoritates, et similiter rationes. Primam autoritatem allegat ab Augustino 1. De libero arbitrio; et ita est, non connumerato; Vnde malum, scilicet primo libro, sed illo connumerato, sicut ipsemet Augustinus 1. Retract. 9. connumerat, est 2. de libero arbitrio 28. dicit igitur Augustinus; Si quicquid mutabile aspexeris vel sensu corporis, vel animi consideratione capere non potes, nisi aliqua numerorum forma teneatur, qua detracta in nihilum recedat necesse est; Noli dubitare, vbi ista mutabilia non intercipiantur, sed dimensis motibus, et distincta varietate formarum, quasi quosdam versus temporum peragant, esse aliquam formam aeternam et incommutabilem,\n\nquae neque contineatur, et quasi diffundatur locis, neque protendatur atque varietur temporibus, per quam cuncta ista formari valeant, et pro suo genere implere, atque agere locorum atque temporum numeros. Omnis autem res mutabilis etiam formabilis sit necesse est; sicut et mutabile dicimus, quod mutari potest, ita formabile quod formari potest appellauerim. Nulla autem res formare seipsam potest, quia nulla res potest dare sibi quod non habet; et vtique vt habeat formam, formatur aliquid. Quapropter quaelibet res si quam habet formam, non ei opus est accipere quod habet; si quam vero formam non habet, non potest a se accipere quod non habet; nulla ergo res, vt diximus, formare seipsam potest. Conficitut itaque vt corpus et animus, cum sint mutabilia, forma quadam incommutabili et semper manente formentur, cui formae dictum est; Mutabis ea et mutabuntur, tu autem idem ipse es, et anni tui non deficient: annos sine defectu pro aeternitate posuit prophetica locutio: De hac item forma dictum est, quod in se manens innouat omnia. Hinc etiam comprehenditur\n\nomnia prouidentia gubernari: Si enim omnia quae sunt, forma penitus subtracta nulla erunt, forma ipsa incommutabilis, per quam mutabilia cuncta subsistunt, vt formarum suarum numeris impleantur, et agantur; Ipsa est eorum prouidentia: non enim ista essent, si illa non esset, et haec videtur ratio Auicennae et Algazelis tacta superius, qua per ens possibile inuenerunt vnum necesse esse. Ad hoc etiam allegat Augustinus 13. de Confess. talem sermonem dirigentem ad Patrem; quid te promeruerunt spiritualis, corporalisque natura quas fecisti, vt inde penderent etiam inchoata, at que ita penderēt in tuo verbo informata, nisi per idem verbum reuocarentur ad vnitatem tuam, et formarentur, et essent ab vno te summo bono, vniuersa bona valde? Et sequitur, quid te promeruit inchoatio creaturae spiritualis, vt saltem tenebrosa fluitaret similis abysso, tui dissimilis, nisi perverbum tuum conuerteretur ad id a quo facta est atque ab eo illuminata lux fieret, quamuis non aequaliter, tamen conformis formae\n\naequali tibi. Iterumque adducit eundem 2. de Confess. sic loquentem ad Patrem; Stabo atque solidabor in te in forma mea, vita tua. Post haec per quatuor rationes ostendit, quod Deus sit forma ad seipsum, deinde manifestat quomodo Deus est forma creaturarum, et vult quod forma in creaturis inueniatur quadrupliciter; Primo, sicut altera pars compositi, ex qua et materia componitur ipsum totum, et sic Deus non est forma creaturarum; Secundo, dicitur forma, ad cuius similitudinem quid formatur, sicut pes ligneus dicitur forma soleae, quae secundum illum formatur; Tertio, dicitur forma illud per applicationem, ad quod materia ad eius similitudinem figuratur, sicque sigillum est forma cerae, et argilla statuae fusilis. Quarto, similitudo in animo artificis, ad quam respiciens operatur, dicitur forma scilicit talis artificiati, nec multum distat a forma secundi modi, et subdit; Imaginare itaque in mente Architecti formam domus fabricandae ad quam solummodo respicit, vt ad eius imitationem domum faciat, et imaginare cum hoc per impossibile ipsius voluntatem ita potentem,\n\nquod se sola applicet materiam formandam in domum; et imaginare cum his quod materia domus esset fluida, nec posset permanere in forma recepta in se, si separaretur a forma in mente Architecti, sicut aqua figurata sigillo argenteo, separato sigillo, statim amitteret figuram receptam. Imaginare itaque voluntatem artificis applicantem materiam domus ad formam in mente sua, non solum vt sic formetur in domum, sed quamdiu domus manet in esse domus, vt formata in esse seruetur. Eo itaque modo quo forma huiusmodi in mente Architecti esset forma domus, est ars siue sapientia, siue verbum omnipotentis Dei, forma omnium creaturarum; Ipsa enim simul est exemplar efficiens, formans, et in forma data conseruans. Et infra dicit aeternam Dei sapientiam sic esse formam omnium, velut si imagineris figuram sigilli argentei esse vitam et intelligentiam, intelligentem se volentemque figurare ad sui imitationem et similitudinem magis minusue expressam ceram fluidam, non potentem per se permanere in aliqua figuratione recepta, ipsaque hac sola voluntate informem et fluidam ceram\n\nad se moueret, sibique applicaret, et sic suam similitudinem aliquantam imprimeret, et impressam seruaret; sic aeterna Patris sapientia est forma omnium. Haec Robertus Lincolniensis Grosse teste, sed subtilis ingenij et acuti. Hoc idem expresse testatur Aristoteles in De Mundo 11. ita dicens, Nulla natura sibi per se sufficit priuata salute, quae ex eo, scilicet Deo. Quamobrem et quidam Antiquorum moti sunt ad dicendum quod haec omnia plena sunt Dijs. Vnde et Virgilius in Bucolicis ecloga 3a. A Ioue principium, Musae, Iouis omnia plena. et Ieremiae 23. Caelum et terram ego implebo, seu aliter impleo, ait Dominus; et sequitur in De mundo, vt virtus, quae residet in Caelo et plurimum distantibus, de vno loquendo, (in alia translatione, in vno dicere) omnibus fiat causa salutifera, iste est omnipotens sermo suus, qui de Caelo a regalibus sedibus venit sapient 18. qui sanat omnia, supra 16. Vnde et Apostolus ad Hebraeos 1. portans omnia verbo virtutis suae. Nonne et ista de causa, Hermes dicit Deum esse quodammodo omnia, et nominibus omnium nominari, sicut Autoritas eius de Verbo\n\naeterno 38. allegata superius partim docet? Nonne et supra, eiusdem 31. dicit, quod Pater omnium vel Dominus, et is qui solus est omnia, omnibus se libenter ostendit? et supra 22. inquirens nomen Dei sic ait; Non spero totius maiestatis effectorem, omniumque rerum Patrem vel Dominum, vno posse quamuis e multis composito, nuncupari nomine, hunc vero in nomine, vel potius omnium nomine; si quidem is sit vnus et omnia, vt sit necesse aut omnia eius nomine, aut ipsum omnium nominibus nuncupari. Cui et concordanter Philosophus in de Mundo vltimo agens de diuinis nominibus, ita scribit; Cumque sit vnus, multinomius est, nominatus ab omnibus passionibus quas innouat ipse, et hoc extenso quasi per singula inductiue, in fine dicit, quod nuncupatur Saluator et Eleutherius (in alia translatione liberator) et in summa loquendo, caelestis et terrestris appellandum a qualibet natura, et fortuna, velut ens ipse omnium causa; propter quod non male dicitur in Orphicis, Iupiter fundum terrae et caeli, Iupiter radix ponti, Iupiter sol et luna, Iupiter rex, Iupiter princeps omnium.\n\nQuare et Lucanus, Iupiter est quodcunque vides.— An forte et hoc est quod Deus sciscitanti Moysi nomen eius, velate respondit, Ego sum qui sum, sic dices filijs Israel, Qui est, misit me ad vos. Exod. 3. quasi velit innuere se esse seipsum simpliciter per seipsum, et se etiam esse quodammodo totum ens, essentificando videlicet alia vniuersa. Quare et Dionysius de diuinis nominibus 1. ostendens summam vnitatem et diuinitatem esse innominatam et tamen nominibus omnium nominatam, sic ait Scientes Theologi tanquam innominabilem eam laudant, et ex omni nomine innominabilem, et cum aiunt Diuinitatem ipsam in vna mysticarū symbolicae diuinae manifestationis visionū increpasse dicentē quod nomen tui? et sicut ab omni eum denominatiua scientia reducens, dicere, vt quid interrogas nomen\n\nmeum? et hoc est mirabile, aut nonne hoc vere est mitabile nomen quod est super omne nomē quod innominabile est? Multiuocā vero, vt cum eam iterum introducūt dicentem, Ego sum on (id est, ens) vita, lux, Deus, veritas, et cum ipsi omnium causalem Theosophi multiuoce ex omnibus causatiuis laudant, vt optimum, vt existentem, vt saeculorum causalem, vt vitae largitorem, vt virtutem, vt Dominum dominorum, vt Regem regnantium, vt Antiquum dierum, vt non senescentem, vt immutabilem, vt salutem. Atqui et in animis eum esse aiunt, et in animabus, et in corporibus, et in coelo, et in terra, et simul in eodem, eundem immundanum, circa mundanum, super mundanum, super coelestem, super essentialem, solem, stellam, ignem, aquam, spiritum, roris nebulam, per seipsum lapidem et petram, omnia quae sunt, et nihil horum quae sunt. Sic igitur omnium causae et supereminenti et innominabili adunabunt, et omnia, eorum quae sunt, nomina, vt diligenter sit vniuersorum regnum, et circa ea quae sunt omnia, et ab ea vt causa, vt principio, vt fine dependentia. Ecce hic innuit euidenter\n\nDeum esse triplicem causam rerum, formalem, efficientem, finalem: Et sequitur, et ipsa secundum eloquium sit omnia in omnibus; et vere laudatur omnium substantia inchoatiua, et consummatiua, et continens. Vbi Glossa Omnia, inquit, quae sunt, est Deus, eo quod ex ipso sunt omnia; nihil eorum quae sunt, quia creatus non est. Et infra 5. Op•mi diuina nominatio totas omnium causales processiones manifestans, et in existentia et non existentia ex•enditur, et supra existentia, et super non existentia est; vbi Glossa, Processionem autem dicit diuinam operationem per quam omnia ad effectum procedunt. Deus insuper apud Hermetem de Verbo aeterno 22. et 31. Pater omnium nominatur; Pater autem teste Papia in Elementario suo Graecum est, id est, genitor dictus a pantater graeco quod est omnia seruans: Quare et Hermes, sicut superius tangitur, dicit de Deo, quod est Pater omnium vel Dominus omnium, vel is qui solus est omnia, omnia scilicet essentificans producendo, et similiter conseruando, sicut causa efficiens omnium et formalis. Hanc eandem sententiam videtur Hermes\n\ndocere de Verbo aeterno 1. vbi loquens de plenitudine omnium bonorum, quasi se corrigendo subiungit; si tamen multa sunt bona, et non vnum in quo sunt omnia: alterum enim alterius consentancum esse dignoscitur, omnia vnius esse, aut vnum esse omnia; Ita enim sibi esse vtrumque connexum, vt separari alterum ab vtroque non possit. Cui et Aristoteles concordanter in De mundo 12. per exemplum elegans idem confirmat, Ferunt, inquiens, sculptorem Phidiam Mineruam (in alia translatione, Palladem) in medio cuiusdam scuti infigurasse, et impressisse suam faciem, et connexuisse statuae quodā occulto artificio, vt necessario si quis velit eam auferre, totam statuam dissiparet, et confringeret. Talem gerit rationem Deus ad Mundum, continens omnium harmoniam et salutem. Vnde et Auicenna 8. Metaphys. 6. Omnes res perit, nisi secundum quod est versus faciem eius, et ideo dignius est, vt ipse sit necesse esse, et veritas, et intentio pura: Quibus et consentit 103. Psalmus, dicens; Aperiente te manum tuam omnia implebuntur bonitate; auertente autem te faciem turbabuntur; auferes\n\nspiritum eorum et deficient, et in puluerem suum reuertentur, in nihilum scilicet redigentur. Annon et ista de causa quidam posuerunt Deum Animam mundi esse? quanquam Plato 1. Timae. 2. et 6. videatur astruere, Animam mundi esse productam a Deo, et in medio Mundi sitam. Vnde et Themistius recitante Auerroe super 12. Metaphys. comment. 19. loquens de Animalibus ex putredine generatis, et de industria et intentione naturae, sic ait: Non est mirum, quamuis natura non intelligente aliquid de huiusmodi, et tamen facit hoc inducendo aliquam intentionem, et hoc demonstrat, quod aliquid rememorat ipsam de causis nobilibus, vt anima quae est in terra, de qua Plato dicit, quod sit ex dijs secundis. Sed istud dictum Themistij reprobat Auerroes consequenter, et dicit quod animalia talia generantur ex calore coelesti debite mensurato: Et subdit, Et ista mensura prouenit ab arte diuina intellectuali, quae est similis vni formae vnius artis principalis, sub qua sunt artes plures. Secundum hoc igitur est intelligendum, quod natura facit aliquid perfecte et ordinate, quamuis non intelligat,\n\nquasi esset rememorata ex virtutibus agentibus nobilioribus eis quae dicuntur intelligentiae; et ideo dicitur quod omnes proportiones et formae, quae sunt in potentia in prima materia, sunt in actu in primo motore, et assimilantur aliquo modo esse eius quod fit in anima Artificis. Annon et Auicen. 4. de anima 4. dicit, quod est vna anima communis Coeli et Mundi, cuius operatio est ad naturam totius? Haec autem anima secundum quosdam est Deus, secundum quosdam vero nata, seu producta a Deo; quorum sententiae non repugnant ad inuicem, neque Catholicae veritati. Haec enim Anima potest intelligi ratio, seu voluntas, verbum, seu velle Dei, qua seu quo efficit res et seruat, quae nequaquam a Deo essentialiter differunt, sed sunt Deus per vigesimam sextam partem corollarij primi huius. Vnde et Aristoteles in De Mundo 11. dicit, quod Deus in vno dicere, seu loquendo sit omnibus causa salutis, sicut superius recitatur. Et infra 14. tractans, quomodo Deus producit res,\n\nsic ait, Emisit ex almo corde operans cogitata; in alia translatione ex magno animo. Cui et Hermes concordans de Mundo, et Coelo 1. docet, quod tria sunt rerum principia, Causa scilicet, Ratio, et Natura. Per causam vero intelligit primam causam simpliciter penitus non causatam, scilicet Deum Patrem, qui primo causat rationem procedentem ab eo, scilicet filium et per ipsum vniuersam naturam. Quod etiam Pater causet filium et sit causa eius aeterna, Augustinus et Chrysostomus attestantur; Quare et Hermes vbi prius, Ratio, inquit, ex causa, et ex vtroque natura; Et infra, ratio est vis quaedam a causa procedens, a principio cuncta ordinans; vbi et accipit ista tria, Ratio, Nous, et mens diuina indifferenter, et quasi synonome pro eodem. Dicit enim quod Nous, de qua natura qualitates naturales rebus inserens qualificans dicitur; Et infra dicit, quod mens diuina sine vlla fatigatione mundum et omnia quae intra eum sunt non desinit sustentate, sicut superius plenius tecitatur. Vnde et Papias in Elementario suo ait, Nous voluntas Dei, vel mens quae prouidentia\n\ndicitur. Est autem intelligibilis essentia aemulae bonitatis, propter indefessam ad summum Deum conuertionem, Noun id est verbum Dei continens originales rerum species. Nonne et huic sententiae consonat illud Platonicum, quod Augustinus 7. Confess. 9. in libris Platonicis de Graeco in Latinum translatis, recitat se legisse, licet non sub his verbis, tamen hoc idem omnino. In principio erat verbum, et verbum erat apud Deum, et Deus erat verbum, hoc erat in principio apud Deum, omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil quod factum est, In ipso vita erat. Et quis Catholicus nesciat hoc esse initium sancti Euangelij secundum Iohannem, eisdem sententijs at que verbis? quare et Augustinus 10. de Ciuit. Dei 29. Pudet, inquit, doctos homines, ex discipulis Platonis fieri discipulos Christi, qui piscatorem suo spiritu docuit sapere ac dicere, In principio erat verbum, etc. superius recitata; et subdit, Quod initium sancti Euangelij, cui nomen est secundum Iohannem; Quidam Platonicus, sicut a sancto Simpliciano, qui postea Mediolanensi Ecclesiae praesedit Episcopus, solebamus\n\naudire, aureis literis conscribendum, et per omnes Ecclesias in locis eminentissimis proponendum esse dicebat: sed ideo viluit superbis Deus ille magister, quia verbum caro factum est, et habitauit in nobis. Verum quia causa rationalis per solam rationem non agit sine concomitantia voluntatis, ijdem Philosophi studiosius meditantes, Deo causae primae, seu Deo Patri et rationi eius menti seu verbo voluntatem insuper adiunxerunt; voluntas autem teste Augustino 15. de Trinit. 20. secundum quandam appropriationem Spiritui Sancto dignoscitur pertinere. Vnde idem Hermes de verbo aeterno 22. loquens de Deo Patre omnium ita dicit; Hic solus vt omnia vtra que sexus foecunditate plenissimus, semper voluntatis praegnans suae, parit semper quicquid voluerit procreare: Voluntas eius est bonitas omnis: Haec eadem bonitas omnium rerum est ex diuinitate eius nata. Et infra 23. Ego inquit, et sensum, et naturam et mundum dico continere in se naturam, et nata omnia conseruare: Procreatione enim vrerque plenus est sexus, et eius vtrius que connexio, aut quod est verius, vnitas comprehensibilis\n\nest; quem siue Cupidinem, siue Venerem, siue vtrumque recte poteris nuncupare. Hoc igitur omni vero verius, manifestius que mente percipito, quod ex illo totius naturae Deo hoc sit cunctis in aeternum procreandi inuentum, tributum que ministerium, cui summa Charitas, laetitiae hilaritas, cupiditas, amorque diuinus innatus est. Charitas autem cupiditas, at que amor sunt proprie voluntatis, quae et teste Augustino 15. de Trin. 17. et 20. Spiritui Sancto quodammodo proprie tribuuntur. Quare et Plato 1. Timae. 1. voluntatem, inquit, Dei originem esse omnium rerum certissimam si quis ponat, recte cum putare consentiam. Hanc autem voluntatem diuinam Spiritui Sancto aptam, et idem Hermes videtur quando que Spiritum nominare. De verbo nam que aeterno 15. De his, inquit, huc vsque tractatur; de Spiritu vero et his similibus hinc sumatur exordium. Fuit Deus et hyle quem Graece credimus mundum, mundo comitabatur Spiritus, vel inerat mundo Spiritus, sed non similiter vt Deo, nec Deo de quibus mundus idcirco non erant, quando non erant, sed in eo iam tunc erant, vnde nasci habuerunt.\n\nPan autem vel mundi natura est Spiritus, quamuis nata videatur, a principio tamen in se nascendi, procreandi que vim possidet, atque naturam foecunditatis. Etenim initium in qualitate naturae est. quae et conceptus, et partus in se possidet vim atque materiam. Haec ita que sine alteno conceptu est solo generabilis. Et infra 18. Spiritu ministrantur omnia et vegetantur in mundo, qui quasi organum vel machina summi Dei voluntati subiectus est. Spiritu agitantur, siue gubernantur omnes in mundo species, vnaquae que secundum suam naturam sibi a Deo distributam. Pan autem mundus est receptaculum, omnium que agitatio, at que frequentatio, quorum Deus gubernator, dispensans omnibus, quantum rebus mundanis vnicui que necessarium: Spiritu vero implet omnia, vt cuius que naturae qualitas est. Nonne et hoc est, quod sapiens\n\nprotestatur, Spiritus, inquiens, Domini repleuit orbem terrarum, et hoc quod continet omnia Sap. 1. Adhuc autem et idem Hermes de verbo aeterno 28. Dei, inquit, natura consilium est voluntatis, bonitas summa, voluntas consilio nascitur, et ea vult quae habet; vult autem omnia bona, et habet omnia quae vult; omnia autem bona et cogitat et vult, hoc autem est Deus; eius imago mundus boni. Nonne et sententiam istam fulcit illa prima 24. definitionum totidem Philosophorum de Deo, Deus est monas, monadem gignens, se vnum reflectens ad ardorem; et septima, quae sic ait, Deus est principium sine principio, processus sine variatione, finis sine fine? Istam quoque sententiam et Porphyrius Philosophus, Platonis non Christi discipulus planius attestatur, quem alloquens Augustinus. 10. de Ciuit. Dei. 29. sic ait, Praedicas Patrem et eius filium, quem vocas paternum Intellectum seu mentem, et horum medium quem putamus te dicere spiritum sanctum, et more vestro appellas tres Deos; et supra. 28. differens cum eodem, Ignorantiam, inquit, et propter eam multa vitia per nullas teletas purgari dicis, sed per solum patricum noun, id\n\nest paternam mentem, siue intellectum, qui paternae est conscius voluntatis; hunc autem Christum esse non credis. Hic autem nous, mens, ratio, voluntas diuina, seu spiritus videtur non incongrue appellari Anima mundi et vita. Vnde et Hermes de Verbo aeterno. 2. Licet Omnium multiformi imaginum aequalitate variata, et infinitate qualitatum, ex interuallo species esse noscantur, adunatae tamen ad hoc, vt totum vnum, ex vno omnia esse videantur; Totus itaque quibus est formatus Mundus vnus, Anima vna, et Deus vnus. Et infra vlt: O vitae vera vita, o nostrarum omnium faecunda praegnatio; cognouimus te totius naturae tuo conceptu plenissime, cognouimus te aeterna perseueratio. Cui et concordanter Philosophus in De Mundo vlt. agens de diuinis Nominibus, Vocamus, inquit, eum Iouem, et Zena, vtentes parallele Nominibus, Zena dicentes a ⟨gap: ⟩ graeco quod est viuere, quasi diceremus, per quem viuimus, Iupiter spiritus omnium, Iupiter indetessi ignis motus. Refert etiam Iosephus. 12. Antiquit. Iudaicae 2. quod Aristaeus Graecus dixit Prolomeo Philadelpho Regi Aegypti, Cognoui\n\nIudaeos factorem omnium Deum colere, quem nos Zena, id est, Iouem nominamus, quod omnibus indulget ⟨gap: ⟩ , id est, viuere. Huic et consonat Albricius de origine Deorum, siue in Poetario suo, dicens Deum vocari Vitunetum, quia vitam praestat; Sentinum, quia sensum, sicut circa 21. partem corollarij primi huius plenius allegatur. Vnde et Seruius ille vetus nec ignobilis commentator, super illud Bucol. Virgilij ecloga 3a.—Iouis omnia plena; allegat simile a Lucano dicente, Iupiter est quodcunque vides, quocunque moueris; et addit quod alibi idem dicit; Spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per artus / Mens agitat molem: / Cuius causam reddit ibi Seruius, ita dicens, Ipse enim est spiritus sine quo nihil mouetur aut regitur. Quibus et concorditer Ouidius de Fastis lib. 6o sic dicit;\n\nEst Deus in nobis, agitante calescimus illo, / Impetus hic sacrae semina mentis habet. /\n\nNonne et hoc est quod Apostolus disputans cum Atheniensibus de Deo, allegat a Poetis et docet, cum ait, In ipso viuimus, mouemur, et sumus, sicut et quidam vestrorum Poerarum dixerunt Act. 17. Nullus igitur quaeso mihi succenseat, si allegem quandoque licet rarissime aliquos Poetarum, ex quo constat sanctum Dei Apostolum hoc fecisse, sic que beatus Ieronymus epistola. 58. ad Magnum Senatorem vrbis Romae obijcientem Ieronymo, quod candorem Ecclesiae sordibus pollueret Ethnicorum, eo quod scriptis suis inseruit carmina Poetarum per Apostolum se excusat dicens, quoniam et Poetas Apostolus allegauit, dicitque quod ille quem allegat hoc loco, fuit Aratus Greaeus Poeta. Arator quoque subdiaconus sanctae Romanae Ecclesiae lib. 2o super Actus Apostolorum, metrificans istum locum, sic ait: Sacrilegae nouitatis Amor! vos cernimus Aram /\n\nIgnoto posuisse Deo, qui condidit Astra, / Qui pelagus, terrasque dedit, quem vita parentem / Vt moueamur, habet, cuius spiramus ab igne, / Cuius imago sumus, de quo cecinere Poetae, / Hinc hominum constare genus; quem praedico, cuncta / Sanxit ab ore suo. / Istam quoque sententiam roborat Augustinus, tractans istam Autoritatem Apostoli. 4. super Genesin. 14. superius recitatus. Vnde et Dionysius de diuinis Nominibus. 6. Laudanda est, inquit, laudabilis vita aeterna, ex qua per seipsam vita, et omnis vita, et a qua in omnia vtcunque vitam participantia viuere proprie vnicuique exseminatur. Igitur et immortalium Angelorum vita et immortalitas, et imperdibile ipsum Angelicae semper motionis ex ipsa, et per\n\nipsam est, vt subsistit; Idcirco et viuentes semper, et immortales dicuntur, et non immortales iterum, quia non a seipsis habent immortaliter esse, et aeternaliter viuere, sed ex viuifica et totius vitae factrice, et continuatrice causa; et sicut in onte, id est, in ente dicimus, quia et eiusdem esse est causalis; sic et ibi iterum, quia et per seipsam vitae est diuina vita vitalis et substantialis et omnis vita, et vitalis motus ex ipsa vita, quae est super omnem vitam, et omne principium totius vitae: ex ipsa et Animae imperdibile habent, et Animalia omnia et germina secundum nouissimam consonantiam animae habent viuere; qua ablata iuxta eloquium deficit vita omnis, et ad terram et deficientia, ad participandum cam infirmitate iterum conuersa, iterum Animalia fiunt, et donatur quidem primo, et per seipsam vitae esse vitam, et omni vitae, et ab ea per singula esse proprie, singula aestimatur natura subsistere. Qui adhuc supra 1. dicit quod Deus est omnium causa et principium, et essentia, et vita; Et infra, eodem, loquens de Deo sic scribit; Optima traditio et simpliciter dicendum viuentium\n\nvita et eorum quae sunt essentia, omnis vitae et essentiae principium, et causa, per suam vt sint quae sunt, actiuam et continentem bonitatem; hoc a diuinis eloquijs didicimus, et omnem sic dicere sacram Theologorum hymnologiam inuenies. Amplius autem omnia essentialiter participantia aliquo necessario, egent eo: Sed omnia entia citra primum non sunt essentialiter et pure simpliciter per seipsa secundum quod participant primo ente, quod est pure essentialiter per seipsum; Hoc autem totum apparet ex habitudine principiorum et principiatorum, causarum et causatorum, per se et per aliud entium, magis et minus entium; quod et quamplures Autores Philosophici, et Theologici creberrime contestantur. Hoc enim quasi quaedam regula generalis solet tam a Logicis quam a Philosophis obseruari, quod nullus nescit considerans scripta veterum diligenter. Supponunt enim creberrime quod omne quod dicitur aliquale, vel dicitur tale per essentiam, et tunc est vnicum, vel secundum participationem; et quotcunque participantia fuerint, participatum ab omnibus erit vnum;\n\nquam etiam regulam Theologi amplectuntur. Vnde venerabilis Anselmus Cantuariensis Archiepiscopus Monolog. 1. ostendens quod sit aliquod primum et omnium summum bonum, sic dicit; Certissimum quidem et omnibus est volentibus aduertere perspicuum, quia quaecunque dicuntur aliquid, ita vt ad inuicem magis vel minus, aut aequaliter dicantur, per aliquid dicuntur quod non aliud et aliud, sed idem intelligitur in diuersis, siue in illis aequaliter, siue inaequaliter consideretur: Nam quaecunque iusta dicuntur ad inuicem, siue pariter, siue magis vel minus, non possunt intelligi iusta nisi per iustitiam, quae non est aliud et aliud in diuersis. Et idem dicit de omnibus bonis diuersis, quod sunt bona per aliquod vnum bonum existens idem in diuersis, et quod ipsum solum est bonum per seipsum; et nullum aliud bonum est illi aequale vel maius, quare ipsum est summum. Eundem quoque processum facit, capit 2. de Magno, et cap. 3. de ente seu esse, vbi sic ait; Omne quod est, aut est per aliquid, aut per nihil; sed nihil est per nihil: Non enim vel cogitari potest, vt sit aliquid non\n\nper aliquid; quicquid est igitur non nisi per aliquid est: quod cum ita sit, aut est vnum, aut sunt plura, per quae sunt cuncta quae sunt: Sed si sunt plura, aut ipsa referuntur ad vnum aliquid per quod sunt, aut eadē plura singula sunt per se, aut ipsa per se inuicem sunt. At si plura ipsa sunt per vnum, iam nō suntomnia per plura, sed potius per id vnū, per quod haec plura sunt: Si vero ipsa plura singula sunt per se, vti que est vna aliqua vis vel natura existendi per se quam habent vt per se sint; Non est autem dubium, quod per ipsum vnum sunt, per quod habent vt sint perse. Verius ergo per ipsum vnum cuncta sunt, quā per plura, quia sine eo vno esse non possunt: Vt vero plura per se inuicem sint, nulla patitur ratio, quoniā irrationabilis cogitatio est, vt aliqua res sit per illud, cui dat esse. Similem quoque processum facit Auicenna 1. Metaphys. et 8. et Algazel 2. Metaphys. et Anselmus de veritate vlt. de rectitudine et veritate similiter. Quod et vult Augustinus 8. de Trinit. 4. vbi ex multis bonis inferioribus arguit vnum omnium summum bonum, et multis bonis numeratis dicit, quid plura, et plura, bonum hoc, et bonum illud?\n\ntolle hoc et tolle illud, et vide ipsum bonum si potes; ita Deum videbis, non alio bono bonum, sed bonum omnis boni. Et infra, eodem, Non essent, inquit, mutabilia bona, nisi esset incommutabile bonum. Cum itaque audis bonum hoc et bonum illud, quae possunt alias dici etiam non bona, si potueris, sine illis, quae participatione boni bona sunt, perspicere ipsum bonum, cuius participatione boni bona sunt; simul enim et ipsum intelligis, cum audis hoc aut illud bonum. Si ergo potueris illis detractis per seipsum prospicere, bonum, perspexeris bonum Deum. Et 8. de Ciuit. Dei 6. Cum in conspectu Philosophorum corpus et animus, magis minusque speciosa essent, viderunt esse aliquid, vbi esset prima et incommutabilis species, et ideo nec comparabilis; atque ibi esse rerum principium, rectissime crediderunt. Aristoteles\n\nquo que 4. Metaph. 18. ex hoc quod aliqua sunt minus, et magis falsa, et vera quam alia, probat esse vnum verum simpliciter; quem et Anselmus Monolog. 4. rectissime imitatur. Et hoc idem sentit Augustinus alijs locis multis. Istam quo que sententiam Dionysius de diuinis nominibus multis capitulis, Boetius de Hebdomadibus, et alij Autores quamplurimi locis quamplurimis profitentur, sicut et praemissa hic et primo huius aliquantulum attestantur. Adhuc autem Esse inest materiae, formae, et cōposito, substantiae, et accidenti, et non primo simpliciter, vel non aeque primo, nec aequaliter inest illis; ergo alicui vni primo et maxime, per quod existens in caeteris ipsis inest: hoc autem poni non potest, nisi illud quod primo et per se est, hoc autem est Deus: hoc autem totum clare ostendunt praemissa in proxima ratione: Vnde et Philosophus 2. de Anima 68. ait; Non enim aqua secundum quod aqua, neque aēr secundum quod aer diaphanum est, sed quoniam natura eadem est in his vtrisque; et in perpetuo superius corpore, scilicet Coelo. Vbi Auerroes, Non secundum quod aer etc. id est,\n\nquia diaphaneitas non est in sola aqua aut aere, sed in corpore coelesti, fuit necesse vt diaphaneitas non sit in aliquo eorum, secundum quod est illud quod est, sed secundum naturam communem existentem in omnibus, licet non habeat nomen. Hoc idem confirmari videtur per eundem Philosophum 1. Poster. 4. et 5. et 2. Post. 4. et 5. docentem quod quaecunque passio inest multis diuersis, habet aliquod vnum subiectum seu causam cui primo inest, et per ipsum, seu ipsam caeteris quibus inest, sicut est habere tres angulos duobus rectis, habere cornua, contrarius seu contrarij status, folia fluere, commutatim proportionale, et hoc ostendit de alijs vniuersis, siue fuerint substantialia siue accidentalia, siue vniuoca, siue analoga, siue aequiuoca, quod totum Robertus Lincolniensis magis dilucidat exponendo. Dicetur fortassis quod illa causa diuersorum in diuersis est vna genere, vel specie, numero autem nequaquam; sed si causae multae numeraliter differentes sint similes in natura, et nomine, vel quaelibet illarum est talis per se, primo, et essentialiter, vel per aliud secundario, et participatiue etc. sicut\n\nsupra in proxima ratione. Alij forte dicent, quod illa causa vna diuersorum in diuersis est\n\nvniuersale: Sed si vniuersale sit aliquid citra Deum, videtur quod aliud vniuersale hominum, aliud Asinorum, et alia aliorum; vniuersalia ergo illa sunt multa conuenientia in natura et nomine etc. sicut contra responsionem priorem. Hoc tamen non improbabiliter ponitur, si per vniuersale intelligatur aliqua ratio vniuersalis, seu virtus diuina omnium talium vnitiua. Vnde Psalmo 32o spiritu oris eius omnis virtus eorum, et Aristoteles in de Mundo 10. totam terram, et Mare, aetherem, atque Solem et Lunam, et totum coelum decorauit vna, quae per omnia transit, virtus. Haec autem virtus omnium vnitiua est rerum, Deus, tenax vigor, et illa vnitas principalis quam laudum carmine hymindece deprecamur, cuius principalitatem ostendit Boetius 1. Arithmeticae 6o. cuius titulus de principalitate vnitatis praescribitur. Vnde et Auicebrol. in libro quem nominat fontem vitae, et est 35. capit. quinti libri, sic dicit; Omnia omnino diuersa et diuisa, tam in superioribus, quam in inferioribus, scilicet indiuidua,\n\nspecies, genera, differentiae, propria, et accidentia, ac omnino opposita et contraria mouentur ad coniunctionem, et desiderant conuenientiam, et inquirunt vnitionem, quia quamuis sint diuisa, coniuncta sunt; et quamus diuersa, conuenientia sunt in aliquo, quod ea retineat, et coniungat, et conuenire faciat, et radix omnis in hoc est hoc, quod vnitas vincit omnia, et est diffusa in omnibus, et retentrix omnium. Cui et concordans Proclus Philosophus, propositione prima sic dicit; Omnis multitudo participat aliqualiter vno; et propositione decima quarta: Omne bonum vnitiuum est participantium ipso, et omnis vnitio bonum est, et bonum vni idem. Istam insuper vnitatem omnium vnitiuam testatur dictum Hermetis de Verbo aeterno 2. superius recitatum; qui et infra 14. loquens de coelestibus, terrestribus, et medijs; Horum, inquit, omnium effectus naturamque cognoscens, miretur, adoret, atque collaudet artem mentemque diuinam; Musicen vero nosse nihil aliud esse, nisi iunctarum omnium rerum ordinem scire quid quaeque sit diuina ratione sortita;\n\nOrdo enim rerum singularum in vnum, omnium artificis ratione collata, concentum quendam diuino melo dulcissimum, verissimumque conficiet. Dionysius insuper de diuinis nominibus. 1. In omni, inquit, fere actione Theologica, thearchiam videmus diuinitus laudatam, et monadem quidem et vnum propter simplicitatem et vnitatem supernaturalis impartibilitatis, ex qua vt viuifica virtute vnimur, et partitis nostris alteritatibus supermundane complicatis in deiformem Monadem congregamur. Et infra 5. dicit, quod ipsum per seipsum esse est existenuum principium, et existentia omnia, et quae vtcun que ab esse continentur, et hoc immensurate, et conuolute, et vnite. Etenim in monade omnis numerus ante subsistit, et habet omnem numerum Monas in semetipsa singulariter, et omnis numerus vnitur quidem in Monade, quantum autem a Monade prouenit, tantum discernitur, et multiplicatur; et in centro omnes circuli lineae secundum primam vnitatem constitutae sunt, et omnes habet signum\n\nin semetipso simplas vniformiter vnitas ad se inuicem, et ad vnum principium ex quo procedebant; et in ipso quidem centro vniuersaliter adunantur, breuiter autem eo distantes breuiter et discernuntur, magis autem recedentes, magis, et simpliciter quantum centro proximiores sunt, tantum et ipsi, et sibi inuicem adunantur, et quantum eo, tantum a se inuicem distant; sed et in toto omnium naturae omnes secundum singula naturae rationes convolutae sunt, per vnam inconfusam vnitatem. Et adhuc inferius vlt. agens de vno, quomodo scilicet Deo vnum conueniat, ita scribit, Vnum vero quia omnia vniuersaliter est per vnius vnitatis excellentiam, et omnium est vnius irreuersibiliter causalis: Nullum enim existentium est non participans vnius; sed sicut similis omnis numerus monada participat, et vnum, duo, et decem dicitur, et semis, et vnum, et tertium, et decimum vnum et multitudinem terminat, sic omnia et vnum omnium pars participant, et essendo vnum omnia sunt existentia, et non est omnium causa vnum multis vnum, sed ante omne vnum. Neque enim\n\nest multitudo non participans quid vnius, et nihil existentium quod participat, vel, quid vnius deorsum omnia singulariter omnia, et toto omnia et opposita, et vniuersaliter cōprehendentis; et quidem sine vno non erit multitudo, sine autem multitudine erit vnum, sicut et monas ante omnem numerum multiplicatum, et si omnibus omnia vnita quis posuerit, omnia erunt toto vnum. Sed ita que et hoc cognoscendum, quia secundum vnum vniuscujus que praecogitata est species, vnire dicitur vnita, et omnium est vnum exemplar, et si interimas vnum, ne que vniuersitas, ne que aliquid aliud existentium erit. Omnia enim in seipso vnum vniformiter praeambit, et circumpraehendit: Ipsa igitur Theologia totam Thearchiam. Boetius quo que 3a. de Consolatione Philosophiae, prosa 11a. probat per singula genera entium inductiue, quod omnia desiderant vnitatem. Dicit igitur concludendo: Omnia igitur vnum desiderant, sed vnum ipsum monstrauimus esse quod bonum est; Cuncta igitur bonum petunt, quod quidem ita describas, quod desideratur ab omnibus. Nam vel ad nihilum cuncta\n\nreferuntur, et vno veluti vertice destituta sine rectore fluitabunt; aut si quid est ad quod vniuersa festinant, id erit omnium summum bonorum. Et quot sunt multitudines sic vnitae, tot tales vnitates multitudinum vnitiuae virtu, liter sunt in Deo: ex quibus quidem exemplaris et archetypus numerus, in ista simplicissima vnitate miro modo colligitur, quo caetera numerata format, numerat, et disponit, et hic est mundus ille intelligibilis, et archetypus Hermetis et Platonis, de quo 40a. pars corollarij primi tangit. Vnde Boetius 1. Arithmeticae suae 1. Omnia quaecun que a primaeua rerum natura constructa sunt, numerorum videntur ratione formata; Hoc enim fuit principale in animo conditoris exemplar. Hinc enim 4. Elementorum multitudo mutuata est, hinc temporum vices, hinc motus astrorum, coeli que conuersio, et supra eodem prolog. 2. plenissime vult hoc idem. Hoc autem lucidum dictum Boetij videtur sumi ex verbis obscuris primae partis Timaei Platonis, cap. 1. quod Chalcidius in commentario suo primo, De genitura Mundi intitulat: Vnde Eustratius super 1. Eth. 6. comment.\n\n48. dicit, quod vniuersalia exemplaria, et ideae apud Platonem sunt quidem numerus diuinus, per quem velut per exemplum conditor operatur materialem factionem, et hanc sententiam Platonis contra Aristotelem approbat, et defendit; imo forte Platonem in ista sententia noluit Aristoteles reprobare. Ideoque dicit Eustratius, Aristoteles forte noluit obsistere Platoni, sed illis qui secundum quod non oportet dicta illius recipiunt. Quibus et concordat Sapiens dicens Deo: Omnia in mensura, numero, et pondere disposuisti, Sapient. 11. Quem numerum constat non esse aliquam creaturam, sed illum sapientiae spiritum multiplicem vnicum et subtilem Sapient. 7. imo et ipsammet sapientiam, in qua omnia erant facta, Psalmo 103. Vnde Augustinus 2. de libero arbitrio 19. Sapientia absit quod in comparatione numeri inferior inueniatur, cum eadem sit; et 4. super Genesin ad literam 5. exponens Autoritatem Sapientis adductam sic dicit, Secundum id quod mensura omni rei modum praefigit, et numerus omni rei speciem praebet, et pondus omnem rem ad quietem et\n\nstabilitatem trahit, ille primitus, et veraciter, et singulariter iste est, qui terminat, format, et ordinat omnia, et infra eodem 6. Numerus sine numero est quo formantur omnia, nec formatur ipse. Hujusmodi autem numeri vnitates propriae sunt rationes in mente diuina omnium creattices, nutrices, et continuae seruatrices; et haec forsan sunt vniuersalia, quae plurimi veterum somniabant, sed paucissimi haec videbant: Quare et hanc sententiam velut altissimam in prologo in Vniuersalia conuoluit Porphyrius, non euoluit; quae tamen sententia patet ex prioribus euidenter, vnde et Eustrathius vbi prius dicit, quod Vniuersalia exemplaria, seu ideae sunt rationes conditrices, et velut notationes facientis. Robertus quo que Lincolniensis super 1. Post. 7. dicit, quod Vniuersalia sunt cognitiones rerū creandarū, quae fuerunt\n\nin prima causa aeternaliter, et sunt rationes earum et causae formales, et exemplares, et ipsae sunt etiam creatrices; et hae sunt quas vocauit Plato ideas et mundum Archetypum; et hae sunt secundum ipsum genera, et species, et principia tam essendi, quam cognoscendi. Et hoc idem sentit Augustinus. 83. quaestionum 46. in epistola ad Nebridium manifeste. Item si vniuersalia ponantur in intellectu, vt videtur Auerroem, Boetiū, et alios multos velle, in quo Intellectu dignius ponerentur quam in primo, summo, et dignissimo omnium, qui verissime intelligit Vniuersa, qui et dormientibus alijs vigilat in aeternum? Amplius autem, constat certissime aliquas esse causas entium seruatiuas, et existentium seruatrices, in quibus secunda suppositione docente processus non sinitur infinitus. Omnium ergo illarum causarum est aliqua prima et summa; hanc constat necessario esse Deum, qui prima suppositione et 5a. parte corollarij primi testantibus a nullo alio conseruatur; Deus ergo est primus et summus omnium conseruator; Vel ergo hoc est per se, vel per accidens; si per se, ergo necessario; per se enim necessitatem includit; quia si non esset necessario, posset non esse, et sic esset per accidens,\n\nquod patet per definitionem logicam accidentis, ex Isagoge Porphirij et 1. Topic. Aristotelis satis notam: Hoc etiam satis patet. 1. Post. 4. et 6. et 2i. 4. vbi per se cum suis conditionibus definitur. Si autem hoc dicatur ens per accidens; et omne per accidens est posterius illo quod est per se; et ideo ad ipsum reducitur Deum esse omnium seruatorem, reducitur ad aliquod prius eo, cuius virtute hoc facit: Non ergo Deus, sed potius illud prius est primus omnium conseruator. Quod autem omne per accidens reducatur ad aliquod per se prius, apparet; quia sicut substantia praecedit naturaliter omne accidens, et ad ipsam reducitur quodlibet accidens tanquam ad causam priorem; ita per locum a simili seu a proportionalitate, videtur essentiale praecedere quodlibet accidentale, et hoc omne ad illud reduci. Item omne causatum sicut habet determinatum modum essendi, sic et videtur habere determinatam causam fiendi, et essendi; aliter enim non magis fieret, nec esset hoc quam illud: accidens autem est infinitum, et indeterminatum omnino, vt patet 2. Phys. capit: de casu, et fortuna, quasi per\n\ntotum; et 6. Metaphys. 4. et post diffuse; vbi dicit Auerroes comment. 7. Quod fit casu a principio habet naturam terminatam, et causam terminatam; quod enim est accidentaliter accidit illi quod est essentialiter. Hoc itidem confirmatur; Aliquid est per se conseruatiuum entium se conseruans; et illud quod est per accidens, non est principium illius quod est per se, sed magis e contra: Quod enim est ab eo, quod est per accidens, est simpliciter per accidens, sicut quod est ab aliquo casuali, est simpliciter casuale: Hoc enim patet per Philosophum, 2. Phys. 44. redarguentem ponentes casum esse causam coeli, et omnium coelestium, per hoc quod tunc omnia inferiora essent casualia. Dicit enim Auerroes; Cum posuerunt quod ex se, scilicet fortuna, et casu, fuit renouatio corporis coelestis, et motus, qui largitur alijs entibus ordinem, contingit eis vt omnes causae inueniantur ex casu: quod enim inuenitur in illo quod ex casu inuenitur, inuenitur ex casu. Alias quoque de entibus per accidens posset esse scientia; de omnibus enim perse ordinatis scientia potest esse, quod est contra Philosophum, 2.\n\nPhys. capit. de casu et fortuna, diffuse probantem, quod talia non sunt scibilia, neque certa, quia sunt causae accidentales, et per consequens infinitae: et 6. Metaphys. 4. De ente secundum accidens nulla est speculatio; nulla enim scientia neque actiua, neque factiua studiosa est de eo, neque theologica, quod et totus processus edocet consequenter; et 1. Post. 6. hoc idem ostenditur manifeste. Amplius autem quod est perfectius tribuendum est Deo, vt patet per primam Suppositionem, et tertiam partem primi: sed per se perfectius est, quam per accidens, vt nullus ignorat; nec aliter Deus esset per se bonum, et potens; Deus ergo per se non per accidens est primus omnium conseruator. Item in toto genere conseruatorum aliquis est conseruator per se, et primus naturaliter; et illud quod est per se et primum naturaliter in quolibet genere, est maius, dignius, et melius posteriori quocunque. Dicit enim Philosophus, 2. Metaph. 10. Semper enim quae ante est, magis est; et quae posterior est, non est. Vbi et textus\n\nquem habet Auerroes, sic ait; Prius enim semper magis dignum in esse, posterius autem non sic: qui et 12. Metaphys. 37. Optimum, inquit, semper autem proportionale quod primum; quare et Pictagorici posuerunt primum in coelementatione boni, vltimum vero in coelementatione mali, sicut ostensio decimae octauae partis Corollarij primi tangit. Rursum sic ad idem; Primum in quolibet genere est maxime tale, sicut 2. Metaphysic. et 10. satis patet, sicut illud quod est aequale per se, magis est tale, quam id quod est tale per accidens, sicut manifeste patet per Philosophum, tertio Topic. nec aliquis diffitetur. Adhuc autem si hoc sit per accidens, potest non esse; omne enim quod inest alicui non per se et essentialiter, sed tantum accidentaliter, potest separari ab eo separato; hoc enim nullam contradictionem includit; et quia quodlibet entium sufficienter existit, habitis omnibus et solis illis, quae ad suum existere per se et essentialiter requiruntur; quoniam tunc nihil existentiae suae\n\ndeest; hoc etiam patet per definitionem propriam accidentis; et 1. Post. 6. scribitur isto modo: Omne autem aut sic est scilicet per se primo modo vel secundo; aut per accidens: Accidentia autem non necessaria sunt; et cōfirmatur per Philosophum 8. Phys. 36. probantem quod non omne mouens mouetur, quia non per se, neque per accidens; Non per accidens, quia si secundum accidens, inquit, non est necesse moueri quod mouetur. Si autem hoc est manifestum, quod contingit aliquando moueri, nihil eorum quae sunt; Non enim necessarium est accidens, sed contingit non esse, quod et patet ibi per Auerroē expressius in comment. Si quis autem non vereatur concedere, quod rebus existentibus Deus potest non esse conseruator earum, faciliter conuincetur, quoniam antecedens et consequentia sunt necessaria in ratione, qua per finitatem rerum et conseruationem earum, probatur quod aliquis qui est Deus, est primus omnium conseruator; quare et conclusio simili necessitate firmatur. Item si res sine conseruatione diuina possent existere per seipsas, frustra conseruarentur a Deo secundum illam maximā\n\nPhilosophorum, Frustra ponuntur plura, vbi sufficiunt pauciora: sed secundū Philosophum 1. de Coelo 32. Deus et natura nihil frustra faciunt; quomodo et Apostolus arguit ad Gal. 2. Si per legem, inquit, iustitia, ergo Christus mortuus est gratis; vbi glossa Augustini, si per legem, id est, opera legis, quibus Iudaei confidebant, iustitia est; ergo Christus mortuus est gratis, id est frustra sine causa; est ergo Deus omnium entium necessarius conseruator. Huius quoque sententiae testis est Thomas de Aquino, qui in quaestionibus suis de potentia Dei 35. multipliciter hoc ostendit, et quaestione 36a. quaerit, Vtrum Deus posset alicui creaturae communicare, quod per se in esse conseruaretur absque Deo, et respondet sub verbis quae sequuntur: Dicendū, quod ad omnipotentiam Dei non pertinet, quod possit facere duo cōtradictoria esse simul: In hoc autem quod dicitur, quod Deus faciat aliquid, quod eius conseruatione non indigeat, contradictio implicatur. Iam enim ostensum est, quod omnis effectus a sua causa dependet, secundum quod est eius causa. In hoc igitur quod dicitur quod Dei conseruatione\n\nnon indigeat, ponitur non esse causatum a Deo; et in hoc quod dicitur, quod Deus faciat ipsum, ponitur esse causatum; Sicut igitur contradictionem implicaret, si quis diceret, Deum facere aliquid quod non esset causatum ab eo; ita si quis diceret Deum facere aliquid, quod eius conseruatione non indigeat; vnde vtrumque pari ratione Deus non potest.\n\nCOROLLARIVM.\n\nEX his igitur omnibus manifesta est conclusio principalis. Vnde non immanifeste consequitur hoc porisma, Nulla res creata sufficit aliam conseruare, et quod necesse est Deum per se et immediate seruare quamlibet creaturam; imo et immediatius quacunque causa creata; immediate, inquam, nedum immediatione loci aut situs, sed et naturae ac causae, et immediatius eisdem modis, vel saltem duobus vltimis modis dictis.\n\n1 Quod nulla res creata sufficit aliam conseruare.M\n\nSI enim, vt dicit principalis conclusio, Deus est omnium entium necessarius conseruator, quaelibet res creata necessario indiget conseruatione diuina, ergo nulla res talis sufficit aliam conseruare.\n\n2 Secunda est, quod necesse est Deum per se et immediate seruare quamlibet creaturam.\n\nQVod etiam Deus per se et immediate conseruet quamlibet creaturam, euidenter ostendent rationes praemissae, si ad hoc debite applicentur: Omne namque de se potentiale, si\n\ndebeat actuari, hoc necessario erit per aliquemactum, non immediate exterius, sed omniquaque interius actuantem, atque formantem, diffusumque per totum, vt patet de materia et forma, de accidente et de subiecto. Ille igitur actus sic actuans potentiale huiusmodi, vel est actus per se purus a nullo alio penitus actuatus, et tunc est Deus, et habetur intentum; vel non est actus huiusmodi, et tunc ille actus de se est potentialis necessario indigens alio actu ipsum immediate actuante; et cum propter suppositionem secundam non contingat sic in infinitum procedere, tandem necessario finaliter venietur ad vnum actum per se purum, a nullo alio penitus actuatum, qui quodlibet de se potentiale, positum que sub actu, per se et immediate actuat, et informat, nedum exterius circumstando, verum interius totaliter\n\npenetrando; et quodlibet citra Deum est de se potentiale, ipse autem solus actus per se et purus, sicut praemissa testantur. Item omne de se fluxibile et informe, ad hoc quod figatur stabiliter et formetur, necessario indiget aliqua fixione et forma ipsum immediate figente atque formante; Huiusmodi igitur fixio siue forma, vel est per se fixa seu fixio, formata seu forma, et tunc est Deus, et habetur intentum; vel non est talis, et tunc necessario immediate figitur, et formatur per aliquam fixionem et formam, et cum suppositio secunda non sinat processum huiusmodi infinitum, necessario finaliter stabitur ad vnam fixionem et formam per se, et puram, a nulla alia fixam quomodo libet aut formatam; et haec est habitudo omnium creaturarum et Dei. Hae autem rationes satis concordant cum Autoritatibus Philosophicis, et Theologicis superius recitatis. Item si sufficeret alicui creaturae tantum mediate conseruari a Deo, scilicet tantum mediante alia creatura, cum illa creatura conseruans influeret tantum virtutem finitam creaturae conseruatae, posset Deus creare aliquam creaturam tanto virtuosioris\n\npermanentiae illa creatura per aliam conseruata, quantum virtutis illa conseruans influit conseruatae. Quae si ponatur creata, non indigebit conseruatione alicuius creaturae: Tanto namque est virtuosioris permanentiae ex seipsa, quantum si esset debilior, indigeret a creatura alia confortari: Nec indigebit conseruatione Dei mediata, quia illa fieret per mediam creaturam; quare indigeret conseruatione mediae creaturae, contra proximum praeostensum: Nec indigebit conseruatione Dei immediata, quia et hac creatura debilior non egebat; erit igitur aliqua creatura non egens conseruatione aliqua creatoris, quod praemissa conclusio non permittit. Imo secundum istud, posset Deus tantum confortare res mundi, et totum hunc mundum creare, vel alium mundum secundum se totum, et singulas partes suas tam fortem, quod nullo modo neque mediate, neque secundum totum, neque secundum partem egeret conseruatione diuina; imo et Deo per imaginationem omnino sublato, sanus et integer permaneret, quod praemissa destruunt euidenter. Item sicut Deus est vbique\n\nsic vbique conseruat; sed Deus per se et essentialiter est vbique; quia si non, aut nusquam est, quod nullus non negat; aut est alicubi circumscriptus, quod eius infinitati, et immensitati omnimode contradicit, quas Suppositio prima docet, quod et quaedam Autoritates praemissae testantur. Docet namque prima Suppositio, tertia pars, et quarta Corollarij primi huius, quod quicquid est bonitatis, aut perfectionis perfectissimae et infinitissimae est in Deo; sed magnae perfectionis est posse esse in multis locis praesentialiter totum simul; quare et spiritus qui sic possunt, iudicantur perfectiores corporibus, quae non possunt. Summus igitur spiritus propter suam perfectionem infinitam simpliciter, est necessario repletiuitatis et praesentialitatis infinitae simpliciter, et immensae; quare et omnibus locis et situbus locatis et situatis de necessitate praesentialiter ipse adest, essentialiter cuncta replens supra omnem eorum mensuram magnus, et immensus; vt sicut vere omnipotens dicitur, sic et veraciter dicatur omnipraesens: Et hanc arbitror rationem sacrae Scripturae atque Doctorum, per quam\n\nimmensitatem Dei ostendunt. Vnde vt de multis vnum commemorem, Baruc. 3. scribitur; O Israel, quam magna est domus Dei et ingens locus possessionis eius, magnus et non habens finem, excelsus et immensus. Sique Deus esset alicubi circumscriptus, hoc maxime videretur in Coelo, quoniam dignissimus est locorum, et adhuc in dignissima parte Coeli, seu in dignissimo puncto Coeli, et tunc moto Coelo, ipse similiter moueretur contra sextam partem Corollarij primi huius. Aliter enim partem Coeli, seu punctum digniorem quandoque relinqueret, et indigniorem intraret. Si autem dicatur secundum superficiem secundi de Coelo, et Mundo, Aristotelis, quod Deus est continue in vno situ nobilissimo, scilicet in Oriente, in sectione duorum circulorum magnorum; Istud stare non potest, quia quare magis esset in oriente Oxon, quam in oriente London, seu Gadum Herculis, vel e contra? Si autem dicatur, ipsum esse continue in oriente totius terrae habitabilis in quauis Amphitritis vel Oceani sectione; cum secundum naturalem dispositionem coeli et terrae, et secundum eundem\n\nAristotelem 2. Meteororum, vbi nunc est mare, erit quando que arida, et e contra, erit aliquando alius oriens totius terrae habitabilis quae tunc erit, et tunc vel Deus erit tantum in illo, et sequitur ipsum moueri localiter de oriente vno ad alium orientem; vel tunc non erit in oriente praedicto, ergo eadem ratione nec nunc est. Deus etiam si tantum in oriente ponatur, non erit in loco dignissimo, cum medium coeli, et centrum Solis, Saturni, seu Iouis sit dignior locus seu situs. Item si Deus sit tantum in vno particulari loco, vel situ, posset illum relinquere, et alium ingredi, localiter que moueri. Per hoc quo que quod Deus vbique agit et conseruat, probant Autores ipsum esse vbique tripliciter, scilicet essentialiter, praesentialiter, et potentialiter, sicut patet 1. sentent. Petri, dist. 37. quod tamen nullatenus sequeretur, nisi Deus immediate omnia faceret et seruaret. Vnde Anselmus Monolog. 13. ita dicit, quoniam aliter esse non potest, vt ea quae sunt facta, vigeant, nisi et id a quo sunt facta, vigeat per seipsum;\n\nnecesse est, vt sicut nihil factum est nisi per creatricem praesentem essentiam, ita nihil vigeat nisi per eiusdem seruatricem praesentiam; et addit 14. consequenter; Quod si ita est, imo quia ex necessitate ita est, consequitur vt vbi ipsa non est, nihil sit. Vbique igitur est, et per omnia, et in omnibus. Liquet igitur quoniam ipsa est, quae cuncta alia portat et superat, claudit et penetrat, eademque est quae in omnibus est, et per omnia, et ex qua, et per quam, et in qua omnia, sicut erat superius plenius allegatum, et supra eiusdem septimo praemittebat. Non opus est quaetere, Vtrum ideo sint vniuersa per ipsam summam substantiam, quia alio faciente aut alia materia existente, illa tantum quolibet modo vt res omnes essent adiuuerit, cum repugnet his quae iam supra patuerunt, si secundo loco et non principaliter sint per ipsam quaecunque sunt. Augustinus quoque de diuinitatis Dei essentia primo, ostenso per scripturam, quod Deus est incircumscriptus, immutabilis, et immensus, subiungit; Proculdubio nullus est locus ab eius praesentia absens; super omnem quippe creaturam praesidet regendo,\n\nsubtus est omnia sustinendo, non pondere laboris, sed infatigabili virtute; quoniam nulla creatura ab eo condita per se subsistere valet, nisi ab illo sustentetur, qui eam creauit. Extra omnia est, sed non exclusus; Intra omnia, sed non conclusus. Ecce causalis Augustini probans Deum esse vbique, quoniam, inquit, nulla creatura potest subsistere nisi sustentetur ab illo, qui et Epistola 39. quae est de praesentia Dei ad Dardanum facit diffusum processum ad idem, vbi et inter caetera ita dicit; Sic est Deus per cuncta diffusus, vt non qualitas Mundi, sed substantia creatrix Mundi, sine labore regens, et sine onere continens Mundum. Et 6. super Genesin ad literam 33 ostendit Deum esse immutabilem per tempus et locum, licet administret et moueat mobilia per tempus et locum, cum sit, inquiens, Ipse nullo locorum vel interuallo, vel spacio incommutabili, excellentique potentia, et interior omnire, quia in ipso sunt omnia, et exterior omnire, quia ipse est super omnia: quae tamen ratio non valeret, nisi Deus per se et immediate administret et moueat vniuersa. Si enim Deus per seipsum sit exterior\n\net interior re quacunque, et moueat sic res motas, manifestum est quod ad ipsum mouere quicquam localiter, non sequitur ipsum localiter commoueri, eo quod ipse est in quolibet loco praesens. Nec potest quis dicere ideo improprie tantum dici, Deum esse vbique essentialiter, praesentialiter, et potentialiter, quia quaecunque essentia in quocunque loco existens, et vniuersaliter omnis locus habet esse ab illo, et quia cuncta locata et loca sunt ei, scilicet eius cognitioni praesentia, et eius potestati subiecta, cum ista fictio rationibus prioribus destruatur; et 1. Sentent. Lumbardi. 37. condemnetur. Item si Deus aliquid puta terram tantum mediate seruaret, cum aliquam creaturam immediate conseruet, et eadem ratione, si vellet, posset terram immediate seruare, et in naturalissimo loco suo, posset moueri localiter ad terram sic seruandam, quod praemissis repugnat. Item si Deus tantum mediate aliqua conseruaret, hoc maxime videretur de inferioribus rebus istis, quod illas seruaret coelesti corpore mediante; sed Anima rationalis est de se tantae permanentiae et maioris, quam\n\ncorpus coeleste: ergo nequaquam ab illo naturaliter conseruatur; Hoc enim naturalis ordo requirit, vt a fortiori debilius conseruetur. Hoc idem et Autoritates ostendunt; Dicit enim Philosophus in De mundo 8. totam terram et mare, aetherem, atque Solem et Lunam, et totum Coelum decorauit vna, quae per omnia transit, virtus. Ammonius quoque Armenus in recordatione in librum peri hermenias Aristotelis, super vlt. primi, dicit, magis erat verisimile aeternas res non a prouidentia regi, quam quae fluxibilem habent naturam; quoniam illa quidem a sua natura determinationem habent et immutabilitatem talem a dijs sortita subsistentiam; quae autem in generatione propter fluxibilitatem propriae materiae in omnimoda transmutatione fieri nata, neque esse, neque contineri, neque ordinari posse si non sortiantur multa virtute conditiua, et prouisiua eorum, quae semper eodem modo se habent, non solum totaliore, et supereminente, scilicet corpori coelesti, sed etiam aliqua magis particulari et proximiori, sicut et hominum videtur ampliori indigentes cura foeminas quam viros,\n\net insensatos quā sapientes. Et Auicebrol. 5o fontis vitae 35. sicut erat superius allegatū, ostendens omnia diuersa, cōtraria, superiora et inferiora per vnitatē coniungi, sic ait; Et radix communis in hoc est hoc, quod vnitas vincit omnia, et est diffusa in omnibus et retentrix omnium. Et infra 36. dicit, Verbum, scilicet voluntas postquam creauit materiam et formam, ligauit se cum illis sicut est ligatio animae cum corpore, et effudit se in illis, et non discessit ab eis, et penetrat ea a summo vsque ad infimum. Et adhuc inferius 38. sic ait: Describere voluntatem impossibile est, sed pene describitur quum dicitur, quod est virtus diuina faciens materiam et formam, et ligans illas, et diffusa a summo vsque ad imum, sicut diffusio animae in corpore; Et ipsa est mouens omnia et disponens, quod et manifestat exemplo sic dicens; Materia et\n\nforma est sicut corpus et aer; et anima et voluntas ligans illa, et infusa in illis est sicut anima in corpore, lumen in aere, et intelligentia in anima, et modum infussionis huiusmodi sic ostendit: postquam voluntas est virtus spiritualis, sed multo excelsior, quam spiritualis; non dubites ipsam infundi materiae, et comprehendere eam simul cum forma, sicut est penetratio virtutis solis, id est, virtutis diffundentis lumen, et vnitio eius cum lumine in aere: erit ergo voluntas sicut virtus, et forma sicut lumen, et materia sicut aer. Et 39. dicit; Voluntas penetrat omnia sine motu, et agit omnia sine tempore propter magnam suam fortitudinem et vnitatem: Cui et autoritates sacrae concordant; Nam Sap. 1. sic scribitur; Spiritus Domini repleuit orbem terrarum, et hoc quod continet omnia: et infra 8. legitur de sapientia increata quod attingit a fine vsque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suauiter. De qua et Ecclesiastici 1. dicitur, quod altissimus Creator effudit eam super omnia opera sua; et Esaiae 66. Caelum sedes mea, et terra scabellum pedum meorum: De quo dicit expressius Ieremias 23. Nunquid\n\nnon caelum et terram ego impleo, ait Dominus. Vnde Propheta Psalmo 138. Quo ibo a spiritu tuo? et quo a facie tua fugiam? si ascendero in caelum, tu illic es, si descendero ad infernum, ades: si sumpsero pennas in diluculo, et habitauero in extremis maris, etenim illic manus tua deducet me, et tenebit me dextra tua. Beatus quo que Iob 11. de hoc dicit; Excelsior caelo est, et quid facies; profundior inferno, et vnde cognosces; Longior terra mensura eius, et latior mari. Et infra 22. recitat haereticorum falsam insaniam in haec verba; Nubes latibulum eius, nec nostra considerat, et per cardines caeli ambulat. Super quod beatus Gregorius 16. Moralium 4. dicit; Quis de Deo ista vel desipiens suspicetur, qui nimirum dum sit semper omnipotens, sic intendit omnibus, vt assit singulis, sic adest singulis, vt simul omnibus nunquam desit; sic itaque extetiora circundat, vt interiora impleat, sic interiora implet, vt exteriora circundet, sic summa regit vt ima non deserat, sic imis praesens est, vt a superioribus non recedat. Sanctus quoque Thomas de Christiana religione ad Raynaldum, siue de\n\nfide, spe, et charitate 133. dicit, quod Deus immediate ordinat omnes effectus per seipsum, licet per causas medias exequatur, sed in ipsa executione quodammodo immediate se habet ad omnes effectus, in quantum omnes causae mediae agunt in virtute causae primae, vt quodammodo ipse in omnibus agere videatur, et omnia opera secundarum causarum ei possunt attribui, sicut artifici attribuitur opus instrumenti: Conuenientius enim dicitur, quod Faber facit cultellum, quam martellus. Habet etiam se immediate ad omnes effectus, in quantum ipse est per se causa essendi, et omnia ab ipso seruantur in esse. Idem quoque in quaestionibus suis de potentia Dei, quaest. 20. qua quaeritur; Vtrum Deus operetur in omni operatione naturae; respondendo probat, quod Deus est causa cuiuslibet actionis naturalis et voluntariae sex modis: Primo, quia tribuit virtutem agendi, sicut dicitur 8. Phys. quod generans mouet graue, et leue in quantum dat virtutem, per quam consequitur talis motus. Secundo, quia conseruat eam continue. Tertio, quia mouet quodlibet agens ad agendum, et applicat virtutem\n\nad actionem, sicut homo est causa incisionis cultelli; et hoc est vt dicit, quia nulla res per seipsam mouet, nisi mouens non motum: Ideo sequitur de necessitate, quod Deus sit causa actionis cuiuslibet rei naturalis, vt mouens et applicans virtutem ad agendum. Quarto, quia ipse est agens principale in qualibet actione, et quodlibet aliud agens est instrumentum illius; quoniam virtute illius quaelibet alia virtus agit; et paulo post subiungit; sic igitur Deus est causa actionis cuiuslibet, in quantum dat virtutem agendi, et in quantum conseruat eam, et in quantum applicat actionem, et in quantum eius virtute omnis alia virtus agit; et cum coniunximus his, quod Deus sit sua virtus, et quod sit intra rem quamlibet, non sicut pars essentiae, sed sicut tenens rem in esse, sequetur quod ipse in qualibet re operante immediate operetur, non exclusa operatione voluntatis et naturae. Vnde potest elici quintus modus, scilicet quod Deus immediate vbique operatur. Quod et patet clarissime per Dominum Stephanum Parisiensem Episcopum condemnantem quendam articulum sub hac forma, Quod prima\n\ncausa est causa entium temotissima; error si intelligatur cum praecisione, ita scilicet quod non propinquissima.\n\nTertia, quod necesse est Deum seruare quamlibet creaturam immediatius quacunque\n\ncausa creata.\n\nDEus igitur immediate quamlibet rem conseruat, nec immediate tantum, verum et immediatius quolibet alio conseruante; quia si non immediatius conseruaret, cum immediate conseruet; aut ergo aeque immediate conseruat, sicut causa secunda conseruans, aut minus immediate quam ipsa; Non aeque immediate, quia Deus et causa secunda conseruans sunt causae conseruatiuae eiusdem essentialiter ordinatae; et nullae tales causae, et maxime in eodem genere causae habent eundem ordinem ad suum causatum; sed necesse est vnam esse\n\npriorem, aliam vero posteriorem in illo modo causandi, sicut ratio et Philosophia testatur. Aliter enim eadem ratione, qua possent esse duae causae propinquae eiusdem causati coaequales in ordine, possent esse et aliae duae superiores similiter coaequales, et sic deinceps; quare et possent esse duae causae primae simpliciter in eodem ordine causandi penitus coaequales; et duo principia prima simpliciter, ac duo Dij, cum tamen omnia multa qualitercunque ordinata ad vnum aliquid necessario reducantur, sicut primo huius, et secundo praehabita manifestant. Docet quoque Philosophus in sua Metaphysica, quod omnium duarum causarum huiusmodi attributarum ad idem, vna reducitur ad aliam, vel ambae ad tertiam. Cum ergo Deus, et causa secunda sint causae coaequales in ordine conseruandi, neutra reducitur ad aliam, tanquam propinquiot conseruato ad temotiorem; ergo ambae reducuntur ad aliquam tertiam priorem ambabus, cuius virtute ambae conseruant, quod impossibile est de Deo, sicut praecedentia docuerunt, et suppositiones ostendunt. Si autem fingatur Deum et causam secundam\n\nesse causas conseruatiuas eiusdem accidentaliter ordinatas; tunc multo magis vel vna reduceretur ad alteram, vel ambae ad tertiam essentialem priorem, sicut superius est ostensum. Item omne nomen conueniens Deo et creaturae perfectius competit ipsi Deo, maxime cum ipse sit primum in tali genere; et causa quare illud nomen dicatur de alijs quibuscunque iuxta processum Philosophi 2. et 10. Metaphysicae superius allegatum. Ergo hoc nomen immediate conseruans maxime et perfectissime competit ipsi Deo. Quare Deus magis immediate conseruat quocunque alio conseruante; Non ergo aeque immediate nec minus. Praeterea si Deus minus immediate conseruaret, et per consequens sic causaret conseruatum et causatum causae secundae quam ipsa, ipse non esset causa propinquissima entium, quod est damnatum in articulo Parisiensi praemisso, propinquissima scilicet propinquitate causalitatis et naturae, non tantum situs aut loci. Tunc quoque Deus plus distaret in conseruatione, et causatione quam causa secunda; ergo per plura media, vel saltem per aliquod medium, et causa\n\nsecunda per nullum; ergo Deus nequaquam illud immediate seruaret, nec etiam sic causaret, cuius oppositum est ostensum. Item omnis causa secunda causans, aut conseruans quodcunque causatum, hoc facit per causationem seu conseruationem mediam naturaliter inter illa, quae ideo naturaliter propinquior est causato seu conseruato, quam illa causa secunda; Deus autem omnium causationem seu conseruationem huiusmodi per se et immediate conseruat, sicut proxima pars corollarij huius docet, ipsamque cum causato vel conseruato copulat, et coniungit, sicut praehabita manifestant; Ergo inter causam secundam et omne eius causatum Deus naturaliter mediat, ipsum immediatius concausando. Item causa essentialior et magis necessaria in esse causati est ei propinquior naturaliter; Deus autem est essentialior et magis necessaria causa in causatione cuiuscunque causati quam aliqua causa secunda; Non enim potest esse aeque vel minus essentialis causa alicuius causati, sicut [vel] quam causa secunda, sicut processus praemissus de aeque immediate vel minus ostendit. Praeterea illud\n\nquod per se et virtute propria est aliquale, essentialius et magis est tale quocunque quod per aliud et virtute aliena est tale, sicut tam Logica quam Philosophia varijs locis docet, et superius tangebatur; Prima autem causa causat causatum commune virtute propria et perse; causa vero secunda virtute causae primae et per illam; ergo causa prima essentialius atque magis; quare et causa prima propinquior, coniunctior, et intimior est causato, quam materia eius vel forma, vel quae cunque causa secunda; ergo et propinquior, coniunctior, intimior, atque immediatior cuilibet rei creatae, quam aliqua res creata alteri posset esse. Quamobrem et in causatione quacunque cuiuscunque causae creatae siue secundae, quodcunque causatum quomodocunque causantis, prima causa propinquius, coniunctius, intimius, et immediatius idem causat. Vnde Commentator super hanc primam propositionem de causis, Omnis causa primaria plus est influens super causatum suum, quam causa vniuersalis secunda, sic ait. Causa vniuersalis prima agit in causatum suae causae, antequam in ipsum agat causa vniuersalis\n\nsecunda quae sequitur ipsum; Et infra, Manifestum est quod causa prima longinqua, est plus comprehendens et vehementius causa rei, quam propinqua; et propter id fit eius operatio vehementioris adhaerentiae, quam causae propinquae; et hoc quidem non fit secundum hoc, nisi quia res imprimis non patitur nisi a virtute longinqua, deinde patitur secundo a virtute quae est sub prima, et prima adiuuat secundam super operationem suam, quoniam omnem operationem quam causa efficit secunda, prima ibi efficit; veruntamen efficit eam per modum alium altiorem, et sublimiorem: Et quando remouetur causa secunda a causato suo, non remouetur ab eo causa prima; quoniam causa prima est maioris et vehementioris adhaerentiae cum re quam causa propinqua. Item Sanctus Thomas in quaestionibus suis de\n\npotentia Dei quaest. 20. qua quaeritur, Vtrum Deus operetur in omni operatione naturae, respondendo inter caetera, ita dicit, Deus est causa omnis actionis, prout quodlibet agens est instrumentum diuinae virtutis operantis. Sic ergo si consideremus supposita agentia, quodlibet agens particulare est immediatum ad suum effectum; si autem consideremus virtutem qua fit actio, sic virtus superioris causae erit immediatior effectui, quam virtus inferioris: Nam virtus inferior non coniungitur effectui nisi per virtutem causae superioris. Vnde dicitur in libro de Causis, quod Virtus causae primae prius agit in causatum, et vehementius ingreditur in ipsum: Sic igitur oportet virtutem diuinam adesse cuilibet rei agenti, sicut virtutem corporis coelestis oportet adesse c•ilibet corpori elementari agenti; sed in hoc differt, quod vbicunque est virtus diuina, est essentia diuina; non autem essentia corporis coelestis est vbicunque est sua virtus. Et iterum Deus est sua virtus, non autem corpus coeleste, et ideo potest dici quod Deus in qualibet te operatur, in quantum eius virtute quaelibet res indiget ad agendum.\n\nNon autem potest proprie dici, quod coelum semper agat in corpore elementari, licet eius virtute corpus elementare agat. Vnde et praeter quinque modos operationis diuinae praemissos, potest elici sextus modus, scilicet quod Deus in operatione quacunque immediatius operatur quolibet alio operante. Quare et Philosophus de Mundo vlt. loquens de Deo, sic ait; Cum sit vnus multinomius, nominatus ab omnibus passionibus quas innouat ipse; vocamus autem eum Iouem; dicitur etiam fulmineus a fulmine, pluuialis a pluuia, tonitrualis tempestuosus, serenus, et sequitur consequenter; et in summa loquendo, coelestis et terrestris appellandus a qualibet natura, et fortuna, velut ens ipse omnium causa; propter quod non male dicitur in Orphicis, Iupiter primogenitus est, Iupiter nouissimus, Iupiter caput, Iupiter medius. Ecce quomodo Philosophus 1o docet, Deum esse generaliter omnium rerum causam; secundo vero ostendit ipsum esse specialiter causam triplicem cuiuscunque, scilicet primam, vltimam, seu finalem, et mediam; Est, inquit, Iupiter primogenitus et caput pro causa prima;\n\nest Iupiter nouissimus pro causa vltima seu finali; est etiam Iupiter medius pro causa media quorumcunque: ideoque expressius sic adiungit; Deus itaque sicut antiquus sermo testatur, initium, medium, et finem habet omnium entium; Deus ergo secundum Philosophum quacunque causa secunda quomodocunque causante quodcunque causatum, est in causando prior, posterior, et immediatior omniquaque. Vnde Dionysius de diuinis nominibus 5. dicit, quod ipse est existendi omnium substantificum principium, medictas, et consummatio: quod et Autoritates praemissae, dicentes, quod Deus est omni re interior, sonare videntur. Nec ignoro responsiones quorundam fingentium, fingereue potentium Autores non ideo dicere Deum omnia conseruare, quia immediate per seipsum, et proprie ipsa seruat, sed tantum mediante Coelo, vel aliquo alio, et per illud, vel quia prohibet corruptiua, vel quia permittit rem esse, aut non desiruit rem cum possit; sed has omnes falsas insanias quas vanitas confingebat confringet faciliter veritas praemissorum.\n\nObijciunt autem quidam, Non videtur consonum rationi, quod quaelibet res creata, finita, paruula, et tantilla, tanta forma, et tanto conseruatore indigeat simpliciter infinito. Alij vero obijciunt aliter, Si Deus est omnipotens potest facere aliquid potens sufficienter existere per seipsum. Adhuc autem obijciet forte quisnam, Deum dignissimum, pulcherrimum, et honestissimum non decere, per seipsum et immediate quibuslibet obscaenitatibus immisceri, sicut nec quaeuis opera turpia facere, aut quaeque negotia vilia exercere; Imo tam sublimi maiestati potius conueniret in aliquo loco dignissimo, puta in summo coeli vertice residere, aliquam operationem nobilissimam sibique propriam exercendo, alijs operibus vniuersis, alijs causis secundis, velut subiectis sibi ministris gradualiter assignatis. Quare et Philosophus in De Mundo 11. sic ait, potius aestimandum est, et quod conueniens est et magis aptum Deo, vt virtus quae residet in coelo, et plurimum distantibus de vno loquendo, omnibus fiat causa salutifera, magis quam icus et perueniens quo non est bonum nec honestum\n\noperari per se in terra. Hoc enim nec hominum ducibus conuenit cuilibet insistere operi, vt principi exercitus vel ciuitatis seu domus, et si opus sit, supellectilem sarcire, vel aliquod vilius agere, quod in magno Rege non quodcunque mancipium exerceret; quod et probat a simili per Xerxem Regem, qui morabatur in Susis seu Bastanis, qui multa fecit in multis prouincijs, non tamen per seipsum, sed per officiarios varios ad varia deputatos. Ad primum autem istorum perspicue respondendum, quia quaelibet creatura est creata, finita, paruula, et tantilla, ideo per 17. partem Corollarij primi huius, est de se possibile esse et non esse. Quare secundum praemissa indiget necessario aliquo per se necesse esse ipsum continue sustentante, quare et Deo, eadem 17. parte teste. Secundum faciliter soluitur; quia etsi Deus sit omnipotens, non tamen potest facere aliquid impossibile simpliciter absolute, quare nec potest facere alium Deum, nec aliud necesse esse, sed tantum possibile\n\nesse per 17. partem dictam, etc. sicut supra. Istam responsionem confirmat Thomas superius memoratus. Tertium autem obiectum Petrus 1. Sentent. dist. 37. dicit esse tam friuolum vt nec responsione sit dignum; quod tamen soluit per duo exempla, quorum primum est, quod sicut spiritus creatus, scilicet Anima rationalis sordibus corporis leprosi et quantumcunque polluti nequaquam polluitur, sic nec Deus. Secundum est, quod sicut radius solaris per pollutionem quancum que diffusus, nequaquam polluitur; sic nec Deus. Augustinus quo que de Agone Christiano per idem exemplum eodem modo respondet. Vnde et Sapienttiae 10. dicitur de Sapientia increata; Attingit autem vbi que propter munditiam suam, vapor est virtutis Dei et emanatio quaedam est claritatis omnipotentis Dei sincera, et ideo nihil coinquinatum in illam incurrit. Candor est enim lucis aeternae, et speculum sine macula Dei maiestatis, et imago bonitatis illius. Est enim haec speciosior Sole, et super omnem dispositionem stellarum luci comparata, prior, seu aliter, purior inuenitur. Haec autem responsio sic poterit\n\nconfirmari. Perfectius est, omni deturpatiuo posse resistere, nequid deturpationis patiatur ab illo, et per consequens non posse penitus pollui, quam sic posse. Prima ergo Suppositio hoc dat Deo: Aliter autem, nec minus rationabiliter potest dici, quod sicut quaelibet res in quantum est, bona est, vt omnes Philosophi et Theologi simul docent; sic et omnis res in quantum est, pulchra est; Nam pulchritudo rei est eius dispositio naturalis: Vnde Philosophus 7. Phys. 17. in translatione quam Commentator exponit, sic ait; Pulchritudo et fortitudo sunt de cap. relationis; Sunt enim dispositiones Animalium in respectu nobilissimi Animalium; et dico laudabilissimam dispositionem illam, quae est naturalis sphaera. Super quod dicit Auerroes, quod pulchritudo, et fortitudo sunt dispositiones laudabiles in Animalibus, quae non intelliguntur nisi in respectu laudabilissimae dispositionis, sicut in respectu Animalis nobilissimi; dispositio enim laudabilissima Animalis est, vt in omnibus suis dispositionibus sit secundum cursum •aturae; et pulchritudo in aliquo Animali est dispositio in sua creatione considerata\n\nsecundum suam dispositionem quam habet in comparatione nobilissimi Animalium in illa specie, et est illud quod in omnibus suis dispositionibus est secundum cursum naturae. Quod et testatur Auicenna 8. Metaphys. 7. sub his verbis, Pulchritudo omnis rei, et suus decor est, vt sit quemadmodum conuenit ei. Vnde et Plato 1. parte Timae. vbi secundum Chalcidium in Comment. agit de genitura mundi, sic ait; Nec fas erat bonitati praestanti quicquam facere nisi pulchrum, et secundum cum praestans Dei bonitas cuncta fecit; quare et secundum eundem cuncta fuerant pulchra: quare et simili ratione, cuncta quae sunt, in quantum sunt, pulchra sunt. Quare et Augustinus de Natura boni. 13. loquens de varijs modis rerum, sic ait; In his omnibus quaecun que parua sunt in maiorum comparatione contrarijs nominibus appellantur, sicut in hominis forma qua maior est pulchritudo, in eius comparatione simiae pulchritudo deformitas dicitur; et fallit imprudentes, tanquam id sit bonum et hoc malum. Et infra 15. probat quod turpitudo non sit omnino malum, sed bonum, et hoc specialiter de Simia,\n\nquia ipsa potest fieri turpior; ergo et in ea potest minui pulchritudinis bonum; quare et pulchritudinis bonum habet. Quid igitur dedecet pulchrum pulchris misceri? et pulchrius minus pulchris, vt sic magis pulchrum apparet, ea que sua pulchritudine in deturpabili illuminet et exornet? Quare et Philosophus in De Mundo •o. ait totam terram et mare, aetherem at que Solem, et Lunam decorauit vna, quae per omnia transit, virtus. Vnde et Dionysius de diuinis nominibus 4. ait, Bonum autem et pulchrum non separandum in ipsa, in vno omnia comprehendenti causa. Hoc enim in existentibus omnibus in participationes et participantia diuidentes, bonum quidem esse dicimus pulchri particeps, pulchrum vero participationem pulchrificae omnium bonorum causae; super essentiale autem bonum pulchrum quidem dicitur, propter ab eo omnibus existentibus traditam proprie vnicuique pulchritudinem, et velut omnium bene compactionis et claritais causale, instar lucis fulminans simul omnibus pulchrificas fontalis radij sui traditiones, et velut omnia ad seipsum vocans. Imo\n\nnedum decet Deum esse vbique praesentem, sed indecentissimum, et impossibilissimum sibi esset, locis et locatis existentibus non sic esse, quia tunc Deus non esset, sicut in ostensione secundae partis praemissi Corollarij demonstrantur. Quod autem dicit Philosophus, Deum non per se operari in terra; verum est, non sic per se, quin per causam secundam, et per aliud agens inferius, sicut per se, et per nullum illorum operationem suam propriam operatur. Hanc autem materiam parumper diffusius persequebar propter pulchritudinem eius magnam, et quia videtur non paruum sequentium fundamentum.", "english": "CHAPTER II.\n\nThat God is the necessary conserver of all other things; it has a Corollary having three parts.\n\nSo far, then, the cause of God has been argued in general terms against the various heretics. From now on, in his special cause against Pelagius, with the counsel of the supreme Advocate ever lending patronage, it must be specially pleaded. First, then, let it be shown that God is the necessary conserver of all beings. He is necessary, I mean, from a supposition, namely with the entity of things supposed. For nothing that is per se possible to be and not to be has being except from something that is per se necessary to be, on which it always depends in being. But whatever is below God is per se possible to be, and God alone is per se necessary to be. All this is plain from the power and connection of causes, from the first supposition and the seventeenth part of the first Corollary of this book. For every existing thing that stands determinately in being, if it is not sufficiently determined to being through itself, is determined to being through something else. But every existing thing that is per se possible to be and not to be is of this kind; therefore it is so through something else. Now that something else either is per se necessary to be, and the point intended is gained; or it is per se possible to be and not to be. In that case, by the immediately preceding reasoning, it follows that it too is determined to being through something else, and the same dividing inquiry is made about that other. And since, by the second Supposition, there is no infinite regress among such others, one must necessarily arrive at something per se necessary to be, by which every existing thing per se possible to be and not to be is determined to being. This is the argument in the strength of Avicenna and Algazel, by which they hold that they demonstrate this very conclusion: Avicenna, Metaphysics 1 and 8, in many chapters; Algazel, Metaphysics 2, in his twelfth saying.\n\nHence Avicenna, Metaphysics 8, 3, says thus: \"When 'first principle' is said absolutely, it must be one. But when 'first material cause' and 'first formal cause' are spoken of, it is not necessary that with these there be one, as this must hold in the Necessary Being. For none of them is a first cause absolutely; but the Necessary Being is the principle also of these first causes. From this, then, and from what we said before, it is manifest that the Necessary Being is one in number. And it was made clear that whatever is other than it, when considered through itself, is possible in its being, and therefore caused; and it has been well noted that in causality one arrives, without doubt, at it. Hence whatever is, except the one which is one to itself, and the being which is being to itself, is acquiring being from another than itself, through which it has being, not through itself. And this is the meaning of this: that a thing is caused, namely, receiving being from another than itself, and has a privation which is ascertained of it in its essence absolutely.\"\n\nAlgazel also, Metaphysics 2, where before, says: \"Whatever is other than the Necessary Being must come from that, and have its being from that. For it has been shown that the Necessary Being is only one; therefore everything else is possible to be, and depends on that Necessary Being.\" And further on, in the same place: \"It has been shown that the universe is possible and needs a cause, and all causes proceed by necessity from the Necessary Being, which is necessarily one. It is said, then, that this is the first principle of the World.\" Hence also Hermes, On the Eternal Word 21, says that the whole sum of things governed, higher and lower, obeys that supreme Lord, for all things depend on him and flow from him. So too Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy 3, the last prose: \"He is, as it were, a kind of tiller and rudder, by which the machine of the world is kept stable and uncorrupted.\" Aristotle also, Metaphysics 12, 38, says thus: \"The first is necessary, not able to be otherwise, but simple.\" On such a principle, therefore, heaven and nature depend. And Metaphysics 9, 17:\n\n\"Things that are from necessity are themselves the first; for if these were not, nothing at all would be.\" And Physics 8, 52: \"There must,\" he says, \"be some first mover, immovable and not so per accidens, if there is to be, as we have said, among the things that are, some ceaseless and immortal motion, and if what is is to remain, that is, the whole universe itself, in itself and in the same state. For if the principle remains of necessity, what is continuous with the principle must necessarily remain.\" Hence God is said to be the necessary principle of all things, as to both being and moving. Augustine, reciting this opinion of the Philosophers, and not without due praise, says in City of God 8, 6: \"The Philosophers,\" he says, \"whom we see, not undeservedly, preferred to the rest in fame and glory, saw that every form in any mutable thing whatever that is, whatever it is in whatever way,\n\nand whatever its nature, cannot be except from him who truly is, because he is immutably.\" And he pursues this same opinion at length in On Free Choice 2, 28, showing that all mutable things are led back to something immutable, by which they are formed and on which they continually rest in being. Hence the Philosopher also, in On the Cause of the Movement of Animals [n1], which is On Animals 12, in the new translation, chapters 1 and 3 and almost throughout, holds that everything moved rests, in moving, upon something fixed; and Augustine says this same thing plainly in On Genesis according to the Letter 8, 13. Hence also Ammonius Ermenus, in the Recollection on Aristotle's book On Interpretation, on the end of the first, says: \"The gods truly exist, and it is not possible, even in thought, for them to admit change. For what is wholly unchangeable must needs precede that which is in any way changed, so that what is changed may remain. Hence in gods who have the character of a principle toward beings, past and future cannot be considered.\" The faithful Abraham, moreover, who [also] deserved to be called Friend of God, faithfully attests the bringing forth of all things by God, and the conservation of the things brought forth by him, as Josephus reports, as is recounted more fully around the thirty-fifth part of the first. Does not the Apostle too, in Hebrews 1, saying that God has spoken to us in the Son, through whom he also made the ages, who, being the splendor of his glory and the figure of his substance, and upholding all things by the word of his power, etc., seem to ascribe to God himself both the making and the conservation of all things? Wherefore Chrysostom also, expounding this, says in homily 2: \"'Upholding,'\" he says, \"'all things,' that is, governing; for he holds what is falling and tending to nothing. For it is no less to hold the world than to have made it; but if one may say something rather bolder, it is even more. For in making, the essences of things were produced from no existing things; in holding, the things that were made are held so that they do not return to nothing. Here, therefore, while things are ruled and things repugnant to one another are fitted together, a great and exceedingly marvellous sign of very great power is shown.\" And Augustine says in On the Essence of the Divinity of God, and on His Invisibility and Immutability, at 1, [n2] thus of God: \"Without doubt there is no place absent from his\n\npresence. For he presides over every creature by ruling; he is beneath all things by sustaining and bearing them, not by the weight of toil but by tireless power; since no creature made by him can subsist through itself unless it is sustained by him who created it. He is outside all things, but not shut out; within all things, but not shut in.\" This little book, however, is in some codices ascribed to Jerome, but I rather judge that it was Augustine's. Hence also Gregory, on Ezekiel, book 2, homily 5 [n3]: \"He is within and without, below and above; above by ruling, below by bearing, within by filling, without by encircling; and so he is within that he may be without, so he encircles that he may penetrate, so he presides that he may bear, so he bears that he may preside.\" Wherefore Anselm also, Monologion 14, speaking of the supreme essence: \"It is plain,\" he says, \"that it is itself which bears all other things, and surpasses, encloses and penetrates them.\" With this saying of the Apostle agrees the saying of the Philosopher, in On the World, last chapter, where he shows that God, though he is one, is nevertheless many-named according to the multitude of the things he renews and of which he is the cause;\n\nand he says that he is called Jupiter; wherefore it is also not ill said in the Orphic poems: \"Jupiter is the foundation of earth and of starry heaven; Jupiter is the root of the sea.\" Is not this also what the Wise Man teaches wisely in Wisdom 11, where, speaking to God, he says: \"You love all things that are, and you hate none of the things you have made. For how could anything endure unless you had willed it, or be preserved if it had not been called by you?\" Again, this same point is once more confirmed by a similar reasoning. Whatever thing is pointed out, such as the Earth, either is through itself, or is through another and in a certain way per accidens. If it is per accidens and through another, the same question must be asked about that other; and since there cannot be an infinite regress in this way, by reason of the second Supposition there is something that is through itself one and the first of all things, which is God, through whom all other things whatsoever are. Nor can it be said that the Earth exists through itself, since then it would always have existed necessarily. For per se includes de omni (\"of every\"), as is plain from Posterior Analytics 1, 4. And de omni, as it is taken there, carries the universality of time in every respect, as is plain from Aristotle himself defining it in this way: \"By 'of every' I mean this: what belongs not in some instance thus and in another not, nor at one time thus and at another not, but of every instance and always.\"\n\nIn favor of this argument is Augustine, in the gloss on that verse of Galatians 2: \"But from those who seemed to be something, what they once were makes no difference to me,\" saying thus: \"They are not something, even if they are good ministers of God; for Christ in them is something, not they through themselves. For if they were something through themselves, they would always have been something; but they were once sinners and unlettered men.\" This argument already set forth, that per se includes the universality of time, is likewise plain from Augustine, On the Immortality of the Soul 15, who says: \"This power and incorporeal nature, the maker of the whole body, holds the universe by its present power; for it did not make and depart, and abandon its effect. For that substance which is not a body is not moved locally, so to speak, so as to be able to be separated from the substance which occupies place; and that effective power cannot be idle, so as not to protect what was made by it,\n\nand not to allow it to lack form, so far as it exists. For what is not through itself, if it is deprived of that through which it is, will surely not be. And we cannot say that the body received this when it was made, so that it could now be content with itself, even if it were forsaken by its maker. Yet if it is so, the soul has this all the more, being manifestly that which bestows it upon the body; and thus it is immediately proved immortal, if it can exist through itself. For whatever is of such a kind must be incorruptible, and for this reason cannot perish, since nothing abandons itself [n4]. But the mutability of the body is at hand, which the whole motion of the body of the universe sufficiently shows. Hence, for those who look carefully, so far as such a nature can be looked into, with its mutability duly ordered, what is mutable is found to be mutable; but what is through itself has no need even of any motion, all abundance existing for it in itself, since all motion is toward another, which the thing moved needs. Form is therefore present to the whole body, a better nature sufficing for it and holding what it made; therefore that mutability does not take away from the body its being a body, but makes it pass from form to form\n\nby a most ordered motion. For no part of it is allowed to be reduced to nothing, since that effective power takes in the whole, with neither a laboring nor an idle power, giving that everything which is through it should be, so far as it is.\" And in chapter 16 he writes thus: \"But if, as no one doubts, the mind is wisest when it imitates the truth, which is always in the same way, and clings to it immovably, joined by divine love [n5]; and from it are all things that in any way are, they are from that essence which supremely and most greatly is; either the mind is from it so far as it is, or it is through itself; but if through itself, since it is itself the cause of its existing, and never abandons itself, it never perishes, as we also argued above.\" Nor can anyone say that the Earth exists through itself, while yet this proposition \"The Earth is\" is not per se, so as thus to block the argument set forth. For according to the truth, and according to the Philosopher in the Categories: \"From the fact that a thing is or is not, a statement is called true or false.\" Therefore, from the fact that a thing is, or is not, thus or thus, a statement is called thus true or thus false. Hence also in On Interpretation 1, last: \"Statements are likewise true just as things are.\" Moreover,\n\neven if someone, relying on some reasons or authorities, should wish to defend altogether that some things apart from God exist and remain through themselves, he cannot by any pretext maintain that any things apart from God are through themselves as worthily, as primarily, as supremely, as perfectly, and as equally as God, as the Suppositions and the parts of the first Corollary show. Indeed, even if other things are in some fashion said to be through themselves, God nevertheless is said to be through himself incomparably more, more worthily, prior, and more perfectly. And it is agreed that, of all things that share the same name, that to which the name belongs in a greater and more worthy way is the cause of the rest, according as they share that name. For by this the Philosopher proves, Metaphysics 7, 3, that Substance is the cause of the being of every other category. Where also the text which Averroes expounds, from the fact that substance is worthier of the name of being than the others, concludes thus: \"It is manifest, therefore, that this is the cause of the essence of each of these, and these are on account of that.\" On which Averroes says, Comment 3: \"Since this has been declared of substances, it is manifest that substances are the causes of the essence of accidents,\n\nand accidents are only on account of substances; and this is necessary. For since it has been declared that this name 'being' is said of the ten categories, and more worthily of substances, and it has been declared that when several things share in the same name, and something more worthily than others, that which is more worthy of this name is the cause of the rest, and the disposition of the rest toward causality is like their disposition in that name. From these propositions, therefore, it is concluded that substance is the cause of the other categories.\" Hence also the Philosopher, Metaphysics 2, 4: \"But that which is most of all in other things, according as it is in the others univocally, say fire, is hottest. For it is a cause to the others, causing them; wherefore also it is most true that it is the cause, to later things, that they be true. Therefore the principles of things that always exist must always be most true; for they are not true at one time and not at another, nor is anything the cause for them that they be, but they are the cause for the others. So as each thing stands as to being, so it stands as to truth.\" Here the Commentator's text has it more expressly in this way: \"Each of the principles is properly the cause of those things according to which other things are, which agree in name and intention\" [n6]. Where Averroes says:\n\n\"Since it has been declared that the cause in any genus of beings is worthier in being and in truth than those of which it is the cause in that genus, it is manifest that if there is here a first cause of all things, as was declared in the science of natural things, that cause is worthier in being and in truth than all beings. For all beings acquire being and truth only from that cause. It alone, therefore, is being through itself and true through itself, and all other beings and true things are so through its being and truth.\" Hence also Augustine, Confessions 7, 15: \"I looked at some things, and saw that they owe it to you that they are. In you all things are bounded, not as in a place, but because you hold all things in hand and in truth [n7]; and all true things are true so far as they are, nor is anything falsity, except when something is thought to be that is not.\" With these\n\nagrees Avicenna, Metaphysics 8, 6, saying: \"The Necessary Being is truth; for the truth of each thing is the property of its being, which is established for it; therefore nothing is more worthy to be truth than the Necessary Being. Now truth is said to be that of whose being the judgment is certain. Therefore nothing is more worthy of this certitude than that of whose being the judgment is certain; and with its certitude it always is, and with its eternity it always is through itself, and not through another than itself. But the quiddities of the other things do not merit being as they are in themselves, their relation to the Necessary Being not being considered [n8], but merit privation; and on this account all things as they are in themselves are false; but because of him there is certitude for them, and on this account every thing perishes, except in so far as it is turned toward his face; and therefore it is more worthy that he himself be the Necessary Being and truth.\" Isaiah 40 writes in agreement with this: \"All nations, as if they were not, so are they before him, and as nothing and emptiness are they reckoned by him.\" Hence also Job 23: \"For he alone is.\" On which Gregory, Moralia 16, 14, speaking of Angels and men, heaven and earth and all the rest: \"All these,\" he says,\n\n\"are, but are not principally, because they do not subsist at all in themselves; and unless they were held by the hand of the governor, they could in no way be. For all things subsist in him by whom they were created; nor do those that live give life to themselves, nor are those that are moved and do not live led to motion by their own movements; but he moves all things who gives life to some, and preserves others, once given life, wondrously ordering them in the farthest reach of being. For all things were made from nothing, and their essence would tend again to nothing, unless the Author of all held it by the hand of government. All things, therefore, that were created can neither subsist nor be moved through themselves; they subsist only so far as they have received that they should be; they are moved only so far as they are disposed by a hidden instinct. For behold, the sinner is to be scourged through human affairs. The earth withers in his burning heats, the sea is shaken in his shipwrecks, the air is kindled in his sweats, the heaven grows dark against him in floods, men are inflamed in his oppressions, and the angelic powers also are stirred in his adversity. Surely these things which we have called inanimate or living\n\nare not driven by their own instincts and not rather by divine impulses? Whatever it is, then, that rages outwardly, through it must be regarded he who disposes it inwardly; in every cause, therefore, there is he alone who is principally, who also says to Moses: 'I am who am; thus you shall say to the children of Israel: He who is has sent me to you.'\" Wherefore Plato also, Timaeus 2, 3, introduces God addressing the other gods, namely the Angels, in this way: \"Gods, of whom I am maker and Father: you are my works, dissoluble by nature, yet indissoluble by my will. For everything that is joined together is by nature dissoluble; but it is not of God to will to dissolve what has been well joined and harmonized by reason. Therefore, since you have been made and generated, you are by no means immortal, nor altogether indissoluble; yet you will never be dissolved, nor undergo the necessity of death, because my will is a greater and more vigorous bond for the keeping of eternity than those vital bonds out of which your eternity has been joined together and composed.\" Moreover, even the heaven, the firmest of bodies, is by no means sufficient to exist through itself. For Averroes says, On the Substance of the Sphere, treatise 2: \"You should know that the celestial body, which is simple and unchangeable\n\nby anything extrinsic, needs not only a power moving it always in place, but also a power bestowing on it, in its substance, eternal permanence. For although it is simple and has no potency for corruption, it is nevertheless of finite action by necessity, because it is of finite dimensions, bounded by the surface that contains it. And in every such thing, when the intellect has posited it as existing through itself, apart from anything else bestowing permanence and eternity on it, it is necessary that its permanence be finite just as its action is finite; and therefore it is necessary, in the intellect, that there be here a power bestowing on it eternal permanence, just as it bestows on it eternal motion.\" Hence also Psalm 32 [33]: \"By the word of the Lord the heavens were made firm, and all their power by the breath of his mouth.\" If, therefore, according to Augustine, Plato, and Averroes, neither mind nor Angel nor heaven can remain through itself without divine conservation and sustaining, what else could so remain? Wherefore also the Father of the Philosophers,\n\nHermes, On the Eternal Word 38, says: \"This sensible one, which is called the world, is the receptacle of all sensible forms, qualities, or bodies, none of which can be quickened without God. For God is all things, and from him are all things, and all things are subject to his will, which is wholly good, seemly, prudent, and immutable, and perceptible and intelligible to himself alone; and without this nothing was, nor is, nor will be. For all things are from him, and in him, and through him: both manifold qualities, and great quantities, and all measures exceeding magnitudes, and forms of every shape; when you have understood these, O Asclepius, you will give thanks to God.\" In agreement with him, the Apostle in Romans 11: \"From him,\" he says, \"and through him and in him are all things; to him be glory.\" And the book of the twenty-four definitions of God by as many Philosophers [n9], as if expounding him, says in the twenty-second: \"God is that from which is whatever is, not by division; through which it is, not by variation; in which it is, not by commingling.\" Hence also Augustine, Confessions 1, 1, speaking to God, says: \"I would not be at all\n\nunless you were in me. Or rather, would I not be, unless I were in you? From whom are all things, through whom are all things, in whom are all things? Even so, Lord, even so.\" The same Augustine also says on that verse of Psalm 113 [115]: \"Whatever he willed, he did\": \"In them,\" he says, \"he himself is, as one who contains things in need, not as one contained by them in need.\" Dionysius, moreover, in On the Divine Names 11, to Timothy asking what is meant by saying that God is through himself, whether God through himself is life, or wisdom, or anything else of the kind, replies: \"But this we say: it is not trifling [n10], but right, and admits of a simple declaration. For we do not say that some divine or Angelic essence is, by being through itself, the cause of the being of all things that are. For it is only the cause of the being of all things that are, only of the existing of all things that are, and being itself is the superessential principle, and essence, and causal [principle]; nor [do we say that there is] another deity, parent of life, apart from the super-divine cause of all that live and the cause of life brought forth; nor is one to speak of a [deity] gathering life, nor of principal existents and creating essences and substances [n11], which indeed they promptly made to be both gods of existing things and creators,\n\nwhich, to speak truly and properly, neither did they form, nor are they existing things, nor their fathers; but we call deity through itself being and through itself life: principally, in a deiform and causal way, the one superprincipal and superessential principle and cause of all things; but participatedly, the providential powers brought forth from the God who does not participate: through itself life-giving (according to another translation, essence-making) and through itself deifying; which existing things each participate in their own proper way, and both exist and live and are divine, and are so called, and likewise the others in the same way; and the best establisher of the first of them is said to be, then of their wholes, then of their parts, then of the wholes that participate in them, then of those that participate in them partially. And what need is there to speak of these, since indeed some of our divine Masters say that the establisher of goodness itself and divinity itself is more than best and more than divine, saying that goodness itself and divinity itself\n\nare beneficent and deifying, a gift proceeding from God, and form through itself, an outpouring through itself form-making, both total form and particular form, and the universally good, and whatever else has been or will be said according to the same manner, declaring providence and goodness as participated by existing things, proceeding from the God who does not participate.\" And further on, 5: \"Goodness,\" he says, \"converts all things to itself, as being principally the gatherer of things scattered, as principal and life-giving deity; and all things seek it as principle, as containment, as end; and it is the best, as the Scriptures say, from which all things subsist and are, as brought forth from a most perfect cause, and in which all things are established, as guarded and comprehended in an omnipotent counsel, and toward which all things are converted, each as to its own summit; and all things desire it.\" And further on, in the same place: \"Simply, every on, that is, being, is from the good and best, and is converted to the good and best; and all things whatever that are and come to be, are and come to be through the good and best, and all look to this,\n\nand are moved and contained by it; and on account of it and through it and in it is every principle, exemplary, consummative, intellectual, specific, formal; and simply every principle, every containment, every summit, or, to speak comprehensively, all things that are, from the good and best, and all things that are not, are superessentially in the good and best; and it is of all things the principle and end, superprincipal and superfinal, because from it and through it and in it and into it are all things, as the sacred word says.\" By the reasoning already made Anselm also shows, in Monologion 3 and in the chapters following, that there is some being which alone is through itself, and that through this one all the rest are; and that it is unique, having no equal or greater, since whatever is through another is less than it. Hence he concludes that of all beings it is supremely and greatest; and afterwards, by the same reasoning, he shows that it necessarily and continually sustains all other things. Hence also in chapter 13 he says thus: \"It is agreed, therefore, that whatever is not identical with it has been made through the supreme nature. But only an irrational mind can doubt\n\nthat all things that have been made flourish by the same one sustaining them, and persevere in being as long as they are, by whose making they have from nothing the being that they are. For by a wholly similar reasoning to that by which it was gathered that all things that are, are through some one thing, and that this one alone is through itself and the others through it, by a similar reasoning, I say, it can be proved that whatever flourishes, flourishes through some one thing, and this one alone flourishes through itself, and the others through another. And since this cannot be otherwise than that the things that were made flourish through another, and that from which they were made flourishes through itself, it is necessary that, as nothing was made except through the creating present essence, so nothing flourishes except through the preserving presence of that same essence.\" And in chapter 14 he adds, in consequence, that if it is so, indeed because by necessity it is so, it follows that where it is not, nothing is; it is therefore everywhere, and through all things,\n\nand in all things. And further on: \"It is clear that it is itself which bears all other things, and surpasses, encloses and penetrates them. If, therefore, this is joined with the things found above, it is the same that is in all things, and through all things, and from which, and through which, and in which are all things.\" Moreover, every thing caused is caused by some cause actually causing now, which is plain from the mutual relation between them, and from Algazel, Metaphysics 1, and Avicenna, Metaphysics 6, and 8, at length. But everything apart from God is something caused, and he alone is uncaused; everything, therefore, besides God is in some way caused by God. But this causation, at least of those things which are not moved nor newly produced, can be called nothing but necessary conservation, which is also plain from the aforementioned Philosophers in the places cited. Nor can it be said that God is said now to cause some thing caused for the reason that he earlier caused it, or caused the cause that caused it; for this contradicts the cited Authorities; and because then a Father would be said now actually to cause his son as existing, indeed even a dead Father his son now living, because he caused him or the cause of him. Wherefore also Algazel, Metaphysics 1, last:\n\n[Algazel] shows that nothing possible has being except through another, which is its maker; and that the world too, even if it is eternal, can be called a thing made by God the Most High. Distinguishing concerning the maker, he adds: \"Maker\" is understood in two ways. First, as the one who draws what is made from non-being into being. Second, as the one through whom the being of a thing exists, as the being of light is through the sun; and the sun is seen to be the maker of light by nature. Some, however, thought that once a thing has being it has no need of a maker, and that even if he does not exist, what he made does not cease to be. Perhaps they presume to say that even if God is posited not to be, it does not follow from this that the world is not; and they try to show this by an example and by a reason. By example, thus: when the builder of a house is dead, the house itself remains. By reason, thus: what is not needs a giver of being; but what is does not need one in this way. He answers the example and says that the builder is not the cause of the house, except improperly. He is the cause of the motion of the parts of the house while they are being moved toward the form of the house; but once the form of the house has been introduced and the motions cease, his causality ceases. Indeed, according to the same author in the same place, the form of the foundation, of the wall, and of the other parts are the causes of the house.\n\nTo the reason he says that what already has being needs no giver but a preserver, which he proves thus: Every made thing depends on its maker, and not according to its non-being, which it had; therefore according to its being. And he adds: \"Therefore what has begun to be needs the maker only according to its being, since it is according to this mode that it is possible to be.\" And below: \"But since the made thing depends on the maker only insofar as it has being, then as long as it remains in being it needs the maker, and depends on him according to its being, and exists on account of him and with him in all its dispositions, just as the being of the day is on account of the sun and with the sun in all its dispositions.\" Now Algazel, in this argument as in very many of his sayings, follows Avicenna, who in Metaphysics 6, 1 pursues the same argument in effect, at great length, and where among other things he says: \"The divine philosophers do not understand an agent only as the principle of motion, as the natural philosophers do, but as the principle of being and its giver, as the creator of the world is. But a natural cause does not acquire the being of a thing except through some motion among the modes of motion; therefore what acquires being in natural things is a principle of motion.\" And below in the same place: \"Perhaps someone will think that there is need of an agent and cause only so that the thing may have being after non-being, but that after the thing has had being, if the cause is destroyed, the thing will nevertheless be sufficient in itself. So he will think that a thing needs a cause only for beginning to be, but that once it has begun and has had being it will no longer need a cause. Causes, then, will in his view be causes only of coming-to-be, and prior to what comes to be, not simultaneous with it. Now he has thought falsely, as you know; for the being of a thing, after the thing has been made, must be either necessary being or not necessary being. And having shown at length that it is not necessary being through itself, but dependent on the necessary being through itself, at the end of the chapter he speaks thus: After it has become clear that the being of a quiddity depends on something, insofar as it is being for that quiddity, not insofar as it is being after non-being, then that being is caused in this way; and in the meantime, while it lasts, it will thus be something caused, depending on another. It is therefore now manifest that what is caused\n\nneeds something that gives it being itself, per se only; but beginning and other such things are things that happen to it; and that what is caused needs a giver of its being always and unceasingly, as long as it has being.\" In agreement with this, Hermes too, On the World and Heaven 1, treating of the principles of things and exploring and inquiring what the highest and first cause is, and what its effect, speaks thus: \"That cause, then, is tu yta olbz, that is, the spring that holds the seedbed of life, [n12] which is called the fullness of knowledge, the good of the goodness of divine clemency; which, set in the manner of a circle through the whole body of the world, and placed now outside, now within, rules and composes all things; and, to care for and preserve all things fiery and spherical, does not cease to perpetuate their agitation. There are joined, in individual form, inscribed by singularity, whatever matter, whatever world, whatever machine of the world, whatever time, whatever the elements bring forth among temporal things. There is the text of the work, the fated series, the ordering of the ages, the boundary of all temporal things, written out by the finger of the highest disposer; there is the knot of perpetuity.\n\nThe divine Mind, therefore, lays down its office through no weariness, but does not cease to sustain itself and the world and all things within it, with perpetual and untiring usefulness, or otherwise by its own stability.\" The Truth itself bears the most true witness to this same thing when it says, \"My Father works even until now, and I work\" (John 5). This is understood not of the working by which things are merely newly produced, but of the necessary preservation of things produced, as Avicenna and Algazel explained above. Hence Augustine, Literal Commentary on Genesis 4, 14, treating how God rested on the seventh day from every work and yet how the Father nevertheless works continually until now, speaks thus: \"It can be understood that God rested from founding the kinds of creature; but that henceforth, until now and beyond, he works the administration of those same kinds, which were then established. This is not to say that on the seventh day at least his power ceased from the governance of heaven and earth and of all the things he had founded; otherwise they would at once slip away. For the power of the Creator, and the might of the Omnipotent who holds all things,\n\nis the cause of subsisting for every creature; and if it were ever to cease from them, their species would cease along with them, and every creature would collapse. Nor, as the builder of a house departs when he has built it, and his work stands with him ceasing and departing, could the world likewise stand even for the blink of an eye, if the Lord withdrew his rule from it. Therefore also what the Lord says, 'My Father works even until now,' shows a certain continuation of his work, by which he contains and administers the whole creation; and what is written of his wisdom, 'It reaches from end to end mightily, and disposes all things sweetly,' of which it is likewise written that its motion is more agile and swifter than all motions. To those who look rightly it is clear enough that wisdom supplies to things, to be sweetly disposed, this very motion of hers, incomparable and ineffable and, if it could be understood, stable; and that if this were withdrawn, if she ceased from operation, they would at once perish [n13]. And what the Apostle says, when preaching God to the Athenians, 'In him we live and move and are,' clearly understood, as far as the human mind can, supports this opinion, by which we believe and say that God works unceasingly in the things he has created.\n\n\"For we are not in him as though we were his substance, in the way it has been said that he has life in himself; but, since we are something other than he, we are in him for no other reason than that he works this; and this is his work, which contains all things, and by which his wisdom reaches from end to end mightily and disposes all things sweetly; and through this disposition we live and move and are in him.\" From this it is gathered that if he withdrew this work of his from things, we should neither live nor be moved nor exist. \"It is clear, therefore, that God did not cease even for a single day from the work of ruling the things he created, lest they should at once lose their natural motions (by which they are driven and quickened, so that they may be the natures of all things, and in what they are may remain, each according to its kind) and cease altogether to be anything, if the motion of God's wisdom, by which he disposes all things sweetly, were withdrawn from them.\" From this passage proposition 277 of Prosper's Sentences has been excerpted. Further, Augustine also, Literal Commentary on Genesis 9, 23, says that if God were to withdraw from nature the inmost operation by which he establishes it\n\nand makes it continually, nothing of it will remain, as though extinguished. And below, in 23, he says that the formation of woman from the rib was done by that work of God which he worked not through Angels but through himself, and did not hand over; but works are so continued that the nature neither of any other things nor of the Angels themselves would subsist if he were not working. And on that verse of Psalm 118 [119], \"Your hands have made me,\" he says thus: \"If God's operative power were withdrawn from things, they perish.\" The same author also teaches a similar opinion in On Genesis Literally 8, 19; in On Nature and Grace 26; and in Prosper's Sentences 131 and 285. Anselm also, On the Fall of the Devil 1, says: \"Not only is there no other essence except by his making it, but what was made cannot in any way remain unless the same himself preserves it. When he himself ceases to preserve what he made, what was returns into non-being.\" Lombard also, Sentences 1, dist. 37, recites some who say: \"All places are present to God, and as to what is in them, he does not cease to work in them; for the places themselves, and whatever is in them, cannot remain unless he preserves them. In them, therefore, God is said to be through substance, because by the power\n\nof his own substance he brings it about that places also exist, and all things that are in them\"; and he approves and confirms this opinion of theirs. Furthermore, nothing that has a formal cause can exist without it; but God is the first form of all things, as the Suppositions demonstrate, as Metaphysics 2 also demonstrates, since in formal causes there is no infinite regress, but there is one first of all; and this is God. In Metaphysics 12 also, nearly at the beginning, the same is plain; whence Averroes too says there, comment 6, what Alexander had also said before, that God is the first form of all things, the first efficient cause, and likewise the first end. Averroes likewise says the following on On Sleep and Waking: \"Since these individuals have determinate being, it is necessary that none of them be understood in connection with an abstract form, whose proportion to it [n14]\n\nis as the proportion of the form of the artifice to the thing made by art.\" For this form is the artificer of all things (Wisdom 7). Plotinus affirms the same, of whom Augustine writes thus in City of God 10, 4 [n15]: \"Plotinus the Platonist certainly discusses providence, and proves that it reaches from the highest God, whose beauty is unintelligible and ineffable, even to these earthly and lowest things, by the beauty of little flowers and leaves; all of these, as things cast aside and most swiftly perishing, he affirms could not have the most seemly numbers of their forms unless they were formed from that place where the intelligible and unchangeable form, having all things at once, endures.\" Therefore Augustine too, in On the Word of the Lord, sermon 38, says: \"The Word of God is a certain form, a form not formed, but the form of all things formed, without place surpassing all things, standing out above all, and a kind of foundation on which they stand, and a summit beneath which they stand. For since he is God [n16], all things are beneath him; the Word, remaining in itself, renews all things; therefore it is the form of all things, an unfashioned form, without time, without the spaces of places.\" He also says in the Eighty-three Questions, 23, that the very likeness\n\nof the Father is called the Son, by participation in whom whatever things exist are alike, either to one another or to God; and adds: \"For he is the first species, by which things are, so to speak, given species, and the form by which all things are formed.\" Chrysostom also, on the Epistle to the Hebrews, homily 2, says that the Son is the proper stamp of the first form; and Dionysius, On the Divine Names 11, cited above, bears witness to this too. Saint Hierotheus also, as Dionysius recites him in On the Divine Names 2, writes thus [n17]: \"The divinity of Jesus, cause and fulfiller of all things, joining parts to the universe and saving them; it is neither part nor whole, and is both whole and part, encompassing in itself every whole and part and whole, supereminent and excelling. It is perfect indeed among the perfect, as principal perfection; but imperfect among the imperfect, as super-perfect and pre-perfect, a form forming among the formless, as a principal form unformed in the forms themselves, as the super-formal essence of the whole of essence, [and] passing beyond the uncontaminated, and superessentially, with all essence set aside, beginning and ordering all principles, destining them, and set above in every principle and order,\n\nand the measure of the things that are.\" A not ignoble imitator of these is Robert, Bishop of Lincoln, in a certain letter directed to Master Adam Rufus, who asked whether God is the first form of all things. He shows that God is the form of all things, and also the first form. First he supposes that he is form, and proves that he is necessarily the first form, because before him there is nothing; for he is the first and the last. Then he proves that he is form, by authorities and likewise by arguments. He cites the first authority from Augustine, On Free Choice 1; and so it is, if \"Whence evil,\" that is, the first book, is not counted [n18]; but if that is counted, as Augustine himself counts it in Retractations 1, 9, it is On Free Choice 2, 28. Augustine therefore says: \"Whatever mutable thing you look at, you cannot grasp it, whether by bodily sense or by consideration of the mind, unless it is held by some form of numbers, and if this is withdrawn it must needs fall back into nothing. Do not doubt that where these mutable things are not cut off, but with measured motions and a distinct variety of forms go through, as it were, certain verses of times, there is some eternal and unchangeable form,\n\nwhich is neither contained and, as it were, diffused in places, nor stretched out and varied in times, and through which all these things are able to be formed, and each according to its kind to fill out and carry out the numbers of places and times. Now every mutable thing must also be formable; just as we call mutable what can be changed, so I should call formable what can be formed. But no thing can form itself, because no thing can give itself what it does not have; and to have form, something must be formed. Wherefore any thing, if it has some form, has no need to receive what it has; if it has no form, it cannot receive from itself what it does not have; so no thing, as we have said, can form itself. It follows, therefore, that body and soul, since they are mutable, are formed by a certain form that is unchangeable and always remaining, to which it has been said: 'You will change them and they will be changed; but you are the same, and your years will not fail.' The prophetic speech put 'years without failing' for eternity. Of this form too it has been said that, remaining in itself, it renews all things [n19]. From this also it is understood\n\nthat all things are governed by providence: for if all things that are, with form wholly withdrawn, would be nothing, it is the unchangeable form itself, through which all mutable things subsist, so that they are filled and driven by the numbers of their forms, that is their providence; for these things would not be if that were not.\" And this seems to be the argument of Avicenna and Algazel touched on above, by which, from possible being, they found that there is one necessary being. For this Augustine also cites, in Confessions 13, such a speech addressed to the Father: \"What did the spiritual and corporeal nature that you made deserve from you, that even things merely begun should depend on you, and so depend in your Word as unformed [n20], unless through the same Word they were recalled to your unity, and were formed, and were, from you the one highest good, all things very good?\" And it follows: \"What did the beginning of spiritual creation deserve from you, that it should at least float shadowy, like an abyss, unlike you, unless through your Word it were converted to that by which it was made and, illuminated by it, became light, though not equally, yet conformed to a form equal to you?\" [n21]\n\nAgain he [Robert] brings in the same Augustine, Confessions 2, speaking thus to the Father: \"I shall stand and be made firm in you, in my form, your life\" [n22]. After this he shows by four arguments that God is form to himself; then he makes clear how God is the form of creatures, and holds that form is found in creatures in four ways. First, as the other part of a composite, from which and from matter the whole itself is composed; and in this way God is not the form of creatures. Second, that to whose likeness something is formed is called a form, as a wooden foot is called the form of a sandal, which is formed according to it. Third, that is called form by application to which matter is shaped to its likeness; and so the seal is the form of the wax, and the clay mould of the cast statue. Fourth, the likeness in the mind of the craftsman, looking to which he works, is called the form, namely, of such an artefact; and this does not differ much from the form of the second mode. And he adds: \"Imagine, then, in the mind of the Architect the form of the house to be built, to which alone he looks, so as to make the house in imitation of it; and imagine, in addition, impossibly, that his will is so powerful\n\nthat it alone applies the matter to be formed into a house. And imagine along with this that the matter of the house were fluid and could not remain in the form received in itself if it were separated from the form in the mind of the Architect, as water shaped by a silver seal, when the seal is removed, at once loses the received shape. Imagine, then, the craftsman's will applying the matter of the house to the form in his mind, not only so that it may thus be formed into a house, but, as long as the house remains in the being of a house, so that, once formed, it is preserved in being. In the same way, then, as such a form in the mind of the Architect would be the form of the house, the art, or wisdom, or word of omnipotent God is the form of all creatures; for it is at once exemplar, efficient, forming, and preserving in the form given. And below he says that the eternal wisdom of God is thus the form of all things, as if you were to imagine that the figure of a silver seal were life and intelligence, understanding itself and willing to shape, to the imitation and likeness of itself, more or less expressed, fluid wax, which cannot of itself remain in any shaping received; and by this will alone were to move the formless and fluid wax\n\ntoward itself, and apply it to itself, and so imprint some likeness of itself, and preserve it once imprinted; thus the eternal wisdom of the Father is the form of all things.\" These are the words of Robert of Lincoln, \"Great-head,\" but of subtle and acute intellect [n23]. Aristotle bears express witness to the same thing in On the World 11, saying thus: \"No nature suffices for itself by itself, deprived of the safety that comes from him, namely God. For this reason some of the Ancients were moved to say that all these things are full of gods.\" Whence also Virgil, in the Bucolics, eclogue 3: \"From Jove the beginning, Muses; all things are full of Jove.\" And Jeremiah 23: \"I fill heaven and earth, says the Lord.\" And there follows in On the World that the power which resides in heaven and in the things farthest apart, speaking of the one (in another translation, \"to say in one\"), becomes to all a cause of salvation. This is his omnipotent word, which came from heaven from the royal seats (Wisdom 18), which heals all things (above, 16) [n24]. Whence also the Apostle, Hebrews 1: \"bearing all things by the word of his power.\" Is it not also for this reason that Hermes says that God is in a way all things, and is named by the names of all, as his authority On the Eternal Word, 38, cited above, in part teaches?\n\nDoes he not also say above, in 31 of the same work, that the Father of all, or Lord, he who alone is all things, shows himself willingly to all? And above, in 22, inquiring into the name of God, he speaks thus: \"I do not expect that the maker of all majesty, the Father or Lord of all things, can be called by a single name, though compounded of many, but that he is called in a name, or rather by the name of all things [n25]; if indeed he is one and all, so that it must needs be either that all things are named by his name, or that he is named by the names of all things.\" In agreement with this the Philosopher, treating of the divine names at the end of On the World, writes thus: \"Though he is one, he has many names, being named from all the affections that he himself renews.\" And having extended this, as it were, through individual cases by induction, he says at the end that he is called Savior and Eleutherius (in another translation, Liberator), and, in sum, speaking generally, that he is to be called heavenly and earthly from every nature and fortune, as being himself the cause of all. \"For which reason it is not badly said in the Orphic verses: Jupiter the foundation of earth and heaven, Jupiter the root of the sea, Jupiter sun and moon, Jupiter king, Jupiter prince of all.\"\n\nHence Lucan too, Jupiter is whatever you see.— Is it perhaps this also, that when Moses asked God his name, God answered veiledly, I am who am; thus you shall say to the children of Israel: He Who Is has sent me to you (Exodus 3)? It is as if he wished to intimate that he is himself simply through himself, and that he is also, in a certain way, the whole of being, conferring essence [n26] on all else. Hence Dionysius too, On the Divine Names 1, shows that the highest unity and divinity is unnamed and yet named by the names of all things, and says: \"The theologians, knowing this, praise it as unnameable, and as unnameable from every name. They say that the Divinity itself, in one of the mystical visions of the symbolic divine manifestation, rebuked the one who said, What is your name? [n27]. As it were drawing him back from all denominative knowledge, the Divinity said, Why do you ask my name? And this is wonderful. Or is not this truly the wonderful name, which is above every name, and which is unnameable? It is of many names, as when they again introduce it saying, I am On (that is, Being), life, light, God, truth, and when the God-wise, in many names drawn from all that it causes, praise it as the cause of all: as the best, as the existent, as cause of the ages, as giver of life, as power, as Lord of lords, as King of reigning kings, as Ancient of days, as not growing old, as unchangeable, as salvation. Moreover they say that it is in minds and in souls, in bodies, in heaven and on earth, and at once in the same; that the same is unworldly, about the world, above the world, above the heavenly, above the essential; sun, star, fire, water, spirit, mist of dew, itself through itself stone and rock, all things that are, and none of the things that are. Thus, then, they will join [n28] to the cause of all, supereminent and unnameable, even all the names of the things that are, so that there may be, with care, a kingdom of all things, and, around what exists, all things dependent upon it as cause, as principle, as end.\" Behold, here he clearly intimates\n\nthat God is the threefold cause of things: formal, efficient, final. And it follows: \"and it itself, according to the saying, is all in all; and it is truly praised as the inchoative and consummative and containing substance of all.\" Where the Gloss says: \"All things that are, is God,\" \"in that from him are all things; nothing of the things that are, because he is not created.\" And below, in 5: \"The divine naming of the Best, manifesting all the causal processions of all things, extends both to existents and to non-existents, and is above existents and above non-existents.\" Where the Gloss: \"By procession he means the divine operation by which all things proceed to their effect.\" Moreover, God is named \"Father of all\" in Hermes [n29], On the Eternal Word 22 and 31. And \"Father,\" as Papias attests in his Elementarium, is Greek, that is, \"begetter,\" so called from the Greek pantater, which is \"preserving all things.\" Hence Hermes too, as touched on above, says of God that he is the Father of all, or the Lord of all, or he who alone is all things: namely, conferring essence on all things by producing them, and likewise by preserving them, as the efficient and formal cause of all. Hermes seems to teach this same opinion in On the Eternal Word 1, where, speaking of the fullness of all goods, he adds, as though correcting himself: \"if, however, there are many goods, and not one in which all are: for the one is recognized as akin to the other, that all belong to one, or that the one is all; for each is so joined to the other that neither can be separated from the other.\" Aristotle agrees with him in On the World 12 [n30], and confirms the same by an elegant example: \"They say,\" he says, \"that the sculptor Phidias figured Minerva (in another translation, Pallas) in the middle of a certain shield, and impressed his own face on it, and joined it to the statue by some hidden contrivance, so that of necessity, if anyone wished to remove it, he would break up and shatter the whole statue. God stands in such a relation to the World, containing the harmony and safety of all.\" Hence Avicenna too, Metaphysics 8, 6: \"Everything perishes, except insofar as it is turned toward his face; and therefore it is more fitting that he himself be the necessary being, and truth, and pure intention.\" Psalm 103 [n31] also agrees with these, saying: \"When you open your hand, all things will be filled with goodness; when you turn away your face, they will be troubled; you will take away their spirit, and they will fail, and they will return to their dust,\" that is, they will be reduced to nothing. Is it not also for this reason that some have posited that God is the Soul of the world? Although Plato, Timaeus 1, 2 and 6, seems to maintain that the Soul of the world was produced by God, and set in the middle of the World. Hence also Themistius, as Averroes reports on Metaphysics 12, comment 19, speaking of animals generated from putrefaction, and of the craft and intention of nature, says: \"It is not strange that nature, though it understands nothing of this kind, yet does this by inducing some intention; and this shows that something reminds it of noble causes, like the soul that is on earth, of which Plato says that it is from the second gods.\" But Averroes consequently rejects this saying of Themistius, and says that such animals are generated from heavenly heat duly measured. He adds: \"And this measure comes from the divine intellectual art, which is like the one form of one principal art, under which there are several arts.\" According to this, then, it must be understood that nature makes something perfectly and in order, although it does not understand,\n\nas if it had been reminded by agent powers nobler than those that are called intelligences. And therefore it is said that all proportions and forms which are in potency in prime matter are in act in the first mover, and are in some way likened to the being of what comes to be in the soul of the Artisan. Does not Avicenna too, in On the Soul 4, 4, say that there is one soul common to Heaven and the World, whose operation is toward the nature of the whole? This Soul, according to some, is God; according to others, it is born, or produced, by God. These opinions are not repugnant to one another, nor to Catholic truth. For this Soul can be understood as the reason, or will, the word, or willing of God, by which he makes and preserves things; and these differ in no way essentially from God, but are God, by the twenty-sixth part of the first Corollary of this. Hence Aristotle also, in On the World 11, says that God, by one saying, that is, by speaking, is the cause of safety for all, as is recited above. And below, in 14, treating how God produces things, he says thus: \"He sent forth from his nurturing heart, working out what he had thought\"; in another translation, \"from a great mind.\" Hermes agrees with him, and teaches in On the World and Heaven 1 that there are three principles of things: namely Cause, Reason, and Nature. By \"Cause\" he means the first cause, simply and altogether uncaused, namely God the Father, who first causes the Reason proceeding from him, namely the Son, and through him the whole of Nature. That the Father also causes the Son, and is his eternal cause, Augustine and Chrysostom attest. Hence Hermes too, where he was cited before, says: \"Reason is from Cause, and Nature from both.\" And below: \"Reason is a certain power proceeding from Cause, ordering all things from the beginning.\" There he also takes these three, Reason, Nous, and the divine mind, indifferently, and almost synonymously, for the same thing. For he says that Nous is that of which nature is said to be the qualifier, implanting natural qualities in things [n32]. And below he says that the divine mind, without any weariness, does not cease to sustain the world and all that is within it, as is more fully recited above. Hence Papias too in his Elementarium says: \"Nous: the will of God, or the mind which is called providence. It is, moreover, an intelligible essence of emulous goodness, on account of its unwearied conversion to the highest God; Noun, that is, the Word of God containing the original species of things.\" Does not that Platonic saying also accord with this opinion, which Augustine, Confessions 7, 9, says he read in the books of the Platonists translated from Greek into Latin: not in these words, to be sure, but altogether the same? In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and God was the Word; this was in the beginning with God; all things were made through him, and without him nothing was made that was made; in him was life. And what Catholic does not know that this is the beginning of the holy Gospel according to John, in the same sentences and words? Hence Augustine too, City of God 10, 29, says: \"It shames learned men to become, from disciples of Plato, disciples of Christ, who taught a fisherman by his spirit to know and to say, In the beginning was the Word,\" etc., recited above; and he adds: \"That beginning of the holy Gospel, whose name is according to John: a certain Platonist, as we used to hear from the holy Simplicianus, who afterwards presided as bishop over the church of Milan, used to say that it ought to be written in golden letters and set up in the most eminent places in all the churches. But that God, the master, became cheap to the proud because the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us.\" But because a rational cause does not act through reason alone without the concomitance of will, the same Philosophers, meditating more earnestly, added will besides to God the first cause, or God the Father, and to his reason, mind, or Word. And will, as Augustine witnesses (On the Trinity 15, 20), is recognized to belong to the Holy Spirit by a certain appropriation. Hence the same Hermes, On the Eternal Word 22, speaking of God, the Father of all, says thus: \"He alone, as being all things, most full of the fruitfulness of both sexes [n33], always pregnant with his own will, always brings forth whatever he has willed to procreate. His will is all goodness; this same goodness of all things is born of his divinity.\" And below, in 23: \"I say,\" he says, \"that sense, and nature, and the world contain nature in themselves, and preserve all things born; for each sex is full of procreation, and the union of both, or, what is more true, their unity, is comprehensible [n34]; whom you may rightly call Cupid, or Venus, or both. Perceive, then, with a mind truer than all truth and more manifest, that from that God of the whole of nature this has been devised for all for ever, and the service of procreating assigned, to which supreme Charity, the gladness of joy, desire, and divine love are innate.\" Now charity, desire, and love belong properly to the will, and these, as Augustine also witnesses (On the Trinity 15, 17 and 20), are in a way properly attributed to the Holy Spirit. Hence Plato too, Timaeus 1, 1, says: \"If anyone posits that the will of God is the most certain origin of all things, I would agree that he thinks rightly.\" Hermes, too, seems at times to name this divine will, which is fitting to the Holy Spirit, \"Spirit.\" For in On the Eternal Word 15 he says: \"Thus far these matters are treated; but of Spirit and its like let the beginning be taken from here. There was God and hyle, which in Greek we take to be the world; with the world there was Spirit, or Spirit was in the world, but not in the same way as with God, nor [as with] God, of whom the world; for this reason they were not, when they were not, but were already then in him from whom they were to be born [n35].\"\n\n\"Pan, or the nature of the world, is Spirit. Although it seems to be born, yet from the beginning it possesses in itself the power of being born and of procreating, and the nature of fecundity. For its beginning is in the quality of nature, which possesses in itself the power and the matter of both conception and birth. This, then, without another's conception, is generable by itself alone.\" And below, in 18: \"By Spirit all things in the world are served and enlivened; Spirit, like an organ or machine of the highest God, is subject to his will. By Spirit all species in the world are moved, or governed, each according to its own nature allotted to it by God. Pan, moreover, is the receptacle of the world, and the stirring and thronging of all things, of which God is the governor, dispensing to each what is necessary to it among worldly things; but he fills all things with Spirit, according to the quality of each nature.\" Is not this also what the Wise Man declares, saying: \"The Spirit of the Lord has filled the world, and that which contains all things\" (Wisdom 1)? Moreover the same Hermes, On the Eternal Word 28, says: \"God's nature is the counsel of will, the highest goodness; will is born from counsel, and wills what it has; and it wills all good things, and has all it wills; and it both thinks and wills all good things, and this is God; his image is the world of the good.\" Does not that first of the twenty-four definitions of as many Philosophers about God [n36] also support this opinion: \"God is a monad begetting a monad, reflecting one toward ardor\"; and the seventh, which says: \"God is a beginning without beginning, a procession without variation, an end without end\"? Porphyry the Philosopher, a disciple of Plato, not of Christ, attests this opinion too more plainly, and Augustine, addressing him in City of God 10, 29, says: \"You preach the Father and his Son, whom you call the paternal Intellect or Mind, and the middle between them, whom we suppose you mean as the Holy Spirit, and in your manner you call them three Gods.\" And above, in 28, disputing with the same man: \"You say that ignorance, and on account of it many vices, are purged by no rites, but only by the paternal noun, that is, the paternal mind, or intellect, which is conscious of the paternal will; but you do not believe that this is Christ.\" This divine nous, mind, reason, will, or spirit seems, however, to be called not unsuitably the Soul of the world and its life. Hence Hermes too, On the Eternal Word 2, says: \"Although the species of all things, varied by the multiform equality of images and the infinity of qualities, are known to exist at intervals, yet they are united to this end, that the whole may seem one, and all things from one. Thus, in all by which it is formed [n37], the whole is one World, one Soul, and one God.\" And below, near the end: \"O true life of life, O fruitful pregnancy of us all; we have known you most fully by your conception of the whole of nature; we have known you, O eternal perseverance.\" The Philosopher agrees with this in On the World, last chapter, treating of the divine Names: \"We call him,\" he says, \"Jove, and Zena, using the names in parallel, saying Zena from the Greek ζῆν, which is 'to live,' as if we were to say, 'through whom we live'; Jupiter, the spirit of all; Jupiter, the motion of unwearied fire.\" Josephus also reports, Jewish Antiquities 12, 2, that Aristaeus the Greek said to Ptolemy Philadelphus, King of Egypt: \"I have learned that the Jews worship God, the maker of all, whom we call Zena, that is, Jove, because he grants to all ζῆν, that is, to live.\" With this Albricus also agrees, in his On the Origin of the Gods, or in his Poetarium, saying that God is called Vitunetus because he provides life, and Sentinus because he gives sense, as is more fully set out around the twenty-first part of the first Corollary of this. Hence Servius too, that old and not ignoble commentator, on that line of Virgil in the Bucolics, third eclogue, —all things full of Jove, cites a similar line from Lucan, who says, Jupiter is whatever you see, wherever you move; and he adds that elsewhere the same poet says [n38]: The spirit within nourishes, and mind, poured through the limbs, moves the whole mass. Servius there gives the reason of this, saying: \"For he himself is the spirit without which nothing is moved or ruled.\" In harmony with these Ovid too, in Fasti book 6, says:\n\nThere is a god in us; when he stirs, we grow warm; this impulse holds the seeds of a sacred mind.\n\nIs it not also this, that the Apostle, disputing with the Athenians about God, cites from the Poets and teaches, when he says: In him we live and move and are, as some of your poets also have said (Acts 17)? Let no one, then, I ask, be angry with me if I sometimes cite, though very rarely, some of the poets, since it is established that the holy Apostle of God did this. So too blessed Jerome, in Epistle 58 [n39], to Magnus, a senator of the city of Rome who objected to Jerome that he defiled the purity of the Church with the filth of the heathens, because he had inserted poems of the poets into his writings, excuses himself by the Apostle, saying that the Apostle also cited poets; and he says that the one the Apostle cites in this place was Aratus, a Greek poet. Arator also, subdeacon of the holy Roman Church, in book 2 on the Acts of the Apostles, putting this passage into verse, says: O love of sacrilegious novelty! We see that you have set up an altar / to an unknown god, who founded the stars, / who gave the sea and the lands, whom life has as parent, / that we may be moved, from whose fire we breathe, / whose image we are, of whom the poets have sung / that from him the race of men stands; whom I proclaim, / who ordained all things by his mouth. Augustine strengthens this opinion too, treating this authority of the Apostle in [his commentary] on Genesis 4, 14, cited above. Hence Dionysius too, On the Divine Names 6, says [n40]: \"To be praised is the praiseworthy eternal life, from which, through itself, is life and all life, and from which into all things participating in life in any way, living is sown out properly to each. Thus both the life and immortality of the immortal Angels, and the indestructibility itself of the Angelic perpetual motion, are from it and through it, so that it subsists. Therefore they are called both always living and immortal, and again not immortal, because they do not have it from themselves to be immortally and to live eternally, but from the vivifying cause that makes and continues all life. And as we say in onte, that is, in being, because it is also the cause of the being of the same, so there again, because through itself it is the divine life of life, vital and substantial, and all life, and vital motion from life itself, which is above all life and every principle of all life. From it Souls have their indestructibility, and all Animals and sprouts have it, according to the last consonance of soul, to live. When it is removed, according to the saying, all life fails, and, turned back to earth and to deficiency, again toward participating in it by weakness, they again become Animals. And it is indeed given first, and through itself, for life to be life, and for all life; and from it, through each, being in the proper sense; each is reckoned to subsist by nature.\" The same writer says further, above, in 1, that God is the cause and principle of all things, and essence, and life. And below, in the same, speaking of God, he writes thus: \"The best tradition, and to be said simply, is that he is the life of the living and the essence of the things that are, the principle and cause of all life and essence, through his active and containing goodness, so that the things that are may be. This we have learned from the divine sayings, and you will find that the whole sacred hymnology of the theologians speaks thus. Furthermore, all things that participate essentially in something necessarily need it; but all beings short of the first are not essentially and purely, simply, through themselves, insofar as they participate in the first being, which is purely, essentially, through itself.\" All this appears from the relation of principles and what is derived from principles, of causes and effects, of beings through themselves and through another, of more and less beings. Very many authors, philosophical and theological, attest this very frequently. For this is a kind of general rule, which is wont to be observed by Logicians as well as by Philosophers, as anyone knows who diligently considers the writings of the ancients. They very often suppose that everything which is called qualified in some way is called such either through essence, and then it is unique, or according to participation; and however many participants there are, what is participated by all will be one;\n\na rule which the Theologians also embrace. Hence the venerable Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, Monologion 1, showing that there is something first and the highest good of all, says: \"It is most certain, and plain to all who are willing to attend, that whatever things are called something, so that in relation to one another they are called more or less, or equally, are so called through something which is not one thing and another, but the same is understood in different things, whether it be considered in them equally or unequally. For whatever things are called just in relation to one another, whether equally, or more or less, cannot be understood as just except through justice, which is not one thing and another in different things.\" And he says the same of all diverse goods: that they are good through some one good, existing the same in different things; that this alone is good through itself; and that no other good is equal to it or greater, so that it is the highest. He makes the same procedure also in chapter 2, on the Great, and in chapter 3, on being or existing, where he says thus: \"Everything that is, either is through something or through nothing; but nothing is through nothing. For it cannot even be thought that there be something not through something; whatever is, therefore, is only through something. Since this is so, either there is one thing, or there are many, through which are all things that are. But if there are many, either they are themselves referred to some one thing through which they are, or those many are each through themselves, or they are through one another. But if the many are through one, then all things are no longer through many, but rather through that one through which these many are. But if the many are each through themselves, there is surely some one power or nature of existing through itself, which they have so that they are through themselves; and there is no doubt that they are through that one through which they have it that they are through themselves. More truly, therefore, all things are through that one than through the many, because without that one they cannot be. But that the many should be through one another, no reason allows, since it is an irrational thought that anything should be through that to which it gives being.\" Avicenna makes a similar procedure in Metaphysics 1 and 8, and Algazel in Metaphysics 2, and Anselm in the last of On Truth, and likewise in On Rectitude and Truth. This Augustine also maintains, On the Trinity 8, 4, where from many lower goods he argues one highest good of all, and, having counted up many goods, says: \"Why more and more—this good and that good? Take away this, and take away that, and see Good itself, if you can; so you will see God, good not by another good, but the Good of every good.\" And below, in the same: \"There would not be changeable goods,\" he says, \"unless there were an unchangeable good. When, therefore, you hear this good and that good, which in other respects can be called not good either, if you can, without those which are good by participation in the good, discern the Good itself, by whose participation they are good; for you understand it at the same time when you hear this or that good. If, therefore, you can, those being set aside, look upon the good through itself, you will have discerned the good God.\" And in City of God 8, 6: \"Since in the view of the Philosophers body and mind were more and less beautiful, they saw that there is something where the first and unchangeable form was, and therefore incomparable; and there, they most rightly believed, was the principle of things.\" Aristotle\n\nalso, Metaphysics 4, 18, from the fact that some things are less and more false, and true, than others, proves that there is one thing simply true; and Anselm, Monologion 4, most rightly imitates him. Augustine holds the same in many other places. Dionysius in On the Divine Names in many chapters, Boethius in On the Hebdomads, and very many other authors in very many places profess this opinion, as the premises here, and in the first of this, also somewhat attest. Furthermore, Being belongs to matter, to form, and to the composite, to substance and to accident, and it belongs to them not first, simply, or not equally first, nor equally; therefore it belongs to some one thing first and most of all, through which, existing in the others, it belongs to them. But this cannot be posited except of that which is first and through itself, and this is God. The premises in the preceding argument clearly show all this. Hence the Philosopher too says in On the Soul 2, 68 [n41]: \"It is not water insofar as it is water, nor air insofar as it is air, that is diaphanous, but because the same nature is in both of these, and in the everlasting body above, namely Heaven.\" On which Averroes says: \"Not insofar as air, etc.; that is, because diaphaneity is not in water or air alone, but in the celestial body, it was necessary that diaphaneity not be in any of them insofar as it is what it is, but according to a common nature existing in all, although it has no name.\" The same thing seems to be confirmed by the same Philosopher, Posterior Analytics 1, 4 and 5, and 2, 4 and 5, teaching that whatever attribute belongs to many diverse things has some one subject or cause to which it belongs first, and through it, or through that cause, to the others in which it is, as it is to have three angles equal to two right angles, to have horns, to be in a contrary state, or in the state of a contrary, for leaves to shed, for proportionals to be so alternately. And he shows this of other universals, whether they be substantial or accidental, univocal, analogous, or equivocal; all of which Robert of Lincoln [n42] elucidates further in his exposition. It will perhaps be said that that cause of diverse things in diverse things is one in genus, or in species, but in no way in number; but if many causes, numerically different, are similar in nature and name, then either each of them is such through itself, first and essentially, or through another, secondarily and by participation, etc., as above in the preceding argument. Others perhaps will say that that one cause of diverse things in diverse things is a universal. But if a universal is something short of God, it seems that there is one universal of men, another of asses, and others of others; those universals, then, are many, agreeing in nature and name, etc., as against the former answer. This, however, is not improbably posited, if by \"universal\" is understood some universal reason, or a divine power that unifies all such things. Hence Psalm 32 [n31]: \"by the spirit of his mouth, all the power of them\"; and Aristotle in On the World 10: \"One power, which passes through all things, adorned the whole earth, and the Sea, the aether, and the Sun and Moon, and the whole heaven.\" This power, however, is the unifier of all things, God, tenacious vigor, and that principal unity whom we beseech hymn-wise [n43] with a song of praises, whose principality Boethius shows in Arithmetic 1, chapter 6, the title of which is set down as \"On the principality of unity.\" Hence also Avicebron, in the book which he calls The Fountain of Life, and it is chapter 35 of the fifth book, says thus [n44]: \"All things whatever, diverse and divided, in the higher as in the lower, namely individuals, species, genera, differences, properties, and accidents, and all opposed and contrary things, are moved toward conjunction, and desire agreement, and seek unition; because although they are divided, they are joined; and although diverse, they agree in something that holds them, joins them, and makes them agree. And the root of all this is this: that unity overcomes all things, and is diffused in all, and is the retainer of all.\" Proclus the Philosopher agrees with this, saying in proposition 1: \"Every multitude participates in some way in the one\"; and in proposition 14: \"Every good is unitive of those who participate in it, and all unition is good, and the good and the one are the same.\" Moreover the saying of Hermes, On the Eternal Word 2, recited above, attests this unity that unifies all things; and below, in 14, speaking of the heavenly, the earthly, and the intermediate, he says: \"Knowing the effects and nature of all these, let him wonder, adore, and praise the divine art and mind; and to know Music is nothing other than to know the order of all things joined, what each has obtained by divine reason;\n\nfor the order of single things brought into one by the reason of the artificer of all will produce a certain harmony, most sweet and most true, with divine melody.\" Dionysius, moreover, On the Divine Names 1, says: \"In almost every theological action we see the thearchy divinely praised, as monad indeed and as one, on account of the simplicity and unity of its supernatural indivisibility, from which, as by a vivifying power, we are made one, and, our divided otherness supermundanely folded together, we are gathered into a god-like Monad.\" And below, in 5, he says that being itself, through itself, is the principle of existing things, and of all that exists, and of whatever is in any way contained by being, and this immeasurably, folded together, and unitedly. \"For in the monad every number subsists beforehand, and the Monad has every number in itself singly; and every number is indeed united in the Monad, but as far as it proceeds from the Monad, so far it is distinguished and multiplied. And in the centre all the lines of a circle are constituted according to the first unity, and the centre has the mark of them all in itself, as simple [n45] unities, uniformly united to one another and to the one principle from which they proceeded. In the centre itself they are united universally; slightly distant from it, they are slightly distinguished; receding more, more; and, simply, the nearer they are to the centre, so much the more they are united, both to it and to one another, and the farther from it, so much the farther they are from one another. But in the whole nature of all things too, all the reasons of nature, each singly, are enfolded together through one unconfused unity.\" And further below, in the last chapter, treating of the One, namely how the one befits God, he writes thus: \"It is One because it is all things universally, through the excellence of the one unity, and it is the irreversible cause of all of one. For none of existing things is non-participating in the one; but just as every number likewise participates in the monad [n46], and is called one, two, and ten, and a half, and one, and a third, and a tenth, and delimits unity and multitude, so all things, and each one part of all, participate; and by being one, all things are existing, and the one is not the cause of all as one among many, but before every one. For neither is there a multitude not participating in something of the one, and nothing of existing things that participates, or something of the one, downward, all things singly all, and wholly all, and opposites, and of the one that comprehends universally [n47]. And indeed without the one there will be no multitude, but without multitude there will be the one, as the monad is before every multiplied number; and if anyone should set all things united to all, all things will be wholly one. But this too must be recognized: that according to the one the species of each thing is foreknown; the united is said to unite, and there is one exemplar of all; and if you destroy the one, there will be neither the universe nor anything else of existing things. For the one precedes and encompasses all things in itself uniformly: therefore Theology itself, the whole Thearchy [n48].\" Boethius also, in book 3 of On the Consolation of Philosophy, prose 11, proves inductively, through each genus of beings, that all things desire unity. He says, therefore, in conclusion: \"All things, therefore, desire the one, but we have shown that the one itself is what is good; all things, therefore, seek the good, which you may thus describe: what is desired by all. For either all things are referred to nothing, and, as if stripped of a single summit, will drift without a ruler; or, if there is something toward which all things hasten, that will be the highest of all goods.\" And as many multitudes as are thus united, so many such unifying unities of multitudes are virtually in God. From these the exemplary and archetypal number is wondrously gathered in that most simple unity, by which he forms, numbers, and arranges the other numbered things; and this is that intelligible world, the archetype of Hermes and Plato, which the fortieth part of the first Corollary touches. Hence Boethius, Arithmetic 1, 1: \"Whatever things were constructed by the primeval nature of things appear formed by the principle of numbers; for this was the principal exemplar in the mind of the maker. Hence the multitude of the four Elements was borrowed, hence the changes of the seasons, hence the motion of the stars and the revolution of heaven.\" And above, in the same prologue, 2, he maintains the same most fully. This lucid saying of Boethius seems to be taken from the obscure words of the first part of Plato's Timaeus, chapter 1, which Chalcidius in his first commentary entitles \"On the generation of the World.\" Hence Eustratius on Ethics 1, 6, comment [n49]\n\n48, says that the universal exemplars and Ideas, in Plato, are indeed a divine number, through which, as through an exemplar, the Maker carries out the making of material things. He approves and defends this opinion of Plato against Aristotle; indeed, perhaps Aristotle did not wish to reject Plato in this opinion. And so Eustratius says: Aristotle perhaps did not wish to oppose Plato, but only those who receive his sayings in a way they should not. With these the Wise Man also agrees, when he says to God: \"You have arranged all things in measure, number, and weight\" (Wisdom 11). It is established that this number is not any creature, but is that \"spirit of wisdom, manifold, unique, and subtle\" (Wisdom 7), indeed wisdom itself, \"in which all things were made,\" Psalm 103 [104]. Hence Augustine, On Free Choice 2, 19: \"Far be it that Wisdom be found inferior in comparison with number, since it is the same.\" Expounding the cited authority of the Wise Man in On Genesis according to the Letter 4, 5, he says: \"According to this, that measure prescribes the limit for every thing, and number furnishes every thing its species, and weight draws every thing to rest and stability, he it is, primarily and truly and uniquely, who bounds, forms, and orders all things.\" And further on, in the same work, 6: \"Number without number is that by which all things are formed, and it is not itself formed.\" The proper units of such a number are the reasons in the divine mind, which create, nourish, and continually preserve all things. And these perhaps are the universals that very many of the ancients dreamed of, but very few saw. Hence Porphyry, in the prologue to the Universals, enfolded this opinion, as a most lofty one, but did not unfold it.[n50] Yet the opinion is evident from what has gone before. Hence too Eustrathius, where he spoke earlier, says that the universal exemplars, or Ideas, are creative reasons and, as it were, the notations of the maker. Robert of Lincoln also says, on Posterior Analytics 1, 7, that the universals are the cognitions of things to be created, which were\n\nin the first cause eternally, and are their reasons and their formal and exemplar causes, and are themselves also creative. These are what Plato called the Ideas and the Archetypal World; and these, according to him, are the genera, the species, and the principles of both being and knowing. Augustine thinks the same, plainly, in the Eighty-three Questions, 46, and in the letter to Nebridius. Again, if the universals are placed in an intellect, as it seems Averroes, Boethius, and many others hold, in what Intellect would they be more worthily placed than in the first, highest, and most worthy of all, who most truly understands all things, and who keeps watch forever while others sleep?\n\nFurther, it is most certain that there are some causes that are preservative of beings and preservers of existing things, among which, as the second supposition teaches, the process is not allowed to go on infinitely. Of all those causes, therefore, there is some first and highest; and this, it is established, is necessarily God, who, as the first supposition and the fifth part of the first corollary attest, is preserved by no other. God, therefore, is the first and highest preserver of all. Now this is either per se or per accidens. If per se, then necessarily; for per se includes necessity, since if it were not necessary, it could fail to be, and so it would be per accidens, as is evident from the logical definition of accident, well known from Porphyry's Isagoge and from Aristotle's Topics 1. This is also quite evident from Posterior Analytics 1, 4 and 6, and 2i. 4,[n51] where per se is defined with its conditions. But if this is called being per accidens, then, since everything per accidens is posterior to what is per se, God's being the preserver of all is reduced to what is per se; it is reduced to something prior to him, by whose power he does this. So it is not God, but rather that prior thing, that is the first preserver of all. That everything per accidens is reduced to something prior that is per se is apparent. For just as substance naturally precedes every accident, and every accident is reduced to it as to a prior cause, so, by the topic from similarity or proportion, the essential seems to precede everything accidental, and all of this to be reduced to it. Again, as everything caused has a determinate mode of being, so it seems also to have a determinate cause of its coming to be and of its being; otherwise it would no more come to be, nor be, this than that. But an accident is infinite and wholly indeterminate, as is evident from Physics 2, in the chapter on chance and fortune, almost throughout, and from Metaphysics 6, 4 and afterwards at length. There Averroes says, in comment 7: \"What comes about by chance has from the beginning a determinate nature and a determinate cause; for what is accidentally happens to that which is essentially.\" This is likewise confirmed. Something is per se preservative of beings, preserving itself; and what is per accidens is not the principle of what is per se, but rather the reverse. For what comes from that which is per accidens is simply per accidens, just as what comes from something casual is simply casual. This is evident from the Philosopher, Physics 2, 44, refuting those who posit chance as the cause of the heavens and of all heavenly things, on the ground that then all lower things would be casual. For Averroes says: \"When they posited that from itself, that is, from fortune and chance, there was a renewal of the heavenly body and of its motion, which bestows order on the other beings, it follows for them that all causes are found from chance; for what is found in that which is found from chance is found from chance.\" Otherwise, too, there could be a science of beings per accidens; for there can be science of all things ordered per se; which is contrary to the Philosopher, Physics 2, in the chapter on chance and fortune, who proves at length that such things are not knowable, nor certain, because they are accidental causes and consequently infinite. And Metaphysics 6, 4: \"Of being according to accident there is no speculation; for no science, whether practical or productive, makes it its study, nor theological science,\" as the whole discussion that follows also teaches. And Posterior Analytics 1, 6 shows the same plainly. Further, what is more perfect is to be attributed to God, as is evident from the first Supposition and the third part of the first Corollary; but per se is more perfect than per accidens, as no one is ignorant; nor would God otherwise be good and powerful per se. God therefore is the first preserver of all per se, not per accidens. Again, in the whole genus of preservers there is some preserver per se and first by nature; and that which is per se and first by nature in any genus is greater, worthier, and better than anything posterior. For the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 2, 10: \"For what is prior is always more; and what is posterior is not.\" Here the text that Averroes has says: \"For the prior is always more worthy in being, but the posterior not so.\" He also says in Metaphysics 12, 37: \"The best is always proportional to that which is first.\" Hence the Pythagoreans also placed the first in the co-ordination of the good, and the last in the co-ordination of the evil,[n52] as the proof of the eighteenth part of the first Corollary touches on. Again, to the same end: the first in any genus is most of that kind, as is quite evident from Metaphysics 2 and 10, just as what is equal per se is more of that kind than what is of that kind per accidens, as is plainly evident from the Philosopher, Topics 3; nor does anyone deny it. Moreover, if this be per accidens, it can fail to be; for everything that belongs to something not per se and essentially, but only accidentally, can be separated from it, the separation being supposed;[n53] for this involves no contradiction. And since any being exists sufficiently when all those things, and only those, are present which are required for its existing per se and essentially, because then nothing of its existence is lacking,\n\nthis too is evident from the proper definition of accident. And Posterior Analytics 1, 6 is written in this way: \"Everything either is thus, namely per se in the first or second way, or is per accidens; but accidents are not necessary.\" This is confirmed by the Philosopher, Physics 8, 36, who proves that not every mover is moved, because it is not moved per se, nor per accidens. Not per accidens, because if it were according to accident, he says, it is not necessary that what is moved be moved. But if this is manifest, that it sometimes happens to be moved—none of the things that are—[n54] then an accident is not necessary, but may fail to be, as Averroes also states more expressly there in his comment. Now if anyone does not shrink from conceding that God can fail to be the preserver of existing things, he will easily be convicted, since the antecedent and the consequence are necessary in the argument by which, from the finitude of things and their preservation, it is proved that someone, who is God, is the first preserver of all; therefore the conclusion too is confirmed by like necessity. Again, if things could exist of themselves without divine preservation, they would be preserved by God in vain, according to that maxim of the Philosophers: \"Many are posited in vain where fewer suffice.\" But according to the Philosopher, On the Heavens 1, 32, God and nature do nothing in vain. In just this way the Apostle argues in Gal 2: \"If righteousness is through the law,\" he says, \"then Christ died for nothing.\" The gloss of Augustine there reads: \"If righteousness is through the law, that is, through the works of the law, in which the Jews trusted, then Christ died for nothing,\" that is, in vain, without cause. God, therefore, is the necessary preserver of all beings. A witness to this opinion is Thomas Aquinas, who in his questions On the Power of God, 35, shows this in many ways, and in question 36 asks whether God could communicate to some creature that it be preserved in being of itself without God. He answers in the following words: \"It must be said that it does not belong to the omnipotence of God that he be able to make two contradictories be at once. But in saying that God makes something that does not need his preservation, a contradiction is involved. For it has already been shown that every effect depends on its cause, insofar as it is its effect. In saying, therefore, that it does not need God's preservation, it is posited as not caused by God; and in saying that God makes it, it is posited as caused. Just as it would involve a contradiction, then, if someone said that God makes something that is not caused by him, so too if someone said that God makes something that does not need his preservation; hence in both cases, by equal reasoning, God cannot.\"\n\nCOROLLARY.\n\nFrom all these things, therefore, the principal conclusion is manifest. From it there follows, not obscurely, this porism: No created thing suffices to preserve another, and it is necessary that God preserve every creature per se and immediately; indeed more immediately than any created cause; immediately, I say, not only by immediacy of place or position, but also of nature and of cause, and more immediately in these same ways, or at least in the last two ways named.\n\n1. That no created thing suffices to preserve another.\n\nFor if, as the principal conclusion says, God is the necessary preserver of all beings, then every created thing necessarily needs divine preservation; therefore no such thing suffices to preserve another.\n\n2. The second is that it is necessary that God preserve every creature per se and immediately.\n\nThat God also preserves every creature per se and immediately, the reasons set out above will evidently show, if they are duly applied to this. For everything that is of itself potential, if it is to be actuated, will necessarily be actuated through some act that actuates not immediately from outside but in every way from within, and formatively, and that is diffused through the whole, as is evident of matter and form, and of accident and subject. That act, then, which thus actuates what is potential in this way, either is an act per se pure, actuated by no other at all, and then it is God, and what was intended is obtained; or it is not an act of this kind, and then that act is of itself potential, and necessarily needs another act immediately actuating it. Since, by the second supposition, it is not possible to go on thus to infinity, we shall in the end necessarily come finally to one act per se pure, actuated at all by no other, which actuates and informs per se and immediately whatever is of itself potential and placed under act, not merely by surrounding it from outside, but by wholly penetrating it from within,\n\nand every thing short of God is of itself potential, while he alone is act per se and pure, as the premises attest. Again, everything of itself fluid and formless, in order to be firmly fixed and formed, necessarily needs some fixing and form that immediately fixes and forms it. This fixing or form, then, either is per se fixed, that is, is fixation itself, and formed, that is, is form itself, and then it is God, and what was intended is obtained; or it is not such, and then it is necessarily fixed and formed immediately through some fixation and form; and since the second supposition does not permit such a process to be infinite, we shall necessarily come finally to one fixation and form per se and pure, fixed or formed in no way by any other. And this is the relation of all creatures and of God. These reasons agree well enough with the philosophical and theological authorities recited above.\n\nAgain, if it sufficed for a creature to be preserved by God only mediately, that is, only through another creature, while that preserving creature pours into the preserved creature only a finite power, then God could create a creature of permanence so much the more powerful than that creature preserved through another, as the amount of power the preserving one pours into the preserved one. If this creature is posited as created, it will not need the preservation of any creature. For of itself it is of so much more powerful permanence as the amount by which, were it weaker, it would need to be strengthened by another creature. Nor will it need God's mediate preservation, because that would come about through an intermediate creature, so that it would need the preservation of the intermediate creature, contrary to what was shown immediately before. Nor will it need God's immediate preservation, because even a creature weaker than this one did not need it. There will therefore be some creature not needing any preservation from the Creator, which the conclusion premised does not permit. Indeed, according to this, God could so strengthen the things of the world, and create this whole world, or another world, so strong in itself as a whole and in each of its parts, that in no way, neither mediately, nor as to the whole, nor as to a part, would it need divine preservation; indeed, with God wholly removed by imagination, it would remain sound and entire; which the premises evidently destroy.\n\nAgain, as God is everywhere, so he preserves everywhere; but God is everywhere per se and essentially. For if not, either he is nowhere, which everyone denies; or he is somewhere circumscribed, which in every way contradicts his infinity and immensity, which the first Supposition teaches, and which certain authorities cited above also attest. For the first Supposition, together with the third and fourth parts of the first Corollary of this book, teaches that whatever there is of goodness or of perfection, most perfect and most infinite, is in God; but it belongs to great perfection to be able to be wholly present at once in many places; hence spirits that can do so are judged more perfect than bodies, which cannot. The highest Spirit, therefore, on account of his simply infinite perfection, is necessarily of simply infinite and immense fullness and presence; hence he is of necessity present to all places and positions, and to all located and situated things, essentially filling all things, great above all measure of them, and immense; so that, as he is truly said to be omnipotent, so he may be truly said to be omnipresent. And this, I judge, is the reason of Sacred Scripture and of the Doctors, by which\n\nthey show the immensity of God. Hence, to recall one out of many, it is written in Baruch 3: \"O Israel, how great is the house of God, and how vast the place of his possession; great, and having no end; lofty and immense.\" And if God were circumscribed anywhere, this would seem to be above all in the heaven, since it is the most worthy of places, and still more in the most worthy part of the heaven, or at the most worthy point of the heaven; and then, when the heaven is moved, he too would likewise be moved, against the sixth part of the first Corollary of this book. For otherwise he would at some time leave a worthier part or point of the heaven, and enter a less worthy one. But if it is said, following the surface of Aristotle's second book On the Heavens and the World, that God is continually in one most noble position, namely in the east, at the intersection of two great circles, this cannot stand: for why would he be more in the east of Oxford than in the east of London, or of Cadiz, or the reverse? And if it is said that he is continually in the east of the whole habitable earth, at whatever section of Amphitrite or of Ocean, then, since according to the natural disposition of heaven and earth, and according to the same Aristotle, Meteorology 2, where there is now sea there will sometimes be dry land, and the reverse, there will sometime be another east of the whole habitable earth, which will then exist. Then either God will be only in that one, and it follows that he is moved locally from one east to another east; or then he will not be in the aforesaid east, and therefore by the same reasoning neither is he now. Also, if God were posited only in the east, he would not be in the most worthy place, since the middle of the heaven, and the center of the Sun, of Saturn, or of Jupiter, is a worthier place or position. Again, if God were only in one particular place or position, he could leave it and enter another, and be moved locally. By the very fact, too, that God acts and preserves everywhere, the authors prove that he is everywhere in three ways, namely by essence, by presence, and by power, as is evident from Peter's Sentences 1, distinction 37; which would by no means follow unless God made and preserved all things immediately. Hence Anselm, Monologion 13, says thus: \"Since it cannot be otherwise, [n55] than that the things which have been made have vigor, unless that by which they were made also has vigor through itself,\n\nit is necessary that, as nothing was made except through the creating presence of the Essence, so nothing has vigor except through the preserving presence of the same.\" And he adds, in 14, in consequence: \"If this is so, indeed because it is so of necessity, it follows that where it is not, nothing is. It is therefore everywhere, and through all things, and in all things.\" It is clear, then, that it is that which carries and surpasses all other things, encloses and penetrates them, and is the same which is in all things, and through all, and from which, and through which, and in which are all things, as was alleged more fully above and as he laid down earlier in the seventh chapter of the same work. There is no need to ask whether all things are through the supreme substance itself merely in the sense that, while another made them or other matter already existed, that substance only helped in some way that all things should be; since that is repugnant to what has already been shown above, if whatever things are, are through it in second place and not principally. Augustine also, in On the Essence of the Divinity of God, the first chapter,[n56] after showing from Scripture that God is uncircumscribed, immutable, and immense, adds: \"Beyond doubt no place is absent from his presence; for he presides over every creature by ruling it,\n\nhe is beneath all things by sustaining them, not by the weight of toil, but by tireless power; since no creature made by him can subsist of itself unless it is sustained by him who created it. He is outside all things, but not shut out; within all things, but not shut in.\" Here is Augustine's causal clause proving that God is everywhere, since, he says, no creature can subsist unless it is sustained by him. The same Augustine, in Letter 39, which is on the presence of God, to Dardanus,[n57] makes an extended discourse to the same end, where among other things he says: \"So is God diffused through all things, that he is not a quality of the world, but the creating substance of the world, ruling it without toil and containing it without burden.\" And in On Genesis according to the Letter 6, 33, he shows that God is immutable through time and place, although he administers and moves mobile things through time and place, since, he says, Himself, by no interval or space of places, by an unchangeable and excellent power, is more inward than every thing, because all things are in him, and more outward than every thing, because he is above all. This reasoning would not hold, however, unless God per se and immediately administered and moved all things. For if God through himself is outer and inner to any thing whatever, and thus moves things that are moved, it is evident that from his moving anything locally it does not follow that he himself is locally moved, because he is present in every place. Nor can anyone say that it is therefore said only improperly that God is everywhere by essence, by presence, and by power, on the ground that whatever essence exists in whatever place, and universally every place, has its being from him, and that all things located and all places are present to him, that is, to his knowledge, and subject to his power; for this fiction is destroyed by the arguments above, and is condemned in Lombard's Sentences 1, 37. Again, if God preserved something, say the earth, only mediately, while he preserves some creature immediately, then by the same reasoning, if he wished, he could preserve the earth immediately, and in its own most natural place;[n58] he could be moved locally to the earth to be so preserved, which is repugnant to the premises. Again, if God preserved some things only mediately, this would seem above all to be true of these lower things, that he preserves them by means of a heavenly body; but the rational Soul is of itself of such permanence, indeed greater, than\n\nthe heavenly body; therefore it is by no means preserved by it naturally. For the natural order requires this, that the weaker be preserved by the stronger. The authorities also show the same. For the Philosopher says in On the World 8: \"One power, which passes through all things, adorned the whole earth and sea, the ether, and the Sun and Moon, and the whole Heaven.\" Ammonius also, called the Armenian, in his recollection on Aristotle's book On Interpretation, at the end of the first book, says: \"It was more likely that eternal things are not ruled by providence than those which have a fluid nature; since the former have their determination from their own nature, and immutability of such a kind, having obtained subsistence from the gods; but the things that in generation, on account of the flux of their own matter, are born to come to be in every kind of change, can neither be, nor be held together, nor be ordered unless they obtain a great creative and provident power from those things that always stand in the same way: not only a more total and supereminent one, namely the heavenly body, but also some more particular and nearer one; just as it seems that women need more care than men, and the foolish more than the wise.\" And Avicebron, Fountain of Life 5, 35, as was alleged above, showing that all diverse and contrary things, higher and lower, are joined by unity, says thus: \"And the common root in this is this: that unity overcomes all things, and is diffused in all things and is the retainer of all things.\" And below, 36, he says: \"The Word, that is, the will, after it created matter and form, bound itself with them as the soul is bound with the body, and poured itself out into them, and did not depart from them, and penetrates them from the highest to the lowest.\" And still further down, 38, he says thus: \"To describe the will is impossible, but it is nearly described when it is said that it is the divine power making matter and form, and binding them, and diffused from the highest to the lowest, as the diffusion of the soul in the body; and it is itself that which moves and disposes all things.\" He makes this clear by an example, saying: \"Matter and form are like the body and the air; and soul and will, binding them and poured into them, is like soul in the body, light in the air, and intelligence in the soul.\" And he shows the manner of such an infusion thus: \"Since the will is a spiritual power, but far more excellent than any spiritual one, do not doubt that it is poured into matter and comprehends it together with form, as is the penetration of the power of the sun, that is, of the power that diffuses light, and its union with the light in the air. The will, then, will be as the power, and form as light, and matter as air.\" And in 39 he says: \"The will penetrates all things without motion, and acts on all things without time, on account of its great strength and unity.\" With him the sacred authorities agree. For in Wisdom 1 it is written:\n\n\"The Spirit of the Lord has filled the whole world, and that which contains all things\"; and below, 8, it is read of uncreated wisdom that \"it reaches from end to end mightily, and disposes all things sweetly.\" [n59] Of this wisdom it is also said in Ecclesiasticus 1 that the Most High Creator poured it out over all his works; and in Isaiah 66: \"Heaven is my seat, and the earth the footstool of my feet.\" Of this Jeremiah 23 speaks more expressly: \"Do I not fill heaven and earth, says the Lord?\" Hence the Prophet in Psalm 138 [139]: \"Where shall I go from your spirit? And where shall I flee from your face? If I ascend into heaven, you are there; if I descend to hell, you are present. If I take wings at daybreak, and dwell at the ends of the sea, even there your hand will lead me, and your right hand will hold me.\" Blessed Job also says of this, in chapter 11: \"He is higher than heaven, and what will you do? Deeper than hell, and how will you know? His measure is longer than the earth, and broader than the sea.\" And below, 22, he recounts the false madness of the heretics in these words: \"The clouds are his hiding place, and he does not consider our affairs, and he walks about the poles of heaven.\" On this blessed Gregory, Moralia 16, 4, says: \"Who could suspect such things of God, even in folly? For while he is always omnipotent, he so attends to all that he is present to each one, and so is present to each one that he is never absent from all at once. So he surrounds the outer things as to fill the inner, so fills the inner as to surround the outer; he so rules the highest as not to abandon the lowest, and is so present to the lowest as not to withdraw from the highest.\" Saint Thomas also, in On the Christian Religion, to Reginald, or On Faith, Hope, and Charity, 133,[n60] says that God immediately orders all effects through himself, although he carries them out through intermediate causes; but in the very execution he is in a certain way immediately related to all effects, insofar as all intermediate causes act in the power of the first cause, so that in a certain way he himself seems to act in all things, and all the works of second causes can be attributed to him, as the work of an instrument is attributed to the craftsman: for it is more fittingly said that the smith makes the knife than that the hammer does. He is also immediately related to all effects insofar as he is himself per se the cause of being, and all things are preserved in being by him. In his questions On the Power of God, question 20, the same Thomas asks whether God works in every operation of nature; and answering, he proves that God is the cause of every natural and voluntary action in six ways:[n61] First, because he bestows the power of acting, as is said in Physics 8, that the generator moves the heavy and the light insofar as it gives the power from which such motion follows. Second, because he preserves it continually. Third, because he moves every agent to act, and applies its power\n\nto the action, as a man is the cause of the cutting of the knife; and this is, as he says, because nothing moves of itself, except an unmoving mover. \"Therefore it follows of necessity that God is the cause of the action of every natural thing, as the one who moves and applies power to act.\" Fourth, because he is himself the principal agent in every action, and every other agent is his instrument, since by his power every other power acts; and a little later he adds: \"Thus, then, God is the cause of every action, insofar as he gives the power of acting, and insofar as he preserves it, and insofar as he applies the action, and insofar as by his power every other power acts; and when we have joined to these that God is his own power, and that he is within every thing, not as a part of its essence, but as holding the thing in being, it will follow that he himself works immediately in every thing that works, without excluding the operation of will and of nature.\" From this a fifth way can be drawn, namely that God works immediately everywhere. This is also most clearly evident from the Lord Stephen, Bishop of Paris, when he condemned a certain article in this form: \"That the first cause is the most remote cause of beings\";[n62] an error, if it is understood with exclusion, that is, so that it is not the nearest.\n\nThird: that it is necessary for God to preserve any creature more immediately than any created cause whatever. [n63]\n\nGod, therefore, preserves each thing immediately, and not only immediately but more immediately than any other preserver. If he did not preserve more immediately, then since he does preserve immediately, he would preserve either equally immediately as the preserving secondary cause, or less immediately than it. Not equally immediately, because God and the preserving secondary cause are preservative causes of the same thing, essentially ordered. No such causes, and least of all in the same genus of cause, have the same order to their effect; it is necessary that one be prior and the other posterior in that mode of causing, as reason and philosophy testify. Otherwise, by the same reasoning by which there could be two proximate causes of the same effect, equal in order, there could also be two other higher causes likewise equal, and so on. Hence there could also be two causes first simply, wholly equal in the same order of causing, two first principles simply, and two Gods. Yet all many things, however ordered, are necessarily reduced to some one thing, as the first of this and the second, among the things already established, make plain. [n64] The Philosopher also teaches in his Metaphysics that of any two causes of this kind attributed to the same thing, one is reduced to the other, or both to a third. Since, then, God and the secondary cause would be equal causes in the order of preserving, neither is reduced to the other as nearer to the preserved thing to one more remote. Therefore both are reduced to some third prior to both, by whose power both preserve. This is impossible for God, as the preceding discussion has taught and the suppositions show. But suppose it is imagined that God and the secondary cause are preservative causes of the same thing, ordered accidentally. Then much more would either one be reduced to the other, or both to a third, essential and prior, as was shown above.\n\nAgain, every name that suits God and a creature belongs more perfectly to God himself, above all since he is the first in such a genus. He is also the reason why that name is said of any others, according to the argument of the Philosopher in Metaphysics 2 and 10, cited above. Therefore this name \"immediately preserving\" belongs most and most perfectly to God himself. Hence God preserves more immediately than any other preserver; so he does not preserve equally immediately, nor less. Moreover, if God preserved less immediately, and consequently so caused what is preserved and caused by the secondary cause, less than that cause itself does, he would not be the most proximate cause of beings. That is condemned in the Parisian article cited above: most proximate, that is, in proximity of causality and nature, not merely of position or place. Then, too, God would stand further off in preserving and causing than the secondary cause. He would therefore act through many intermediaries, or at least through some intermediary, and the secondary cause through none. Therefore God would in no way preserve that thing immediately, nor so cause it; the opposite of this has been shown.\n\nAgain, every secondary cause that causes or preserves any effect does this through a causation or preservation naturally intermediate between them. That causation or preservation is therefore naturally nearer to the caused or preserved thing than the secondary cause is. But God preserves every such causation or preservation through himself and immediately, as the next part of this corollary teaches, and joins and unites it with the caused or preserved thing, as the foregoing make plain. Therefore God mediates naturally between the secondary cause and its whole effect, co-causing it more immediately. Again, the more essential cause, and the one more necessary in the being of the effect, is naturally nearer to it. But God is a more essential and more necessary cause in the causation of any effect whatever than any secondary cause. For he cannot be a cause of any effect equally essential, or less essential, as [or] than a secondary cause, as the argument set out above about \"equally immediately or less\" shows. [n65] Besides, whatever is of a certain kind through itself and by its own power is so more essentially and more truly than anything that is so through another and by another's power, as both Logic and Philosophy teach in various places, and as was touched on above. But the first cause causes the common effect by its own power and through itself, whereas the secondary cause does so by the power of the first cause and through it. Therefore the first cause does so more essentially and more truly. Hence the first cause is nearer, more conjoined and more intimate to the effect than its matter or form or any secondary cause whatever. It is therefore also nearer, more conjoined, more intimate and more immediate to any created thing than any created thing could be to another. For this reason, in any causation whatever by any created or secondary cause, whatever the effect and in whatever way the cause produces it, the first cause causes the same effect more nearly, more conjointly, more intimately and more immediately.\n\nHence the Commentator, on this first proposition of the Book of Causes, \"Every primary cause is more influential upon its effect than the universal secondary cause,\" speaks thus. [n66] \"The first universal cause acts on the effect of its cause before the second universal cause that follows it acts on that effect.\" And further on: \"It is manifest that the first cause, though remote, is more comprehending and more vehemently the cause of the thing than the near cause; and on that account its operation is one of more vehement adherence than that of the near cause. This comes about for no other reason than that the thing, first of all, is acted upon only by the remote power, and then, secondly, is acted upon by the power that stands below the first; and the first helps the second in its operation, since every operation that the second cause effects, the first effects there; yet it effects it in another way, higher and more sublime. And when the second cause is removed from its effect, the first cause is not removed from it, since the first cause is of greater and more vehement adherence to the thing than the near cause.\"\n\nAgain, St Thomas in his Questions on the Power of God, question 20, where it is asked whether God works in every operation of nature, replies among other things as follows. God is the cause of every action, inasmuch as every agent is an instrument of the divine power that works. [n67] So if we consider the supposits that act, each particular agent is immediate to its effect; but if we consider the power by which the action is done, then the power of the higher cause will be more immediate to the effect than the power of the lower. For a lower power is joined to the effect only through the power of the higher cause. Hence it is said in the Book of Causes that the power of the first cause acts first on the effect and enters into it more vehemently. So, then, the divine power must be present to every acting thing, just as the power of a heavenly body must be present to every acting elemental body. But in this they differ: wherever divine power is, there is the divine essence, whereas the essence of a heavenly body is not wherever its power is. And again, God is his power, but a heavenly body is not; and so it can be said that God works in every thing, inasmuch as every thing needs his power in order to act.\n\nIt cannot properly be said, however, that the heaven always acts on an elemental body, though the elemental body acts by its power. Hence, besides the five modes of divine operation set out above, a sixth mode can be drawn out: that in any operation whatever, God works more immediately than any other worker. For this reason the Philosopher, too, in the last chapter of On the World, speaking of God, says: \"Since he is one, of many names, named from all the effects which he himself brings about, we call him Jove. He is also called lightning-wielding from lightning, rain-giving from rain, thundering, stormy, clear, and so on in turn. And, to speak in sum, he is to be called heavenly and earthly from every nature and fortune, as being himself the cause of all things. On this account it is not ill said in the Orphic verses: Jupiter is the firstborn, Jupiter the last, Jupiter the head, Jupiter the middle.\" [n68] See how the Philosopher teaches first that God is, in general, the cause of all things; and then shows that he is, in particular, the threefold cause of anything whatever, that is, first, last or final, and middle. \"Jupiter,\" he says, \"the firstborn and the head,\" stands for the first cause; Jupiter the last stands for the last or final cause; and Jupiter the middle stands for the middle cause of all things whatever. And therefore he adds more expressly: \"God, therefore, as the ancient saying attests, has the beginning, the middle and the end of all beings.\" Thus God, according to the Philosopher, whatever secondary cause is causing any effect in whatever way, is in causing prior, posterior and more immediate in every respect.\n\nHence Dionysius, On the Divine Names 5, says that he is the substance-making principle, the middle and the consummation of the existence of all things. The authorities cited above, who say that God is more interior than any thing, seem to sound the same note. I am not unaware of the replies of certain people who pretend, or can pretend, that the authors do not say that God preserves all things because he preserves them immediately, through himself and properly, but only by means of the Heaven or something else, and through that; or because he prevents the things that corrupt; or because he permits a thing to be, or does not destroy a thing when he could. But the truth of the foregoing will easily crush all these false follies which vanity was fabricating.\n\nSome, however, object: it does not seem consonant with reason that any created thing, finite, tiny and trifling, should need so great a form and so great a preserver, simply infinite. [n69] Others object otherwise: if God is omnipotent, he can make something able to exist sufficiently through itself. Still further, someone will perhaps object that it does not befit God, most worthy, most beautiful and most honorable, to be mixed up through himself and immediately with any obscenities, as it does not befit him to do any base works or to carry on any vile business. Rather, it would suit such sublime majesty to reside in some most worthy place, say on the summit of heaven, exercising some most noble operation proper to himself, while all other works and other secondary causes are assigned, in due degrees, as ministers subject to him. Hence the Philosopher too, in On the World 11, says: it must rather be judged both fitting and more apt for God that the power which resides in heaven should become a saving cause for all, speaking of one thing, even for those most widely distant, [n70] than that he should go and arrive where it is neither good nor honorable to work through himself on earth. For this does not suit even the leaders of men: to devote themselves to any work whatever, as a prince of an army or a city or a household might, and, if need be, to mend furniture or do something baser, since a great King would not undertake just any servile task. [n71] He proves this by a similar case, through King Xerxes, who dwelt in Susa or Bastana, [n72] and who did many things in many provinces, yet not through himself, but through various officials deputed to various tasks.\n\nTo the first of these objections one must reply plainly. Since every creature is created, finite, tiny and trifling, it is therefore, by the 17th part of the first Corollary of this book, of itself possible to be and not to be. So, according to what was set out before, it necessarily needs something that is of itself necessary to be, continually sustaining it; and hence it needs God, with the same 17th part as witness. The second is easily answered: although God is omnipotent, he nevertheless cannot do anything simply and absolutely impossible. Hence he cannot make another God, nor another thing necessary to be, but only things possible to be, by the said 17th part, and so forth, as above. Thomas, mentioned above, confirms this reply. The third objection Peter, in Sentences 1, dist. 37, says is so frivolous as not to be worthy of a reply; [n73] yet he resolves it by two examples. The first is that just as a created spirit, namely the rational soul, is in no way polluted by the filth of a leprous body, however polluted, so neither is God. The second is that just as a sunbeam, diffused through any pollution whatever, is in no way polluted, so neither is God. Augustine too, in On the Christian Struggle, replies in the same way by the same example. Hence also Wisdom 10 says of uncreated Wisdom: \"It reaches everywhere because of its purity; for it is a vapor of the power of God and a pure emanation of the radiance of almighty God, and therefore nothing defiled runs into it. For it is the brightness of eternal light, and the spotless mirror of God's majesty, and the image of his goodness. For it is more beautiful than the sun, and when compared with light it is found, above every arrangement of the stars, prior, or otherwise, purer.\" [n74] This reply can be confirmed as follows. It is more perfect to be able to resist everything that defiles, lest any defilement be suffered from it, and consequently to be unable to be utterly polluted, than to be able to be polluted. Therefore the first Supposition grants this to God.\n\nBut it can be said otherwise, and no less reasonably, that just as every thing, insofar as it is, is good, as all Philosophers and Theologians teach together, so also every thing, insofar as it is, is beautiful. For the beauty of a thing is its natural disposition. Hence the Philosopher, in Physics 7, 17, in the translation which the Commentator expounds, says: \"Beauty and strength belong under the heading of relation; for they are dispositions of animals with respect to the noblest of animals; and I call that disposition most praiseworthy which is the natural sphere.\" [n75] On this Averroes says that beauty and strength are praiseworthy dispositions in animals, which are understood only with respect to the most praiseworthy disposition, as with respect to the noblest animal. For the most praiseworthy disposition of an animal is that in all its dispositions it be according to the course of nature; and beauty in some animal is a disposition considered in its creation,\n\naccording to the disposition it has in comparison with the noblest of the animals in that species; and that is what in all its dispositions is according to the course of nature. Avicenna attests this too, in Metaphysics 8, 7, in these words: \"The beauty of every thing, and its comeliness, is that it be as befits it.\" Hence Plato too, in the first part of the Timaeus, where according to Chalcidius in his Commentary he deals with the begetting of the world, says: \"Nor was it right for surpassing goodness to make anything but the beautiful; and according to him the surpassing goodness of God made all things.\" Hence, according to the same, all things were beautiful; and by like reasoning all things that are, insofar as they are, are beautiful. Hence Augustine too, in On the Nature of the Good 13, speaking of the various modes of things, says: \"In all these things, whatever are small in comparison with greater are called by contrary names; so, in the human form, whose beauty is greater, in comparison with it the beauty of an ape is called deformity; and this deceives the unwary, as if the one were good and the other evil.\" And further on, in 15, he proves that ugliness is not wholly evil but good, and this especially of the Ape, because it can itself become uglier; therefore the good of beauty can be diminished in it; and so it also has the good of beauty.\n\nWhat, then, is unbecoming in the beautiful being mixed with the beautiful? Or the more beautiful with the less beautiful, so that the beautiful thus appears more beautiful, and illumines and adorns them with its own beauty in what is capable of defilement? Hence the Philosopher too, in On the World 10, says that one power, which passes through all things, adorned the whole earth and sea, the ether, and the Sun and the Moon. Hence also Dionysius, On the Divine Names 4, says: \"The good and the beautiful are not to be separated in it, the one cause that comprehends all things. For in all existing things, distinguishing between participations and participants, we say that the good is a participant of the beautiful, and the beautiful a participation of the beautifying cause of all good things. But the superessential Good is indeed called the Beautiful, on account of the beauty that is given from it to all existing things, properly to each one; and as the cause of the good fitting-together and radiance of all things, it is like a light flashing forth, giving at once to all things the beautifying gifts of the ray that is its fountain, and, as it were, calling all things to itself.\"\n\nIndeed, it not only befits God to be everywhere present, but it would be most unseemly and most impossible for him not to be so with places and things located, since then God would not be, as is demonstrated in the proof of the second part of the aforesaid Corollary. As for what the Philosopher says, that God does not work through himself on earth: it is true, not so through himself that he does not work also through a second cause and through another, inferior agent, while he works his own proper operation through himself and through none of them. [n76] I was pursuing this matter for a little at somewhat greater length because of its great beauty, and because it seems to be no small foundation of what follows.", "apparatus": {"notes": [{"n": 1, "text": "Print: inde causa motus Animalium. I read in de causa motus Animalium: the Philosopher's De causa motus animalium (the De motu animalium), here counted as book 12 of De animalibus, in the \"new\" (Moerbeke) translation. The keyed text and the print agree on inde."}, {"n": 2, "text": "Ps.-Augustine (not Augustine), De essentia divinitatis. Bradwardine himself reports (147C) that some codices ascribe it to Jerome. The numeral \"1°\" after the title is rendered \"at 1\"; the print does not say whether chapter or section is meant."}, {"n": 3, "text": "The print repeats the name: Gregorius 2. super Ezechielem Gregorius homilia 5a. Rendered once, as \"Gregory, on Ezekiel, book 2, homily 5\"."}, {"n": 4, "text": "The print has a question mark after quia nihil se deserit, but Augustine's sentence is a statement and the next clause begins with a lower-case sed. Translated as a statement."}, {"n": 5, "text": "Main reading intimetur is a passive form that cannot govern the accusative veritatem. Savile's margin variant imitetur (\"imitates\") construes and is Augustine's sense, so I have adopted it (rule 2, variant adopted because the main reading cannot be construed). Translated: \"when it imitates the truth\". Note too that the sentence begins Sed si quod nemini dubium: \"if, as no one doubts\", and its later clauses (\"and from it are all things…\") are loosely joined to that si."}, {"n": 6, "text": "The print ends this quotation of the Commentator's text with a question mark (in nomine & intentione ?). It is a quotation, not a question, and is translated as a statement."}, {"n": 7, "text": "Print: omni tenens manu & veritate (two words). Read as Augustine's omnitenens, \"all-holding\": \"you hold all things by your hand and by truth\"."}, {"n": 8, "text": "nec considerata relatione earum ad necesse esse. I take nec as \"not\": the quiddities, taken in themselves and with their relation to the Necessary Being left out of account, merit privation, and are \"false\" in that state. The alternative (\"nor, even when their relation is considered\") would conflict with the next clause, which says their certitude is propter ipsum."}, {"n": 9, "text": "Liber XXIV philosophorum (\"Book of the Twenty-Four Philosophers\"), a medieval Hermetic collection of twenty-four definitions of God. Definition 22 is the one cited here."}, {"n": 10, "text": "Print: non est paruum with a variant marker after non; the margin offers esse. The main reading is taken as a parenthesis (\"it is not trifling, but right\"). The variant, dicimus non esse paruum, would give the same sense."}, {"n": 11, "text": "This long Dionysian passage is a word-for-word Latin rendering of the Greek (as in the Dionysiaca translations), and its syntax is rough: the objects of dicendum and the subjects of perfecerunt and formauerunt are not clearly marked. I have kept the Latin order and given the evident sense (the pagan \"principal existents\" and \"creating essences\", which they hastily made into gods and creators, are not what we mean by Being-itself, Life-itself, and Deity-itself). The renderings \"deiform\" and \"form-making\" are literal."}, {"n": 12, "text": "After fons habens seminarium vitae the print shows a small non-Latin sign (not a Greek word) which TCP marks as a gap; I cannot read it, and it is not translated. The italic tu yta olbz, which Bradwardine glosses id est, fons habens seminarium vitae, is a garbled transliteration (apparently of Greek or Arabic); I leave it untransliterated. Savile's catchword textus at the foot of p. 151 is a catchword only; the text continues \"textus operis\" once at the top of p. 152."}, {"n": 13, "text": "The print reads continno (for continuo), a misprint in the 1618 text. I translate \"at once\"."}, {"n": 14, "text": "The sentence of Averroes (On Sleep and Waking) is hard: apud abstractam formam (\"in connection with / in the presence of an abstract form\") and the antecedent of illam (\"to it\") are not clear in the Latin. I translate literally, with illam taken as the thing whose form is in question, and do not emend."}, {"n": 15, "text": "The print reads \"10. de Ciuit. Dei. 4\"; the passage on Plotinus and providence is City of God 10, 14, so \"4\" is probably a dropped digit. I keep Savile's reference."}, {"n": 16, "text": "Quia enim Deus sub illo sunt omnia has no verb for Deus. I supply \"he is\" (the Word is God) and keep \"all things are beneath him\"."}, {"n": 17, "text": "The text is a medieval Latin rendering of Dionysius, Divine Names 2, quoting Hierotheus, and is awkward in construction. formitans (print) is Bradwardine's/the translator's form for \"forming\". tota principia et ordiens, destinans is rendered as \"beginning and ordering all principles, destining them\", taking tota as \"all\"; the construction is uncertain. The Latin \"Ierotenus\" is Hierotheus."}, {"n": 18, "text": "Bradwardine's point is that On Free Choice is in three books, and Robert, by \"book 1\", means what is book 2 by Augustine's own reckoning (Retractations 1, 9) once the first book, whose theme is \"Whence evil\", is counted."}, {"n": 19, "text": "Unflagged allusions: \"You will change them…\" is Ps 101 [102]:27–28 (Augustine calls it \"prophetic speech\"); \"remaining in itself it renews all things\" is Wis 7:27."}, {"n": 20, "text": "informata after penderent… in tuo verbo must mean \"unformed\" (the Latin word can mean either \"formed\" or \"unformed\", but the nisi… formarentur that follows requires the second); I translate accordingly."}, {"n": 21, "text": "Savile's variant in the margin of p. 154 was keyed as \"• unt\"; from the image I cannot read the opening letter(s) with certainty (probably sunt, for est). The marker is placed, as keyed, at facta … est, though it stands at the page break."}, {"n": 22, "text": "The sentence is Augustine, Confessions 11, 30 (not book 2), which has veritate tua, \"your truth\", for vita tua; the print (and the keyed text) read vita tua and I translate it."}, {"n": 23, "text": "Grosseteste's name is Latinized in the print as two words, Grosse teste, \"Great-head\"; the sed (\"but of subtle and acute intellect\") plays on it."}, {"n": 24, "text": "The quotations are Wis 18:15 and Wis 16:12 (\"above, 16\" refers to chapter 16 of the same book)."}, {"n": 25, "text": "hunc vero in nomine, vel potius omnium nomine is compressed: the verb \"I expect/hope\" must be understood again from Non spero. Savile's variant omni at this place is not adopted; the main reading construes."}, {"n": 26, "text": "Essentificare is a scholastic coinage meaning \"to give essence to, to make be.\" I render it \"conferring essence on\" here and at 155B (essentificans)."}, {"n": 27, "text": "The old Latin of Dionysius is compressed. The scene is the angel's reply to Manoah (Judges 13:18): \"Why do you ask my name, which is wonderful?\" This explains mirabile in the next unit. I take dicentem as the questioner, the object of increpasse and of reducens, and the Divinity as the subject of increpasse and dicere."}, {"n": 28, "text": "Sic igitur omnium causae … adunabunt, et omnia … nomina, vt diligenter sit vniuersorum regnum: the verb adunabunt and the adverb diligenter come from the old Latin translation of Dionysius and construe only loosely. I take \"join\" (all the names) to the cause, and diligenter with sit regnum."}, {"n": 29, "text": "\"Hermes … De Verbo aeterno\" is Bradwardine's title for the Latin Hermetic Asclepius. Savile's numbers (1, 2, 14, 15, 18, 22, 23, 28, 31) are his own divisions and do not match the chapter numbers of modern editions. I keep them unchanged (Conventions §5.4)."}, {"n": 30, "text": "De mundo is pseudo-Aristotelian. Savile's \"12\" is the Phidias passage, ch. 6, 399b. His other numbers for it (11, 14, 10, \"last\") are likewise kept as printed."}, {"n": 31, "text": "\"Psalm 103\" (155C) is Ps 104:28–29 in English numbering. \"Psalm 32\" (159C) is Ps 33:6."}, {"n": 32, "text": "Dicit enim quod Nous, de qua natura qualitates naturales rebus inserens qualificans dicitur: the construction is loose. I take it as \"Nous is that concerning which nature is said to qualify, by implanting natural qualities in things.\""}, {"n": 33, "text": "The print reads vtraq; sexus (\"vtraque sexus\"), a nominative where vtriusque is needed. A little further on it reads vtrerque plenus est sexus for vterque. The Latin Asclepius has \"utriusque sexus.\" I translate the evident sense, \"both sexes\" and \"each sex.\""}, {"n": 34, "text": "The print has comprehensibilis, and I translate it. As far as I know the Latin Asclepius (§21) reads incomprehensibilis (\"incomprehensible\"). I have not corrected the text."}, {"n": 35, "text": "The Hermetic Latin here is compressed: nec Deo de quibus mundus idcirco non erant does not construe cleanly. I translate it as it stands, supplying only \"as with.\""}, {"n": 36, "text": "The Liber XXIV philosophorum (Book of the Twenty-four Philosophers), a medieval collection of twenty-four definitions of God, here credited to \"as many Philosophers.\""}, {"n": 37, "text": "The Latin of Totus itaque quibus est formatus Mundus vnus is compressed (cf. Asclepius 2). I take quibus as \"in all by which.\""}, {"n": 38, "text": "The two lines are Virgil, Aeneid 6.726–27. \"The same\" is therefore Virgil, whom Servius is commenting. Lucan's line is Pharsalia 9.580. Ovid, Fasti 6.5–6, follows."}, {"n": 39, "text": "Jerome's letter to Magnus is Ep. 70 in the modern numbering. Bradwardine's \"58\" follows another numbering. Aratus is the poet quoted in Acts 17:28."}, {"n": 40, "text": "This and the following Dionysius quotations are taken from an obscure old Latin translation. I follow its words closely and do not smooth it. In the long passage at 158A the clauses ad terram et deficientia, ad participandum eam infirmitate iterum conuersa and donatur quidem primo … singula aestimatur natura subsistere are the hardest. I have not tried to resolve them."}, {"n": 41, "text": "De anima 2, 68 is De anima II.7, 418b7. The number 68 appears to be the comment number in Averroes's commentary, which is quoted next."}, {"n": 42, "text": "Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln, in his commentary on the Posterior Analytics."}, {"n": 43, "text": "Hymindice (keyed hymindece) is not a classical word. I understand it as \"hymn-wise,\" from hymnus + dicere."}, {"n": 44, "text": "Avicebron is Solomon ibn Gabirol, and the book is the Fons vitae."}, {"n": 45, "text": "Simplas is an irregular form, apparently an accusative plural of simplex. Together with signum the sentence is hard, and I have kept the sense only."}, {"n": 46, "text": "Sicut similis omnis numerus monada participat: similis is probably a mistake for similiter. The string of fractions and unity (semis … terminat) is obscure in the Latin. I have rendered the words in order, with \"every number\" as subject of terminat."}, {"n": 47, "text": "Neque enim est multitudo non participans quid vnius … vel quid vnius deorsum omnia singulariter omnia, et toto omnia et opposita, et vniuersaliter comprehendentis is obscure and perhaps corrupt, in the Latin of Dionysius and in Savile's print. The evident sense is that no multitude lacks some participation in the one, and that the one embraces all things, singly and as a whole, even opposites. I give the Latin's own order and have emended nothing."}, {"n": 48, "text": "Ipsa igitur Theologia totam Thearchiam lacks a verb in the Latin. Something like \"[names as one]\" is understood."}, {"n": 49, "text": "The sentence breaks off here, at the end of the keyed unit, and continues in the next unit (160D)."}, {"n": 50, "text": "Porphyry's preface to the Isagoge declines to say whether genera and species subsist or are mere concepts, calling that a \"most lofty business.\" Bradwardine reads this reticence as the enfolding of the Platonic doctrine of Ideas, which Eustratius and Grosseteste then unfold."}, {"n": 51, "text": "So printed: the image shows \"2ⁱ. 4\" with a raised i. I have not resolved the reference and translate it as printed. The Posterior Analytics citations just before it concern the definition of per se."}, {"n": 52, "text": "Coelementatio is the Latin rendering (from Moerbeke's Aristotle) of the Pythagorean \"column\" or co-ordinated series of opposites (good, limited, one, and so on, against evil, unlimited, many)."}, {"n": 53, "text": "Ab eo separato is an ablative absolute. I take it as \"the separation being supposed.\" The sense is that an accident can be supposed separated from its subject without contradiction."}, {"n": 54, "text": "The Aristotelian quotation is elliptical in Savile's Latin (quod contingit aliquando moueri, nihil eorum quae sunt). I translate it as it stands. The drift of the argument is that, since an accident is not necessary, a mover need not be moved."}, {"n": 55, "text": "Margin address: this variant is keyed 164E·1, but the print sets it at the head of 164A, beside the first line of the next page, where Anselm's sentence is carried over. I keep the keyed marker. The main reading is construable (it is Anselm's own wording), so it is translated and the variant is not adopted."}, {"n": 56, "text": "De essentia divinitatis is not by Augustine; it is pseudo-Augustinian. Bradwardine and Savile cite it under Augustine's name."}, {"n": 57, "text": "Bradwardine's \"Letter 39\" is the letter to Dardanus On the Presence of God, which is Augustine, Ep. 187 in modern numbering. The next citation, \"On Genesis according to the Letter 6, 33,\" is likewise given in Bradwardine's own numbering."}, {"n": 58, "text": "In naturalissimo loco suo: \"suo\" could refer to the earth (its natural place at the center) or to God. I take it with the earth, since the argument is that God would have to travel locally to the earth."}, {"n": 59, "text": "The four margin names printed beside this passage (Ecclesiasticus, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Psalm) are keyed under the single address 165A·2. In the print they stand beside the several citations (Sirach 1; Isa 66; Jer 23; Ps 138 [139]) in the order of the text."}, {"n": 60, "text": "The Compendium theologiae, which Aquinas addressed to Reginald of Piperno and which is also called On Faith, Hope, and Charity. The chapter number is as Savile gives it."}, {"n": 61, "text": "Savile prints \"six ways\" (sex modis), but only four are enumerated before Bradwardine draws a \"fifth.\" The four match Aquinas's treatment in De potentia (giving the power, preserving it, applying it, acting through it as principal agent). I translate the print and leave the count unchanged."}, {"n": 62, "text": "Stephen Tempier, Bishop of Paris, whose condemnation of 219 propositions in 1277 lies behind this reference. Bradwardine, not Savile, gives the article in this form."}, {"n": 63, "text": "Savile prints the numeral \"3.\" in the outer margin beside this italic heading, marking the third part of the Corollary. It is not one of his source or variant margins, so it has no `{·}` marker."}, {"n": 64, "text": "\"sicut primo huius, et secundo praehabita manifestant\": the cross-reference is compressed and I cannot tell what \"primo huius\" and \"secundo\" refer to. The translation keeps Bradwardine's words without expanding them (Conventions §5.4). The same sense is repeated below in \"as the preceding show\"."}, {"n": 65, "text": "Savile's print has \"sicut [vel] quam causa secunda\", with a bracketed vel. The bracket is probably a scribe's or Savile's alternative: \"as\" for \"equally … as\", \"than\" for \"less … than\". The text is construable as \"equally or less essential … as [or] than\", which is how I took it."}, {"n": 66, "text": "\"The Commentator\" on the Book of Causes is not Averroes, the usual referent of the Commentator in this translation. The quoted lines are from the Latin commentary on Proposition 1 of the Liber de causis. I have not identified the commentator or verified the quotation."}, {"n": 67, "text": "Savile's \"quaest. 20\" does not match the usual numbering, in which \"Whether God works in every operation of nature\" is De potentia q. 3, a. 7. The citation is left as printed."}, {"n": 68, "text": "On the World is pseudo-Aristotelian. Savile's chapter numbers (here \"last\", then \"11\", then \"10\") follow neither the modern chapters nor each other consistently; they are left as printed. The Orphic line is quoted there. The Jupiter/Jove passage corresponds to ch. 7, 401a."}, {"n": 69, "text": "\"tanta forma\": the sense of \"form\" here is unclear; the objector perhaps means a form-giver as great as the preserver. The text is translated as it stands, and the Latin is not sure."}, {"n": 70, "text": "\"plurimum distantibus de uno loquendo\" is elliptical. I take it as \"speaking of one power, even for things very far apart\". A looser rendering is possible."}, {"n": 71, "text": "\"non quodcunque mancipium exerceret\": I take mancipium as \"servile employment\" rather than \"slave\", since the subject is the king. The alternative, \"a great King would not do what any slave does\", gives much the same sense."}, {"n": 72, "text": "\"Susis seu Bastanis\": Susa or Ecbatana, if Bradwardine's Bastanis corresponds to the Ecbatana of the pseudo-Aristotelian On the World. I have not checked this. The Latin spelling is left."}, {"n": 73, "text": "\"Petrus\" is presumably Peter Lombard, Sentences I, dist. 37, on God's presence in things. I have not checked that these examples occur there."}, {"n": 74, "text": "This is Wisdom 7:24–26 and 29 (Vulgate), not Wisdom \"10\" as Savile has it; the figure is left as printed. The clause \"prior, seu aliter, purior\" gives the Vulgate reading (\"prior\") followed by a variant (\"or otherwise, purer\"). I translate both."}, {"n": 75, "text": "\"de cap. relationis\" is de capite relationis, \"under the heading (category) of relation\". The cited text is Aristotle, Physics VII.3 (246b), in the Latin translation with Averroes's commentary. \"Sphaera\" is in the print. I render it \"sphere\" because I cannot improve it."}, {"n": 76, "text": "\"sicut per se, et per nullum illorum operationem suam propriam operatur\" is elliptical. I take it as: whereas his own proper operation he works through himself and through none of the others. The reading \"sicut\" = \"as well as\" would shift the sense slightly."}], "errata": [{"address": "146A", "keyed": "Corrollarium", "print": "Corollarium"}, {"address": "147A", "keyed": "incomm•abiliter", "print": "incommutabiliter"}, {"address": "147A", "keyed": "estendo", "print": "essendo"}, {"address": "147B", "keyed": "margin 147B·1 \"Iosephus. Apostolus.\" as one entry", "print": "two margins: \"Iosephus.\" at \"Iosepho referente\", \"Apostolus.\" at \"Nonne et Apostolus\""}, {"address": "147D", "keyed": "scipsum", "print": "seipsum"}, {"address": "147E", "keyed": "animae 13.", "print": "animae 15."}, {"address": "147E", "keyed": "separati", "print": "separari (also the catchword at foot of 147)"}, {"address": "148A", "keyed": "incortuptibile", "print": "incorruptibile"}, {"address": "148C", "keyed": "Manfestum", "print": "Manifestum"}, {"address": "148C", "keyed": "cuiusslibet", "print": "cuiuslibet"}, {"address": "148D", "keyed": "margin \"Philosoph • .\"", "print": "Philosophus."}, {"address": "149A", "keyed": "I am autem … vetitas", "print": "Iam autem … veritas"}, {"address": "149A", "keyed": "cuius que rei", "print": "cuiusque rei"}, {"address": "149A", "keyed": "margin 149A·1 \"Esaias. Iob. Gregorius.\" as one entry", "print": "three margins: Esaias. (at \"Esaias 40\"), Iob. (at \"Iob 23\"), Gregorius. (at \"Gregorius 16\")"}, {"address": "149C", "keyed": "Issrael", "print": "Israel"}, {"address": "149E", "keyed": "margin 149E·2 \"Apostolus. 24. Philosophi.\" as one entry", "print": "two margins: \"Apostolus.\" (at \"Apostolus ad Ro. 11\") and \"24. Philosophi.\" (at \"24. definitionum\")"}, {"address": "149E", "keyed": "marker 150E·1", "print": "marker belongs at the head of page 150, section A (the print's first line, \"non commixtione\"); label kept as given to avoid collision with 150A·1"}, {"address": "150A", "keyed": "de• tatem", "print": "deitatem"}, {"address": "150A", "keyed": "omnia qua sunt", "print": "omnia quae sunt"}, {"address": "150B", "keyed": "delformiter", "print": "deiformiter"}, {"address": "150B", "keyed": "delficationem", "print": "deificationem"}, {"address": "150B", "keyed": "demde", "print": "deinde"}, {"address": "150B", "keyed": "scipsam (twice)", "print": "seipsam"}, {"address": "150C", "keyed": "secundum eundum", "print": "secundum eundem"}, {"address": "150D", "keyed": "superessenualiter", "print": "superessentialiter"}, {"address": "150D", "keyed": "candem", "print": "eandem"}, {"address": "150D", "keyed": "scipsum", "print": "seipsum"}, {"address": "152A", "keyed": "Iuper (Augustinus 4. Iuper Genesin)", "print": "super"}, {"address": "152B", "keyed": "abscede•te", "print": "abscedente"}, {"address": "152D", "keyed": "seruan•e", "print": "seruante"}, {"address": "153B", "keyed": "formit ans", "print": "formitans"}, {"address": "153D", "keyed": "Conficitut", "print": "Conficitur"}, {"address": "153E", "keyed": "margin 154E·1 \"• unt\" (gap)", "print": "variant \"…unt\", first letter(s) not securely read from the image"}, {"address": "154C", "keyed": "Caelum et terram ego implebo, seu aliter impleo, ait Dominus", "print": "Caelum et terram ego impleo, ait Dominus"}, {"address": "154C", "keyed": "margin 154C·2 \"(variant) impressa Aristoteles\"", "print": "two margins: variant \"impressa\" and a separate source margin \"Aristoteles\" (at \"Hoc idem expresse testatur Aristoteles\")"}, {"address": "154D", "keyed": "margin 154D·1 \"(variant) omni Philosophus\"", "print": "two margins: variant \"omni\" and a separate source margin \"Philosophus\" (at \"Cui et concordanter Philosophus\")"}, {"address": "154E", "keyed": "margin 154E·2 \"L • anus\"", "print": "Lucanus"}, {"address": "155A", "keyed": "mitabile", "print": "mirabile"}, {"address": "155A", "keyed": "margin 155A·1 keyed only \"1.\"", "print": "the print also seems to carry small marks in the outer margin beside the lines \"Ego sum on …\" (a small mark, perhaps Greek) and \"solem, stellam\" (a ‖ variant); not legible at this resolution and not keyed; check against the archive.org image"}, {"address": "155B", "keyed": "Op•mi", "print": "Optimi"}, {"address": "155B", "keyed": "ex•enditur", "print": "extenditur"}, {"address": "155B", "keyed": "margin 155B·1 \"Dionysiu • \"", "print": "Dionysius"}, {"address": "155C", "keyed": "consentancum", "print": "consentaneum"}, {"address": "156A", "keyed": "sustentate", "print": "sustentare"}, {"address": "156A", "keyed": "tecitatur", "print": "recitatur"}, {"address": "156A", "keyed": "margin 156A·2 \"Pap •\"", "print": "Papias"}, {"address": "156A", "keyed": "margins {156A}, {156B}, {156E}: none keyed", "print": "small Greek words in the margin beside Nous, Noun and Pan (apparently νοῦς, νοῦν, πᾶν), unkeyed and without marker numbers"}, {"address": "156C", "keyed": "vrerque", "print": "vtrerque (print; a misprint for vterque, see note 33)"}, {"address": "156D", "keyed": "margin 156D·1 \"Plat • .\"", "print": "Plato."}, {"address": "156E", "keyed": "alteno", "print": "alieno"}, {"address": "157A", "keyed": "margin 157A·3 \"〈in non-Latin alphabet〉\"", "print": "Greek marginal gloss, apparently πατρικὸν νοῦν"}, {"address": "157B", "keyed": "indetessi", "print": "indefessi"}, {"address": "157B", "keyed": "⟨gap⟩ (Zena dicentes a …)", "print": "ζῆν"}, {"address": "157B", "keyed": "Prolomeo", "print": "Ptolomeo"}, {"address": "157C", "keyed": "⟨gap⟩ (quod omnibus indulget …)", "print": "ζῆν"}, {"address": "157D", "keyed": "Poerarum", "print": "Poetarum"}, {"address": "157D", "keyed": "Greaeus", "print": "Graecus"}, {"address": "158A", "keyed": "cam", "print": "eam"}, {"address": "158B", "keyed": "margin 158B·1 \"6•. Ratio principalis\"", "print": "5ª. Ratio principalis"}, {"address": "159C", "keyed": "hymindece", "print": "hymindicè (print, as read)"}, {"address": "159D", "keyed": "quamus", "print": "quamuis"}, {"address": "159E", "keyed": "existenuum", "print": "existentium"}, {"address": "160C", "keyed": "virtu, liter", "print": "virtualiter"}, {"address": "160E", "keyed": "creattices", "print": "creatrices"}, {"address": "162D", "keyed": "conseruare.M", "print": "conseruare. (the \"M\" is a stray keying mark; the \"1\" is Savile's margin numeral)"}, {"address": "164A", "keyed": "quaetere", "print": "quaerere"}, {"address": "165A", "keyed": "infussionis", "print": "infusionis"}, {"address": "165B", "keyed": "extetiora", "print": "exteriora"}, {"address": "165E", "keyed": "temotissima", "print": "remotissima"}, {"address": "165E", "keyed": "1653", "print": "165E (the \"3.\" is the margin numeral beside the heading, not a letter)"}, {"address": "165E", "keyed": "1653", "print": "165E (same)"}, {"address": "166A", "keyed": "propinquiot conseruato ad temotiorem", "print": "propinquior conseruato ad remotiorem"}, {"address": "166E", "keyed": "Thomaes. (margin)", "print": "Thomas."}, {"address": "167A", "keyed": "c•ilibet", "print": "cuilibet"}, {"address": "167A", "keyed": "in qualibet te operatur", "print": "in qualibet re operatur"}, {"address": "167C", "keyed": "medictas", "print": "medietas"}, {"address": "167C", "keyed": "desiruit", "print": "destruit"}, {"address": "167D", "keyed": "magis quam icus et perueniens", "print": "magis quam iens et perueniens"}, {"address": "168B", "keyed": "secundum cursum •aturae", "print": "secundum cursum naturae"}, {"address": "168C", "keyed": "secundum cum praestans Dei bonitas", "print": "secundum eum praestans Dei bonitas"}, {"address": "168D", "keyed": "De Mundo •o.", "print": "De Mundo 10. (the digits are hard to read; I take \"10\")"}, {"address": "168D", "keyed": "claritais", "print": "claritatis"}, {"address": "168D", "keyed": "Philosophies. (margin)", "print": "Philosophus."}]}, "segments": [{"anchor": "p146A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p146A", "locator_display": "146A", "source_text": "CAP. II. Quod Deus est omnium aliorum necessarius conseruator: habet Corrollarium habens tres partes.", "english": "CHAPTER II.\n\nThat God is the necessary conserver of all other things; it has a Corollary having three parts.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p146A-2", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p146A-2", "locator_display": "146A–146D", "source_text": "HActenus igitur in causa Dei contra diuersos Haereticos generali generaliter perorato, amodo in causa eius contra Pelagium speciali summi semper aduocati patrocinante consilio specialiter postulandum. Primo igitur ostendatur, quod Deus sit omnium entium necessarius\n\nconseruator, necessarius, inquam, ex suppositione, rerum videlicet supposita entitate; Nihil enim per se possibile esse et non esse habet esse, nisi ab aliquo per se necesse esse, a quo semper dependeat in essendo; Sed quidlibet citra Deum est per se possibile esse, solus vero Deus per se necesse esse: Hoc autem totum apparet ex virtute et connexione causarum ex prima suppositione, et 17a. parte corollarij primi huius. Nam omne existens determinate subesse, quod non per se sufficienter determinatur ad esse, per aliquid aliud determinatur ad esse: Omne autem existens per se possibile esse, et non esse, est existens huiusmodi; ergo per aliud. Illud autem aliud vel est per se necesse esse, et habetur intentum; vel est per se possibile esse et non esse, et tunc per proximam rationem sequitur ipsum per aliquid aliud determinari ad esse, et de illo alio fiat eadem inquisitio diuisiua, et cum per secundam Suppositionem in talibus alijs non sit infinitus processus, necessario deuenietur ad aliquod per se necesse esse; per\n\nquod omne existens per se possibile esse et non esse, determinatur ad esse; et haec est ratio in virtute Auicennae, et Algazelis, per quam hanc eandem conclusionem se reputant demonstrare; Auicenna 1. Metaphys. et 8i. multis capitulis: Algazel 2. Metaphys. 12. dicto suo. Vnde Auicenna 8. Metaphys. 3. ita dicit; Cum dicitur primum principium absolute, necesse est esse vnum: cum autem dicitur causa prima materialis, et causa prima formalis, et cum his non est necesse esse vnam, quemadmodum hoc debet in necesse esse: Nulla enim earum est causa prima absolute; sed necesse esse, principium etiam est istarum causarum primarum. Ex hoc igitur, et ex eo quod praediximus manifestum est, quod necesse esse, vnum numero est, et patuit quod quicquid est aliud ab illo cum consideratur per se, est possibile in suo esse, et ideo est causatum, et bene innotuit, quod in causalitate sine dubio peruenitur ad ipsum; Vnde quicquid est, excepto vno quod est sibi ipsi vnum, et ente, quod est sibi ipsi ens, est acquirens esse ab alio a se, per quod est sibi esse, non per se: Et haec est intentio de hoc, quod res\n\nest causata, scilicet recipiens esse ab alio a se, et habet priuationem quae certificatur ei in sua essentia absolute. Algazel quoque 2. Metaphys. vbi prius, sic ait, Quicquid est aliud a necesse esse, oportet vt perueniat ab illo, et habeat esse ab illo; ostensum est enim, quod necesse esse, est tantum vnum; ergo omne aliud est possibile esse, et dependet ab illo necesse esse. Et infra eodem, Ostensum est quod vniuersitas est possibilis, et eget causa, et omnes causae ex necessitate proueniunt a necesse esse, quod necessario est vnum. Dicitur ergo quod hoc est primum principium Mundi. Quare et Hermes de verbo aeterno 21. dicit, quod summa gubernatorum superiorum et inferiorum summo illi Domino paret Cuncta enim ex eo pendentia atque defluentia. Vnde et Boetius 3. de consolatione Philosophiae prosa vlt. ita scribit; Hic est veluti quidam clauus atque gubernaculum, quo mundana machina stabilis atque incorrupta seruatur. Aristoteles etiam 12. Metaphys. 38. sic dicit, Primum est necessarium, non contingens aliter, sed simplex. Ex tali igitur principio dependet caelum et natura et 9.", "english": "So far, then, the cause of God has been argued in general terms against the various heretics. From now on, in his special cause against Pelagius, with the counsel of the supreme Advocate ever lending patronage, it must be specially pleaded. First, then, let it be shown that God is the necessary conserver of all beings. He is necessary, I mean, from a supposition, namely with the entity of things supposed. For nothing that is per se possible to be and not to be has being except from something that is per se necessary to be, on which it always depends in being. But whatever is below God is per se possible to be, and God alone is per se necessary to be. All this is plain from the power and connection of causes, from the first supposition and the seventeenth part of the first Corollary of this book. For every existing thing that stands determinately in being, if it is not sufficiently determined to being through itself, is determined to being through something else. But every existing thing that is per se possible to be and not to be is of this kind; therefore it is so through something else. Now that something else either is per se necessary to be, and the point intended is gained; or it is per se possible to be and not to be. In that case, by the immediately preceding reasoning, it follows that it too is determined to being through something else, and the same dividing inquiry is made about that other. And since, by the second Supposition, there is no infinite regress among such others, one must necessarily arrive at something per se necessary to be, by which every existing thing per se possible to be and not to be is determined to being. This is the argument in the strength of Avicenna and Algazel, by which they hold that they demonstrate this very conclusion: Avicenna, Metaphysics 1 and 8, in many chapters; Algazel, Metaphysics 2, in his twelfth saying.\n\nHence Avicenna, Metaphysics 8, 3, says thus: \"When 'first principle' is said absolutely, it must be one. But when 'first material cause' and 'first formal cause' are spoken of, it is not necessary that with these there be one, as this must hold in the Necessary Being. For none of them is a first cause absolutely; but the Necessary Being is the principle also of these first causes. From this, then, and from what we said before, it is manifest that the Necessary Being is one in number. And it was made clear that whatever is other than it, when considered through itself, is possible in its being, and therefore caused; and it has been well noted that in causality one arrives, without doubt, at it. Hence whatever is, except the one which is one to itself, and the being which is being to itself, is acquiring being from another than itself, through which it has being, not through itself. And this is the meaning of this: that a thing is caused, namely, receiving being from another than itself, and has a privation which is ascertained of it in its essence absolutely.\"\n\nAlgazel also, Metaphysics 2, where before, says: \"Whatever is other than the Necessary Being must come from that, and have its being from that. For it has been shown that the Necessary Being is only one; therefore everything else is possible to be, and depends on that Necessary Being.\" And further on, in the same place: \"It has been shown that the universe is possible and needs a cause, and all causes proceed by necessity from the Necessary Being, which is necessarily one. It is said, then, that this is the first principle of the World.\" Hence also Hermes, On the Eternal Word 21, says that the whole sum of things governed, higher and lower, obeys that supreme Lord, for all things depend on him and flow from him. So too Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy 3, the last prose: \"He is, as it were, a kind of tiller and rudder, by which the machine of the world is kept stable and uncorrupted.\" Aristotle also, Metaphysics 12, 38, says thus: \"The first is necessary, not able to be otherwise, but simple.\" On such a principle, therefore, heaven and nature depend. And Metaphysics 9, 17:", "margins": [{"id": "146A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) First principal argument."}, {"id": "146D·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) eo"}, {"id": "146D·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) possibile"}, {"id": "146D·3", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Boethius."}, {"id": "146D·4", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Aristotle."}]}, {"anchor": "p146E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p146E", "locator_display": "146E", "source_text": "Metaphys. 17. Quae ex necessitate sunt, ipsa quidem prima sunt; Nam si haec non essent, nihil vtique esset. Et 8 Phys. 52. Oportet, inquit, esse aliquid primum mouens immobile, et non secundum accidens, si debet, sicut diximus, in his quae sunt esse incessabilis quidam et immortalis motus, et manere quod est, id est, totum vniuersum ipsum in seipso, et in eodem. Principio enim manente necessario, necesse manere quod continuum est ad principium. Vnde dicitur Deum esse principium necessarium omnium tam essendi quam mouendi. Istam vero Philosophorum sententiam non absque debitis laudibus recitans Augustinus 8. de Ciuit. Dei 6. Viderunt, inquit, Philosophi, quos caeteris non immerito fama atque gloria praelatos videmus, omnem speciem in re quacunque mutabili, quae est, quicquid illud est quoquomodo,", "english": "\"Things that are from necessity are themselves the first; for if these were not, nothing at all would be.\" And Physics 8, 52: \"There must,\" he says, \"be some first mover, immovable and not so per accidens, if there is to be, as we have said, among the things that are, some ceaseless and immortal motion, and if what is is to remain, that is, the whole universe itself, in itself and in the same state. For if the principle remains of necessity, what is continuous with the principle must necessarily remain.\" Hence God is said to be the necessary principle of all things, as to both being and moving. Augustine, reciting this opinion of the Philosophers, and not without due praise, says in City of God 8, 6: \"The Philosophers,\" he says, \"whom we see, not undeservedly, preferred to the rest in fame and glory, saw that every form in any mutable thing whatever that is, whatever it is in whatever way,", "margins": [{"id": "146E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Augustine."}]}, {"anchor": "p147A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p147A", "locator_display": "147A–147B", "source_text": "et qualiscunque natura est, non esse posse nisi ab illo qui vere est, quia incomm•abiliter est. Et hanc eandem sententiā diffuse prosequitur 2. de libero arbitrio 28. ostendens quod omnia mutabilia ad aliquod immutabile reducuntur, quo formantur, et innituntur continue in estendo. Vnde et Philosophus inde causa motus Animalium, qui est 12. de Animalibus, in noua translatione 1. et 3. et quasi per totum, vult quod omne motum innititur aliquo fixo in mouendo; et illud idem dicit Augustinus 8. super Genesim ad literam 13. manifeste. Vnde et Ammonius Ermenus, in Recordatione in librum peri hermenias Aristotelis, super vltimum primi dicit; Dij vere existunt, et transmutationem ne que secundum intellectum est possibile suscipere; praecedere quidem necesse quod penitus impermutabile est, id quod qualitercunque transmutatur, vt et maneat quod transmutatur. Quare in dijs habentibus rationem principij ad entia, praeteritum et futurum considerari impossibile est. Fidelis insuper Abraham qui [et] Amicus Dei meruit appellari, et perductionem omnium rerum a Deo, et conseruationem\n\nproductarum ab eo, fideliter attestatur, Iosepho referente, sicut circa 35am partem primi plenius recitatur. Nonne et Apostolus ad Hebraeos 1. dicens quod Deus locutus est nobis in filio per quem fecit et saecula, qui cum sit splendor gloriae, et figura substantiae eius, portansque omnia verbo virtutis suae, etc. videtur tam factionem, quam conseruationem omnium tribuere ipsi Deo. Quare et Chrysostomus istud exponendo, homilia 2a sic ait; Ferens, inquit, omnia, hoc est gubernans; siquidem cadentia et ad nihilum tendentia continet. Non enim minus est continere mundum quam fecisse; sed si oportet aliquid audacius dicere, adhuc amplius est. Nam in faciendo quidem ex nullis existentibus rerum essentiae productae sunt; In continendo vero, ea quae facta sunt, ne ad nihilum redeant, continentur. Hic ergo dum reguntur, et ad inuicem sibi repugnantia coaptantur, magnum et valde mirabile plurimaeque virtutis indicium declaratur. Dicitque Augustinus in De diuinitatis Dei essentia, et de inuisibilitate, atque incommutabilitate, 1o sic de Deo; Proculdubio nullus est locus ab eius", "english": "and whatever its nature, cannot be except from him who truly is, because he is immutably.\" And he pursues this same opinion at length in On Free Choice 2, 28, showing that all mutable things are led back to something immutable, by which they are formed and on which they continually rest in being. Hence the Philosopher also, in On the Cause of the Movement of Animals [n1], which is On Animals 12, in the new translation, chapters 1 and 3 and almost throughout, holds that everything moved rests, in moving, upon something fixed; and Augustine says this same thing plainly in On Genesis according to the Letter 8, 13. Hence also Ammonius Ermenus, in the Recollection on Aristotle's book On Interpretation, on the end of the first, says: \"The gods truly exist, and it is not possible, even in thought, for them to admit change. For what is wholly unchangeable must needs precede that which is in any way changed, so that what is changed may remain. Hence in gods who have the character of a principle toward beings, past and future cannot be considered.\" The faithful Abraham, moreover, who [also] deserved to be called Friend of God, faithfully attests the bringing forth of all things by God, and the conservation of the things brought forth by him, as Josephus reports, as is recounted more fully around the thirty-fifth part of the first. Does not the Apostle too, in Hebrews 1, saying that God has spoken to us in the Son, through whom he also made the ages, who, being the splendor of his glory and the figure of his substance, and upholding all things by the word of his power, etc., seem to ascribe to God himself both the making and the conservation of all things? Wherefore Chrysostom also, expounding this, says in homily 2: \"'Upholding,'\" he says, \"'all things,' that is, governing; for he holds what is falling and tending to nothing. For it is no less to hold the world than to have made it; but if one may say something rather bolder, it is even more. For in making, the essences of things were produced from no existing things; in holding, the things that were made are held so that they do not return to nothing. Here, therefore, while things are ruled and things repugnant to one another are fitted together, a great and exceedingly marvellous sign of very great power is shown.\" And Augustine says in On the Essence of the Divinity of God, and on His Invisibility and Immutability, at 1, [n2] thus of God: \"Without doubt there is no place absent from his", "margins": [{"id": "147A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) The Philosopher."}, {"id": "147A·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Augustine."}, {"id": "147A·3", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) Armenus."}, {"id": "147A·4", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Ammonius."}, {"id": "147A·5", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Abraham."}, {"id": "147B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Josephus; and, at \"Nonne et Apostolus\", the Apostle."}, {"id": "147B·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Chrysostom."}, {"id": "147B·3", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Augustine."}]}, {"anchor": "p147C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p147C", "locator_display": "147C–147D", "source_text": "praesentia absens: Super omnem quippe creaturam praesidet regendo, subtus est omnia sustinendo atque portando, non pondere laboris, sed infatigabili virtute; quoniam nulla creatura ab eo condita per se subsistere valet, nisi ab eo sustinetur qui eam creauit; extra omnia est, sed non exclusus; intra omnia est, sed non conclusus. Iste autem libellus in quibusdam codicibus intitulatur Ieronymo, sed potius aestimo quod fuerit Augustini. Vnde et Gregorius 2. super Ezechielem Gregorius homilia 5a. Ipse est interior et exterior, inferior et superior, regendo superior, portando inferior, replendo interior, circumdando exterior; sicque est intus vt extra sit, sic circundat, vt penetret, sic praesidet vt portet, sic portat vt praesideat. Quare et Anselmus Monolog. 14. loquens de summa essentia; Liquet, inquit, quoniam ipsa est quae cuncta alia portat, et superat, claudit et penetrat. Huic autem dicto Apostoli concordat dictum Philosophi, in de Mundo vlt. vbi ostendit quod Deus cum sit vnus, est tamen multinomius secundum multitudinem eorum quae innouat, et quorum est causa;\n\net dicit, quod vocatur Iupiter, quare et non male dicitur in Orphicis, Iupiter est fundum terrae, et coeli stelliferi, Iupiter radix Ponti. Nonne et hoc est quod docet Sapiens Sapient. 11. sapienter, vbi loquens Deo sic ait; Diligis omnia quae sunt, et nihil odisti eorum quae fecisti: Quomodo enim posset aliquid manere nisi tu voluisses, aut quod a te vocatum non esset conseruaretur. Rurfus autem hoc idem per similem rationem, iterum confirmatur. Quodlibet siquidem demonstratum, vt Terra; vel est per se, vel per aliud et per accidens quodammodo: Si per accidens et per aliud, idem de illo alio est quaerendum, et cum sic non possit esse infinitus processus propter Suppositionem 2am aliquid est per scipsum vnum et primum omnium, quod est Deus, per quod caetera sunt quaecunque. Nec potest dici quod Terra per se existat, quia tunc semper necessario extitisset. Per se enim includit de omni, vt patet 1. poster. 4. De omni vero, vt ibi accipitur, importat vniuersalitatem temporis omniquaque, vt patet per Aristotelem ipsum definientem hoc modo; De omni quidem hoc dico, quod vtique est non in", "english": "presence. For he presides over every creature by ruling; he is beneath all things by sustaining and bearing them, not by the weight of toil but by tireless power; since no creature made by him can subsist through itself unless it is sustained by him who created it. He is outside all things, but not shut out; within all things, but not shut in.\" This little book, however, is in some codices ascribed to Jerome, but I rather judge that it was Augustine's. Hence also Gregory, on Ezekiel, book 2, homily 5 [n3]: \"He is within and without, below and above; above by ruling, below by bearing, within by filling, without by encircling; and so he is within that he may be without, so he encircles that he may penetrate, so he presides that he may bear, so he bears that he may preside.\" Wherefore Anselm also, Monologion 14, speaking of the supreme essence: \"It is plain,\" he says, \"that it is itself which bears all other things, and surpasses, encloses and penetrates them.\" With this saying of the Apostle agrees the saying of the Philosopher, in On the World, last chapter, where he shows that God, though he is one, is nevertheless many-named according to the multitude of the things he renews and of which he is the cause;\n\nand he says that he is called Jupiter; wherefore it is also not ill said in the Orphic poems: \"Jupiter is the foundation of earth and of starry heaven; Jupiter is the root of the sea.\" Is not this also what the Wise Man teaches wisely in Wisdom 11, where, speaking to God, he says: \"You love all things that are, and you hate none of the things you have made. For how could anything endure unless you had willed it, or be preserved if it had not been called by you?\" Again, this same point is once more confirmed by a similar reasoning. Whatever thing is pointed out, such as the Earth, either is through itself, or is through another and in a certain way per accidens. If it is per accidens and through another, the same question must be asked about that other; and since there cannot be an infinite regress in this way, by reason of the second Supposition there is something that is through itself one and the first of all things, which is God, through whom all other things whatsoever are. Nor can it be said that the Earth exists through itself, since then it would always have existed necessarily. For per se includes de omni (\"of every\"), as is plain from Posterior Analytics 1, 4. And de omni, as it is taken there, carries the universality of time in every respect, as is plain from Aristotle himself defining it in this way: \"By 'of every' I mean this: what belongs not in some instance thus and in another not, nor at one time thus and at another not, but of every instance and always.\"", "margins": [{"id": "147C·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) sustentatur."}, {"id": "147C·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Gregory."}, {"id": "147C·3", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Anselm."}, {"id": "147C·4", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) The Philosopher."}, {"id": "147D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) The Wise Man."}, {"id": "147D·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Second principal argument."}]}, {"anchor": "p147E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p147E", "locator_display": "147E", "source_text": "quodam quidem sic, in quodam autem non, neque aliquando quidem sic, aliquando autem non; sed de omni et semper. Pro hac autem ratione est Augustinus in glossa super illud ad Gal. 2. Ab his autem, qui videbantur esse aliquid, quales aliquando fuerunt, nihil mea interest, sic dicens; Ipsi non sunt aliquid, et si boni ministri Dei sint; Christus enim in illis est aliquid, non ipsi per se. Nam si ipsi per se essent aliquid, semper fuissent aliquid, sed aliquando peccatores et idiotae fuerunt. Haec etiam ratio iam praemissa, et quod per se temporis vniuersalitatem includit, patet similiter per Augustinum de immortalitate animae 13. sic dicentem; Haec autem vis, et natura incorporea effectrix corporis vniuersi, praesenti potentia tenet vniuersum; Non enim fecit, atque discessit, effectumque deseruit. Ea quippe substantia, quae corpus non est, nec, vt ita dicam, localiter mouetur, vt ab ea substantia, quae locum obtinet, separati queat; et illa effectoria vis vacare non potest, quin id, quod ab ea factum est, tueatur", "english": "In favor of this argument is Augustine, in the gloss on that verse of Galatians 2: \"But from those who seemed to be something, what they once were makes no difference to me,\" saying thus: \"They are not something, even if they are good ministers of God; for Christ in them is something, not they through themselves. For if they were something through themselves, they would always have been something; but they were once sinners and unlettered men.\" This argument already set forth, that per se includes the universality of time, is likewise plain from Augustine, On the Immortality of the Soul 15, who says: \"This power and incorporeal nature, the maker of the whole body, holds the universe by its present power; for it did not make and depart, and abandon its effect. For that substance which is not a body is not moved locally, so to speak, so as to be able to be separated from the substance which occupies place; and that effective power cannot be idle, so as not to protect what was made by it,", "margins": [{"id": "147E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Augustine."}]}, {"anchor": "p148A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p148A", "locator_display": "148A–148C", "source_text": "et specie carere non sinat, in quantumcunque est. Quod enim per se non est, si destituatur ab eo per quod est, profecto non erit. Et non possumus dicere id accepisse corpus cum factum est, vt seipso iam contentum esse posset, etiam si a conditore desereretur. Quanquam si ita est, magis id habet animus, quam corpori praestare manifestum est, atque ita de proximo immortalis esse probatur, si potest esse per seipsum. Quicquid enim tale est, incortuptibile sit necesse est, ac per hoc interire non possit, quia nihil se deserit? sed corporis mutabilitas in promptu est, quod ipsius vniuersi corporis vniuersus motus satis indicat. Vnde diligenter inspicientibus, quantum talis natura inspici potest, ordinata mutabilitate, id quod mutabile est, mutabile reperitur; quod autem per se est, nec motu quidem vllo habet opus, omni copia sibi seipso existente, quia motus omnis ad aliud est, cuius indiget quod mouetur. Adest igitur species vniuerso corpori meliore natura sufficiente, atque obtinente quae fecit; quare illa mutabilitas non adimit corpori corpus esse, sed de specie in speciem transire facit\n\nmotu ordinatissimo. Non enim quaepiam eius pars ad nihilum redigi sinitur, cum totum capessat vis illa effectoria, nec laborante, nec deside potentia, dans vt sit omne quod per illam est in quantum est. Et cap. 16. ita scribit; Sed si quod nemini dubium, tunc est animus sapientissimus, cum veritatem, quae semper eodem modo est, intimetur, eique immobilis inhaeret, diuino amore coniunctus, et ex illa omnia sunt, quae quoquomodo sunt, ab ea essentia sunt, quae summe maximeque est; Aut ab illa est animus in quantum est, aut per seipsum est: Sed si per seipsum, quando ipse sibi causa existendi est, et nunquam se deserit, nunquam interit, vt supra etiam disputauimus. Nec potest quis dicere quod Terra per se est, nec tamen haec propositio est per se, Terra est, vt sic obuiet rationi praemissae: Nam secundum veritatem, et secundum Philosophum in praedicamentis; In eo quod res est vel non est, oratio vera vel falsa dicitur; Ergo ex eo quod res est, vel non est sic vel sic, oratio dicitur sic vera vel sic falsa. Vnde et 1. peri hermenias vlt. similiter orationes verae sunt quemadmodum et res. Adhuc\n\nautem et si quis aliquibus rationibus autoritatibusue innitens, omnino velit defendere aliqua citra Deum per se esse et manere; nullo tamen colore potest astruere, aliqua citra Deum esse per se aeque digne, prime, summe, perfecte, et aequaliter sicut Deum, sicut Suppositiones et partes Corolarij primi monstrant. Quinimo et si alia vtcunque dicantur esse per se, Deus tamen incomparabiliter magis, dignius, prius, atque perfectius dicitur per se esse: et constat quod omnium communicantium idem, nomen, illud cui nomen maius et dignius competit, est causa caeterorum, secundum quod communicant illud nomen: Per hoc enim probat Philosophus 7. Metaphys. 3 quod Substantia est causa essendi cuiuslibet alterius praedicamenti. Vbi et textus quem Auerroes exponit, Ex hoc quod substantia est dignior nomine entis quam caetera sic concludit, Manfestum est igitur, quod haec est causa essentiae cuiusslibet istorum, et ista sunt propter illud. Super quod Auerroes Comment 3. ita dicit, Cum hoc sit declaratum de substantijs, manifestum est quod substantiae sunt causae essentiae accidentium,", "english": "and not to allow it to lack form, so far as it exists. For what is not through itself, if it is deprived of that through which it is, will surely not be. And we cannot say that the body received this when it was made, so that it could now be content with itself, even if it were forsaken by its maker. Yet if it is so, the soul has this all the more, being manifestly that which bestows it upon the body; and thus it is immediately proved immortal, if it can exist through itself. For whatever is of such a kind must be incorruptible, and for this reason cannot perish, since nothing abandons itself [n4]. But the mutability of the body is at hand, which the whole motion of the body of the universe sufficiently shows. Hence, for those who look carefully, so far as such a nature can be looked into, with its mutability duly ordered, what is mutable is found to be mutable; but what is through itself has no need even of any motion, all abundance existing for it in itself, since all motion is toward another, which the thing moved needs. Form is therefore present to the whole body, a better nature sufficing for it and holding what it made; therefore that mutability does not take away from the body its being a body, but makes it pass from form to form\n\nby a most ordered motion. For no part of it is allowed to be reduced to nothing, since that effective power takes in the whole, with neither a laboring nor an idle power, giving that everything which is through it should be, so far as it is.\" And in chapter 16 he writes thus: \"But if, as no one doubts, the mind is wisest when it imitates the truth, which is always in the same way, and clings to it immovably, joined by divine love [n5]; and from it are all things that in any way are, they are from that essence which supremely and most greatly is; either the mind is from it so far as it is, or it is through itself; but if through itself, since it is itself the cause of its existing, and never abandons itself, it never perishes, as we also argued above.\" Nor can anyone say that the Earth exists through itself, while yet this proposition \"The Earth is\" is not per se, so as thus to block the argument set forth. For according to the truth, and according to the Philosopher in the Categories: \"From the fact that a thing is or is not, a statement is called true or false.\" Therefore, from the fact that a thing is, or is not, thus or thus, a statement is called thus true or thus false. Hence also in On Interpretation 1, last: \"Statements are likewise true just as things are.\" Moreover,\n\neven if someone, relying on some reasons or authorities, should wish to defend altogether that some things apart from God exist and remain through themselves, he cannot by any pretext maintain that any things apart from God are through themselves as worthily, as primarily, as supremely, as perfectly, and as equally as God, as the Suppositions and the parts of the first Corollary show. Indeed, even if other things are in some fashion said to be through themselves, God nevertheless is said to be through himself incomparably more, more worthily, prior, and more perfectly. And it is agreed that, of all things that share the same name, that to which the name belongs in a greater and more worthy way is the cause of the rest, according as they share that name. For by this the Philosopher proves, Metaphysics 7, 3, that Substance is the cause of the being of every other category. Where also the text which Averroes expounds, from the fact that substance is worthier of the name of being than the others, concludes thus: \"It is manifest, therefore, that this is the cause of the essence of each of these, and these are on account of that.\" On which Averroes says, Comment 3: \"Since this has been declared of substances, it is manifest that substances are the causes of the essence of accidents,", "margins": [{"id": "148B·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) imitetur"}, {"id": "148B·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) in"}, {"id": "148C·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) magis dig."}, {"id": "148C·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) The Philosopher. Averroes."}]}, {"anchor": "p148D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p148D", "locator_display": "148D–148E", "source_text": "et accidentia non sunt nisi propter substantias; et hoc est necessarium. Quoniam cum declaratum est, quod hoc nomen ens, dicitur de decem praedicamentis, et dignius de substantijs, et est declaratum, quod cum plura communicant in eodem nomine, et quoddam dignius quibusdam, id quod est dignius isto nomine est causa caeterorum et dispositio caeterorum ad causalitatem, est sicut dispositio istorum in illo nomine. Ex istis igitur propositionibus concluditur, quod substantia est causa caeterorum praedicamentorum: Quare et Philosophus 2. Metaphys. 4. Vnumquodque vero ipsum maxime aliorum, secundum quod et alijs inest vniuoce, puta ignis, calidissimus. Etenim est causa alijs hic causans; quare et verissimum, quod posterioribus est causa vt sint vera. Quapropter semper existentium principia semper esse verissima necesse est; non enim quandoque vera, nec illis causa aliquid ita est vt sint; sed illa alijs: Quare vnumquodque sicut se habet vt sit, ita ad veritatem; vbi textus Commentatoris habet expressius isto modo; Vnumquodque principiorum proprie est causa eorum\n\nsecundum quae sunt aliae res, quae conueniunt in nomine et intentione? Vbi Auerroes, Cum declaratum est, quod causa in quolibet genere entium est magis digna in esse, et in veritate, quam illa quorum est causa in illo genere, manifestum est quod si est hic prima causa omnium, vt declaratum est in scientia naturalium, illa est magis digna in esse et in veritate, quam omnia entia. Omnia enim entia non acquirunt esse et veritatem nisi ab ista causa. Est igitur tantum ens per se, et verum per se, et omnia alia entia et vera per esse et veritatem illius. Vnde et Augustinus 7. Confess. 15. Aspexi aliqua, et vidi tibi debere quia sunt: In te cuncta finita sunt, non quasi in loco, sed quia tu es omni tenens manu et veritate; et omnia vera sunt in quantum sunt, nec quicquam est falsitas nisi cum putatur esse quod non est. Quibus", "english": "and accidents are only on account of substances; and this is necessary. For since it has been declared that this name 'being' is said of the ten categories, and more worthily of substances, and it has been declared that when several things share in the same name, and something more worthily than others, that which is more worthy of this name is the cause of the rest, and the disposition of the rest toward causality is like their disposition in that name. From these propositions, therefore, it is concluded that substance is the cause of the other categories.\" Hence also the Philosopher, Metaphysics 2, 4: \"But that which is most of all in other things, according as it is in the others univocally, say fire, is hottest. For it is a cause to the others, causing them; wherefore also it is most true that it is the cause, to later things, that they be true. Therefore the principles of things that always exist must always be most true; for they are not true at one time and not at another, nor is anything the cause for them that they be, but they are the cause for the others. So as each thing stands as to being, so it stands as to truth.\" Here the Commentator's text has it more expressly in this way: \"Each of the principles is properly the cause of those things according to which other things are, which agree in name and intention\" [n6]. Where Averroes says:\n\n\"Since it has been declared that the cause in any genus of beings is worthier in being and in truth than those of which it is the cause in that genus, it is manifest that if there is here a first cause of all things, as was declared in the science of natural things, that cause is worthier in being and in truth than all beings. For all beings acquire being and truth only from that cause. It alone, therefore, is being through itself and true through itself, and all other beings and true things are so through its being and truth.\" Hence also Augustine, Confessions 7, 15: \"I looked at some things, and saw that they owe it to you that they are. In you all things are bounded, not as in a place, but because you hold all things in hand and in truth [n7]; and all true things are true so far as they are, nor is anything falsity, except when something is thought to be that is not.\" With these", "margins": [{"id": "148D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) The Philosopher."}, {"id": "148D·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) vicissim"}]}, {"anchor": "p149A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p149A", "locator_display": "149A–149B", "source_text": "concordat Auicenna 8. Metaphys. 6. dicens, necesse esse est veritas; veritas enim cuius que rei est proprietas sui esse, quod stabilitum est ei; ergo nihil est dignius esse veritatem, quam necesse esse. I am autem dicitur vetitas id, de cuius esse est sententia certa. Ergo nihil est dignius hac certitudine, quam id de cuius esse est sententia certa; et cum sua certitudine semper est, et cum sua sempiternitate semper est per seipsum, et non per aliud a se: caeterarum vero rerum quidditates non merentur esse, prout sunt in seipsis, nec considerata relatione earum ad necesse esse, sed merentur priuationem; et ob hoc omnes res prout sunt in seipsis, sunt falsae; sed propter ipsum est certitudo earum, et ob hoc omnis res perit, nisi secundum quod est versus faciem eius; et ideo dignius est, vt ipse sit necesse esse et veritas. Cui et concorditer Esaias 40. ita scribit; Omnes gentes quasi non sint, sic sunt coram eo, et quasi nihilum et inane reputatae sunt ei. Vnde et Iob 23. Ipse enim solus est. Super quod Gregorius 16. Moral. 14. loquens de Angelis et hominibus, coelo et terra, et alijs vniuersis; Sunt, inquit, haec omnia,\n\nsed principaliter non sunt, quia in semetipsis minime subsistunt; et nisi gubernantis manu teneantur, esse nequaquam possunt. Cuncta namque in illo subsistunt a quo creata sunt, nec ea, quae viuunt, sibimetipsis vitam tribuunt; nec ea quae mouentur, et non viuunt suis motibus ad motum ducuntur; sed ille cuncta mouet qui quaedam viuificat, quaedam vero viuificata in extrema essentia mire ordinans seruat. Cuncta quippe ex nihilo facta sunt, eorumque essentia rursum ad nihilum tenderet, nisi eam Autor omnium regiminis manu teneret. Omnia itaque quae creata sunt, per se nec subsistere praeualent, nec moueri, sed in tantum subsistunt, in quantum vt esse debeant, acceperunt; in tantum mouentur, in quantum occulto instinctu disponuntur: Ecce enim peccator flagellandus est de rebus humanis. Arescit in ardoribus eius terra, concutitur in naufragijs eius mare, ignescit in eius sudoribus aer, obtenebrescit contra eum in vndationibus coelum, inardescunt in eius oppressionibus homines, mouentur in eius aduersitate et angelicae virtutes. Nunquidnam haec quae inanimata, vel quae viuentia diximus,", "english": "agrees Avicenna, Metaphysics 8, 6, saying: \"The Necessary Being is truth; for the truth of each thing is the property of its being, which is established for it; therefore nothing is more worthy to be truth than the Necessary Being. Now truth is said to be that of whose being the judgment is certain. Therefore nothing is more worthy of this certitude than that of whose being the judgment is certain; and with its certitude it always is, and with its eternity it always is through itself, and not through another than itself. But the quiddities of the other things do not merit being as they are in themselves, their relation to the Necessary Being not being considered [n8], but merit privation; and on this account all things as they are in themselves are false; but because of him there is certitude for them, and on this account every thing perishes, except in so far as it is turned toward his face; and therefore it is more worthy that he himself be the Necessary Being and truth.\" Isaiah 40 writes in agreement with this: \"All nations, as if they were not, so are they before him, and as nothing and emptiness are they reckoned by him.\" Hence also Job 23: \"For he alone is.\" On which Gregory, Moralia 16, 14, speaking of Angels and men, heaven and earth and all the rest: \"All these,\" he says,\n\n\"are, but are not principally, because they do not subsist at all in themselves; and unless they were held by the hand of the governor, they could in no way be. For all things subsist in him by whom they were created; nor do those that live give life to themselves, nor are those that are moved and do not live led to motion by their own movements; but he moves all things who gives life to some, and preserves others, once given life, wondrously ordering them in the farthest reach of being. For all things were made from nothing, and their essence would tend again to nothing, unless the Author of all held it by the hand of government. All things, therefore, that were created can neither subsist nor be moved through themselves; they subsist only so far as they have received that they should be; they are moved only so far as they are disposed by a hidden instinct. For behold, the sinner is to be scourged through human affairs. The earth withers in his burning heats, the sea is shaken in his shipwrecks, the air is kindled in his sweats, the heaven grows dark against him in floods, men are inflamed in his oppressions, and the angelic powers also are stirred in his adversity. Surely these things which we have called inanimate or living", "margins": [{"id": "149A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Isaiah. Job. Gregory."}, {"id": "149B·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) laboribus; in other copies, arboribus."}]}, {"anchor": "p149C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p149C", "locator_display": "149C–149D", "source_text": "suis instinctionibus, et non magis diuinis impulsionibus agitantur? Quicquid est igitur quod exterius saeuit, per hoc ille intuendus est, qui hoc interius disponit: in omni igitur causa solus ipse qui principaliter est, qui etiam ad Mosen dicit; Ego sum qui sum, sic dices filijs Issrael, Qui est, misit me ad vos. Quare et Plato 2. Timae. 3. inducit Deum sic alloquentem alios deos, scilicet Angelos isto modo; Dij, quorum opifex Paterque sum ego: Opera si quidem vos mea dissolubilia natura, mea tamen voluntate indissolubilia: Omne siquidem quod iunctum est, natura dissolubile est; at vero quod bonum ratione iunctum atque modulatum est, dissolui velle non est Dei. Quapropter quia facti generatique estis, immortales quidem nequaquam, nec omnino indissolubiles estis, nec tamen vnquam dissoluemini, nec mortis necessitatem subibitis, quia voluntas mea maior nexus et vegetatior ad aeternitatis custodiam, quam illi vitales nexus, ex quibus aeternitas vestra coagmentata at que composita est. Adhuc autem et coelum firmissimum corporum nequaquam sibi sufficit per se esse. Dicit enim Auerroes de Substantia orbis tractatu 2. Debes scire, quod corpus coeleste, quod est simplex, et intransmutabile\n\nab aliquo extrinseco, non indiget virtute mouente in loco semper tantum, sed etiam virtute largiente in se, et sua substantia permanentiam aeternam. Quoniam et si sit simplex, et non habens potentiam ad corruptionem, tamen est finitae actionis necessario, quia est finitarum dimensionum et determinatarum a superficie continente ipsum; et omne tale, cum intellectus posuerit illud existens per se, absque eo quod aliud largiatur ei permanentiam et aeternitatem; necesse est vt ita sit de finitate permanentiae suae, sicut est de finitate suae actionis; et ideo necesse est in intellectu potentiam hic esse largientem ipsi permanentiam aeternam, quemadmodum largitur ei motum aeternum. Vnde et Psal. 32. Verbo Domini Coeli firmati sunt, et spiritu oris eius omnis virtus eorum. Si igitur secundum Augustinum, Platonem, et Auerroem, nec animus, nec Angelus, nec coelum potest manere per se, sine conseruatione et sustentatione diuina, quid aliud poterit sic manere? Quapropter et Pater Philosophorum", "english": "are not driven by their own instincts and not rather by divine impulses? Whatever it is, then, that rages outwardly, through it must be regarded he who disposes it inwardly; in every cause, therefore, there is he alone who is principally, who also says to Moses: 'I am who am; thus you shall say to the children of Israel: He who is has sent me to you.'\" Wherefore Plato also, Timaeus 2, 3, introduces God addressing the other gods, namely the Angels, in this way: \"Gods, of whom I am maker and Father: you are my works, dissoluble by nature, yet indissoluble by my will. For everything that is joined together is by nature dissoluble; but it is not of God to will to dissolve what has been well joined and harmonized by reason. Therefore, since you have been made and generated, you are by no means immortal, nor altogether indissoluble; yet you will never be dissolved, nor undergo the necessity of death, because my will is a greater and more vigorous bond for the keeping of eternity than those vital bonds out of which your eternity has been joined together and composed.\" Moreover, even the heaven, the firmest of bodies, is by no means sufficient to exist through itself. For Averroes says, On the Substance of the Sphere, treatise 2: \"You should know that the celestial body, which is simple and unchangeable\n\nby anything extrinsic, needs not only a power moving it always in place, but also a power bestowing on it, in its substance, eternal permanence. For although it is simple and has no potency for corruption, it is nevertheless of finite action by necessity, because it is of finite dimensions, bounded by the surface that contains it. And in every such thing, when the intellect has posited it as existing through itself, apart from anything else bestowing permanence and eternity on it, it is necessary that its permanence be finite just as its action is finite; and therefore it is necessary, in the intellect, that there be here a power bestowing on it eternal permanence, just as it bestows on it eternal motion.\" Hence also Psalm 32 [33]: \"By the word of the Lord the heavens were made firm, and all their power by the breath of his mouth.\" If, therefore, according to Augustine, Plato, and Averroes, neither mind nor Angel nor heaven can remain through itself without divine conservation and sustaining, what else could so remain? Wherefore also the Father of the Philosophers,", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p149E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p149E", "locator_display": "149E", "source_text": "Hermes de Verbo aeterno 38. Hic, inquit, sensibilis, qui dicitur, mundus receptaculum est omnium sensibilium specierum, qualitatum, vel corporum, quae omnia sine Deo vegetari non possunt. Omnia enim Deus, et ab eo omnia, et eius omnia voluntati, quod totum est bonum, decens, prudens, et immutabile, et ipsi soli sensibile atque intelligibile, et sine hoc nec fuit aliquid, nec est, nec erit. Omnia enim ab ipso, et per ipsum, et multiformes qualitates, et magnae quantitates, et omnes mensurae excedentes magnitudines, et omniformes species, quas cum intellexeris, o Asclepi, gratias acturus es Deo. Cui et concordanter Apostolus ad Ro. 11. Ex ipso, inquit, et per ipsum, et in ipso sunt omnia, ipsi gloria: Quem et quasi exponens 24. definitionum totidem Philosophorum de Deo 22a. sic ait, Deus est, ex quo est, quicquid est non partitione, per quem est non variatione, in quo est non commixtione. Vnde et Augustinus 1. Confess. 1. loquens Deo, sic ait; Non omnino", "english": "Hermes, On the Eternal Word 38, says: \"This sensible one, which is called the world, is the receptacle of all sensible forms, qualities, or bodies, none of which can be quickened without God. For God is all things, and from him are all things, and all things are subject to his will, which is wholly good, seemly, prudent, and immutable, and perceptible and intelligible to himself alone; and without this nothing was, nor is, nor will be. For all things are from him, and in him, and through him: both manifold qualities, and great quantities, and all measures exceeding magnitudes, and forms of every shape; when you have understood these, O Asclepius, you will give thanks to God.\" In agreement with him, the Apostle in Romans 11: \"From him,\" he says, \"and through him and in him are all things; to him be glory.\" And the book of the twenty-four definitions of God by as many Philosophers [n9], as if expounding him, says in the twenty-second: \"God is that from which is whatever is, not by division; through which it is, not by variation; in which it is, not by commingling.\" Hence also Augustine, Confessions 1, 1, speaking to God, says: \"I would not be at all", "margins": [{"id": "149E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Hermes."}, {"id": "149E·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) The Apostle; and, at the next line, \"24. Philosophers.\""}, {"id": "150E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Augustine."}]}, {"anchor": "p150A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p150A", "locator_display": "150A–150B", "source_text": "essem nisi esses in me, An potius non essem, nisi essem in te? ex quo omnia, per quem omnia, in quo omnia? etiam et sic, Domine, et sic. Qui et super illud Psalmi 113. Omnia quaecunque voluit, fecit; In quibus, inquit, est ipse tanquam indigentia continet, non ab eis tanquam indigens continetur. Dionysius insuper de diuinis nominibus 11. Timotheo interroganti quid sibi vult quod dicitur Deum per seipsum esse, nunquid quod Deus per seipsum sit vita, aut sapientia, aut aliud quicquam tale? respondet; Hoc autem dicimus non est paruum, sed rectum, et simplicem declarationem habet. Non enim essentiam quandam diuinam aut Angelicam esse dicimus per seipsam essendo, essendi, quae sunt, omnium causam; Solummodo enim essendi omnia quae sunt, causam; tantum enim existendi omnia qua sunt, et ipsum esse superessentiale principium, et essentia, et causale, nec vitae parentem aliam de• tatem praeter super diuinam omnium quaecunque viuunt, et editae vitae causam vitam nec colligentem dicendum principales existentium, et creatrices essentias, et substantias, quas\n\nquidem et Deos existentium, et creatores promptos confestim perfecerunt, quos vere et proprie dicendum, neque ipsi formauerunt, neque existentes, neque patres eorum, sed per seipsum esse, et per seipsam vitam deitatem dicimus principaliter quidem, et delformiter et causaliter vnum omnium superprincipale et superessentiale principium et causam, participaliter autem editas ex Deo non participante prouidas virtutes, per scipsam viuificationem, (secundum aliam translationem essentificationem) et per seipsam delficationem, quas existentia proprie sibimet ipsis participant, et existentia, et viuentia, et diuina, et sunt et dicuntur, et alia similiter proinde, et primarum ipsarum optimus substitutor dicitur esse demde totarum earum, deinde particularum ipsarum, deinde totarum ipsarum participantium, deinde particulariter earum participantium. Et quid oportet de his dicere, quando quidem diuinorum nostrorum Magistrorum, et per seipsam bonitatis et diuinitatis substitutricem aiunt plusquam optimam, et plusquam diuinam per seipsam bonitatem et diuinitatem dicentes", "english": "unless you were in me. Or rather, would I not be, unless I were in you? From whom are all things, through whom are all things, in whom are all things? Even so, Lord, even so.\" The same Augustine also says on that verse of Psalm 113 [115]: \"Whatever he willed, he did\": \"In them,\" he says, \"he himself is, as one who contains things in need, not as one contained by them in need.\" Dionysius, moreover, in On the Divine Names 11, to Timothy asking what is meant by saying that God is through himself, whether God through himself is life, or wisdom, or anything else of the kind, replies: \"But this we say: it is not trifling [n10], but right, and admits of a simple declaration. For we do not say that some divine or Angelic essence is, by being through itself, the cause of the being of all things that are. For it is only the cause of the being of all things that are, only of the existing of all things that are, and being itself is the superessential principle, and essence, and causal [principle]; nor [do we say that there is] another deity, parent of life, apart from the super-divine cause of all that live and the cause of life brought forth; nor is one to speak of a [deity] gathering life, nor of principal existents and creating essences and substances [n11], which indeed they promptly made to be both gods of existing things and creators,\n\nwhich, to speak truly and properly, neither did they form, nor are they existing things, nor their fathers; but we call deity through itself being and through itself life: principally, in a deiform and causal way, the one superprincipal and superessential principle and cause of all things; but participatedly, the providential powers brought forth from the God who does not participate: through itself life-giving (according to another translation, essence-making) and through itself deifying; which existing things each participate in their own proper way, and both exist and live and are divine, and are so called, and likewise the others in the same way; and the best establisher of the first of them is said to be, then of their wholes, then of their parts, then of the wholes that participate in them, then of those that participate in them partially. And what need is there to speak of these, since indeed some of our divine Masters say that the establisher of goodness itself and divinity itself is more than best and more than divine, saying that goodness itself and divinity itself", "margins": [{"id": "150A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Dionysius."}, {"id": "150A·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) esse"}, {"id": "150B·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) essentia"}]}, {"anchor": "p150C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p150C", "locator_display": "150C–150E", "source_text": "esse beneficam et deificam, ex Deo procedentem donationem, et per seipsam formam, per seipsam formificam fusionem, et totam formam et particularem formam, et vniuersaliter bona, et quaecunque alia, quae secundum eundum dicta sunt et dicentur, modum declarantia, prouidentiam, et bonitatem participatas ab existentibus ex Deo non participante prouenientes. Et infra 5. Omnia, inquit, ad semetipsam bonitas conuertit, vt principaliter congregatrix est dispersorum, vt principalis et viuifica deitas, et omnia ipsam vt principium, vt continentiam, vt finem appetunt; et optimum est, vt eloquia aiunt, ex quo omnia subsistunt, et sunt, tanquam ex causa perfectissima adducta, et in quo omnia constituta sunt, tanquam in omnipotente consulto custodita et comprehensa, et in quod omnia conuertuntur, sicut in propriam singula summitatem, et illud concupiscunt omnia. Et infra, eodem; Simpliciter omne on, id est ens ex bono et optimo est, et in bonum et optimum conuertitur, et omnia quaecunque sunt et fiunt, per bonum et optimum sunt et fiunt, et ad hoc omnia videt,\n\net ab ipso mouentur et continentur, et propter ipsum et per ipsum et in ipso omne principiū exemplatiuum, consummatiuum, intellectuale, speciale, formale, et simpliciter omne principium, omnis continentia, omne summum, aut, vt comprehendens dicam, omnia quae sunt, ex bono et optimo, et omnia quae non sunt superessenualiter in bono et optimo; et est omnium principium et finis, superprincipale, et superfinale, quia ex ipso, et per ipsum, et in ipso, et in ipsum sunt omnia, vt ait sacer sermo. Per rationem quoque iam factam ostendit Anselmus Monolog. 3. et capitulis alijs consequenter, aliquod esse ens quod solum est per scipsum, et per hoc vnum caetera cuncta esse, et quod ipsum est vnicum non habens aequale nec maius, quoniam quicquid est per aliud minus est illo. Quare concludit, omnium entium summe et maxime ipsum esse, et post per candem rationem ostendit ipsum omnia alia necessario continue sustinere. Vnde et capit. 13o. ita dicit: Constat ergo per summam naturam esse factum quicquid non est idem illi; Dubium autem non nisi irrationali menti esse potest,\n\nquod cuncta quae facta sunt, eodem ipso sustinente vigent, et perseuerant esse quam diu sunt, quo faciente de nihilo habent esse quod sunt. Simili namque per omnia ratione qua collectum est omnia quae sunt, esse per vnum aliquid, vnum ipsum solū esse per seipsum, et alia per illud: Simili, inquam, ratione potest probari, quia quaecunque vigent, per vnum aliquid vigent, vnum illud solum viget per seipsum, et alia per aliud; quod quoniam aliter esse non potest, nisi vt ea quae sunt facta vigeāt per aliud, et illud a quo sunt facta vigeat per se ipsum, necesse est, vt sicut nihil factum est nisi per creatricem praesentem essentiam, ita nihil vigeat nisi per eiusdem seruatricem praesentiam. Et subdit capit 14. consequenter, quod si ita est, imo quia ex necessitate sic est, consequitur vt vbi ipsa non est, nihil sit; vbique igitur est, et per omnia,", "english": "are beneficent and deifying, a gift proceeding from God, and form through itself, an outpouring through itself form-making, both total form and particular form, and the universally good, and whatever else has been or will be said according to the same manner, declaring providence and goodness as participated by existing things, proceeding from the God who does not participate.\" And further on, 5: \"Goodness,\" he says, \"converts all things to itself, as being principally the gatherer of things scattered, as principal and life-giving deity; and all things seek it as principle, as containment, as end; and it is the best, as the Scriptures say, from which all things subsist and are, as brought forth from a most perfect cause, and in which all things are established, as guarded and comprehended in an omnipotent counsel, and toward which all things are converted, each as to its own summit; and all things desire it.\" And further on, in the same place: \"Simply, every on, that is, being, is from the good and best, and is converted to the good and best; and all things whatever that are and come to be, are and come to be through the good and best, and all look to this,\n\nand are moved and contained by it; and on account of it and through it and in it is every principle, exemplary, consummative, intellectual, specific, formal; and simply every principle, every containment, every summit, or, to speak comprehensively, all things that are, from the good and best, and all things that are not, are superessentially in the good and best; and it is of all things the principle and end, superprincipal and superfinal, because from it and through it and in it and into it are all things, as the sacred word says.\" By the reasoning already made Anselm also shows, in Monologion 3 and in the chapters following, that there is some being which alone is through itself, and that through this one all the rest are; and that it is unique, having no equal or greater, since whatever is through another is less than it. Hence he concludes that of all beings it is supremely and greatest; and afterwards, by the same reasoning, he shows that it necessarily and continually sustains all other things. Hence also in chapter 13 he says thus: \"It is agreed, therefore, that whatever is not identical with it has been made through the supreme nature. But only an irrational mind can doubt\n\nthat all things that have been made flourish by the same one sustaining them, and persevere in being as long as they are, by whose making they have from nothing the being that they are. For by a wholly similar reasoning to that by which it was gathered that all things that are, are through some one thing, and that this one alone is through itself and the others through it, by a similar reasoning, I say, it can be proved that whatever flourishes, flourishes through some one thing, and this one alone flourishes through itself, and the others through another. And since this cannot be otherwise than that the things that were made flourish through another, and that from which they were made flourishes through itself, it is necessary that, as nothing was made except through the creating present essence, so nothing flourishes except through the preserving presence of that same essence.\" And in chapter 14 he adds, in consequence, that if it is so, indeed because by necessity it is so, it follows that where it is not, nothing is; it is therefore everywhere, and through all things,", "margins": [{"id": "150D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Anselm."}]}, {"anchor": "p151A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p151A", "locator_display": "151A", "source_text": "et in omnibus. Et infra; Liquet quoniam ipsa est, quae cuncta alia portat et superat, claudit et penetrat. Si igitur haec illis quae superius sunt inuenta iungantur, eadem est quae in omnibus est, et per omnia, et ex qua, et per quam, et in qua omnia. Amplius autem omne causatum causatur ab aliqua causa actualiter nunc causante, quod patet ex relatione mutua inter illa, et per Algaz. 1. Metaphys. et Auicen. 6. Metaphys. et 8. diffuse: quilibet autem citra Deum est causatum, et ipse solus incausatus; quilibet ergo praeter Deum aliquo modo causatur a Deo. Sed ista causatio saltem illorum quae non mouentur, neque nouiter producuntur, non nisi conseruatio necessaria dici potest, quod et patet per praedictos Philosophos dictis locis. Nec potest dici quod Deus ideo dicitur nunc causare aliquod causatum, quia prius causauit illud, vel causam quae illud causauit; hoc enim repugnat Autoribus allegatis; et quia tunc Pater diceretur modo causare filium actualiter existentem, imo et Pater mortuus filium nunc viuentem, quia causauit illum vel causam illius. Quare et Algazel. 1. Metaphys. vlt.", "english": "and in all things. And further on: \"It is clear that it is itself which bears all other things, and surpasses, encloses and penetrates them. If, therefore, this is joined with the things found above, it is the same that is in all things, and through all things, and from which, and through which, and in which are all things.\" Moreover, every thing caused is caused by some cause actually causing now, which is plain from the mutual relation between them, and from Algazel, Metaphysics 1, and Avicenna, Metaphysics 6, and 8, at length. But everything apart from God is something caused, and he alone is uncaused; everything, therefore, besides God is in some way caused by God. But this causation, at least of those things which are not moved nor newly produced, can be called nothing but necessary conservation, which is also plain from the aforementioned Philosophers in the places cited. Nor can it be said that God is said now to cause some thing caused for the reason that he earlier caused it, or caused the cause that caused it; for this contradicts the cited Authorities; and because then a Father would be said now actually to cause his son as existing, indeed even a dead Father his son now living, because he caused him or the cause of him. Wherefore also Algazel, Metaphysics 1, last:", "margins": [{"id": "151A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Third principal argument."}, {"id": "151A·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) non."}, {"id": "151A·3", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Algazel."}]}, {"anchor": "p151B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p151B", "locator_display": "151B–151D", "source_text": "ostendit, quod nullum possibile esse habet esse nisi per aliud quod est factor eius; quod etiam Mundus etsi sit aeternus, potest dici factura Dei altissimi: et distinguens de factore subiungit; Factor autem intelligitur dupliciter: Primo qui extrahit factum de non esse, ad esse; secundo, vt sit esse rei per illud, sicut esse luminis est per solem, et videtur Sol factor luminis naturaliter. Quidam vero putabant, quod cum res haberet esse, non indiget factore, sed quamuis iste non sit, tamen factum suum non desinat esse; et fortassis praesument dicere, quod quamuis ponatur Deum non esse, non sequitur ex hoc mundum non esse, et conantur ostendere hoc exemplo et ratione; Exemplo sic, sicut fabricatori domus mortuo, remanet ipsa domus; Ratione vero sic, Quod non est, indiget datore essendi; sed quod est, non sic eget. Respondet ad exemplum, et dicit, quod fabricator non est causa domus nisi improprie, sed est causa motus partium domus dum mouetur ad formam domus; sed inducta forma domus, et cessantibus motibus causalitas eius cessat. Imo secundum eundem ibidem forma fundamenti\n\nparietis, et partium caeterarum sunt causae domus. Ad rationem vero dicit, quod illud quod iam habet esse non indiget datore, sed conseruatore, quod sic probat: Omnis factura dependet a suo factore, et hoc non secundum suum non esse, quod habuit, ergo secundum suum esse; et addit, Igitur quod coepit esse eget factore secundum suum esse tantum, quoniam secundum hunc modum est possibile esse. Et infra; Postquam autem non pendet factura ex factore, nisi in quantum habet esse, tunc quamdiu permanet in esse, indiget factore, et pendet ex eo secundum suum esse, et est propter ipsum, et cum ipso in omnibus suis dispositionibus, sicut esse diei est propter solem, et cum sole in omnibus suis dispositionibus. Algazel autem in hac ratione, sicut et in plurimis dictis suis sequitur Auicennam, qui 6. Metaphys. 1. multum diffuse prosequitur eandem virtualiter rationem, vbi inter caetera ita dicit; Diuini Philosophi non intelligunt peragentem principium motionis tantum, sicut intelligunt naturales, sed principium essendi et datorem eius, sicut est creator Mundi. Causa\n\nvero naturalis non acquirit esse rei, nisi per motionem aliquam ex modis motionum; ergo acquirens esse in naturalibus est principium motus. Et infra eodem, fortasse putabit aliquis, quod agente et causa non est opus, nisi vt res habeat esse post non esse, sed post quam res habuerit esse, si destruatur causa, erit tamen res sufficiens in se. Igitur putabit, quod res non indiget causa nisi ad incipiendum esse, sed postquam incoeperit et habuerit esse, iam non indigebit causa. Causae igitur apud se erunt causae fiendi tantum, et priores eo quod fit, non simul cum eo. Iam igitur putauit falsum, sicut tu nosti: Esse enim rei postquam res facta est, necesse est vt sit vel necesse esse, vel non necesse esse; et ostenso diffuse, quod non est necesse esse per se, sed dependens a necesse esse per se, et in fine capituli ita dicit; Postquam patuit quod esse quidditatis pendet ab aliquo, in quantum est esse illi quid ditati, non in quantum ipsum est esse post non esse, tunc illud esse secundum hunc modum causatum est, et interim dum durauerit, sic erit causatum pendens ab alio. Iam igitur manifestum est, quod causatum", "english": "[Algazel] shows that nothing possible has being except through another, which is its maker; and that the world too, even if it is eternal, can be called a thing made by God the Most High. Distinguishing concerning the maker, he adds: \"Maker\" is understood in two ways. First, as the one who draws what is made from non-being into being. Second, as the one through whom the being of a thing exists, as the being of light is through the sun; and the sun is seen to be the maker of light by nature. Some, however, thought that once a thing has being it has no need of a maker, and that even if he does not exist, what he made does not cease to be. Perhaps they presume to say that even if God is posited not to be, it does not follow from this that the world is not; and they try to show this by an example and by a reason. By example, thus: when the builder of a house is dead, the house itself remains. By reason, thus: what is not needs a giver of being; but what is does not need one in this way. He answers the example and says that the builder is not the cause of the house, except improperly. He is the cause of the motion of the parts of the house while they are being moved toward the form of the house; but once the form of the house has been introduced and the motions cease, his causality ceases. Indeed, according to the same author in the same place, the form of the foundation, of the wall, and of the other parts are the causes of the house.\n\nTo the reason he says that what already has being needs no giver but a preserver, which he proves thus: Every made thing depends on its maker, and not according to its non-being, which it had; therefore according to its being. And he adds: \"Therefore what has begun to be needs the maker only according to its being, since it is according to this mode that it is possible to be.\" And below: \"But since the made thing depends on the maker only insofar as it has being, then as long as it remains in being it needs the maker, and depends on him according to its being, and exists on account of him and with him in all its dispositions, just as the being of the day is on account of the sun and with the sun in all its dispositions.\" Now Algazel, in this argument as in very many of his sayings, follows Avicenna, who in Metaphysics 6, 1 pursues the same argument in effect, at great length, and where among other things he says: \"The divine philosophers do not understand an agent only as the principle of motion, as the natural philosophers do, but as the principle of being and its giver, as the creator of the world is. But a natural cause does not acquire the being of a thing except through some motion among the modes of motion; therefore what acquires being in natural things is a principle of motion.\" And below in the same place: \"Perhaps someone will think that there is need of an agent and cause only so that the thing may have being after non-being, but that after the thing has had being, if the cause is destroyed, the thing will nevertheless be sufficient in itself. So he will think that a thing needs a cause only for beginning to be, but that once it has begun and has had being it will no longer need a cause. Causes, then, will in his view be causes only of coming-to-be, and prior to what comes to be, not simultaneous with it. Now he has thought falsely, as you know; for the being of a thing, after the thing has been made, must be either necessary being or not necessary being. And having shown at length that it is not necessary being through itself, but dependent on the necessary being through itself, at the end of the chapter he speaks thus: After it has become clear that the being of a quiddity depends on something, insofar as it is being for that quiddity, not insofar as it is being after non-being, then that being is caused in this way; and in the meantime, while it lasts, it will thus be something caused, depending on another. It is therefore now manifest that what is caused", "margins": [{"id": "151D·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) \"tunc\"."}]}, {"anchor": "p151E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p151E", "locator_display": "151E", "source_text": "eget aliquo quod dat sibi ipsum esse perse tantum; sed incoeptio et alia huiusmodi sunt res quae accidunt ei, et quod causatum eget datore sui esse semper et incessanter, quamdiu habuerit esse. Quibus et concorditer Hermes de Mundo et Coelo 1. agendo de rerum principijs, explorans et inquirens quid sit summa et prima causa, et quid eius effectus, sic ait: Est igitur causa illa tu yta olbz, id est, fons habens seminarium vitae, ⟨gap: ⟩ quae dicitur plenitudo scientiae, bonum bonitatis diuinae clementiae quae per omne mundi corpus in modum circuli collocata, et nunc extrinsecus, nunc intrinsecus posita cuncta regit et componit, et ad procuranda et conseruanda omnia ignita et sphaerica, perpetuare non desinit agitationem, illic iungūtur in specie indiuiduali singularitate conscripta, quicquid hyle, quicquid mundus, quicquid mundi machina, quicquid tempus, quicquid in temporalibus parturiunt elementa. Illic textus operis, fatalis series, saeculorum dispositio, temporalium omnium meta summi digito", "english": "needs something that gives it being itself, per se only; but beginning and other such things are things that happen to it; and that what is caused needs a giver of its being always and unceasingly, as long as it has being.\" In agreement with this, Hermes too, On the World and Heaven 1, treating of the principles of things and exploring and inquiring what the highest and first cause is, and what its effect, speaks thus: \"That cause, then, is tu yta olbz, that is, the spring that holds the seedbed of life, [n12] which is called the fullness of knowledge, the good of the goodness of divine clemency; which, set in the manner of a circle through the whole body of the world, and placed now outside, now within, rules and composes all things; and, to care for and preserve all things fiery and spherical, does not cease to perpetuate their agitation. There are joined, in individual form, inscribed by singularity, whatever matter, whatever world, whatever machine of the world, whatever time, whatever the elements bring forth among temporal things. There is the text of the work, the fated series, the ordering of the ages, the boundary of all temporal things, written out by the finger of the highest disposer; there is the knot of perpetuity.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p152A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p152A", "locator_display": "152A–152B", "source_text": "dispositoris exarata, Illic nodus perpetuitatis. Mens itaque diuina nulla fatigatione officium deponit, sed seipsum et mundum, et omnia quae intra eum sunt, perpetua, et infatigabili vtilitate, seu alias stabilitate sui sustentare non desinit. Hoc idem et veritas ipsa verissime testatur, cum dicit, Pater meus vsque modo operatur, et ego operor Iohan. 5. quod intelligitur non de operatione, qua res tantummodo nouiter producuntur, sed de conseruatione necessaria productarum, sicut Auicenna et Algazel superius exponebant. Vnde Augustinus 4. Iuper Genesin ad literam 14. tractans quomodo Deus die 7o ab omni opere requieuit, et quomodo tamen cum hoc, Pater vsque nunc continue operatur, sic dicit; Potest intelligi Deum requieuisse a condendis generibus creaturae; deinceps autem vsque nunc et vltra operari eorundum generum administrationem, quae tunc instituta sunt, non vt saltem die 7o potentia eius a coeli et terrae, omnium que rerum quas condiderat, gubernatione cessaret; alioquin continuo dilaberentur. Creatoris namque potentia, et omnipotentis atque omnia tenentis virtus\n\ncausa subsistendi est omni creaturae, quae si ab eis aliquando cessaret, simul et illorum cessaret species, omnisque creatura concideret. Neque sicut structor aedium, cum fabricauerit, abscedit, at que illo cessante atque abscede•te stat opus eius; Ita Mundus vel ictu oculi stare poterit, si ei Dominus regimen sui subtraxerit. Proinde et quod Dominus ait, Pater meus vsque nunc operatur, continuationem quandam operis eius, qua vniuersam creaturam continet, atque administrat, ostendit, et quod scriptum est de sapientia eius, Pertingit a fine vsque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suauiter, de qua itidem scriptum est, quod motus eius agilior, celeriorque sit omnibus motibus, satis apparet recte intuentibus hunc ipsum incomparabilem et ineffabilem, et si posset intelligi, stabilem motum suum rebus eam praebere suauiter disponendis, quo vtique subtracto, si ab operatione cessauerit, eas continno perituras; et illud quod ait Apostolus, cum Deum Atheniensibus praedicaret, In illo viuimus, et mouemur, et sumus, liquide cognitum, quantum humana mens valet, adiuuat hanc sententiam qua", "english": "The divine Mind, therefore, lays down its office through no weariness, but does not cease to sustain itself and the world and all things within it, with perpetual and untiring usefulness, or otherwise by its own stability.\" The Truth itself bears the most true witness to this same thing when it says, \"My Father works even until now, and I work\" (John 5). This is understood not of the working by which things are merely newly produced, but of the necessary preservation of things produced, as Avicenna and Algazel explained above. Hence Augustine, Literal Commentary on Genesis 4, 14, treating how God rested on the seventh day from every work and yet how the Father nevertheless works continually until now, speaks thus: \"It can be understood that God rested from founding the kinds of creature; but that henceforth, until now and beyond, he works the administration of those same kinds, which were then established. This is not to say that on the seventh day at least his power ceased from the governance of heaven and earth and of all the things he had founded; otherwise they would at once slip away. For the power of the Creator, and the might of the Omnipotent who holds all things,\n\nis the cause of subsisting for every creature; and if it were ever to cease from them, their species would cease along with them, and every creature would collapse. Nor, as the builder of a house departs when he has built it, and his work stands with him ceasing and departing, could the world likewise stand even for the blink of an eye, if the Lord withdrew his rule from it. Therefore also what the Lord says, 'My Father works even until now,' shows a certain continuation of his work, by which he contains and administers the whole creation; and what is written of his wisdom, 'It reaches from end to end mightily, and disposes all things sweetly,' of which it is likewise written that its motion is more agile and swifter than all motions. To those who look rightly it is clear enough that wisdom supplies to things, to be sweetly disposed, this very motion of hers, incomparable and ineffable and, if it could be understood, stable; and that if this were withdrawn, if she ceased from operation, they would at once perish [n13]. And what the Apostle says, when preaching God to the Athenians, 'In him we live and move and are,' clearly understood, as far as the human mind can, supports this opinion, by which we believe and say that God works unceasingly in the things he has created.", "margins": [{"id": "152A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) John."}, {"id": "152A·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Augustine."}, {"id": "152A·3", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) \"dici\" [for intelligi]."}, {"id": "152B·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) \"idem\" [for itidem]."}]}, {"anchor": "p152C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p152C", "locator_display": "152C–152D", "source_text": "credimus et dicimus, Deum in his, quae creauit, indesinenter operari. Neque enim tanquam substantia eius, sic in illo sumus, quemadmodum dictum est, quod habeat vitam in semetipso; sed vti que cum aliud sumus quam ipse, non ob aliud in illo sumus, nisi quia id operatur, et hoc est opus eius quod continet omnia, et quo eius sapientia pertingit a fine vsque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suauiter, per quam dispositionem in illo viuimus et mouemur, et sumus. Vnde colligitur, quod si hoc opus suum rebus subtraxerit, nec viuemus, nec mouebimur, nec erimus. Claret ergo nec vno quidem die cessasse Deum ab opere regendi quae creauit, ne motus suos naturales (quibus aguntur, atque vegetantur, vt omnium naturae sint, et in eo quod sunt, pro suo quaecunque genere maneant) illico amitterent, et esse aliquid omnino desinerent, si eis subtraheretur motus sapientiae Dei quo disponit omnia suauiter: et ab hoc loco 277. propositio sententiarum Prosperi est excerpta. Adhuc autem et Augustinus 9. super Genesin ad literam 23. dicit, quod si Deus subtrahat naturae operationē intimam, qua eam substituit,\n\net facit continuo, tanquam extincta nulla remanebit. Et infra 23. dicit, quod formatio mulieris ex costa illo opere Dei facta est, quod non per Angelos, sed per semetipsum operatus est, et non demisit; sed ita continuantur opera, vt nec vllarum aliarum rerū, nec ipsorum Angelorum natura subsistat, si non operetur. Et super illud Psalmi 118. Manus tuae fecerunt me, sic dicit, Si operatoria Dei potentia rebus subtrahatur, intereunt. Qui et 8. super Genesin ad literam. 19 de Natura et Gratia 26. in sententijs Prosperi 131.285. sententiam similem huic docet. Anselmus quoque de casu diaboli 1. dicit, Quoniam non solum non est alia aliqua essentia nisi illo faciente, sed nec aliquatenus manere potest, quod facta est, nisi eodem ipso seruan•e. Cum ipse desinit seruare quod fecit, quod erat redit in non esse. Lumbardus etiam 1o sentent. dist. 37. recitat quosdam dicentes, Cuncta loca sunt Deo praesentia, et quae in eis sunt, nec in eis aliquid operari cessat; Nam et ipsa loca, et quicquid in eis est, nisi ipse conseruet, manere non possunt. In eis ergo per substantiā Deus esse dicitur, quia per virtutem", "english": "\"For we are not in him as though we were his substance, in the way it has been said that he has life in himself; but, since we are something other than he, we are in him for no other reason than that he works this; and this is his work, which contains all things, and by which his wisdom reaches from end to end mightily and disposes all things sweetly; and through this disposition we live and move and are in him.\" From this it is gathered that if he withdrew this work of his from things, we should neither live nor be moved nor exist. \"It is clear, therefore, that God did not cease even for a single day from the work of ruling the things he created, lest they should at once lose their natural motions (by which they are driven and quickened, so that they may be the natures of all things, and in what they are may remain, each according to its kind) and cease altogether to be anything, if the motion of God's wisdom, by which he disposes all things sweetly, were withdrawn from them.\" From this passage proposition 277 of Prosper's Sentences has been excerpted. Further, Augustine also, Literal Commentary on Genesis 9, 23, says that if God were to withdraw from nature the inmost operation by which he establishes it\n\nand makes it continually, nothing of it will remain, as though extinguished. And below, in 23, he says that the formation of woman from the rib was done by that work of God which he worked not through Angels but through himself, and did not hand over; but works are so continued that the nature neither of any other things nor of the Angels themselves would subsist if he were not working. And on that verse of Psalm 118 [119], \"Your hands have made me,\" he says thus: \"If God's operative power were withdrawn from things, they perish.\" The same author also teaches a similar opinion in On Genesis Literally 8, 19; in On Nature and Grace 26; and in Prosper's Sentences 131 and 285. Anselm also, On the Fall of the Devil 1, says: \"Not only is there no other essence except by his making it, but what was made cannot in any way remain unless the same himself preserves it. When he himself ceases to preserve what he made, what was returns into non-being.\" Lombard also, Sentences 1, dist. 37, recites some who say: \"All places are present to God, and as to what is in them, he does not cease to work in them; for the places themselves, and whatever is in them, cannot remain unless he preserves them. In them, therefore, God is said to be through substance, because by the power", "margins": [{"id": "152C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Prosper. Augustine."}, {"id": "152D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Anselm."}, {"id": "152D·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Lombard."}]}, {"anchor": "p152E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p152E", "locator_display": "152E", "source_text": "propriae substantiae suae facit, vt etiam loca sint, et omnia quae in eis sunt, et hanc istorum Sententiam approbat, et confirmat. Praeterea nulla res habens causam formalem potest existere sine ipsa; sed Deus est omnium prima forma, sicut Suppositiones demonstrant, sicut etiam 2. Metaph. demonstratur; quoniam in causis formalibus non est infinitus processus, sed est omnium vna prima; haec autem est Deus. Duodecimo quoque Metaph. quasi in principio patet idem; Vnde et Auerroes dicit ibi comment. 6. quod et prius dixerat Alexander, quod Deus est omnium prima forma, primum efficiens, et similiter primus finis. Idem quoque Auerroes super de somno et vigilia dicit ita; Cum ista indiuidua habent determinatum esse, necesse est, vt nulla eorum sit intellecta apud abstractam formam, cuius proportio ad illam", "english": "of his own substance he brings it about that places also exist, and all things that are in them\"; and he approves and confirms this opinion of theirs. Furthermore, nothing that has a formal cause can exist without it; but God is the first form of all things, as the Suppositions demonstrate, as Metaphysics 2 also demonstrates, since in formal causes there is no infinite regress, but there is one first of all; and this is God. In Metaphysics 12 also, nearly at the beginning, the same is plain; whence Averroes too says there, comment 6, what Alexander had also said before, that God is the first form of all things, the first efficient cause, and likewise the first end. Averroes likewise says the following on On Sleep and Waking: \"Since these individuals have determinate being, it is necessary that none of them be understood in connection with an abstract form, whose proportion to it [n14]", "margins": [{"id": "152E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) 4. Principal argument."}, {"id": "152E·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Averroes."}]}, {"anchor": "p153A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p153A", "locator_display": "153A–153B", "source_text": "est, sicut proportio formae artificij ad artificiatum. Ipsa enim est omnium artifex sap. 7o. Hoc idem et Plotinus affirmat, de quo Augustinus 10. de Ciuit. Dei. 4. scribit ita; De prouidentia certe Plotinus Platonicus disputat, eamque a summo Deo, cuius est inintelligibilis atque ineffabilis pulchritudo vsque ad haec terrena et ima pertingere flosculorum atque foliorum pulchritudine comprobat, quae omnia quasi abiecta, et velocissime pereuntia decentissimos formarum suarum numeros habere non posse confirmat, nisi inde formentur, vbi forma intelligibilis et incommutabilis simul habens omnia perseuerat. Quapropter et Augustinus de Verbo Domini, sermone 38. Verbum, inquit, Dei est forma quaedam, forma non formata, sed forma omnium formatorum sine loco superans omnia, eminens omnibus, et fundamentum quoddam in quo sunt, et fastigium sub quo sunt. Quia enim Deus sub illo sunt omnia; verbum in se manens innouat omnia, ergo est forma omnium rerum, forma infabricata sine tempore, sine spacijs locorum. Qui et 83. quaestionum 23. dicit, quod ipsa similitudo\n\nPatris filius dicitur, cuius participatione similia sunt quaecunque sunt, vel inter se, vel Deo similia; et subdit; Ipsa est enim species prima, qua sunt, vt ita dicam, speciata, et forma qua formata sunt omnia. Chrysostomus etiam super epistolam ad Hebraeos homil. 2. dicit; Filium esse characterem proprium primae formae: quod et testatur Dionysius de diuinis nominibus 11o. superius allegatus. Sanctus etiam Ierotenus, Dionysio 2. de diuinis nominibus recitante, sic scribit; Omnium causa et repletiua Iesu diuinitas, partes vniuersitati consocians, saluans; et neque pars neque totum est, et totum et pars, vt omnem et partem et totum in semetipso coambiens, et supereminens, et excellens, perfecta quidem est in perfectis, vt perfectio principalis; imperfecta vero in imperfectis tanquam superfecta, et ante perfecta forma formit ans in informibus, tanquam forma principalis informis in ipsis formis, tanquam superformis essentia totius essentiae, [et] incontaminatas supergrediens, et superessentialiter omni essentia remota tota principia et ordiens, destinans, et in omni principio et ordine supercollocata,", "english": "is as the proportion of the form of the artifice to the thing made by art.\" For this form is the artificer of all things (Wisdom 7). Plotinus affirms the same, of whom Augustine writes thus in City of God 10, 4 [n15]: \"Plotinus the Platonist certainly discusses providence, and proves that it reaches from the highest God, whose beauty is unintelligible and ineffable, even to these earthly and lowest things, by the beauty of little flowers and leaves; all of these, as things cast aside and most swiftly perishing, he affirms could not have the most seemly numbers of their forms unless they were formed from that place where the intelligible and unchangeable form, having all things at once, endures.\" Therefore Augustine too, in On the Word of the Lord, sermon 38, says: \"The Word of God is a certain form, a form not formed, but the form of all things formed, without place surpassing all things, standing out above all, and a kind of foundation on which they stand, and a summit beneath which they stand. For since he is God [n16], all things are beneath him; the Word, remaining in itself, renews all things; therefore it is the form of all things, an unfashioned form, without time, without the spaces of places.\" He also says in the Eighty-three Questions, 23, that the very likeness\n\nof the Father is called the Son, by participation in whom whatever things exist are alike, either to one another or to God; and adds: \"For he is the first species, by which things are, so to speak, given species, and the form by which all things are formed.\" Chrysostom also, on the Epistle to the Hebrews, homily 2, says that the Son is the proper stamp of the first form; and Dionysius, On the Divine Names 11, cited above, bears witness to this too. Saint Hierotheus also, as Dionysius recites him in On the Divine Names 2, writes thus [n17]: \"The divinity of Jesus, cause and fulfiller of all things, joining parts to the universe and saving them; it is neither part nor whole, and is both whole and part, encompassing in itself every whole and part and whole, supereminent and excelling. It is perfect indeed among the perfect, as principal perfection; but imperfect among the imperfect, as super-perfect and pre-perfect, a form forming among the formless, as a principal form unformed in the forms themselves, as the super-formal essence of the whole of essence, [and] passing beyond the uncontaminated, and superessentially, with all essence set aside, beginning and ordering all principles, destining them, and set above in every principle and order,", "margins": [{"id": "153A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Wisdom 7. Plotinus."}, {"id": "153A·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Augustine."}, {"id": "153B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Chrysostom. Dionysius. Hierotheus."}, {"id": "153B·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) \"perfecto\"."}]}, {"anchor": "p153C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p153C", "locator_display": "153C–153D", "source_text": "et mensura est eorum quae sunt. Quorum non ignobilis imitator Robertus Lincolniensis Episcopus in quadam Epistola directa Magistro Adae Rufo quaerenti; An Deus esset prima forma omnium, ostendit, quod Deus est forma omnium, et etiam prima forma. Et primo supposito, quod sit forma, probat quod sit necessario prima forma, quia ante ipsum nihil; Ipse enim est primus et nouissimus; deinde probat quod sit forma per autoritates, et similiter rationes. Primam autoritatem allegat ab Augustino 1. De libero arbitrio; et ita est, non connumerato; Vnde malum, scilicet primo libro, sed illo connumerato, sicut ipsemet Augustinus 1. Retract. 9. connumerat, est 2. de libero arbitrio 28. dicit igitur Augustinus; Si quicquid mutabile aspexeris vel sensu corporis, vel animi consideratione capere non potes, nisi aliqua numerorum forma teneatur, qua detracta in nihilum recedat necesse est; Noli dubitare, vbi ista mutabilia non intercipiantur, sed dimensis motibus, et distincta varietate formarum, quasi quosdam versus temporum peragant, esse aliquam formam aeternam et incommutabilem,\n\nquae neque contineatur, et quasi diffundatur locis, neque protendatur atque varietur temporibus, per quam cuncta ista formari valeant, et pro suo genere implere, atque agere locorum atque temporum numeros. Omnis autem res mutabilis etiam formabilis sit necesse est; sicut et mutabile dicimus, quod mutari potest, ita formabile quod formari potest appellauerim. Nulla autem res formare seipsam potest, quia nulla res potest dare sibi quod non habet; et vtique vt habeat formam, formatur aliquid. Quapropter quaelibet res si quam habet formam, non ei opus est accipere quod habet; si quam vero formam non habet, non potest a se accipere quod non habet; nulla ergo res, vt diximus, formare seipsam potest. Conficitut itaque vt corpus et animus, cum sint mutabilia, forma quadam incommutabili et semper manente formentur, cui formae dictum est; Mutabis ea et mutabuntur, tu autem idem ipse es, et anni tui non deficient: annos sine defectu pro aeternitate posuit prophetica locutio: De hac item forma dictum est, quod in se manens innouat omnia. Hinc etiam comprehenditur", "english": "and the measure of the things that are.\" A not ignoble imitator of these is Robert, Bishop of Lincoln, in a certain letter directed to Master Adam Rufus, who asked whether God is the first form of all things. He shows that God is the form of all things, and also the first form. First he supposes that he is form, and proves that he is necessarily the first form, because before him there is nothing; for he is the first and the last. Then he proves that he is form, by authorities and likewise by arguments. He cites the first authority from Augustine, On Free Choice 1; and so it is, if \"Whence evil,\" that is, the first book, is not counted [n18]; but if that is counted, as Augustine himself counts it in Retractations 1, 9, it is On Free Choice 2, 28. Augustine therefore says: \"Whatever mutable thing you look at, you cannot grasp it, whether by bodily sense or by consideration of the mind, unless it is held by some form of numbers, and if this is withdrawn it must needs fall back into nothing. Do not doubt that where these mutable things are not cut off, but with measured motions and a distinct variety of forms go through, as it were, certain verses of times, there is some eternal and unchangeable form,\n\nwhich is neither contained and, as it were, diffused in places, nor stretched out and varied in times, and through which all these things are able to be formed, and each according to its kind to fill out and carry out the numbers of places and times. Now every mutable thing must also be formable; just as we call mutable what can be changed, so I should call formable what can be formed. But no thing can form itself, because no thing can give itself what it does not have; and to have form, something must be formed. Wherefore any thing, if it has some form, has no need to receive what it has; if it has no form, it cannot receive from itself what it does not have; so no thing, as we have said, can form itself. It follows, therefore, that body and soul, since they are mutable, are formed by a certain form that is unchangeable and always remaining, to which it has been said: 'You will change them and they will be changed; but you are the same, and your years will not fail.' The prophetic speech put 'years without failing' for eternity. Of this form too it has been said that, remaining in itself, it renews all things [n19]. From this also it is understood", "margins": [{"id": "153C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Augustine."}]}, {"anchor": "p153E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p153E", "locator_display": "153E", "source_text": "omnia prouidentia gubernari: Si enim omnia quae sunt, forma penitus subtracta nulla erunt, forma ipsa incommutabilis, per quam mutabilia cuncta subsistunt, vt formarum suarum numeris impleantur, et agantur; Ipsa est eorum prouidentia: non enim ista essent, si illa non esset, et haec videtur ratio Auicennae et Algazelis tacta superius, qua per ens possibile inuenerunt vnum necesse esse. Ad hoc etiam allegat Augustinus 13. de Confess. talem sermonem dirigentem ad Patrem; quid te promeruerunt spiritualis, corporalisque natura quas fecisti, vt inde penderent etiam inchoata, at que ita penderēt in tuo verbo informata, nisi per idem verbum reuocarentur ad vnitatem tuam, et formarentur, et essent ab vno te summo bono, vniuersa bona valde? Et sequitur, quid te promeruit inchoatio creaturae spiritualis, vt saltem tenebrosa fluitaret similis abysso, tui dissimilis, nisi perverbum tuum conuerteretur ad id a quo facta est atque ab eo illuminata lux fieret, quamuis non aequaliter, tamen conformis formae", "english": "that all things are governed by providence: for if all things that are, with form wholly withdrawn, would be nothing, it is the unchangeable form itself, through which all mutable things subsist, so that they are filled and driven by the numbers of their forms, that is their providence; for these things would not be if that were not.\" And this seems to be the argument of Avicenna and Algazel touched on above, by which, from possible being, they found that there is one necessary being. For this Augustine also cites, in Confessions 13, such a speech addressed to the Father: \"What did the spiritual and corporeal nature that you made deserve from you, that even things merely begun should depend on you, and so depend in your Word as unformed [n20], unless through the same Word they were recalled to your unity, and were formed, and were, from you the one highest good, all things very good?\" And it follows: \"What did the beginning of spiritual creation deserve from you, that it should at least float shadowy, like an abyss, unlike you, unless through your Word it were converted to that by which it was made and, illuminated by it, became light, though not equally, yet conformed to a form equal to you?\" [n21]", "margins": [{"id": "153E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Augustine."}, {"id": "154E·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) \"…unt\" [first letter(s) not securely read; see note 21]."}]}, {"anchor": "p154A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p154A", "locator_display": "154A–154B", "source_text": "aequali tibi. Iterumque adducit eundem 2. de Confess. sic loquentem ad Patrem; Stabo atque solidabor in te in forma mea, vita tua. Post haec per quatuor rationes ostendit, quod Deus sit forma ad seipsum, deinde manifestat quomodo Deus est forma creaturarum, et vult quod forma in creaturis inueniatur quadrupliciter; Primo, sicut altera pars compositi, ex qua et materia componitur ipsum totum, et sic Deus non est forma creaturarum; Secundo, dicitur forma, ad cuius similitudinem quid formatur, sicut pes ligneus dicitur forma soleae, quae secundum illum formatur; Tertio, dicitur forma illud per applicationem, ad quod materia ad eius similitudinem figuratur, sicque sigillum est forma cerae, et argilla statuae fusilis. Quarto, similitudo in animo artificis, ad quam respiciens operatur, dicitur forma scilicit talis artificiati, nec multum distat a forma secundi modi, et subdit; Imaginare itaque in mente Architecti formam domus fabricandae ad quam solummodo respicit, vt ad eius imitationem domum faciat, et imaginare cum hoc per impossibile ipsius voluntatem ita potentem,\n\nquod se sola applicet materiam formandam in domum; et imaginare cum his quod materia domus esset fluida, nec posset permanere in forma recepta in se, si separaretur a forma in mente Architecti, sicut aqua figurata sigillo argenteo, separato sigillo, statim amitteret figuram receptam. Imaginare itaque voluntatem artificis applicantem materiam domus ad formam in mente sua, non solum vt sic formetur in domum, sed quamdiu domus manet in esse domus, vt formata in esse seruetur. Eo itaque modo quo forma huiusmodi in mente Architecti esset forma domus, est ars siue sapientia, siue verbum omnipotentis Dei, forma omnium creaturarum; Ipsa enim simul est exemplar efficiens, formans, et in forma data conseruans. Et infra dicit aeternam Dei sapientiam sic esse formam omnium, velut si imagineris figuram sigilli argentei esse vitam et intelligentiam, intelligentem se volentemque figurare ad sui imitationem et similitudinem magis minusue expressam ceram fluidam, non potentem per se permanere in aliqua figuratione recepta, ipsaque hac sola voluntate informem et fluidam ceram", "english": "Again he [Robert] brings in the same Augustine, Confessions 2, speaking thus to the Father: \"I shall stand and be made firm in you, in my form, your life\" [n22]. After this he shows by four arguments that God is form to himself; then he makes clear how God is the form of creatures, and holds that form is found in creatures in four ways. First, as the other part of a composite, from which and from matter the whole itself is composed; and in this way God is not the form of creatures. Second, that to whose likeness something is formed is called a form, as a wooden foot is called the form of a sandal, which is formed according to it. Third, that is called form by application to which matter is shaped to its likeness; and so the seal is the form of the wax, and the clay mould of the cast statue. Fourth, the likeness in the mind of the craftsman, looking to which he works, is called the form, namely, of such an artefact; and this does not differ much from the form of the second mode. And he adds: \"Imagine, then, in the mind of the Architect the form of the house to be built, to which alone he looks, so as to make the house in imitation of it; and imagine, in addition, impossibly, that his will is so powerful\n\nthat it alone applies the matter to be formed into a house. And imagine along with this that the matter of the house were fluid and could not remain in the form received in itself if it were separated from the form in the mind of the Architect, as water shaped by a silver seal, when the seal is removed, at once loses the received shape. Imagine, then, the craftsman's will applying the matter of the house to the form in his mind, not only so that it may thus be formed into a house, but, as long as the house remains in the being of a house, so that, once formed, it is preserved in being. In the same way, then, as such a form in the mind of the Architect would be the form of the house, the art, or wisdom, or word of omnipotent God is the form of all creatures; for it is at once exemplar, efficient, forming, and preserving in the form given. And below he says that the eternal wisdom of God is thus the form of all things, as if you were to imagine that the figure of a silver seal were life and intelligence, understanding itself and willing to shape, to the imitation and likeness of itself, more or less expressed, fluid wax, which cannot of itself remain in any shaping received; and by this will alone were to move the formless and fluid wax", "margins": [{"id": "154A·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) \"anima\" [for animo]."}]}, {"anchor": "p154C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p154C", "locator_display": "154C", "source_text": "ad se moueret, sibique applicaret, et sic suam similitudinem aliquantam imprimeret, et impressam seruaret; sic aeterna Patris sapientia est forma omnium. Haec Robertus Lincolniensis Grosse teste, sed subtilis ingenij et acuti. Hoc idem expresse testatur Aristoteles in De Mundo 11. ita dicens, Nulla natura sibi per se sufficit priuata salute, quae ex eo, scilicet Deo. Quamobrem et quidam Antiquorum moti sunt ad dicendum quod haec omnia plena sunt Dijs. Vnde et Virgilius in Bucolicis ecloga 3a. A Ioue principium, Musae, Iouis omnia plena. et Ieremiae 23. Caelum et terram ego implebo, seu aliter impleo, ait Dominus; et sequitur in De mundo, vt virtus, quae residet in Caelo et plurimum distantibus, de vno loquendo, (in alia translatione, in vno dicere) omnibus fiat causa salutifera, iste est omnipotens sermo suus, qui de Caelo a regalibus sedibus venit sapient 18. qui sanat omnia, supra 16. Vnde et Apostolus ad Hebraeos 1. portans omnia verbo virtutis suae. Nonne et ista de causa, Hermes dicit Deum esse quodammodo omnia, et nominibus omnium nominari, sicut Autoritas eius de Verbo", "english": "toward itself, and apply it to itself, and so imprint some likeness of itself, and preserve it once imprinted; thus the eternal wisdom of the Father is the form of all things.\" These are the words of Robert of Lincoln, \"Great-head,\" but of subtle and acute intellect [n23]. Aristotle bears express witness to the same thing in On the World 11, saying thus: \"No nature suffices for itself by itself, deprived of the safety that comes from him, namely God. For this reason some of the Ancients were moved to say that all these things are full of gods.\" Whence also Virgil, in the Bucolics, eclogue 3: \"From Jove the beginning, Muses; all things are full of Jove.\" And Jeremiah 23: \"I fill heaven and earth, says the Lord.\" And there follows in On the World that the power which resides in heaven and in the things farthest apart, speaking of the one (in another translation, \"to say in one\"), becomes to all a cause of salvation. This is his omnipotent word, which came from heaven from the royal seats (Wisdom 18), which heals all things (above, 16) [n24]. Whence also the Apostle, Hebrews 1: \"bearing all things by the word of his power.\" Is it not also for this reason that Hermes says that God is in a way all things, and is named by the names of all, as his authority On the Eternal Word, 38, cited above, in part teaches?", "margins": [{"id": "154C·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) \"sua similitudine aliquanta\"."}, {"id": "154C·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) \"impressa\"; Savile's separate source margin at \"Aristoteles\": Aristotle."}, {"id": "154C·3", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Virgil. Jeremiah. The Philosopher."}, {"id": "154C·4", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Hermes."}]}, {"anchor": "p154D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p154D", "locator_display": "154D", "source_text": "aeterno 38. allegata superius partim docet? Nonne et supra, eiusdem 31. dicit, quod Pater omnium vel Dominus, et is qui solus est omnia, omnibus se libenter ostendit? et supra 22. inquirens nomen Dei sic ait; Non spero totius maiestatis effectorem, omniumque rerum Patrem vel Dominum, vno posse quamuis e multis composito, nuncupari nomine, hunc vero in nomine, vel potius omnium nomine; si quidem is sit vnus et omnia, vt sit necesse aut omnia eius nomine, aut ipsum omnium nominibus nuncupari. Cui et concordanter Philosophus in de Mundo vltimo agens de diuinis nominibus, ita scribit; Cumque sit vnus, multinomius est, nominatus ab omnibus passionibus quas innouat ipse, et hoc extenso quasi per singula inductiue, in fine dicit, quod nuncupatur Saluator et Eleutherius (in alia translatione liberator) et in summa loquendo, caelestis et terrestris appellandum a qualibet natura, et fortuna, velut ens ipse omnium causa; propter quod non male dicitur in Orphicis, Iupiter fundum terrae et caeli, Iupiter radix ponti, Iupiter sol et luna, Iupiter rex, Iupiter princeps omnium.", "english": "Does he not also say above, in 31 of the same work, that the Father of all, or Lord, he who alone is all things, shows himself willingly to all? And above, in 22, inquiring into the name of God, he speaks thus: \"I do not expect that the maker of all majesty, the Father or Lord of all things, can be called by a single name, though compounded of many, but that he is called in a name, or rather by the name of all things [n25]; if indeed he is one and all, so that it must needs be either that all things are named by his name, or that he is named by the names of all things.\" In agreement with this the Philosopher, treating of the divine names at the end of On the World, writes thus: \"Though he is one, he has many names, being named from all the affections that he himself renews.\" And having extended this, as it were, through individual cases by induction, he says at the end that he is called Savior and Eleutherius (in another translation, Liberator), and, in sum, speaking generally, that he is to be called heavenly and earthly from every nature and fortune, as being himself the cause of all. \"For which reason it is not badly said in the Orphic verses: Jupiter the foundation of earth and heaven, Jupiter the root of the sea, Jupiter sun and moon, Jupiter king, Jupiter prince of all.\"", "margins": [{"id": "154D·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) \"omni\" [for omnium]; Savile's separate source margin at \"Cui et concordanter Philosophus\": The Philosopher."}]}, {"anchor": "p154E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p154E", "locator_display": "154E–155A", "source_text": "Quare et Lucanus, Iupiter est quodcunque vides.— An forte et hoc est quod Deus sciscitanti Moysi nomen eius, velate respondit, Ego sum qui sum, sic dices filijs Israel, Qui est, misit me ad vos. Exod. 3. quasi velit innuere se esse seipsum simpliciter per seipsum, et se etiam esse quodammodo totum ens, essentificando videlicet alia vniuersa. Quare et Dionysius de diuinis nominibus 1. ostendens summam vnitatem et diuinitatem esse innominatam et tamen nominibus omnium nominatam, sic ait Scientes Theologi tanquam innominabilem eam laudant, et ex omni nomine innominabilem, et cum aiunt Diuinitatem ipsam in vna mysticarū symbolicae diuinae manifestationis visionū increpasse dicentē quod nomen tui? et sicut ab omni eum denominatiua scientia reducens, dicere, vt quid interrogas nomen\n\nmeum? et hoc est mirabile, aut nonne hoc vere est mitabile nomen quod est super omne nomē quod innominabile est? Multiuocā vero, vt cum eam iterum introducūt dicentem, Ego sum on (id est, ens) vita, lux, Deus, veritas, et cum ipsi omnium causalem Theosophi multiuoce ex omnibus causatiuis laudant, vt optimum, vt existentem, vt saeculorum causalem, vt vitae largitorem, vt virtutem, vt Dominum dominorum, vt Regem regnantium, vt Antiquum dierum, vt non senescentem, vt immutabilem, vt salutem. Atqui et in animis eum esse aiunt, et in animabus, et in corporibus, et in coelo, et in terra, et simul in eodem, eundem immundanum, circa mundanum, super mundanum, super coelestem, super essentialem, solem, stellam, ignem, aquam, spiritum, roris nebulam, per seipsum lapidem et petram, omnia quae sunt, et nihil horum quae sunt. Sic igitur omnium causae et supereminenti et innominabili adunabunt, et omnia, eorum quae sunt, nomina, vt diligenter sit vniuersorum regnum, et circa ea quae sunt omnia, et ab ea vt causa, vt principio, vt fine dependentia. Ecce hic innuit euidenter", "english": "Hence Lucan too, Jupiter is whatever you see.— Is it perhaps this also, that when Moses asked God his name, God answered veiledly, I am who am; thus you shall say to the children of Israel: He Who Is has sent me to you (Exodus 3)? It is as if he wished to intimate that he is himself simply through himself, and that he is also, in a certain way, the whole of being, conferring essence [n26] on all else. Hence Dionysius too, On the Divine Names 1, shows that the highest unity and divinity is unnamed and yet named by the names of all things, and says: \"The theologians, knowing this, praise it as unnameable, and as unnameable from every name. They say that the Divinity itself, in one of the mystical visions of the symbolic divine manifestation, rebuked the one who said, What is your name? [n27]. As it were drawing him back from all denominative knowledge, the Divinity said, Why do you ask my name? And this is wonderful. Or is not this truly the wonderful name, which is above every name, and which is unnameable? It is of many names, as when they again introduce it saying, I am On (that is, Being), life, light, God, truth, and when the God-wise, in many names drawn from all that it causes, praise it as the cause of all: as the best, as the existent, as cause of the ages, as giver of life, as power, as Lord of lords, as King of reigning kings, as Ancient of days, as not growing old, as unchangeable, as salvation. Moreover they say that it is in minds and in souls, in bodies, in heaven and on earth, and at once in the same; that the same is unworldly, about the world, above the world, above the heavenly, above the essential; sun, star, fire, water, spirit, mist of dew, itself through itself stone and rock, all things that are, and none of the things that are. Thus, then, they will join [n28] to the cause of all, supereminent and unnameable, even all the names of the things that are, so that there may be, with care, a kingdom of all things, and, around what exists, all things dependent upon it as cause, as principle, as end.\" Behold, here he clearly intimates", "margins": [{"id": "154E·2", "kind": "source", "text": "Lucan (source)."}, {"id": "154E·3", "kind": "source", "text": "Exodus (source)."}, {"id": "155A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "\"1.\" (source)."}]}, {"anchor": "p155B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p155B", "locator_display": "155B–155D", "source_text": "Deum esse triplicem causam rerum, formalem, efficientem, finalem: Et sequitur, et ipsa secundum eloquium sit omnia in omnibus; et vere laudatur omnium substantia inchoatiua, et consummatiua, et continens. Vbi Glossa Omnia, inquit, quae sunt, est Deus, eo quod ex ipso sunt omnia; nihil eorum quae sunt, quia creatus non est. Et infra 5. Op•mi diuina nominatio totas omnium causales processiones manifestans, et in existentia et non existentia ex•enditur, et supra existentia, et super non existentia est; vbi Glossa, Processionem autem dicit diuinam operationem per quam omnia ad effectum procedunt. Deus insuper apud Hermetem de Verbo aeterno 22. et 31. Pater omnium nominatur; Pater autem teste Papia in Elementario suo Graecum est, id est, genitor dictus a pantater graeco quod est omnia seruans: Quare et Hermes, sicut superius tangitur, dicit de Deo, quod est Pater omnium vel Dominus omnium, vel is qui solus est omnia, omnia scilicet essentificans producendo, et similiter conseruando, sicut causa efficiens omnium et formalis. Hanc eandem sententiam videtur Hermes\n\ndocere de Verbo aeterno 1. vbi loquens de plenitudine omnium bonorum, quasi se corrigendo subiungit; si tamen multa sunt bona, et non vnum in quo sunt omnia: alterum enim alterius consentancum esse dignoscitur, omnia vnius esse, aut vnum esse omnia; Ita enim sibi esse vtrumque connexum, vt separari alterum ab vtroque non possit. Cui et Aristoteles concordanter in De mundo 12. per exemplum elegans idem confirmat, Ferunt, inquiens, sculptorem Phidiam Mineruam (in alia translatione, Palladem) in medio cuiusdam scuti infigurasse, et impressisse suam faciem, et connexuisse statuae quodā occulto artificio, vt necessario si quis velit eam auferre, totam statuam dissiparet, et confringeret. Talem gerit rationem Deus ad Mundum, continens omnium harmoniam et salutem. Vnde et Auicenna 8. Metaphys. 6. Omnes res perit, nisi secundum quod est versus faciem eius, et ideo dignius est, vt ipse sit necesse esse, et veritas, et intentio pura: Quibus et consentit 103. Psalmus, dicens; Aperiente te manum tuam omnia implebuntur bonitate; auertente autem te faciem turbabuntur; auferes\n\nspiritum eorum et deficient, et in puluerem suum reuertentur, in nihilum scilicet redigentur. Annon et ista de causa quidam posuerunt Deum Animam mundi esse? quanquam Plato 1. Timae. 2. et 6. videatur astruere, Animam mundi esse productam a Deo, et in medio Mundi sitam. Vnde et Themistius recitante Auerroe super 12. Metaphys. comment. 19. loquens de Animalibus ex putredine generatis, et de industria et intentione naturae, sic ait: Non est mirum, quamuis natura non intelligente aliquid de huiusmodi, et tamen facit hoc inducendo aliquam intentionem, et hoc demonstrat, quod aliquid rememorat ipsam de causis nobilibus, vt anima quae est in terra, de qua Plato dicit, quod sit ex dijs secundis. Sed istud dictum Themistij reprobat Auerroes consequenter, et dicit quod animalia talia generantur ex calore coelesti debite mensurato: Et subdit, Et ista mensura prouenit ab arte diuina intellectuali, quae est similis vni formae vnius artis principalis, sub qua sunt artes plures. Secundum hoc igitur est intelligendum, quod natura facit aliquid perfecte et ordinate, quamuis non intelligat,", "english": "that God is the threefold cause of things: formal, efficient, final. And it follows: \"and it itself, according to the saying, is all in all; and it is truly praised as the inchoative and consummative and containing substance of all.\" Where the Gloss says: \"All things that are, is God,\" \"in that from him are all things; nothing of the things that are, because he is not created.\" And below, in 5: \"The divine naming of the Best, manifesting all the causal processions of all things, extends both to existents and to non-existents, and is above existents and above non-existents.\" Where the Gloss: \"By procession he means the divine operation by which all things proceed to their effect.\" Moreover, God is named \"Father of all\" in Hermes [n29], On the Eternal Word 22 and 31. And \"Father,\" as Papias attests in his Elementarium, is Greek, that is, \"begetter,\" so called from the Greek pantater, which is \"preserving all things.\" Hence Hermes too, as touched on above, says of God that he is the Father of all, or the Lord of all, or he who alone is all things: namely, conferring essence on all things by producing them, and likewise by preserving them, as the efficient and formal cause of all. Hermes seems to teach this same opinion in On the Eternal Word 1, where, speaking of the fullness of all goods, he adds, as though correcting himself: \"if, however, there are many goods, and not one in which all are: for the one is recognized as akin to the other, that all belong to one, or that the one is all; for each is so joined to the other that neither can be separated from the other.\" Aristotle agrees with him in On the World 12 [n30], and confirms the same by an elegant example: \"They say,\" he says, \"that the sculptor Phidias figured Minerva (in another translation, Pallas) in the middle of a certain shield, and impressed his own face on it, and joined it to the statue by some hidden contrivance, so that of necessity, if anyone wished to remove it, he would break up and shatter the whole statue. God stands in such a relation to the World, containing the harmony and safety of all.\" Hence Avicenna too, Metaphysics 8, 6: \"Everything perishes, except insofar as it is turned toward his face; and therefore it is more fitting that he himself be the necessary being, and truth, and pure intention.\" Psalm 103 [n31] also agrees with these, saying: \"When you open your hand, all things will be filled with goodness; when you turn away your face, they will be troubled; you will take away their spirit, and they will fail, and they will return to their dust,\" that is, they will be reduced to nothing. Is it not also for this reason that some have posited that God is the Soul of the world? Although Plato, Timaeus 1, 2 and 6, seems to maintain that the Soul of the world was produced by God, and set in the middle of the World. Hence also Themistius, as Averroes reports on Metaphysics 12, comment 19, speaking of animals generated from putrefaction, and of the craft and intention of nature, says: \"It is not strange that nature, though it understands nothing of this kind, yet does this by inducing some intention; and this shows that something reminds it of noble causes, like the soul that is on earth, of which Plato says that it is from the second gods.\" But Averroes consequently rejects this saying of Themistius, and says that such animals are generated from heavenly heat duly measured. He adds: \"And this measure comes from the divine intellectual art, which is like the one form of one principal art, under which there are several arts.\" According to this, then, it must be understood that nature makes something perfectly and in order, although it does not understand,", "margins": [{"id": "155B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Gloss; Dionysius (source)."}, {"id": "155B·2", "kind": "source", "text": "Gloss (source)."}, {"id": "155B·3", "kind": "source", "text": "Hermes; Papias (source)."}, {"id": "155C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Aristotle (source)."}, {"id": "155D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Themistius; Averroes (source)."}, {"id": "155D·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) deiurant."}, {"id": "155D·3", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) fit; Averroes (source)."}]}, {"anchor": "p155E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p155E", "locator_display": "155E–156D", "source_text": "quasi esset rememorata ex virtutibus agentibus nobilioribus eis quae dicuntur intelligentiae; et ideo dicitur quod omnes proportiones et formae, quae sunt in potentia in prima materia, sunt in actu in primo motore, et assimilantur aliquo modo esse eius quod fit in anima Artificis. Annon et Auicen. 4. de anima 4. dicit, quod est vna anima communis Coeli et Mundi, cuius operatio est ad naturam totius? Haec autem anima secundum quosdam est Deus, secundum quosdam vero nata, seu producta a Deo; quorum sententiae non repugnant ad inuicem, neque Catholicae veritati. Haec enim Anima potest intelligi ratio, seu voluntas, verbum, seu velle Dei, qua seu quo efficit res et seruat, quae nequaquam a Deo essentialiter differunt, sed sunt Deus per vigesimam sextam partem corollarij primi huius. Vnde et Aristoteles in De Mundo 11. dicit, quod Deus in vno dicere, seu loquendo sit omnibus causa salutis, sicut superius recitatur. Et infra 14. tractans, quomodo Deus producit res,\n\nsic ait, Emisit ex almo corde operans cogitata; in alia translatione ex magno animo. Cui et Hermes concordans de Mundo, et Coelo 1. docet, quod tria sunt rerum principia, Causa scilicet, Ratio, et Natura. Per causam vero intelligit primam causam simpliciter penitus non causatam, scilicet Deum Patrem, qui primo causat rationem procedentem ab eo, scilicet filium et per ipsum vniuersam naturam. Quod etiam Pater causet filium et sit causa eius aeterna, Augustinus et Chrysostomus attestantur; Quare et Hermes vbi prius, Ratio, inquit, ex causa, et ex vtroque natura; Et infra, ratio est vis quaedam a causa procedens, a principio cuncta ordinans; vbi et accipit ista tria, Ratio, Nous, et mens diuina indifferenter, et quasi synonome pro eodem. Dicit enim quod Nous, de qua natura qualitates naturales rebus inserens qualificans dicitur; Et infra dicit, quod mens diuina sine vlla fatigatione mundum et omnia quae intra eum sunt non desinit sustentate, sicut superius plenius tecitatur. Vnde et Papias in Elementario suo ait, Nous voluntas Dei, vel mens quae prouidentia\n\ndicitur. Est autem intelligibilis essentia aemulae bonitatis, propter indefessam ad summum Deum conuertionem, Noun id est verbum Dei continens originales rerum species. Nonne et huic sententiae consonat illud Platonicum, quod Augustinus 7. Confess. 9. in libris Platonicis de Graeco in Latinum translatis, recitat se legisse, licet non sub his verbis, tamen hoc idem omnino. In principio erat verbum, et verbum erat apud Deum, et Deus erat verbum, hoc erat in principio apud Deum, omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil quod factum est, In ipso vita erat. Et quis Catholicus nesciat hoc esse initium sancti Euangelij secundum Iohannem, eisdem sententijs at que verbis? quare et Augustinus 10. de Ciuit. Dei 29. Pudet, inquit, doctos homines, ex discipulis Platonis fieri discipulos Christi, qui piscatorem suo spiritu docuit sapere ac dicere, In principio erat verbum, etc. superius recitata; et subdit, Quod initium sancti Euangelij, cui nomen est secundum Iohannem; Quidam Platonicus, sicut a sancto Simpliciano, qui postea Mediolanensi Ecclesiae praesedit Episcopus, solebamus\n\naudire, aureis literis conscribendum, et per omnes Ecclesias in locis eminentissimis proponendum esse dicebat: sed ideo viluit superbis Deus ille magister, quia verbum caro factum est, et habitauit in nobis. Verum quia causa rationalis per solam rationem non agit sine concomitantia voluntatis, ijdem Philosophi studiosius meditantes, Deo causae primae, seu Deo Patri et rationi eius menti seu verbo voluntatem insuper adiunxerunt; voluntas autem teste Augustino 15. de Trinit. 20. secundum quandam appropriationem Spiritui Sancto dignoscitur pertinere. Vnde idem Hermes de verbo aeterno 22. loquens de Deo Patre omnium ita dicit; Hic solus vt omnia vtra que sexus foecunditate plenissimus, semper voluntatis praegnans suae, parit semper quicquid voluerit procreare: Voluntas eius est bonitas omnis: Haec eadem bonitas omnium rerum est ex diuinitate eius nata. Et infra 23. Ego inquit, et sensum, et naturam et mundum dico continere in se naturam, et nata omnia conseruare: Procreatione enim vrerque plenus est sexus, et eius vtrius que connexio, aut quod est verius, vnitas comprehensibilis\n\nest; quem siue Cupidinem, siue Venerem, siue vtrumque recte poteris nuncupare. Hoc igitur omni vero verius, manifestius que mente percipito, quod ex illo totius naturae Deo hoc sit cunctis in aeternum procreandi inuentum, tributum que ministerium, cui summa Charitas, laetitiae hilaritas, cupiditas, amorque diuinus innatus est. Charitas autem cupiditas, at que amor sunt proprie voluntatis, quae et teste Augustino 15. de Trin. 17. et 20. Spiritui Sancto quodammodo proprie tribuuntur. Quare et Plato 1. Timae. 1. voluntatem, inquit, Dei originem esse omnium rerum certissimam si quis ponat, recte cum putare consentiam. Hanc autem voluntatem diuinam Spiritui Sancto aptam, et idem Hermes videtur quando que Spiritum nominare. De verbo nam que aeterno 15. De his, inquit, huc vsque tractatur; de Spiritu vero et his similibus hinc sumatur exordium. Fuit Deus et hyle quem Graece credimus mundum, mundo comitabatur Spiritus, vel inerat mundo Spiritus, sed non similiter vt Deo, nec Deo de quibus mundus idcirco non erant, quando non erant, sed in eo iam tunc erant, vnde nasci habuerunt.", "english": "as if it had been reminded by agent powers nobler than those that are called intelligences. And therefore it is said that all proportions and forms which are in potency in prime matter are in act in the first mover, and are in some way likened to the being of what comes to be in the soul of the Artisan. Does not Avicenna too, in On the Soul 4, 4, say that there is one soul common to Heaven and the World, whose operation is toward the nature of the whole? This Soul, according to some, is God; according to others, it is born, or produced, by God. These opinions are not repugnant to one another, nor to Catholic truth. For this Soul can be understood as the reason, or will, the word, or willing of God, by which he makes and preserves things; and these differ in no way essentially from God, but are God, by the twenty-sixth part of the first Corollary of this. Hence Aristotle also, in On the World 11, says that God, by one saying, that is, by speaking, is the cause of safety for all, as is recited above. And below, in 14, treating how God produces things, he says thus: \"He sent forth from his nurturing heart, working out what he had thought\"; in another translation, \"from a great mind.\" Hermes agrees with him, and teaches in On the World and Heaven 1 that there are three principles of things: namely Cause, Reason, and Nature. By \"Cause\" he means the first cause, simply and altogether uncaused, namely God the Father, who first causes the Reason proceeding from him, namely the Son, and through him the whole of Nature. That the Father also causes the Son, and is his eternal cause, Augustine and Chrysostom attest. Hence Hermes too, where he was cited before, says: \"Reason is from Cause, and Nature from both.\" And below: \"Reason is a certain power proceeding from Cause, ordering all things from the beginning.\" There he also takes these three, Reason, Nous, and the divine mind, indifferently, and almost synonymously, for the same thing. For he says that Nous is that of which nature is said to be the qualifier, implanting natural qualities in things [n32]. And below he says that the divine mind, without any weariness, does not cease to sustain the world and all that is within it, as is more fully recited above. Hence Papias too in his Elementarium says: \"Nous: the will of God, or the mind which is called providence. It is, moreover, an intelligible essence of emulous goodness, on account of its unwearied conversion to the highest God; Noun, that is, the Word of God containing the original species of things.\" Does not that Platonic saying also accord with this opinion, which Augustine, Confessions 7, 9, says he read in the books of the Platonists translated from Greek into Latin: not in these words, to be sure, but altogether the same? In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and God was the Word; this was in the beginning with God; all things were made through him, and without him nothing was made that was made; in him was life. And what Catholic does not know that this is the beginning of the holy Gospel according to John, in the same sentences and words? Hence Augustine too, City of God 10, 29, says: \"It shames learned men to become, from disciples of Plato, disciples of Christ, who taught a fisherman by his spirit to know and to say, In the beginning was the Word,\" etc., recited above; and he adds: \"That beginning of the holy Gospel, whose name is according to John: a certain Platonist, as we used to hear from the holy Simplicianus, who afterwards presided as bishop over the church of Milan, used to say that it ought to be written in golden letters and set up in the most eminent places in all the churches. But that God, the master, became cheap to the proud because the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us.\" But because a rational cause does not act through reason alone without the concomitance of will, the same Philosophers, meditating more earnestly, added will besides to God the first cause, or God the Father, and to his reason, mind, or Word. And will, as Augustine witnesses (On the Trinity 15, 20), is recognized to belong to the Holy Spirit by a certain appropriation. Hence the same Hermes, On the Eternal Word 22, speaking of God, the Father of all, says thus: \"He alone, as being all things, most full of the fruitfulness of both sexes [n33], always pregnant with his own will, always brings forth whatever he has willed to procreate. His will is all goodness; this same goodness of all things is born of his divinity.\" And below, in 23: \"I say,\" he says, \"that sense, and nature, and the world contain nature in themselves, and preserve all things born; for each sex is full of procreation, and the union of both, or, what is more true, their unity, is comprehensible [n34]; whom you may rightly call Cupid, or Venus, or both. Perceive, then, with a mind truer than all truth and more manifest, that from that God of the whole of nature this has been devised for all for ever, and the service of procreating assigned, to which supreme Charity, the gladness of joy, desire, and divine love are innate.\" Now charity, desire, and love belong properly to the will, and these, as Augustine also witnesses (On the Trinity 15, 17 and 20), are in a way properly attributed to the Holy Spirit. Hence Plato too, Timaeus 1, 1, says: \"If anyone posits that the will of God is the most certain origin of all things, I would agree that he thinks rightly.\" Hermes, too, seems at times to name this divine will, which is fitting to the Holy Spirit, \"Spirit.\" For in On the Eternal Word 15 he says: \"Thus far these matters are treated; but of Spirit and its like let the beginning be taken from here. There was God and hyle, which in Greek we take to be the world; with the world there was Spirit, or Spirit was in the world, but not in the same way as with God, nor [as with] God, of whom the world; for this reason they were not, when they were not, but were already then in him from whom they were to be born [n35].\"", "margins": [{"id": "155E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Avicenna (source)."}, {"id": "155E·2", "kind": "source", "text": "Aristotle (source)."}, {"id": "156A·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) finitum."}, {"id": "156A·2", "kind": "source", "text": "Papias (source)."}, {"id": "156B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Augustine (source)."}, {"id": "156C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Augustine; Hermes (source)."}, {"id": "156D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Plato (source)."}]}, {"anchor": "p156E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p156E", "locator_display": "156E–157D", "source_text": "Pan autem vel mundi natura est Spiritus, quamuis nata videatur, a principio tamen in se nascendi, procreandi que vim possidet, atque naturam foecunditatis. Etenim initium in qualitate naturae est. quae et conceptus, et partus in se possidet vim atque materiam. Haec ita que sine alteno conceptu est solo generabilis. Et infra 18. Spiritu ministrantur omnia et vegetantur in mundo, qui quasi organum vel machina summi Dei voluntati subiectus est. Spiritu agitantur, siue gubernantur omnes in mundo species, vnaquae que secundum suam naturam sibi a Deo distributam. Pan autem mundus est receptaculum, omnium que agitatio, at que frequentatio, quorum Deus gubernator, dispensans omnibus, quantum rebus mundanis vnicui que necessarium: Spiritu vero implet omnia, vt cuius que naturae qualitas est. Nonne et hoc est, quod sapiens\n\nprotestatur, Spiritus, inquiens, Domini repleuit orbem terrarum, et hoc quod continet omnia Sap. 1. Adhuc autem et idem Hermes de verbo aeterno 28. Dei, inquit, natura consilium est voluntatis, bonitas summa, voluntas consilio nascitur, et ea vult quae habet; vult autem omnia bona, et habet omnia quae vult; omnia autem bona et cogitat et vult, hoc autem est Deus; eius imago mundus boni. Nonne et sententiam istam fulcit illa prima 24. definitionum totidem Philosophorum de Deo, Deus est monas, monadem gignens, se vnum reflectens ad ardorem; et septima, quae sic ait, Deus est principium sine principio, processus sine variatione, finis sine fine? Istam quoque sententiam et Porphyrius Philosophus, Platonis non Christi discipulus planius attestatur, quem alloquens Augustinus. 10. de Ciuit. Dei. 29. sic ait, Praedicas Patrem et eius filium, quem vocas paternum Intellectum seu mentem, et horum medium quem putamus te dicere spiritum sanctum, et more vestro appellas tres Deos; et supra. 28. differens cum eodem, Ignorantiam, inquit, et propter eam multa vitia per nullas teletas purgari dicis, sed per solum patricum noun, id\n\nest paternam mentem, siue intellectum, qui paternae est conscius voluntatis; hunc autem Christum esse non credis. Hic autem nous, mens, ratio, voluntas diuina, seu spiritus videtur non incongrue appellari Anima mundi et vita. Vnde et Hermes de Verbo aeterno. 2. Licet Omnium multiformi imaginum aequalitate variata, et infinitate qualitatum, ex interuallo species esse noscantur, adunatae tamen ad hoc, vt totum vnum, ex vno omnia esse videantur; Totus itaque quibus est formatus Mundus vnus, Anima vna, et Deus vnus. Et infra vlt: O vitae vera vita, o nostrarum omnium faecunda praegnatio; cognouimus te totius naturae tuo conceptu plenissime, cognouimus te aeterna perseueratio. Cui et concordanter Philosophus in De Mundo vlt. agens de diuinis Nominibus, Vocamus, inquit, eum Iouem, et Zena, vtentes parallele Nominibus, Zena dicentes a ⟨gap: ⟩ graeco quod est viuere, quasi diceremus, per quem viuimus, Iupiter spiritus omnium, Iupiter indetessi ignis motus. Refert etiam Iosephus. 12. Antiquit. Iudaicae 2. quod Aristaeus Graecus dixit Prolomeo Philadelpho Regi Aegypti, Cognoui\n\nIudaeos factorem omnium Deum colere, quem nos Zena, id est, Iouem nominamus, quod omnibus indulget ⟨gap: ⟩ , id est, viuere. Huic et consonat Albricius de origine Deorum, siue in Poetario suo, dicens Deum vocari Vitunetum, quia vitam praestat; Sentinum, quia sensum, sicut circa 21. partem corollarij primi huius plenius allegatur. Vnde et Seruius ille vetus nec ignobilis commentator, super illud Bucol. Virgilij ecloga 3a.—Iouis omnia plena; allegat simile a Lucano dicente, Iupiter est quodcunque vides, quocunque moueris; et addit quod alibi idem dicit; Spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per artus / Mens agitat molem: / Cuius causam reddit ibi Seruius, ita dicens, Ipse enim est spiritus sine quo nihil mouetur aut regitur. Quibus et concorditer Ouidius de Fastis lib. 6o sic dicit;\n\nEst Deus in nobis, agitante calescimus illo, / Impetus hic sacrae semina mentis habet. /", "english": "\"Pan, or the nature of the world, is Spirit. Although it seems to be born, yet from the beginning it possesses in itself the power of being born and of procreating, and the nature of fecundity. For its beginning is in the quality of nature, which possesses in itself the power and the matter of both conception and birth. This, then, without another's conception, is generable by itself alone.\" And below, in 18: \"By Spirit all things in the world are served and enlivened; Spirit, like an organ or machine of the highest God, is subject to his will. By Spirit all species in the world are moved, or governed, each according to its own nature allotted to it by God. Pan, moreover, is the receptacle of the world, and the stirring and thronging of all things, of which God is the governor, dispensing to each what is necessary to it among worldly things; but he fills all things with Spirit, according to the quality of each nature.\" Is not this also what the Wise Man declares, saying: \"The Spirit of the Lord has filled the world, and that which contains all things\" (Wisdom 1)? Moreover the same Hermes, On the Eternal Word 28, says: \"God's nature is the counsel of will, the highest goodness; will is born from counsel, and wills what it has; and it wills all good things, and has all it wills; and it both thinks and wills all good things, and this is God; his image is the world of the good.\" Does not that first of the twenty-four definitions of as many Philosophers about God [n36] also support this opinion: \"God is a monad begetting a monad, reflecting one toward ardor\"; and the seventh, which says: \"God is a beginning without beginning, a procession without variation, an end without end\"? Porphyry the Philosopher, a disciple of Plato, not of Christ, attests this opinion too more plainly, and Augustine, addressing him in City of God 10, 29, says: \"You preach the Father and his Son, whom you call the paternal Intellect or Mind, and the middle between them, whom we suppose you mean as the Holy Spirit, and in your manner you call them three Gods.\" And above, in 28, disputing with the same man: \"You say that ignorance, and on account of it many vices, are purged by no rites, but only by the paternal noun, that is, the paternal mind, or intellect, which is conscious of the paternal will; but you do not believe that this is Christ.\" This divine nous, mind, reason, will, or spirit seems, however, to be called not unsuitably the Soul of the world and its life. Hence Hermes too, On the Eternal Word 2, says: \"Although the species of all things, varied by the multiform equality of images and the infinity of qualities, are known to exist at intervals, yet they are united to this end, that the whole may seem one, and all things from one. Thus, in all by which it is formed [n37], the whole is one World, one Soul, and one God.\" And below, near the end: \"O true life of life, O fruitful pregnancy of us all; we have known you most fully by your conception of the whole of nature; we have known you, O eternal perseverance.\" The Philosopher agrees with this in On the World, last chapter, treating of the divine Names: \"We call him,\" he says, \"Jove, and Zena, using the names in parallel, saying Zena from the Greek ζῆν, which is 'to live,' as if we were to say, 'through whom we live'; Jupiter, the spirit of all; Jupiter, the motion of unwearied fire.\" Josephus also reports, Jewish Antiquities 12, 2, that Aristaeus the Greek said to Ptolemy Philadelphus, King of Egypt: \"I have learned that the Jews worship God, the maker of all, whom we call Zena, that is, Jove, because he grants to all ζῆν, that is, to live.\" With this Albricus also agrees, in his On the Origin of the Gods, or in his Poetarium, saying that God is called Vitunetus because he provides life, and Sentinus because he gives sense, as is more fully set out around the twenty-first part of the first Corollary of this. Hence Servius too, that old and not ignoble commentator, on that line of Virgil in the Bucolics, third eclogue, —all things full of Jove, cites a similar line from Lucan, who says, Jupiter is whatever you see, wherever you move; and he adds that elsewhere the same poet says [n38]: The spirit within nourishes, and mind, poured through the limbs, moves the whole mass. Servius there gives the reason of this, saying: \"For he himself is the spirit without which nothing is moved or ruled.\" In harmony with these Ovid too, in Fasti book 6, says:\n\nThere is a god in us; when he stirs, we grow warm; this impulse holds the seeds of a sacred mind.", "margins": [{"id": "157A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Wisdom; Hermes (source)."}, {"id": "157A·2", "kind": "source", "text": "Porphyry; Augustine (source)."}, {"id": "157A·3", "kind": "source", "text": "Greek gloss (apparently πατρικὸν νοῦν; not legible enough to confirm)."}, {"id": "157B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Hermes (source)."}, {"id": "157B·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) omni."}, {"id": "157B·3", "kind": "source", "text": "The Philosopher (source)."}, {"id": "157C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Albricus (source)."}, {"id": "157C·2", "kind": "source", "text": "Servius; Lucan (source)."}, {"id": "157C·3", "kind": "source", "text": "Ovid (source)."}]}, {"anchor": "p157D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p157D", "locator_display": "157D–158B", "source_text": "Nonne et hoc est quod Apostolus disputans cum Atheniensibus de Deo, allegat a Poetis et docet, cum ait, In ipso viuimus, mouemur, et sumus, sicut et quidam vestrorum Poerarum dixerunt Act. 17. Nullus igitur quaeso mihi succenseat, si allegem quandoque licet rarissime aliquos Poetarum, ex quo constat sanctum Dei Apostolum hoc fecisse, sic que beatus Ieronymus epistola. 58. ad Magnum Senatorem vrbis Romae obijcientem Ieronymo, quod candorem Ecclesiae sordibus pollueret Ethnicorum, eo quod scriptis suis inseruit carmina Poetarum per Apostolum se excusat dicens, quoniam et Poetas Apostolus allegauit, dicitque quod ille quem allegat hoc loco, fuit Aratus Greaeus Poeta. Arator quoque subdiaconus sanctae Romanae Ecclesiae lib. 2o super Actus Apostolorum, metrificans istum locum, sic ait: Sacrilegae nouitatis Amor! vos cernimus Aram /\n\nIgnoto posuisse Deo, qui condidit Astra, / Qui pelagus, terrasque dedit, quem vita parentem / Vt moueamur, habet, cuius spiramus ab igne, / Cuius imago sumus, de quo cecinere Poetae, / Hinc hominum constare genus; quem praedico, cuncta / Sanxit ab ore suo. / Istam quoque sententiam roborat Augustinus, tractans istam Autoritatem Apostoli. 4. super Genesin. 14. superius recitatus. Vnde et Dionysius de diuinis Nominibus. 6. Laudanda est, inquit, laudabilis vita aeterna, ex qua per seipsam vita, et omnis vita, et a qua in omnia vtcunque vitam participantia viuere proprie vnicuique exseminatur. Igitur et immortalium Angelorum vita et immortalitas, et imperdibile ipsum Angelicae semper motionis ex ipsa, et per\n\nipsam est, vt subsistit; Idcirco et viuentes semper, et immortales dicuntur, et non immortales iterum, quia non a seipsis habent immortaliter esse, et aeternaliter viuere, sed ex viuifica et totius vitae factrice, et continuatrice causa; et sicut in onte, id est, in ente dicimus, quia et eiusdem esse est causalis; sic et ibi iterum, quia et per seipsam vitae est diuina vita vitalis et substantialis et omnis vita, et vitalis motus ex ipsa vita, quae est super omnem vitam, et omne principium totius vitae: ex ipsa et Animae imperdibile habent, et Animalia omnia et germina secundum nouissimam consonantiam animae habent viuere; qua ablata iuxta eloquium deficit vita omnis, et ad terram et deficientia, ad participandum cam infirmitate iterum conuersa, iterum Animalia fiunt, et donatur quidem primo, et per seipsam vitae esse vitam, et omni vitae, et ab ea per singula esse proprie, singula aestimatur natura subsistere. Qui adhuc supra 1. dicit quod Deus est omnium causa et principium, et essentia, et vita; Et infra, eodem, loquens de Deo sic scribit; Optima traditio et simpliciter dicendum viuentium\n\nvita et eorum quae sunt essentia, omnis vitae et essentiae principium, et causa, per suam vt sint quae sunt, actiuam et continentem bonitatem; hoc a diuinis eloquijs didicimus, et omnem sic dicere sacram Theologorum hymnologiam inuenies. Amplius autem omnia essentialiter participantia aliquo necessario, egent eo: Sed omnia entia citra primum non sunt essentialiter et pure simpliciter per seipsa secundum quod participant primo ente, quod est pure essentialiter per seipsum; Hoc autem totum apparet ex habitudine principiorum et principiatorum, causarum et causatorum, per se et per aliud entium, magis et minus entium; quod et quamplures Autores Philosophici, et Theologici creberrime contestantur. Hoc enim quasi quaedam regula generalis solet tam a Logicis quam a Philosophis obseruari, quod nullus nescit considerans scripta veterum diligenter. Supponunt enim creberrime quod omne quod dicitur aliquale, vel dicitur tale per essentiam, et tunc est vnicum, vel secundum participationem; et quotcunque participantia fuerint, participatum ab omnibus erit vnum;", "english": "Is it not also this, that the Apostle, disputing with the Athenians about God, cites from the Poets and teaches, when he says: In him we live and move and are, as some of your poets also have said (Acts 17)? Let no one, then, I ask, be angry with me if I sometimes cite, though very rarely, some of the poets, since it is established that the holy Apostle of God did this. So too blessed Jerome, in Epistle 58 [n39], to Magnus, a senator of the city of Rome who objected to Jerome that he defiled the purity of the Church with the filth of the heathens, because he had inserted poems of the poets into his writings, excuses himself by the Apostle, saying that the Apostle also cited poets; and he says that the one the Apostle cites in this place was Aratus, a Greek poet. Arator also, subdeacon of the holy Roman Church, in book 2 on the Acts of the Apostles, putting this passage into verse, says: O love of sacrilegious novelty! We see that you have set up an altar / to an unknown god, who founded the stars, / who gave the sea and the lands, whom life has as parent, / that we may be moved, from whose fire we breathe, / whose image we are, of whom the poets have sung / that from him the race of men stands; whom I proclaim, / who ordained all things by his mouth. Augustine strengthens this opinion too, treating this authority of the Apostle in [his commentary] on Genesis 4, 14, cited above. Hence Dionysius too, On the Divine Names 6, says [n40]: \"To be praised is the praiseworthy eternal life, from which, through itself, is life and all life, and from which into all things participating in life in any way, living is sown out properly to each. Thus both the life and immortality of the immortal Angels, and the indestructibility itself of the Angelic perpetual motion, are from it and through it, so that it subsists. Therefore they are called both always living and immortal, and again not immortal, because they do not have it from themselves to be immortally and to live eternally, but from the vivifying cause that makes and continues all life. And as we say in onte, that is, in being, because it is also the cause of the being of the same, so there again, because through itself it is the divine life of life, vital and substantial, and all life, and vital motion from life itself, which is above all life and every principle of all life. From it Souls have their indestructibility, and all Animals and sprouts have it, according to the last consonance of soul, to live. When it is removed, according to the saying, all life fails, and, turned back to earth and to deficiency, again toward participating in it by weakness, they again become Animals. And it is indeed given first, and through itself, for life to be life, and for all life; and from it, through each, being in the proper sense; each is reckoned to subsist by nature.\" The same writer says further, above, in 1, that God is the cause and principle of all things, and essence, and life. And below, in the same, speaking of God, he writes thus: \"The best tradition, and to be said simply, is that he is the life of the living and the essence of the things that are, the principle and cause of all life and essence, through his active and containing goodness, so that the things that are may be. This we have learned from the divine sayings, and you will find that the whole sacred hymnology of the theologians speaks thus. Furthermore, all things that participate essentially in something necessarily need it; but all beings short of the first are not essentially and purely, simply, through themselves, insofar as they participate in the first being, which is purely, essentially, through itself.\" All this appears from the relation of principles and what is derived from principles, of causes and effects, of beings through themselves and through another, of more and less beings. Very many authors, philosophical and theological, attest this very frequently. For this is a kind of general rule, which is wont to be observed by Logicians as well as by Philosophers, as anyone knows who diligently considers the writings of the ancients. They very often suppose that everything which is called qualified in some way is called such either through essence, and then it is unique, or according to participation; and however many participants there are, what is participated by all will be one;", "margins": [{"id": "157D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Apostle (source)."}, {"id": "157D·2", "kind": "source", "text": "Arator (source)."}, {"id": "157E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Augustine; Dionysius (source)."}, {"id": "158B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "5th Principal argument (Ratio principalis)."}]}, {"anchor": "p158C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p158C", "locator_display": "158C–158E", "source_text": "quam etiam regulam Theologi amplectuntur. Vnde venerabilis Anselmus Cantuariensis Archiepiscopus Monolog. 1. ostendens quod sit aliquod primum et omnium summum bonum, sic dicit; Certissimum quidem et omnibus est volentibus aduertere perspicuum, quia quaecunque dicuntur aliquid, ita vt ad inuicem magis vel minus, aut aequaliter dicantur, per aliquid dicuntur quod non aliud et aliud, sed idem intelligitur in diuersis, siue in illis aequaliter, siue inaequaliter consideretur: Nam quaecunque iusta dicuntur ad inuicem, siue pariter, siue magis vel minus, non possunt intelligi iusta nisi per iustitiam, quae non est aliud et aliud in diuersis. Et idem dicit de omnibus bonis diuersis, quod sunt bona per aliquod vnum bonum existens idem in diuersis, et quod ipsum solum est bonum per seipsum; et nullum aliud bonum est illi aequale vel maius, quare ipsum est summum. Eundem quoque processum facit, capit 2. de Magno, et cap. 3. de ente seu esse, vbi sic ait; Omne quod est, aut est per aliquid, aut per nihil; sed nihil est per nihil: Non enim vel cogitari potest, vt sit aliquid non\n\nper aliquid; quicquid est igitur non nisi per aliquid est: quod cum ita sit, aut est vnum, aut sunt plura, per quae sunt cuncta quae sunt: Sed si sunt plura, aut ipsa referuntur ad vnum aliquid per quod sunt, aut eadē plura singula sunt per se, aut ipsa per se inuicem sunt. At si plura ipsa sunt per vnum, iam nō suntomnia per plura, sed potius per id vnū, per quod haec plura sunt: Si vero ipsa plura singula sunt per se, vti que est vna aliqua vis vel natura existendi per se quam habent vt per se sint; Non est autem dubium, quod per ipsum vnum sunt, per quod habent vt sint perse. Verius ergo per ipsum vnum cuncta sunt, quā per plura, quia sine eo vno esse non possunt: Vt vero plura per se inuicem sint, nulla patitur ratio, quoniā irrationabilis cogitatio est, vt aliqua res sit per illud, cui dat esse. Similem quoque processum facit Auicenna 1. Metaphys. et 8. et Algazel 2. Metaphys. et Anselmus de veritate vlt. de rectitudine et veritate similiter. Quod et vult Augustinus 8. de Trinit. 4. vbi ex multis bonis inferioribus arguit vnum omnium summum bonum, et multis bonis numeratis dicit, quid plura, et plura, bonum hoc, et bonum illud?\n\ntolle hoc et tolle illud, et vide ipsum bonum si potes; ita Deum videbis, non alio bono bonum, sed bonum omnis boni. Et infra, eodem, Non essent, inquit, mutabilia bona, nisi esset incommutabile bonum. Cum itaque audis bonum hoc et bonum illud, quae possunt alias dici etiam non bona, si potueris, sine illis, quae participatione boni bona sunt, perspicere ipsum bonum, cuius participatione boni bona sunt; simul enim et ipsum intelligis, cum audis hoc aut illud bonum. Si ergo potueris illis detractis per seipsum prospicere, bonum, perspexeris bonum Deum. Et 8. de Ciuit. Dei 6. Cum in conspectu Philosophorum corpus et animus, magis minusque speciosa essent, viderunt esse aliquid, vbi esset prima et incommutabilis species, et ideo nec comparabilis; atque ibi esse rerum principium, rectissime crediderunt. Aristoteles", "english": "a rule which the Theologians also embrace. Hence the venerable Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, Monologion 1, showing that there is something first and the highest good of all, says: \"It is most certain, and plain to all who are willing to attend, that whatever things are called something, so that in relation to one another they are called more or less, or equally, are so called through something which is not one thing and another, but the same is understood in different things, whether it be considered in them equally or unequally. For whatever things are called just in relation to one another, whether equally, or more or less, cannot be understood as just except through justice, which is not one thing and another in different things.\" And he says the same of all diverse goods: that they are good through some one good, existing the same in different things; that this alone is good through itself; and that no other good is equal to it or greater, so that it is the highest. He makes the same procedure also in chapter 2, on the Great, and in chapter 3, on being or existing, where he says thus: \"Everything that is, either is through something or through nothing; but nothing is through nothing. For it cannot even be thought that there be something not through something; whatever is, therefore, is only through something. Since this is so, either there is one thing, or there are many, through which are all things that are. But if there are many, either they are themselves referred to some one thing through which they are, or those many are each through themselves, or they are through one another. But if the many are through one, then all things are no longer through many, but rather through that one through which these many are. But if the many are each through themselves, there is surely some one power or nature of existing through itself, which they have so that they are through themselves; and there is no doubt that they are through that one through which they have it that they are through themselves. More truly, therefore, all things are through that one than through the many, because without that one they cannot be. But that the many should be through one another, no reason allows, since it is an irrational thought that anything should be through that to which it gives being.\" Avicenna makes a similar procedure in Metaphysics 1 and 8, and Algazel in Metaphysics 2, and Anselm in the last of On Truth, and likewise in On Rectitude and Truth. This Augustine also maintains, On the Trinity 8, 4, where from many lower goods he argues one highest good of all, and, having counted up many goods, says: \"Why more and more—this good and that good? Take away this, and take away that, and see Good itself, if you can; so you will see God, good not by another good, but the Good of every good.\" And below, in the same: \"There would not be changeable goods,\" he says, \"unless there were an unchangeable good. When, therefore, you hear this good and that good, which in other respects can be called not good either, if you can, without those which are good by participation in the good, discern the Good itself, by whose participation they are good; for you understand it at the same time when you hear this or that good. If, therefore, you can, those being set aside, look upon the good through itself, you will have discerned the good God.\" And in City of God 8, 6: \"Since in the view of the Philosophers body and mind were more and less beautiful, they saw that there is something where the first and unchangeable form was, and therefore incomparable; and there, they most rightly believed, was the principle of things.\" Aristotle", "margins": [{"id": "158D·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) aliud."}, {"id": "158D·2", "kind": "source", "text": "Avicenna; Algazel; Augustine (source)."}, {"id": "158E·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) bonum; Augustine (source)."}]}, {"anchor": "p159A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p159A", "locator_display": "159A–159D", "source_text": "quo que 4. Metaph. 18. ex hoc quod aliqua sunt minus, et magis falsa, et vera quam alia, probat esse vnum verum simpliciter; quem et Anselmus Monolog. 4. rectissime imitatur. Et hoc idem sentit Augustinus alijs locis multis. Istam quo que sententiam Dionysius de diuinis nominibus multis capitulis, Boetius de Hebdomadibus, et alij Autores quamplurimi locis quamplurimis profitentur, sicut et praemissa hic et primo huius aliquantulum attestantur. Adhuc autem Esse inest materiae, formae, et cōposito, substantiae, et accidenti, et non primo simpliciter, vel non aeque primo, nec aequaliter inest illis; ergo alicui vni primo et maxime, per quod existens in caeteris ipsis inest: hoc autem poni non potest, nisi illud quod primo et per se est, hoc autem est Deus: hoc autem totum clare ostendunt praemissa in proxima ratione: Vnde et Philosophus 2. de Anima 68. ait; Non enim aqua secundum quod aqua, neque aēr secundum quod aer diaphanum est, sed quoniam natura eadem est in his vtrisque; et in perpetuo superius corpore, scilicet Coelo. Vbi Auerroes, Non secundum quod aer etc. id est,\n\nquia diaphaneitas non est in sola aqua aut aere, sed in corpore coelesti, fuit necesse vt diaphaneitas non sit in aliquo eorum, secundum quod est illud quod est, sed secundum naturam communem existentem in omnibus, licet non habeat nomen. Hoc idem confirmari videtur per eundem Philosophum 1. Poster. 4. et 5. et 2. Post. 4. et 5. docentem quod quaecunque passio inest multis diuersis, habet aliquod vnum subiectum seu causam cui primo inest, et per ipsum, seu ipsam caeteris quibus inest, sicut est habere tres angulos duobus rectis, habere cornua, contrarius seu contrarij status, folia fluere, commutatim proportionale, et hoc ostendit de alijs vniuersis, siue fuerint substantialia siue accidentalia, siue vniuoca, siue analoga, siue aequiuoca, quod totum Robertus Lincolniensis magis dilucidat exponendo. Dicetur fortassis quod illa causa diuersorum in diuersis est vna genere, vel specie, numero autem nequaquam; sed si causae multae numeraliter differentes sint similes in natura, et nomine, vel quaelibet illarum est talis per se, primo, et essentialiter, vel per aliud secundario, et participatiue etc. sicut\n\nsupra in proxima ratione. Alij forte dicent, quod illa causa vna diuersorum in diuersis est\n\nvniuersale: Sed si vniuersale sit aliquid citra Deum, videtur quod aliud vniuersale hominum, aliud Asinorum, et alia aliorum; vniuersalia ergo illa sunt multa conuenientia in natura et nomine etc. sicut contra responsionem priorem. Hoc tamen non improbabiliter ponitur, si per vniuersale intelligatur aliqua ratio vniuersalis, seu virtus diuina omnium talium vnitiua. Vnde Psalmo 32o spiritu oris eius omnis virtus eorum, et Aristoteles in de Mundo 10. totam terram, et Mare, aetherem, atque Solem et Lunam, et totum coelum decorauit vna, quae per omnia transit, virtus. Haec autem virtus omnium vnitiua est rerum, Deus, tenax vigor, et illa vnitas principalis quam laudum carmine hymindece deprecamur, cuius principalitatem ostendit Boetius 1. Arithmeticae 6o. cuius titulus de principalitate vnitatis praescribitur. Vnde et Auicebrol. in libro quem nominat fontem vitae, et est 35. capit. quinti libri, sic dicit; Omnia omnino diuersa et diuisa, tam in superioribus, quam in inferioribus, scilicet indiuidua,\n\nspecies, genera, differentiae, propria, et accidentia, ac omnino opposita et contraria mouentur ad coniunctionem, et desiderant conuenientiam, et inquirunt vnitionem, quia quamuis sint diuisa, coniuncta sunt; et quamus diuersa, conuenientia sunt in aliquo, quod ea retineat, et coniungat, et conuenire faciat, et radix omnis in hoc est hoc, quod vnitas vincit omnia, et est diffusa in omnibus, et retentrix omnium. Cui et concordans Proclus Philosophus, propositione prima sic dicit; Omnis multitudo participat aliqualiter vno; et propositione decima quarta: Omne bonum vnitiuum est participantium ipso, et omnis vnitio bonum est, et bonum vni idem. Istam insuper vnitatem omnium vnitiuam testatur dictum Hermetis de Verbo aeterno 2. superius recitatum; qui et infra 14. loquens de coelestibus, terrestribus, et medijs; Horum, inquit, omnium effectus naturamque cognoscens, miretur, adoret, atque collaudet artem mentemque diuinam; Musicen vero nosse nihil aliud esse, nisi iunctarum omnium rerum ordinem scire quid quaeque sit diuina ratione sortita;", "english": "also, Metaphysics 4, 18, from the fact that some things are less and more false, and true, than others, proves that there is one thing simply true; and Anselm, Monologion 4, most rightly imitates him. Augustine holds the same in many other places. Dionysius in On the Divine Names in many chapters, Boethius in On the Hebdomads, and very many other authors in very many places profess this opinion, as the premises here, and in the first of this, also somewhat attest. Furthermore, Being belongs to matter, to form, and to the composite, to substance and to accident, and it belongs to them not first, simply, or not equally first, nor equally; therefore it belongs to some one thing first and most of all, through which, existing in the others, it belongs to them. But this cannot be posited except of that which is first and through itself, and this is God. The premises in the preceding argument clearly show all this. Hence the Philosopher too says in On the Soul 2, 68 [n41]: \"It is not water insofar as it is water, nor air insofar as it is air, that is diaphanous, but because the same nature is in both of these, and in the everlasting body above, namely Heaven.\" On which Averroes says: \"Not insofar as air, etc.; that is, because diaphaneity is not in water or air alone, but in the celestial body, it was necessary that diaphaneity not be in any of them insofar as it is what it is, but according to a common nature existing in all, although it has no name.\" The same thing seems to be confirmed by the same Philosopher, Posterior Analytics 1, 4 and 5, and 2, 4 and 5, teaching that whatever attribute belongs to many diverse things has some one subject or cause to which it belongs first, and through it, or through that cause, to the others in which it is, as it is to have three angles equal to two right angles, to have horns, to be in a contrary state, or in the state of a contrary, for leaves to shed, for proportionals to be so alternately. And he shows this of other universals, whether they be substantial or accidental, univocal, analogous, or equivocal; all of which Robert of Lincoln [n42] elucidates further in his exposition. It will perhaps be said that that cause of diverse things in diverse things is one in genus, or in species, but in no way in number; but if many causes, numerically different, are similar in nature and name, then either each of them is such through itself, first and essentially, or through another, secondarily and by participation, etc., as above in the preceding argument. Others perhaps will say that that one cause of diverse things in diverse things is a universal. But if a universal is something short of God, it seems that there is one universal of men, another of asses, and others of others; those universals, then, are many, agreeing in nature and name, etc., as against the former answer. This, however, is not improbably posited, if by \"universal\" is understood some universal reason, or a divine power that unifies all such things. Hence Psalm 32 [n31]: \"by the spirit of his mouth, all the power of them\"; and Aristotle in On the World 10: \"One power, which passes through all things, adorned the whole earth, and the Sea, the aether, and the Sun and Moon, and the whole heaven.\" This power, however, is the unifier of all things, God, tenacious vigor, and that principal unity whom we beseech hymn-wise [n43] with a song of praises, whose principality Boethius shows in Arithmetic 1, chapter 6, the title of which is set down as \"On the principality of unity.\" Hence also Avicebron, in the book which he calls The Fountain of Life, and it is chapter 35 of the fifth book, says thus [n44]: \"All things whatever, diverse and divided, in the higher as in the lower, namely individuals, species, genera, differences, properties, and accidents, and all opposed and contrary things, are moved toward conjunction, and desire agreement, and seek unition; because although they are divided, they are joined; and although diverse, they agree in something that holds them, joins them, and makes them agree. And the root of all this is this: that unity overcomes all things, and is diffused in all, and is the retainer of all.\" Proclus the Philosopher agrees with this, saying in proposition 1: \"Every multitude participates in some way in the one\"; and in proposition 14: \"Every good is unitive of those who participate in it, and all unition is good, and the good and the one are the same.\" Moreover the saying of Hermes, On the Eternal Word 2, recited above, attests this unity that unifies all things; and below, in 14, speaking of the heavenly, the earthly, and the intermediate, he says: \"Knowing the effects and nature of all these, let him wonder, adore, and praise the divine art and mind; and to know Music is nothing other than to know the order of all things joined, what each has obtained by divine reason;", "margins": [{"id": "159A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Aristotle (source)."}, {"id": "159A·2", "kind": "source", "text": "Dionysius; Boethius (source)."}, {"id": "159A·3", "kind": "source", "text": "6th Principal argument (Ratio principalis)."}, {"id": "159C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Psalm; Aristotle (source)."}, {"id": "159C·2", "kind": "source", "text": "Avicebron (source)."}, {"id": "159D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Proclus (source)."}]}, {"anchor": "p159E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p159E", "locator_display": "159E–160C", "source_text": "Ordo enim rerum singularum in vnum, omnium artificis ratione collata, concentum quendam diuino melo dulcissimum, verissimumque conficiet. Dionysius insuper de diuinis nominibus. 1. In omni, inquit, fere actione Theologica, thearchiam videmus diuinitus laudatam, et monadem quidem et vnum propter simplicitatem et vnitatem supernaturalis impartibilitatis, ex qua vt viuifica virtute vnimur, et partitis nostris alteritatibus supermundane complicatis in deiformem Monadem congregamur. Et infra 5. dicit, quod ipsum per seipsum esse est existenuum principium, et existentia omnia, et quae vtcun que ab esse continentur, et hoc immensurate, et conuolute, et vnite. Etenim in monade omnis numerus ante subsistit, et habet omnem numerum Monas in semetipsa singulariter, et omnis numerus vnitur quidem in Monade, quantum autem a Monade prouenit, tantum discernitur, et multiplicatur; et in centro omnes circuli lineae secundum primam vnitatem constitutae sunt, et omnes habet signum\n\nin semetipso simplas vniformiter vnitas ad se inuicem, et ad vnum principium ex quo procedebant; et in ipso quidem centro vniuersaliter adunantur, breuiter autem eo distantes breuiter et discernuntur, magis autem recedentes, magis, et simpliciter quantum centro proximiores sunt, tantum et ipsi, et sibi inuicem adunantur, et quantum eo, tantum a se inuicem distant; sed et in toto omnium naturae omnes secundum singula naturae rationes convolutae sunt, per vnam inconfusam vnitatem. Et adhuc inferius vlt. agens de vno, quomodo scilicet Deo vnum conueniat, ita scribit, Vnum vero quia omnia vniuersaliter est per vnius vnitatis excellentiam, et omnium est vnius irreuersibiliter causalis: Nullum enim existentium est non participans vnius; sed sicut similis omnis numerus monada participat, et vnum, duo, et decem dicitur, et semis, et vnum, et tertium, et decimum vnum et multitudinem terminat, sic omnia et vnum omnium pars participant, et essendo vnum omnia sunt existentia, et non est omnium causa vnum multis vnum, sed ante omne vnum. Neque enim\n\nest multitudo non participans quid vnius, et nihil existentium quod participat, vel, quid vnius deorsum omnia singulariter omnia, et toto omnia et opposita, et vniuersaliter cōprehendentis; et quidem sine vno non erit multitudo, sine autem multitudine erit vnum, sicut et monas ante omnem numerum multiplicatum, et si omnibus omnia vnita quis posuerit, omnia erunt toto vnum. Sed ita que et hoc cognoscendum, quia secundum vnum vniuscujus que praecogitata est species, vnire dicitur vnita, et omnium est vnum exemplar, et si interimas vnum, ne que vniuersitas, ne que aliquid aliud existentium erit. Omnia enim in seipso vnum vniformiter praeambit, et circumpraehendit: Ipsa igitur Theologia totam Thearchiam. Boetius quo que 3a. de Consolatione Philosophiae, prosa 11a. probat per singula genera entium inductiue, quod omnia desiderant vnitatem. Dicit igitur concludendo: Omnia igitur vnum desiderant, sed vnum ipsum monstrauimus esse quod bonum est; Cuncta igitur bonum petunt, quod quidem ita describas, quod desideratur ab omnibus. Nam vel ad nihilum cuncta\n\nreferuntur, et vno veluti vertice destituta sine rectore fluitabunt; aut si quid est ad quod vniuersa festinant, id erit omnium summum bonorum. Et quot sunt multitudines sic vnitae, tot tales vnitates multitudinum vnitiuae virtu, liter sunt in Deo: ex quibus quidem exemplaris et archetypus numerus, in ista simplicissima vnitate miro modo colligitur, quo caetera numerata format, numerat, et disponit, et hic est mundus ille intelligibilis, et archetypus Hermetis et Platonis, de quo 40a. pars corollarij primi tangit. Vnde Boetius 1. Arithmeticae suae 1. Omnia quaecun que a primaeua rerum natura constructa sunt, numerorum videntur ratione formata; Hoc enim fuit principale in animo conditoris exemplar. Hinc enim 4. Elementorum multitudo mutuata est, hinc temporum vices, hinc motus astrorum, coeli que conuersio, et supra eodem prolog. 2. plenissime vult hoc idem. Hoc autem lucidum dictum Boetij videtur sumi ex verbis obscuris primae partis Timaei Platonis, cap. 1. quod Chalcidius in commentario suo primo, De genitura Mundi intitulat: Vnde Eustratius super 1. Eth. 6. comment.", "english": "for the order of single things brought into one by the reason of the artificer of all will produce a certain harmony, most sweet and most true, with divine melody.\" Dionysius, moreover, On the Divine Names 1, says: \"In almost every theological action we see the thearchy divinely praised, as monad indeed and as one, on account of the simplicity and unity of its supernatural indivisibility, from which, as by a vivifying power, we are made one, and, our divided otherness supermundanely folded together, we are gathered into a god-like Monad.\" And below, in 5, he says that being itself, through itself, is the principle of existing things, and of all that exists, and of whatever is in any way contained by being, and this immeasurably, folded together, and unitedly. \"For in the monad every number subsists beforehand, and the Monad has every number in itself singly; and every number is indeed united in the Monad, but as far as it proceeds from the Monad, so far it is distinguished and multiplied. And in the centre all the lines of a circle are constituted according to the first unity, and the centre has the mark of them all in itself, as simple [n45] unities, uniformly united to one another and to the one principle from which they proceeded. In the centre itself they are united universally; slightly distant from it, they are slightly distinguished; receding more, more; and, simply, the nearer they are to the centre, so much the more they are united, both to it and to one another, and the farther from it, so much the farther they are from one another. But in the whole nature of all things too, all the reasons of nature, each singly, are enfolded together through one unconfused unity.\" And further below, in the last chapter, treating of the One, namely how the one befits God, he writes thus: \"It is One because it is all things universally, through the excellence of the one unity, and it is the irreversible cause of all of one. For none of existing things is non-participating in the one; but just as every number likewise participates in the monad [n46], and is called one, two, and ten, and a half, and one, and a third, and a tenth, and delimits unity and multitude, so all things, and each one part of all, participate; and by being one, all things are existing, and the one is not the cause of all as one among many, but before every one. For neither is there a multitude not participating in something of the one, and nothing of existing things that participates, or something of the one, downward, all things singly all, and wholly all, and opposites, and of the one that comprehends universally [n47]. And indeed without the one there will be no multitude, but without multitude there will be the one, as the monad is before every multiplied number; and if anyone should set all things united to all, all things will be wholly one. But this too must be recognized: that according to the one the species of each thing is foreknown; the united is said to unite, and there is one exemplar of all; and if you destroy the one, there will be neither the universe nor anything else of existing things. For the one precedes and encompasses all things in itself uniformly: therefore Theology itself, the whole Thearchy [n48].\" Boethius also, in book 3 of On the Consolation of Philosophy, prose 11, proves inductively, through each genus of beings, that all things desire unity. He says, therefore, in conclusion: \"All things, therefore, desire the one, but we have shown that the one itself is what is good; all things, therefore, seek the good, which you may thus describe: what is desired by all. For either all things are referred to nothing, and, as if stripped of a single summit, will drift without a ruler; or, if there is something toward which all things hasten, that will be the highest of all goods.\" And as many multitudes as are thus united, so many such unifying unities of multitudes are virtually in God. From these the exemplary and archetypal number is wondrously gathered in that most simple unity, by which he forms, numbers, and arranges the other numbered things; and this is that intelligible world, the archetype of Hermes and Plato, which the fortieth part of the first Corollary touches. Hence Boethius, Arithmetic 1, 1: \"Whatever things were constructed by the primeval nature of things appear formed by the principle of numbers; for this was the principal exemplar in the mind of the maker. Hence the multitude of the four Elements was borrowed, hence the changes of the seasons, hence the motion of the stars and the revolution of heaven.\" And above, in the same prologue, 2, he maintains the same most fully. This lucid saying of Boethius seems to be taken from the obscure words of the first part of Plato's Timaeus, chapter 1, which Chalcidius in his first commentary entitles \"On the generation of the World.\" Hence Eustratius on Ethics 1, 6, comment [n49]", "margins": [{"id": "159E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Dionysius (source)."}, {"id": "160A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Dionysius (source)."}, {"id": "160B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Boethius (source)."}, {"id": "160C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Plato's Timaeus; Chalcidius; Eustratius (source)."}]}, {"anchor": "p160D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p160D", "locator_display": "160D–160E", "source_text": "48. dicit, quod vniuersalia exemplaria, et ideae apud Platonem sunt quidem numerus diuinus, per quem velut per exemplum conditor operatur materialem factionem, et hanc sententiam Platonis contra Aristotelem approbat, et defendit; imo forte Platonem in ista sententia noluit Aristoteles reprobare. Ideoque dicit Eustratius, Aristoteles forte noluit obsistere Platoni, sed illis qui secundum quod non oportet dicta illius recipiunt. Quibus et concordat Sapiens dicens Deo: Omnia in mensura, numero, et pondere disposuisti, Sapient. 11. Quem numerum constat non esse aliquam creaturam, sed illum sapientiae spiritum multiplicem vnicum et subtilem Sapient. 7. imo et ipsammet sapientiam, in qua omnia erant facta, Psalmo 103. Vnde Augustinus 2. de libero arbitrio 19. Sapientia absit quod in comparatione numeri inferior inueniatur, cum eadem sit; et 4. super Genesin ad literam 5. exponens Autoritatem Sapientis adductam sic dicit, Secundum id quod mensura omni rei modum praefigit, et numerus omni rei speciem praebet, et pondus omnem rem ad quietem et\n\nstabilitatem trahit, ille primitus, et veraciter, et singulariter iste est, qui terminat, format, et ordinat omnia, et infra eodem 6. Numerus sine numero est quo formantur omnia, nec formatur ipse. Hujusmodi autem numeri vnitates propriae sunt rationes in mente diuina omnium creattices, nutrices, et continuae seruatrices; et haec forsan sunt vniuersalia, quae plurimi veterum somniabant, sed paucissimi haec videbant: Quare et hanc sententiam velut altissimam in prologo in Vniuersalia conuoluit Porphyrius, non euoluit; quae tamen sententia patet ex prioribus euidenter, vnde et Eustrathius vbi prius dicit, quod Vniuersalia exemplaria, seu ideae sunt rationes conditrices, et velut notationes facientis. Robertus quo que Lincolniensis super 1. Post. 7. dicit, quod Vniuersalia sunt cognitiones rerū creandarū, quae fuerunt", "english": "48, says that the universal exemplars and Ideas, in Plato, are indeed a divine number, through which, as through an exemplar, the Maker carries out the making of material things. He approves and defends this opinion of Plato against Aristotle; indeed, perhaps Aristotle did not wish to reject Plato in this opinion. And so Eustratius says: Aristotle perhaps did not wish to oppose Plato, but only those who receive his sayings in a way they should not. With these the Wise Man also agrees, when he says to God: \"You have arranged all things in measure, number, and weight\" (Wisdom 11). It is established that this number is not any creature, but is that \"spirit of wisdom, manifold, unique, and subtle\" (Wisdom 7), indeed wisdom itself, \"in which all things were made,\" Psalm 103 [104]. Hence Augustine, On Free Choice 2, 19: \"Far be it that Wisdom be found inferior in comparison with number, since it is the same.\" Expounding the cited authority of the Wise Man in On Genesis according to the Letter 4, 5, he says: \"According to this, that measure prescribes the limit for every thing, and number furnishes every thing its species, and weight draws every thing to rest and stability, he it is, primarily and truly and uniquely, who bounds, forms, and orders all things.\" And further on, in the same work, 6: \"Number without number is that by which all things are formed, and it is not itself formed.\" The proper units of such a number are the reasons in the divine mind, which create, nourish, and continually preserve all things. And these perhaps are the universals that very many of the ancients dreamed of, but very few saw. Hence Porphyry, in the prologue to the Universals, enfolded this opinion, as a most lofty one, but did not unfold it.[n50] Yet the opinion is evident from what has gone before. Hence too Eustrathius, where he spoke earlier, says that the universal exemplars, or Ideas, are creative reasons and, as it were, the notations of the maker. Robert of Lincoln also says, on Posterior Analytics 1, 7, that the universals are the cognitions of things to be created, which were", "margins": [{"id": "160D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Sapiens [Wisdom]."}, {"id": "160D·2", "kind": "source", "text": "Augustinus."}, {"id": "160E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Eustrathius."}]}, {"anchor": "p161A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p161A", "locator_display": "161A–161E", "source_text": "in prima causa aeternaliter, et sunt rationes earum et causae formales, et exemplares, et ipsae sunt etiam creatrices; et hae sunt quas vocauit Plato ideas et mundum Archetypum; et hae sunt secundum ipsum genera, et species, et principia tam essendi, quam cognoscendi. Et hoc idem sentit Augustinus. 83. quaestionum 46. in epistola ad Nebridium manifeste. Item si vniuersalia ponantur in intellectu, vt videtur Auerroem, Boetiū, et alios multos velle, in quo Intellectu dignius ponerentur quam in primo, summo, et dignissimo omnium, qui verissime intelligit Vniuersa, qui et dormientibus alijs vigilat in aeternum? Amplius autem, constat certissime aliquas esse causas entium seruatiuas, et existentium seruatrices, in quibus secunda suppositione docente processus non sinitur infinitus. Omnium ergo illarum causarum est aliqua prima et summa; hanc constat necessario esse Deum, qui prima suppositione et 5a. parte corollarij primi testantibus a nullo alio conseruatur; Deus ergo est primus et summus omnium conseruator; Vel ergo hoc est per se, vel per accidens; si per se, ergo necessario; per se enim necessitatem includit; quia si non esset necessario, posset non esse, et sic esset per accidens,\n\nquod patet per definitionem logicam accidentis, ex Isagoge Porphirij et 1. Topic. Aristotelis satis notam: Hoc etiam satis patet. 1. Post. 4. et 6. et 2i. 4. vbi per se cum suis conditionibus definitur. Si autem hoc dicatur ens per accidens; et omne per accidens est posterius illo quod est per se; et ideo ad ipsum reducitur Deum esse omnium seruatorem, reducitur ad aliquod prius eo, cuius virtute hoc facit: Non ergo Deus, sed potius illud prius est primus omnium conseruator. Quod autem omne per accidens reducatur ad aliquod per se prius, apparet; quia sicut substantia praecedit naturaliter omne accidens, et ad ipsam reducitur quodlibet accidens tanquam ad causam priorem; ita per locum a simili seu a proportionalitate, videtur essentiale praecedere quodlibet accidentale, et hoc omne ad illud reduci. Item omne causatum sicut habet determinatum modum essendi, sic et videtur habere determinatam causam fiendi, et essendi; aliter enim non magis fieret, nec esset hoc quam illud: accidens autem est infinitum, et indeterminatum omnino, vt patet 2. Phys. capit: de casu, et fortuna, quasi per\n\ntotum; et 6. Metaphys. 4. et post diffuse; vbi dicit Auerroes comment. 7. Quod fit casu a principio habet naturam terminatam, et causam terminatam; quod enim est accidentaliter accidit illi quod est essentialiter. Hoc itidem confirmatur; Aliquid est per se conseruatiuum entium se conseruans; et illud quod est per accidens, non est principium illius quod est per se, sed magis e contra: Quod enim est ab eo, quod est per accidens, est simpliciter per accidens, sicut quod est ab aliquo casuali, est simpliciter casuale: Hoc enim patet per Philosophum, 2. Phys. 44. redarguentem ponentes casum esse causam coeli, et omnium coelestium, per hoc quod tunc omnia inferiora essent casualia. Dicit enim Auerroes; Cum posuerunt quod ex se, scilicet fortuna, et casu, fuit renouatio corporis coelestis, et motus, qui largitur alijs entibus ordinem, contingit eis vt omnes causae inueniantur ex casu: quod enim inuenitur in illo quod ex casu inuenitur, inuenitur ex casu. Alias quoque de entibus per accidens posset esse scientia; de omnibus enim perse ordinatis scientia potest esse, quod est contra Philosophum, 2.\n\nPhys. capit. de casu et fortuna, diffuse probantem, quod talia non sunt scibilia, neque certa, quia sunt causae accidentales, et per consequens infinitae: et 6. Metaphys. 4. De ente secundum accidens nulla est speculatio; nulla enim scientia neque actiua, neque factiua studiosa est de eo, neque theologica, quod et totus processus edocet consequenter; et 1. Post. 6. hoc idem ostenditur manifeste. Amplius autem quod est perfectius tribuendum est Deo, vt patet per primam Suppositionem, et tertiam partem primi: sed per se perfectius est, quam per accidens, vt nullus ignorat; nec aliter Deus esset per se bonum, et potens; Deus ergo per se non per accidens est primus omnium conseruator. Item in toto genere conseruatorum aliquis est conseruator per se, et primus naturaliter; et illud quod est per se et primum naturaliter in quolibet genere, est maius, dignius, et melius posteriori quocunque. Dicit enim Philosophus, 2. Metaph. 10. Semper enim quae ante est, magis est; et quae posterior est, non est. Vbi et textus\n\nquem habet Auerroes, sic ait; Prius enim semper magis dignum in esse, posterius autem non sic: qui et 12. Metaphys. 37. Optimum, inquit, semper autem proportionale quod primum; quare et Pictagorici posuerunt primum in coelementatione boni, vltimum vero in coelementatione mali, sicut ostensio decimae octauae partis Corollarij primi tangit. Rursum sic ad idem; Primum in quolibet genere est maxime tale, sicut 2. Metaphysic. et 10. satis patet, sicut illud quod est aequale per se, magis est tale, quam id quod est tale per accidens, sicut manifeste patet per Philosophum, tertio Topic. nec aliquis diffitetur. Adhuc autem si hoc sit per accidens, potest non esse; omne enim quod inest alicui non per se et essentialiter, sed tantum accidentaliter, potest separari ab eo separato; hoc enim nullam contradictionem includit; et quia quodlibet entium sufficienter existit, habitis omnibus et solis illis, quae ad suum existere per se et essentialiter requiruntur; quoniam tunc nihil existentiae suae", "english": "in the first cause eternally, and are their reasons and their formal and exemplar causes, and are themselves also creative. These are what Plato called the Ideas and the Archetypal World; and these, according to him, are the genera, the species, and the principles of both being and knowing. Augustine thinks the same, plainly, in the Eighty-three Questions, 46, and in the letter to Nebridius. Again, if the universals are placed in an intellect, as it seems Averroes, Boethius, and many others hold, in what Intellect would they be more worthily placed than in the first, highest, and most worthy of all, who most truly understands all things, and who keeps watch forever while others sleep?\n\nFurther, it is most certain that there are some causes that are preservative of beings and preservers of existing things, among which, as the second supposition teaches, the process is not allowed to go on infinitely. Of all those causes, therefore, there is some first and highest; and this, it is established, is necessarily God, who, as the first supposition and the fifth part of the first corollary attest, is preserved by no other. God, therefore, is the first and highest preserver of all. Now this is either per se or per accidens. If per se, then necessarily; for per se includes necessity, since if it were not necessary, it could fail to be, and so it would be per accidens, as is evident from the logical definition of accident, well known from Porphyry's Isagoge and from Aristotle's Topics 1. This is also quite evident from Posterior Analytics 1, 4 and 6, and 2i. 4,[n51] where per se is defined with its conditions. But if this is called being per accidens, then, since everything per accidens is posterior to what is per se, God's being the preserver of all is reduced to what is per se; it is reduced to something prior to him, by whose power he does this. So it is not God, but rather that prior thing, that is the first preserver of all. That everything per accidens is reduced to something prior that is per se is apparent. For just as substance naturally precedes every accident, and every accident is reduced to it as to a prior cause, so, by the topic from similarity or proportion, the essential seems to precede everything accidental, and all of this to be reduced to it. Again, as everything caused has a determinate mode of being, so it seems also to have a determinate cause of its coming to be and of its being; otherwise it would no more come to be, nor be, this than that. But an accident is infinite and wholly indeterminate, as is evident from Physics 2, in the chapter on chance and fortune, almost throughout, and from Metaphysics 6, 4 and afterwards at length. There Averroes says, in comment 7: \"What comes about by chance has from the beginning a determinate nature and a determinate cause; for what is accidentally happens to that which is essentially.\" This is likewise confirmed. Something is per se preservative of beings, preserving itself; and what is per accidens is not the principle of what is per se, but rather the reverse. For what comes from that which is per accidens is simply per accidens, just as what comes from something casual is simply casual. This is evident from the Philosopher, Physics 2, 44, refuting those who posit chance as the cause of the heavens and of all heavenly things, on the ground that then all lower things would be casual. For Averroes says: \"When they posited that from itself, that is, from fortune and chance, there was a renewal of the heavenly body and of its motion, which bestows order on the other beings, it follows for them that all causes are found from chance; for what is found in that which is found from chance is found from chance.\" Otherwise, too, there could be a science of beings per accidens; for there can be science of all things ordered per se; which is contrary to the Philosopher, Physics 2, in the chapter on chance and fortune, who proves at length that such things are not knowable, nor certain, because they are accidental causes and consequently infinite. And Metaphysics 6, 4: \"Of being according to accident there is no speculation; for no science, whether practical or productive, makes it its study, nor theological science,\" as the whole discussion that follows also teaches. And Posterior Analytics 1, 6 shows the same plainly. Further, what is more perfect is to be attributed to God, as is evident from the first Supposition and the third part of the first Corollary; but per se is more perfect than per accidens, as no one is ignorant; nor would God otherwise be good and powerful per se. God therefore is the first preserver of all per se, not per accidens. Again, in the whole genus of preservers there is some preserver per se and first by nature; and that which is per se and first by nature in any genus is greater, worthier, and better than anything posterior. For the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 2, 10: \"For what is prior is always more; and what is posterior is not.\" Here the text that Averroes has says: \"For the prior is always more worthy in being, but the posterior not so.\" He also says in Metaphysics 12, 37: \"The best is always proportional to that which is first.\" Hence the Pythagoreans also placed the first in the co-ordination of the good, and the last in the co-ordination of the evil,[n52] as the proof of the eighteenth part of the first Corollary touches on. Again, to the same end: the first in any genus is most of that kind, as is quite evident from Metaphysics 2 and 10, just as what is equal per se is more of that kind than what is of that kind per accidens, as is plainly evident from the Philosopher, Topics 3; nor does anyone deny it. Moreover, if this be per accidens, it can fail to be; for everything that belongs to something not per se and essentially, but only accidentally, can be separated from it, the separation being supposed;[n53] for this involves no contradiction. And since any being exists sufficiently when all those things, and only those, are present which are required for its existing per se and essentially, because then nothing of its existence is lacking,", "margins": [{"id": "161A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "7th principal argument (Ratio principalis)."}, {"id": "161C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Averroes."}, {"id": "161C·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) reuocatio [for renouatio]."}, {"id": "161D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Philosophus."}, {"id": "161D·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) theorica [for theologica]."}, {"id": "161D·3", "kind": "source", "text": "Philosophus."}, {"id": "161E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Averroes."}, {"id": "161E·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) aut [for autem]."}]}, {"anchor": "p162A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p162A", "locator_display": "162A–162C", "source_text": "deest; hoc etiam patet per definitionem propriam accidentis; et 1. Post. 6. scribitur isto modo: Omne autem aut sic est scilicet per se primo modo vel secundo; aut per accidens: Accidentia autem non necessaria sunt; et cōfirmatur per Philosophum 8. Phys. 36. probantem quod non omne mouens mouetur, quia non per se, neque per accidens; Non per accidens, quia si secundum accidens, inquit, non est necesse moueri quod mouetur. Si autem hoc est manifestum, quod contingit aliquando moueri, nihil eorum quae sunt; Non enim necessarium est accidens, sed contingit non esse, quod et patet ibi per Auerroē expressius in comment. Si quis autem non vereatur concedere, quod rebus existentibus Deus potest non esse conseruator earum, faciliter conuincetur, quoniam antecedens et consequentia sunt necessaria in ratione, qua per finitatem rerum et conseruationem earum, probatur quod aliquis qui est Deus, est primus omnium conseruator; quare et conclusio simili necessitate firmatur. Item si res sine conseruatione diuina possent existere per seipsas, frustra conseruarentur a Deo secundum illam maximā\n\nPhilosophorum, Frustra ponuntur plura, vbi sufficiunt pauciora: sed secundū Philosophum 1. de Coelo 32. Deus et natura nihil frustra faciunt; quomodo et Apostolus arguit ad Gal. 2. Si per legem, inquit, iustitia, ergo Christus mortuus est gratis; vbi glossa Augustini, si per legem, id est, opera legis, quibus Iudaei confidebant, iustitia est; ergo Christus mortuus est gratis, id est frustra sine causa; est ergo Deus omnium entium necessarius conseruator. Huius quoque sententiae testis est Thomas de Aquino, qui in quaestionibus suis de potentia Dei 35. multipliciter hoc ostendit, et quaestione 36a. quaerit, Vtrum Deus posset alicui creaturae communicare, quod per se in esse conseruaretur absque Deo, et respondet sub verbis quae sequuntur: Dicendū, quod ad omnipotentiam Dei non pertinet, quod possit facere duo cōtradictoria esse simul: In hoc autem quod dicitur, quod Deus faciat aliquid, quod eius conseruatione non indigeat, contradictio implicatur. Iam enim ostensum est, quod omnis effectus a sua causa dependet, secundum quod est eius causa. In hoc igitur quod dicitur quod Dei conseruatione\n\nnon indigeat, ponitur non esse causatum a Deo; et in hoc quod dicitur, quod Deus faciat ipsum, ponitur esse causatum; Sicut igitur contradictionem implicaret, si quis diceret, Deum facere aliquid quod non esset causatum ab eo; ita si quis diceret Deum facere aliquid, quod eius conseruatione non indigeat; vnde vtrumque pari ratione Deus non potest.", "english": "this too is evident from the proper definition of accident. And Posterior Analytics 1, 6 is written in this way: \"Everything either is thus, namely per se in the first or second way, or is per accidens; but accidents are not necessary.\" This is confirmed by the Philosopher, Physics 8, 36, who proves that not every mover is moved, because it is not moved per se, nor per accidens. Not per accidens, because if it were according to accident, he says, it is not necessary that what is moved be moved. But if this is manifest, that it sometimes happens to be moved—none of the things that are—[n54] then an accident is not necessary, but may fail to be, as Averroes also states more expressly there in his comment. Now if anyone does not shrink from conceding that God can fail to be the preserver of existing things, he will easily be convicted, since the antecedent and the consequence are necessary in the argument by which, from the finitude of things and their preservation, it is proved that someone, who is God, is the first preserver of all; therefore the conclusion too is confirmed by like necessity. Again, if things could exist of themselves without divine preservation, they would be preserved by God in vain, according to that maxim of the Philosophers: \"Many are posited in vain where fewer suffice.\" But according to the Philosopher, On the Heavens 1, 32, God and nature do nothing in vain. In just this way the Apostle argues in Gal 2: \"If righteousness is through the law,\" he says, \"then Christ died for nothing.\" The gloss of Augustine there reads: \"If righteousness is through the law, that is, through the works of the law, in which the Jews trusted, then Christ died for nothing,\" that is, in vain, without cause. God, therefore, is the necessary preserver of all beings. A witness to this opinion is Thomas Aquinas, who in his questions On the Power of God, 35, shows this in many ways, and in question 36 asks whether God could communicate to some creature that it be preserved in being of itself without God. He answers in the following words: \"It must be said that it does not belong to the omnipotence of God that he be able to make two contradictories be at once. But in saying that God makes something that does not need his preservation, a contradiction is involved. For it has already been shown that every effect depends on its cause, insofar as it is its effect. In saying, therefore, that it does not need God's preservation, it is posited as not caused by God; and in saying that God makes it, it is posited as caused. Just as it would involve a contradiction, then, if someone said that God makes something that is not caused by him, so too if someone said that God makes something that does not need his preservation; hence in both cases, by equal reasoning, God cannot.\"", "margins": [{"id": "162B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Philosophus. Apostolus. Glossa."}]}, {"anchor": "p162C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p162C", "locator_display": "162C–162D", "source_text": "COROLLARIVM.\n\nEX his igitur omnibus manifesta est conclusio principalis. Vnde non immanifeste consequitur hoc porisma, Nulla res creata sufficit aliam conseruare, et quod necesse est Deum per se et immediate seruare quamlibet creaturam; imo et immediatius quacunque causa creata; immediate, inquam, nedum immediatione loci aut situs, sed et naturae ac causae, et immediatius eisdem modis, vel saltem duobus vltimis modis dictis.\n\n1 Quod nulla res creata sufficit aliam conseruare.M\n\nSI enim, vt dicit principalis conclusio, Deus est omnium entium necessarius conseruator, quaelibet res creata necessario indiget conseruatione diuina, ergo nulla res talis sufficit aliam conseruare.", "english": "COROLLARY.\n\nFrom all these things, therefore, the principal conclusion is manifest. From it there follows, not obscurely, this porism: No created thing suffices to preserve another, and it is necessary that God preserve every creature per se and immediately; indeed more immediately than any created cause; immediately, I say, not only by immediacy of place or position, but also of nature and of cause, and more immediately in these same ways, or at least in the last two ways named.\n\n1. That no created thing suffices to preserve another.\n\nFor if, as the principal conclusion says, God is the necessary preserver of all beings, then every created thing necessarily needs divine preservation; therefore no such thing suffices to preserve another.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p162D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p162D", "locator_display": "162D–162E", "source_text": "2 Secunda est, quod necesse est Deum per se et immediate seruare quamlibet creaturam.\n\nQVod etiam Deus per se et immediate conseruet quamlibet creaturam, euidenter ostendent rationes praemissae, si ad hoc debite applicentur: Omne namque de se potentiale, si\n\ndebeat actuari, hoc necessario erit per aliquemactum, non immediate exterius, sed omniquaque interius actuantem, atque formantem, diffusumque per totum, vt patet de materia et forma, de accidente et de subiecto. Ille igitur actus sic actuans potentiale huiusmodi, vel est actus per se purus a nullo alio penitus actuatus, et tunc est Deus, et habetur intentum; vel non est actus huiusmodi, et tunc ille actus de se est potentialis necessario indigens alio actu ipsum immediate actuante; et cum propter suppositionem secundam non contingat sic in infinitum procedere, tandem necessario finaliter venietur ad vnum actum per se purum, a nullo alio penitus actuatum, qui quodlibet de se potentiale, positum que sub actu, per se et immediate actuat, et informat, nedum exterius circumstando, verum interius totaliter", "english": "2. The second is that it is necessary that God preserve every creature per se and immediately.\n\nThat God also preserves every creature per se and immediately, the reasons set out above will evidently show, if they are duly applied to this. For everything that is of itself potential, if it is to be actuated, will necessarily be actuated through some act that actuates not immediately from outside but in every way from within, and formatively, and that is diffused through the whole, as is evident of matter and form, and of accident and subject. That act, then, which thus actuates what is potential in this way, either is an act per se pure, actuated by no other at all, and then it is God, and what was intended is obtained; or it is not an act of this kind, and then that act is of itself potential, and necessarily needs another act immediately actuating it. Since, by the second supposition, it is not possible to go on thus to infinity, we shall in the end necessarily come finally to one act per se pure, actuated at all by no other, which actuates and informs per se and immediately whatever is of itself potential and placed under act, not merely by surrounding it from outside, but by wholly penetrating it from within,", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p163A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p163A", "locator_display": "163A–163E", "source_text": "penetrando; et quodlibet citra Deum est de se potentiale, ipse autem solus actus per se et purus, sicut praemissa testantur. Item omne de se fluxibile et informe, ad hoc quod figatur stabiliter et formetur, necessario indiget aliqua fixione et forma ipsum immediate figente atque formante; Huiusmodi igitur fixio siue forma, vel est per se fixa seu fixio, formata seu forma, et tunc est Deus, et habetur intentum; vel non est talis, et tunc necessario immediate figitur, et formatur per aliquam fixionem et formam, et cum suppositio secunda non sinat processum huiusmodi infinitum, necessario finaliter stabitur ad vnam fixionem et formam per se, et puram, a nulla alia fixam quomodo libet aut formatam; et haec est habitudo omnium creaturarum et Dei. Hae autem rationes satis concordant cum Autoritatibus Philosophicis, et Theologicis superius recitatis. Item si sufficeret alicui creaturae tantum mediate conseruari a Deo, scilicet tantum mediante alia creatura, cum illa creatura conseruans influeret tantum virtutem finitam creaturae conseruatae, posset Deus creare aliquam creaturam tanto virtuosioris\n\npermanentiae illa creatura per aliam conseruata, quantum virtutis illa conseruans influit conseruatae. Quae si ponatur creata, non indigebit conseruatione alicuius creaturae: Tanto namque est virtuosioris permanentiae ex seipsa, quantum si esset debilior, indigeret a creatura alia confortari: Nec indigebit conseruatione Dei mediata, quia illa fieret per mediam creaturam; quare indigeret conseruatione mediae creaturae, contra proximum praeostensum: Nec indigebit conseruatione Dei immediata, quia et hac creatura debilior non egebat; erit igitur aliqua creatura non egens conseruatione aliqua creatoris, quod praemissa conclusio non permittit. Imo secundum istud, posset Deus tantum confortare res mundi, et totum hunc mundum creare, vel alium mundum secundum se totum, et singulas partes suas tam fortem, quod nullo modo neque mediate, neque secundum totum, neque secundum partem egeret conseruatione diuina; imo et Deo per imaginationem omnino sublato, sanus et integer permaneret, quod praemissa destruunt euidenter. Item sicut Deus est vbique\n\nsic vbique conseruat; sed Deus per se et essentialiter est vbique; quia si non, aut nusquam est, quod nullus non negat; aut est alicubi circumscriptus, quod eius infinitati, et immensitati omnimode contradicit, quas Suppositio prima docet, quod et quaedam Autoritates praemissae testantur. Docet namque prima Suppositio, tertia pars, et quarta Corollarij primi huius, quod quicquid est bonitatis, aut perfectionis perfectissimae et infinitissimae est in Deo; sed magnae perfectionis est posse esse in multis locis praesentialiter totum simul; quare et spiritus qui sic possunt, iudicantur perfectiores corporibus, quae non possunt. Summus igitur spiritus propter suam perfectionem infinitam simpliciter, est necessario repletiuitatis et praesentialitatis infinitae simpliciter, et immensae; quare et omnibus locis et situbus locatis et situatis de necessitate praesentialiter ipse adest, essentialiter cuncta replens supra omnem eorum mensuram magnus, et immensus; vt sicut vere omnipotens dicitur, sic et veraciter dicatur omnipraesens: Et hanc arbitror rationem sacrae Scripturae atque Doctorum, per quam\n\nimmensitatem Dei ostendunt. Vnde vt de multis vnum commemorem, Baruc. 3. scribitur; O Israel, quam magna est domus Dei et ingens locus possessionis eius, magnus et non habens finem, excelsus et immensus. Sique Deus esset alicubi circumscriptus, hoc maxime videretur in Coelo, quoniam dignissimus est locorum, et adhuc in dignissima parte Coeli, seu in dignissimo puncto Coeli, et tunc moto Coelo, ipse similiter moueretur contra sextam partem Corollarij primi huius. Aliter enim partem Coeli, seu punctum digniorem quandoque relinqueret, et indigniorem intraret. Si autem dicatur secundum superficiem secundi de Coelo, et Mundo, Aristotelis, quod Deus est continue in vno situ nobilissimo, scilicet in Oriente, in sectione duorum circulorum magnorum; Istud stare non potest, quia quare magis esset in oriente Oxon, quam in oriente London, seu Gadum Herculis, vel e contra? Si autem dicatur, ipsum esse continue in oriente totius terrae habitabilis in quauis Amphitritis vel Oceani sectione; cum secundum naturalem dispositionem coeli et terrae, et secundum eundem\n\nAristotelem 2. Meteororum, vbi nunc est mare, erit quando que arida, et e contra, erit aliquando alius oriens totius terrae habitabilis quae tunc erit, et tunc vel Deus erit tantum in illo, et sequitur ipsum moueri localiter de oriente vno ad alium orientem; vel tunc non erit in oriente praedicto, ergo eadem ratione nec nunc est. Deus etiam si tantum in oriente ponatur, non erit in loco dignissimo, cum medium coeli, et centrum Solis, Saturni, seu Iouis sit dignior locus seu situs. Item si Deus sit tantum in vno particulari loco, vel situ, posset illum relinquere, et alium ingredi, localiter que moueri. Per hoc quo que quod Deus vbique agit et conseruat, probant Autores ipsum esse vbique tripliciter, scilicet essentialiter, praesentialiter, et potentialiter, sicut patet 1. sentent. Petri, dist. 37. quod tamen nullatenus sequeretur, nisi Deus immediate omnia faceret et seruaret. Vnde Anselmus Monolog. 13. ita dicit, quoniam aliter esse non potest, vt ea quae sunt facta, vigeant, nisi et id a quo sunt facta, vigeat per seipsum;", "english": "and every thing short of God is of itself potential, while he alone is act per se and pure, as the premises attest. Again, everything of itself fluid and formless, in order to be firmly fixed and formed, necessarily needs some fixing and form that immediately fixes and forms it. This fixing or form, then, either is per se fixed, that is, is fixation itself, and formed, that is, is form itself, and then it is God, and what was intended is obtained; or it is not such, and then it is necessarily fixed and formed immediately through some fixation and form; and since the second supposition does not permit such a process to be infinite, we shall necessarily come finally to one fixation and form per se and pure, fixed or formed in no way by any other. And this is the relation of all creatures and of God. These reasons agree well enough with the philosophical and theological authorities recited above.\n\nAgain, if it sufficed for a creature to be preserved by God only mediately, that is, only through another creature, while that preserving creature pours into the preserved creature only a finite power, then God could create a creature of permanence so much the more powerful than that creature preserved through another, as the amount of power the preserving one pours into the preserved one. If this creature is posited as created, it will not need the preservation of any creature. For of itself it is of so much more powerful permanence as the amount by which, were it weaker, it would need to be strengthened by another creature. Nor will it need God's mediate preservation, because that would come about through an intermediate creature, so that it would need the preservation of the intermediate creature, contrary to what was shown immediately before. Nor will it need God's immediate preservation, because even a creature weaker than this one did not need it. There will therefore be some creature not needing any preservation from the Creator, which the conclusion premised does not permit. Indeed, according to this, God could so strengthen the things of the world, and create this whole world, or another world, so strong in itself as a whole and in each of its parts, that in no way, neither mediately, nor as to the whole, nor as to a part, would it need divine preservation; indeed, with God wholly removed by imagination, it would remain sound and entire; which the premises evidently destroy.\n\nAgain, as God is everywhere, so he preserves everywhere; but God is everywhere per se and essentially. For if not, either he is nowhere, which everyone denies; or he is somewhere circumscribed, which in every way contradicts his infinity and immensity, which the first Supposition teaches, and which certain authorities cited above also attest. For the first Supposition, together with the third and fourth parts of the first Corollary of this book, teaches that whatever there is of goodness or of perfection, most perfect and most infinite, is in God; but it belongs to great perfection to be able to be wholly present at once in many places; hence spirits that can do so are judged more perfect than bodies, which cannot. The highest Spirit, therefore, on account of his simply infinite perfection, is necessarily of simply infinite and immense fullness and presence; hence he is of necessity present to all places and positions, and to all located and situated things, essentially filling all things, great above all measure of them, and immense; so that, as he is truly said to be omnipotent, so he may be truly said to be omnipresent. And this, I judge, is the reason of Sacred Scripture and of the Doctors, by which\n\nthey show the immensity of God. Hence, to recall one out of many, it is written in Baruch 3: \"O Israel, how great is the house of God, and how vast the place of his possession; great, and having no end; lofty and immense.\" And if God were circumscribed anywhere, this would seem to be above all in the heaven, since it is the most worthy of places, and still more in the most worthy part of the heaven, or at the most worthy point of the heaven; and then, when the heaven is moved, he too would likewise be moved, against the sixth part of the first Corollary of this book. For otherwise he would at some time leave a worthier part or point of the heaven, and enter a less worthy one. But if it is said, following the surface of Aristotle's second book On the Heavens and the World, that God is continually in one most noble position, namely in the east, at the intersection of two great circles, this cannot stand: for why would he be more in the east of Oxford than in the east of London, or of Cadiz, or the reverse? And if it is said that he is continually in the east of the whole habitable earth, at whatever section of Amphitrite or of Ocean, then, since according to the natural disposition of heaven and earth, and according to the same Aristotle, Meteorology 2, where there is now sea there will sometimes be dry land, and the reverse, there will sometime be another east of the whole habitable earth, which will then exist. Then either God will be only in that one, and it follows that he is moved locally from one east to another east; or then he will not be in the aforesaid east, and therefore by the same reasoning neither is he now. Also, if God were posited only in the east, he would not be in the most worthy place, since the middle of the heaven, and the center of the Sun, of Saturn, or of Jupiter, is a worthier place or position. Again, if God were only in one particular place or position, he could leave it and enter another, and be moved locally. By the very fact, too, that God acts and preserves everywhere, the authors prove that he is everywhere in three ways, namely by essence, by presence, and by power, as is evident from Peter's Sentences 1, distinction 37; which would by no means follow unless God made and preserved all things immediately. Hence Anselm, Monologion 13, says thus: \"Since it cannot be otherwise, [n55] than that the things which have been made have vigor, unless that by which they were made also has vigor through itself,", "margins": [{"id": "163B·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) conformare [for confortare]."}, {"id": "163D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Baruch."}, {"id": "164E·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) nisi vt ea quae sunt facta vigeant per aliud, et id etc. [for the words that follow in the main text: vt ea quae sunt facta, vigeant, nisi et id…]."}]}, {"anchor": "p164A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p164A", "locator_display": "164A–164E", "source_text": "necesse est, vt sicut nihil factum est nisi per creatricem praesentem essentiam, ita nihil vigeat nisi per eiusdem seruatricem praesentiam; et addit 14. consequenter; Quod si ita est, imo quia ex necessitate ita est, consequitur vt vbi ipsa non est, nihil sit. Vbique igitur est, et per omnia, et in omnibus. Liquet igitur quoniam ipsa est, quae cuncta alia portat et superat, claudit et penetrat, eademque est quae in omnibus est, et per omnia, et ex qua, et per quam, et in qua omnia, sicut erat superius plenius allegatum, et supra eiusdem septimo praemittebat. Non opus est quaetere, Vtrum ideo sint vniuersa per ipsam summam substantiam, quia alio faciente aut alia materia existente, illa tantum quolibet modo vt res omnes essent adiuuerit, cum repugnet his quae iam supra patuerunt, si secundo loco et non principaliter sint per ipsam quaecunque sunt. Augustinus quoque de diuinitatis Dei essentia primo, ostenso per scripturam, quod Deus est incircumscriptus, immutabilis, et immensus, subiungit; Proculdubio nullus est locus ab eius praesentia absens; super omnem quippe creaturam praesidet regendo,\n\nsubtus est omnia sustinendo, non pondere laboris, sed infatigabili virtute; quoniam nulla creatura ab eo condita per se subsistere valet, nisi ab illo sustentetur, qui eam creauit. Extra omnia est, sed non exclusus; Intra omnia, sed non conclusus. Ecce causalis Augustini probans Deum esse vbique, quoniam, inquit, nulla creatura potest subsistere nisi sustentetur ab illo, qui et Epistola 39. quae est de praesentia Dei ad Dardanum facit diffusum processum ad idem, vbi et inter caetera ita dicit; Sic est Deus per cuncta diffusus, vt non qualitas Mundi, sed substantia creatrix Mundi, sine labore regens, et sine onere continens Mundum. Et 6. super Genesin ad literam 33 ostendit Deum esse immutabilem per tempus et locum, licet administret et moueat mobilia per tempus et locum, cum sit, inquiens, Ipse nullo locorum vel interuallo, vel spacio incommutabili, excellentique potentia, et interior omnire, quia in ipso sunt omnia, et exterior omnire, quia ipse est super omnia: quae tamen ratio non valeret, nisi Deus per se et immediate administret et moueat vniuersa. Si enim Deus per seipsum sit exterior\n\net interior re quacunque, et moueat sic res motas, manifestum est quod ad ipsum mouere quicquam localiter, non sequitur ipsum localiter commoueri, eo quod ipse est in quolibet loco praesens. Nec potest quis dicere ideo improprie tantum dici, Deum esse vbique essentialiter, praesentialiter, et potentialiter, quia quaecunque essentia in quocunque loco existens, et vniuersaliter omnis locus habet esse ab illo, et quia cuncta locata et loca sunt ei, scilicet eius cognitioni praesentia, et eius potestati subiecta, cum ista fictio rationibus prioribus destruatur; et 1. Sentent. Lumbardi. 37. condemnetur. Item si Deus aliquid puta terram tantum mediate seruaret, cum aliquam creaturam immediate conseruet, et eadem ratione, si vellet, posset terram immediate seruare, et in naturalissimo loco suo, posset moueri localiter ad terram sic seruandam, quod praemissis repugnat. Item si Deus tantum mediate aliqua conseruaret, hoc maxime videretur de inferioribus rebus istis, quod illas seruaret coelesti corpore mediante; sed Anima rationalis est de se tantae permanentiae et maioris, quam\n\ncorpus coeleste: ergo nequaquam ab illo naturaliter conseruatur; Hoc enim naturalis ordo requirit, vt a fortiori debilius conseruetur. Hoc idem et Autoritates ostendunt; Dicit enim Philosophus in De mundo 8. totam terram et mare, aetherem, atque Solem et Lunam, et totum Coelum decorauit vna, quae per omnia transit, virtus. Ammonius quoque Armenus in recordatione in librum peri hermenias Aristotelis, super vlt. primi, dicit, magis erat verisimile aeternas res non a prouidentia regi, quam quae fluxibilem habent naturam; quoniam illa quidem a sua natura determinationem habent et immutabilitatem talem a dijs sortita subsistentiam; quae autem in generatione propter fluxibilitatem propriae materiae in omnimoda transmutatione fieri nata, neque esse, neque contineri, neque ordinari posse si non sortiantur multa virtute conditiua, et prouisiua eorum, quae semper eodem modo se habent, non solum totaliore, et supereminente, scilicet corpori coelesti, sed etiam aliqua magis particulari et proximiori, sicut et hominum videtur ampliori indigentes cura foeminas quam viros,\n\net insensatos quā sapientes. Et Auicebrol. 5o fontis vitae 35. sicut erat superius allegatū, ostendens omnia diuersa, cōtraria, superiora et inferiora per vnitatē coniungi, sic ait; Et radix communis in hoc est hoc, quod vnitas vincit omnia, et est diffusa in omnibus et retentrix omnium. Et infra 36. dicit, Verbum, scilicet voluntas postquam creauit materiam et formam, ligauit se cum illis sicut est ligatio animae cum corpore, et effudit se in illis, et non discessit ab eis, et penetrat ea a summo vsque ad infimum. Et adhuc inferius 38. sic ait: Describere voluntatem impossibile est, sed pene describitur quum dicitur, quod est virtus diuina faciens materiam et formam, et ligans illas, et diffusa a summo vsque ad imum, sicut diffusio animae in corpore; Et ipsa est mouens omnia et disponens, quod et manifestat exemplo sic dicens; Materia et", "english": "it is necessary that, as nothing was made except through the creating presence of the Essence, so nothing has vigor except through the preserving presence of the same.\" And he adds, in 14, in consequence: \"If this is so, indeed because it is so of necessity, it follows that where it is not, nothing is. It is therefore everywhere, and through all things, and in all things.\" It is clear, then, that it is that which carries and surpasses all other things, encloses and penetrates them, and is the same which is in all things, and through all, and from which, and through which, and in which are all things, as was alleged more fully above and as he laid down earlier in the seventh chapter of the same work. There is no need to ask whether all things are through the supreme substance itself merely in the sense that, while another made them or other matter already existed, that substance only helped in some way that all things should be; since that is repugnant to what has already been shown above, if whatever things are, are through it in second place and not principally. Augustine also, in On the Essence of the Divinity of God, the first chapter,[n56] after showing from Scripture that God is uncircumscribed, immutable, and immense, adds: \"Beyond doubt no place is absent from his presence; for he presides over every creature by ruling it,\n\nhe is beneath all things by sustaining them, not by the weight of toil, but by tireless power; since no creature made by him can subsist of itself unless it is sustained by him who created it. He is outside all things, but not shut out; within all things, but not shut in.\" Here is Augustine's causal clause proving that God is everywhere, since, he says, no creature can subsist unless it is sustained by him. The same Augustine, in Letter 39, which is on the presence of God, to Dardanus,[n57] makes an extended discourse to the same end, where among other things he says: \"So is God diffused through all things, that he is not a quality of the world, but the creating substance of the world, ruling it without toil and containing it without burden.\" And in On Genesis according to the Letter 6, 33, he shows that God is immutable through time and place, although he administers and moves mobile things through time and place, since, he says, Himself, by no interval or space of places, by an unchangeable and excellent power, is more inward than every thing, because all things are in him, and more outward than every thing, because he is above all. This reasoning would not hold, however, unless God per se and immediately administered and moved all things. For if God through himself is outer and inner to any thing whatever, and thus moves things that are moved, it is evident that from his moving anything locally it does not follow that he himself is locally moved, because he is present in every place. Nor can anyone say that it is therefore said only improperly that God is everywhere by essence, by presence, and by power, on the ground that whatever essence exists in whatever place, and universally every place, has its being from him, and that all things located and all places are present to him, that is, to his knowledge, and subject to his power; for this fiction is destroyed by the arguments above, and is condemned in Lombard's Sentences 1, 37. Again, if God preserved something, say the earth, only mediately, while he preserves some creature immediately, then by the same reasoning, if he wished, he could preserve the earth immediately, and in its own most natural place;[n58] he could be moved locally to the earth to be so preserved, which is repugnant to the premises. Again, if God preserved some things only mediately, this would seem above all to be true of these lower things, that he preserves them by means of a heavenly body; but the rational Soul is of itself of such permanence, indeed greater, than\n\nthe heavenly body; therefore it is by no means preserved by it naturally. For the natural order requires this, that the weaker be preserved by the stronger. The authorities also show the same. For the Philosopher says in On the World 8: \"One power, which passes through all things, adorned the whole earth and sea, the ether, and the Sun and Moon, and the whole Heaven.\" Ammonius also, called the Armenian, in his recollection on Aristotle's book On Interpretation, at the end of the first book, says: \"It was more likely that eternal things are not ruled by providence than those which have a fluid nature; since the former have their determination from their own nature, and immutability of such a kind, having obtained subsistence from the gods; but the things that in generation, on account of the flux of their own matter, are born to come to be in every kind of change, can neither be, nor be held together, nor be ordered unless they obtain a great creative and provident power from those things that always stand in the same way: not only a more total and supereminent one, namely the heavenly body, but also some more particular and nearer one; just as it seems that women need more care than men, and the foolish more than the wise.\" And Avicebron, Fountain of Life 5, 35, as was alleged above, showing that all diverse and contrary things, higher and lower, are joined by unity, says thus: \"And the common root in this is this: that unity overcomes all things, and is diffused in all things and is the retainer of all things.\" And below, 36, he says: \"The Word, that is, the will, after it created matter and form, bound itself with them as the soul is bound with the body, and poured itself out into them, and did not depart from them, and penetrates them from the highest to the lowest.\" And still further down, 38, he says thus: \"To describe the will is impossible, but it is nearly described when it is said that it is the divine power making matter and form, and binding them, and diffused from the highest to the lowest, as the diffusion of the soul in the body; and it is itself that which moves and disposes all things.\" He makes this clear by an example, saying: \"Matter and form are like the body and the air; and soul and will, binding them and poured into them, is like soul in the body, light in the air, and intelligence in the soul.\" And he shows the manner of such an infusion thus: \"Since the will is a spiritual power, but far more excellent than any spiritual one, do not doubt that it is poured into matter and comprehends it together with form, as is the penetration of the power of the sun, that is, of the power that diffuses light, and its union with the light in the air. The will, then, will be as the power, and form as light, and matter as air.\" And in 39 he says: \"The will penetrates all things without motion, and acts on all things without time, on account of its great strength and unity.\" With him the sacred authorities agree. For in Wisdom 1 it is written:", "margins": [{"id": "164A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Augustinus."}, {"id": "164D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Philosophus."}, {"id": "164D·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) Ermenus [for Armenus]."}, {"id": "164E·2", "kind": "source", "text": "Avicebron."}]}, {"anchor": "p165A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p165A", "locator_display": "165A–165E", "source_text": "forma est sicut corpus et aer; et anima et voluntas ligans illa, et infusa in illis est sicut anima in corpore, lumen in aere, et intelligentia in anima, et modum infussionis huiusmodi sic ostendit: postquam voluntas est virtus spiritualis, sed multo excelsior, quam spiritualis; non dubites ipsam infundi materiae, et comprehendere eam simul cum forma, sicut est penetratio virtutis solis, id est, virtutis diffundentis lumen, et vnitio eius cum lumine in aere: erit ergo voluntas sicut virtus, et forma sicut lumen, et materia sicut aer. Et 39. dicit; Voluntas penetrat omnia sine motu, et agit omnia sine tempore propter magnam suam fortitudinem et vnitatem: Cui et autoritates sacrae concordant; Nam Sap. 1. sic scribitur; Spiritus Domini repleuit orbem terrarum, et hoc quod continet omnia: et infra 8. legitur de sapientia increata quod attingit a fine vsque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suauiter. De qua et Ecclesiastici 1. dicitur, quod altissimus Creator effudit eam super omnia opera sua; et Esaiae 66. Caelum sedes mea, et terra scabellum pedum meorum: De quo dicit expressius Ieremias 23. Nunquid\n\nnon caelum et terram ego impleo, ait Dominus. Vnde Propheta Psalmo 138. Quo ibo a spiritu tuo? et quo a facie tua fugiam? si ascendero in caelum, tu illic es, si descendero ad infernum, ades: si sumpsero pennas in diluculo, et habitauero in extremis maris, etenim illic manus tua deducet me, et tenebit me dextra tua. Beatus quo que Iob 11. de hoc dicit; Excelsior caelo est, et quid facies; profundior inferno, et vnde cognosces; Longior terra mensura eius, et latior mari. Et infra 22. recitat haereticorum falsam insaniam in haec verba; Nubes latibulum eius, nec nostra considerat, et per cardines caeli ambulat. Super quod beatus Gregorius 16. Moralium 4. dicit; Quis de Deo ista vel desipiens suspicetur, qui nimirum dum sit semper omnipotens, sic intendit omnibus, vt assit singulis, sic adest singulis, vt simul omnibus nunquam desit; sic itaque extetiora circundat, vt interiora impleat, sic interiora implet, vt exteriora circundet, sic summa regit vt ima non deserat, sic imis praesens est, vt a superioribus non recedat. Sanctus quoque Thomas de Christiana religione ad Raynaldum, siue de\n\nfide, spe, et charitate 133. dicit, quod Deus immediate ordinat omnes effectus per seipsum, licet per causas medias exequatur, sed in ipsa executione quodammodo immediate se habet ad omnes effectus, in quantum omnes causae mediae agunt in virtute causae primae, vt quodammodo ipse in omnibus agere videatur, et omnia opera secundarum causarum ei possunt attribui, sicut artifici attribuitur opus instrumenti: Conuenientius enim dicitur, quod Faber facit cultellum, quam martellus. Habet etiam se immediate ad omnes effectus, in quantum ipse est per se causa essendi, et omnia ab ipso seruantur in esse. Idem quoque in quaestionibus suis de potentia Dei, quaest. 20. qua quaeritur; Vtrum Deus operetur in omni operatione naturae; respondendo probat, quod Deus est causa cuiuslibet actionis naturalis et voluntariae sex modis: Primo, quia tribuit virtutem agendi, sicut dicitur 8. Phys. quod generans mouet graue, et leue in quantum dat virtutem, per quam consequitur talis motus. Secundo, quia conseruat eam continue. Tertio, quia mouet quodlibet agens ad agendum, et applicat virtutem\n\nad actionem, sicut homo est causa incisionis cultelli; et hoc est vt dicit, quia nulla res per seipsam mouet, nisi mouens non motum: Ideo sequitur de necessitate, quod Deus sit causa actionis cuiuslibet rei naturalis, vt mouens et applicans virtutem ad agendum. Quarto, quia ipse est agens principale in qualibet actione, et quodlibet aliud agens est instrumentum illius; quoniam virtute illius quaelibet alia virtus agit; et paulo post subiungit; sic igitur Deus est causa actionis cuiuslibet, in quantum dat virtutem agendi, et in quantum conseruat eam, et in quantum applicat actionem, et in quantum eius virtute omnis alia virtus agit; et cum coniunximus his, quod Deus sit sua virtus, et quod sit intra rem quamlibet, non sicut pars essentiae, sed sicut tenens rem in esse, sequetur quod ipse in qualibet re operante immediate operetur, non exclusa operatione voluntatis et naturae. Vnde potest elici quintus modus, scilicet quod Deus immediate vbique operatur. Quod et patet clarissime per Dominum Stephanum Parisiensem Episcopum condemnantem quendam articulum sub hac forma, Quod prima\n\ncausa est causa entium temotissima; error si intelligatur cum praecisione, ita scilicet quod non propinquissima.", "english": "\"The Spirit of the Lord has filled the whole world, and that which contains all things\"; and below, 8, it is read of uncreated wisdom that \"it reaches from end to end mightily, and disposes all things sweetly.\" [n59] Of this wisdom it is also said in Ecclesiasticus 1 that the Most High Creator poured it out over all his works; and in Isaiah 66: \"Heaven is my seat, and the earth the footstool of my feet.\" Of this Jeremiah 23 speaks more expressly: \"Do I not fill heaven and earth, says the Lord?\" Hence the Prophet in Psalm 138 [139]: \"Where shall I go from your spirit? And where shall I flee from your face? If I ascend into heaven, you are there; if I descend to hell, you are present. If I take wings at daybreak, and dwell at the ends of the sea, even there your hand will lead me, and your right hand will hold me.\" Blessed Job also says of this, in chapter 11: \"He is higher than heaven, and what will you do? Deeper than hell, and how will you know? His measure is longer than the earth, and broader than the sea.\" And below, 22, he recounts the false madness of the heretics in these words: \"The clouds are his hiding place, and he does not consider our affairs, and he walks about the poles of heaven.\" On this blessed Gregory, Moralia 16, 4, says: \"Who could suspect such things of God, even in folly? For while he is always omnipotent, he so attends to all that he is present to each one, and so is present to each one that he is never absent from all at once. So he surrounds the outer things as to fill the inner, so fills the inner as to surround the outer; he so rules the highest as not to abandon the lowest, and is so present to the lowest as not to withdraw from the highest.\" Saint Thomas also, in On the Christian Religion, to Reginald, or On Faith, Hope, and Charity, 133,[n60] says that God immediately orders all effects through himself, although he carries them out through intermediate causes; but in the very execution he is in a certain way immediately related to all effects, insofar as all intermediate causes act in the power of the first cause, so that in a certain way he himself seems to act in all things, and all the works of second causes can be attributed to him, as the work of an instrument is attributed to the craftsman: for it is more fittingly said that the smith makes the knife than that the hammer does. He is also immediately related to all effects insofar as he is himself per se the cause of being, and all things are preserved in being by him. In his questions On the Power of God, question 20, the same Thomas asks whether God works in every operation of nature; and answering, he proves that God is the cause of every natural and voluntary action in six ways:[n61] First, because he bestows the power of acting, as is said in Physics 8, that the generator moves the heavy and the light insofar as it gives the power from which such motion follows. Second, because he preserves it continually. Third, because he moves every agent to act, and applies its power\n\nto the action, as a man is the cause of the cutting of the knife; and this is, as he says, because nothing moves of itself, except an unmoving mover. \"Therefore it follows of necessity that God is the cause of the action of every natural thing, as the one who moves and applies power to act.\" Fourth, because he is himself the principal agent in every action, and every other agent is his instrument, since by his power every other power acts; and a little later he adds: \"Thus, then, God is the cause of every action, insofar as he gives the power of acting, and insofar as he preserves it, and insofar as he applies the action, and insofar as by his power every other power acts; and when we have joined to these that God is his own power, and that he is within every thing, not as a part of its essence, but as holding the thing in being, it will follow that he himself works immediately in every thing that works, without excluding the operation of will and of nature.\" From this a fifth way can be drawn, namely that God works immediately everywhere. This is also most clearly evident from the Lord Stephen, Bishop of Paris, when he condemned a certain article in this form: \"That the first cause is the most remote cause of beings\";[n62] an error, if it is understood with exclusion, that is, so that it is not the nearest.", "margins": [{"id": "165A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Wisdom."}, {"id": "165A·2", "kind": "source", "text": "Ecclesiasticus [Sirach]. Isaiah. Jeremiah. Psalm."}, {"id": "165B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Job."}, {"id": "165B·2", "kind": "source", "text": "Gregory."}, {"id": "165C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "Thomas."}]}, {"anchor": "p165E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p165E", "locator_display": "165E", "source_text": "Tertia, quod necesse est Deum seruare quamlibet creaturam immediatius quacunque\n\ncausa creata.", "english": "Third: that it is necessary for God to preserve any creature more immediately than any created cause whatever. [n63]", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p165E-2", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p165E-2", "locator_display": "165E–167A", "source_text": "DEus igitur immediate quamlibet rem conseruat, nec immediate tantum, verum et immediatius quolibet alio conseruante; quia si non immediatius conseruaret, cum immediate conseruet; aut ergo aeque immediate conseruat, sicut causa secunda conseruans, aut minus immediate quam ipsa; Non aeque immediate, quia Deus et causa secunda conseruans sunt causae conseruatiuae eiusdem essentialiter ordinatae; et nullae tales causae, et maxime in eodem genere causae habent eundem ordinem ad suum causatum; sed necesse est vnam esse\n\npriorem, aliam vero posteriorem in illo modo causandi, sicut ratio et Philosophia testatur. Aliter enim eadem ratione, qua possent esse duae causae propinquae eiusdem causati coaequales in ordine, possent esse et aliae duae superiores similiter coaequales, et sic deinceps; quare et possent esse duae causae primae simpliciter in eodem ordine causandi penitus coaequales; et duo principia prima simpliciter, ac duo Dij, cum tamen omnia multa qualitercunque ordinata ad vnum aliquid necessario reducantur, sicut primo huius, et secundo praehabita manifestant. Docet quoque Philosophus in sua Metaphysica, quod omnium duarum causarum huiusmodi attributarum ad idem, vna reducitur ad aliam, vel ambae ad tertiam. Cum ergo Deus, et causa secunda sint causae coaequales in ordine conseruandi, neutra reducitur ad aliam, tanquam propinquiot conseruato ad temotiorem; ergo ambae reducuntur ad aliquam tertiam priorem ambabus, cuius virtute ambae conseruant, quod impossibile est de Deo, sicut praecedentia docuerunt, et suppositiones ostendunt. Si autem fingatur Deum et causam secundam\n\nesse causas conseruatiuas eiusdem accidentaliter ordinatas; tunc multo magis vel vna reduceretur ad alteram, vel ambae ad tertiam essentialem priorem, sicut superius est ostensum. Item omne nomen conueniens Deo et creaturae perfectius competit ipsi Deo, maxime cum ipse sit primum in tali genere; et causa quare illud nomen dicatur de alijs quibuscunque iuxta processum Philosophi 2. et 10. Metaphysicae superius allegatum. Ergo hoc nomen immediate conseruans maxime et perfectissime competit ipsi Deo. Quare Deus magis immediate conseruat quocunque alio conseruante; Non ergo aeque immediate nec minus. Praeterea si Deus minus immediate conseruaret, et per consequens sic causaret conseruatum et causatum causae secundae quam ipsa, ipse non esset causa propinquissima entium, quod est damnatum in articulo Parisiensi praemisso, propinquissima scilicet propinquitate causalitatis et naturae, non tantum situs aut loci. Tunc quoque Deus plus distaret in conseruatione, et causatione quam causa secunda; ergo per plura media, vel saltem per aliquod medium, et causa\n\nsecunda per nullum; ergo Deus nequaquam illud immediate seruaret, nec etiam sic causaret, cuius oppositum est ostensum. Item omnis causa secunda causans, aut conseruans quodcunque causatum, hoc facit per causationem seu conseruationem mediam naturaliter inter illa, quae ideo naturaliter propinquior est causato seu conseruato, quam illa causa secunda; Deus autem omnium causationem seu conseruationem huiusmodi per se et immediate conseruat, sicut proxima pars corollarij huius docet, ipsamque cum causato vel conseruato copulat, et coniungit, sicut praehabita manifestant; Ergo inter causam secundam et omne eius causatum Deus naturaliter mediat, ipsum immediatius concausando. Item causa essentialior et magis necessaria in esse causati est ei propinquior naturaliter; Deus autem est essentialior et magis necessaria causa in causatione cuiuscunque causati quam aliqua causa secunda; Non enim potest esse aeque vel minus essentialis causa alicuius causati, sicut [vel] quam causa secunda, sicut processus praemissus de aeque immediate vel minus ostendit. Praeterea illud\n\nquod per se et virtute propria est aliquale, essentialius et magis est tale quocunque quod per aliud et virtute aliena est tale, sicut tam Logica quam Philosophia varijs locis docet, et superius tangebatur; Prima autem causa causat causatum commune virtute propria et perse; causa vero secunda virtute causae primae et per illam; ergo causa prima essentialius atque magis; quare et causa prima propinquior, coniunctior, et intimior est causato, quam materia eius vel forma, vel quae cunque causa secunda; ergo et propinquior, coniunctior, intimior, atque immediatior cuilibet rei creatae, quam aliqua res creata alteri posset esse. Quamobrem et in causatione quacunque cuiuscunque causae creatae siue secundae, quodcunque causatum quomodocunque causantis, prima causa propinquius, coniunctius, intimius, et immediatius idem causat. Vnde Commentator super hanc primam propositionem de causis, Omnis causa primaria plus est influens super causatum suum, quam causa vniuersalis secunda, sic ait. Causa vniuersalis prima agit in causatum suae causae, antequam in ipsum agat causa vniuersalis\n\nsecunda quae sequitur ipsum; Et infra, Manifestum est quod causa prima longinqua, est plus comprehendens et vehementius causa rei, quam propinqua; et propter id fit eius operatio vehementioris adhaerentiae, quam causae propinquae; et hoc quidem non fit secundum hoc, nisi quia res imprimis non patitur nisi a virtute longinqua, deinde patitur secundo a virtute quae est sub prima, et prima adiuuat secundam super operationem suam, quoniam omnem operationem quam causa efficit secunda, prima ibi efficit; veruntamen efficit eam per modum alium altiorem, et sublimiorem: Et quando remouetur causa secunda a causato suo, non remouetur ab eo causa prima; quoniam causa prima est maioris et vehementioris adhaerentiae cum re quam causa propinqua. Item Sanctus Thomas in quaestionibus suis de\n\npotentia Dei quaest. 20. qua quaeritur, Vtrum Deus operetur in omni operatione naturae, respondendo inter caetera, ita dicit, Deus est causa omnis actionis, prout quodlibet agens est instrumentum diuinae virtutis operantis. Sic ergo si consideremus supposita agentia, quodlibet agens particulare est immediatum ad suum effectum; si autem consideremus virtutem qua fit actio, sic virtus superioris causae erit immediatior effectui, quam virtus inferioris: Nam virtus inferior non coniungitur effectui nisi per virtutem causae superioris. Vnde dicitur in libro de Causis, quod Virtus causae primae prius agit in causatum, et vehementius ingreditur in ipsum: Sic igitur oportet virtutem diuinam adesse cuilibet rei agenti, sicut virtutem corporis coelestis oportet adesse c•ilibet corpori elementari agenti; sed in hoc differt, quod vbicunque est virtus diuina, est essentia diuina; non autem essentia corporis coelestis est vbicunque est sua virtus. Et iterum Deus est sua virtus, non autem corpus coeleste, et ideo potest dici quod Deus in qualibet te operatur, in quantum eius virtute quaelibet res indiget ad agendum.", "english": "God, therefore, preserves each thing immediately, and not only immediately but more immediately than any other preserver. If he did not preserve more immediately, then since he does preserve immediately, he would preserve either equally immediately as the preserving secondary cause, or less immediately than it. Not equally immediately, because God and the preserving secondary cause are preservative causes of the same thing, essentially ordered. No such causes, and least of all in the same genus of cause, have the same order to their effect; it is necessary that one be prior and the other posterior in that mode of causing, as reason and philosophy testify. Otherwise, by the same reasoning by which there could be two proximate causes of the same effect, equal in order, there could also be two other higher causes likewise equal, and so on. Hence there could also be two causes first simply, wholly equal in the same order of causing, two first principles simply, and two Gods. Yet all many things, however ordered, are necessarily reduced to some one thing, as the first of this and the second, among the things already established, make plain. [n64] The Philosopher also teaches in his Metaphysics that of any two causes of this kind attributed to the same thing, one is reduced to the other, or both to a third. Since, then, God and the secondary cause would be equal causes in the order of preserving, neither is reduced to the other as nearer to the preserved thing to one more remote. Therefore both are reduced to some third prior to both, by whose power both preserve. This is impossible for God, as the preceding discussion has taught and the suppositions show. But suppose it is imagined that God and the secondary cause are preservative causes of the same thing, ordered accidentally. Then much more would either one be reduced to the other, or both to a third, essential and prior, as was shown above.\n\nAgain, every name that suits God and a creature belongs more perfectly to God himself, above all since he is the first in such a genus. He is also the reason why that name is said of any others, according to the argument of the Philosopher in Metaphysics 2 and 10, cited above. Therefore this name \"immediately preserving\" belongs most and most perfectly to God himself. Hence God preserves more immediately than any other preserver; so he does not preserve equally immediately, nor less. Moreover, if God preserved less immediately, and consequently so caused what is preserved and caused by the secondary cause, less than that cause itself does, he would not be the most proximate cause of beings. That is condemned in the Parisian article cited above: most proximate, that is, in proximity of causality and nature, not merely of position or place. Then, too, God would stand further off in preserving and causing than the secondary cause. He would therefore act through many intermediaries, or at least through some intermediary, and the secondary cause through none. Therefore God would in no way preserve that thing immediately, nor so cause it; the opposite of this has been shown.\n\nAgain, every secondary cause that causes or preserves any effect does this through a causation or preservation naturally intermediate between them. That causation or preservation is therefore naturally nearer to the caused or preserved thing than the secondary cause is. But God preserves every such causation or preservation through himself and immediately, as the next part of this corollary teaches, and joins and unites it with the caused or preserved thing, as the foregoing make plain. Therefore God mediates naturally between the secondary cause and its whole effect, co-causing it more immediately. Again, the more essential cause, and the one more necessary in the being of the effect, is naturally nearer to it. But God is a more essential and more necessary cause in the causation of any effect whatever than any secondary cause. For he cannot be a cause of any effect equally essential, or less essential, as [or] than a secondary cause, as the argument set out above about \"equally immediately or less\" shows. [n65] Besides, whatever is of a certain kind through itself and by its own power is so more essentially and more truly than anything that is so through another and by another's power, as both Logic and Philosophy teach in various places, and as was touched on above. But the first cause causes the common effect by its own power and through itself, whereas the secondary cause does so by the power of the first cause and through it. Therefore the first cause does so more essentially and more truly. Hence the first cause is nearer, more conjoined and more intimate to the effect than its matter or form or any secondary cause whatever. It is therefore also nearer, more conjoined, more intimate and more immediate to any created thing than any created thing could be to another. For this reason, in any causation whatever by any created or secondary cause, whatever the effect and in whatever way the cause produces it, the first cause causes the same effect more nearly, more conjointly, more intimately and more immediately.\n\nHence the Commentator, on this first proposition of the Book of Causes, \"Every primary cause is more influential upon its effect than the universal secondary cause,\" speaks thus. [n66] \"The first universal cause acts on the effect of its cause before the second universal cause that follows it acts on that effect.\" And further on: \"It is manifest that the first cause, though remote, is more comprehending and more vehemently the cause of the thing than the near cause; and on that account its operation is one of more vehement adherence than that of the near cause. This comes about for no other reason than that the thing, first of all, is acted upon only by the remote power, and then, secondly, is acted upon by the power that stands below the first; and the first helps the second in its operation, since every operation that the second cause effects, the first effects there; yet it effects it in another way, higher and more sublime. And when the second cause is removed from its effect, the first cause is not removed from it, since the first cause is of greater and more vehement adherence to the thing than the near cause.\"\n\nAgain, St Thomas in his Questions on the Power of God, question 20, where it is asked whether God works in every operation of nature, replies among other things as follows. God is the cause of every action, inasmuch as every agent is an instrument of the divine power that works. [n67] So if we consider the supposits that act, each particular agent is immediate to its effect; but if we consider the power by which the action is done, then the power of the higher cause will be more immediate to the effect than the power of the lower. For a lower power is joined to the effect only through the power of the higher cause. Hence it is said in the Book of Causes that the power of the first cause acts first on the effect and enters into it more vehemently. So, then, the divine power must be present to every acting thing, just as the power of a heavenly body must be present to every acting elemental body. But in this they differ: wherever divine power is, there is the divine essence, whereas the essence of a heavenly body is not wherever its power is. And again, God is his power, but a heavenly body is not; and so it can be said that God works in every thing, inasmuch as every thing needs his power in order to act.", "margins": [{"id": "166E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Thomas."}]}, {"anchor": "p167B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p167B", "locator_display": "167B–167C", "source_text": "Non autem potest proprie dici, quod coelum semper agat in corpore elementari, licet eius virtute corpus elementare agat. Vnde et praeter quinque modos operationis diuinae praemissos, potest elici sextus modus, scilicet quod Deus in operatione quacunque immediatius operatur quolibet alio operante. Quare et Philosophus de Mundo vlt. loquens de Deo, sic ait; Cum sit vnus multinomius, nominatus ab omnibus passionibus quas innouat ipse; vocamus autem eum Iouem; dicitur etiam fulmineus a fulmine, pluuialis a pluuia, tonitrualis tempestuosus, serenus, et sequitur consequenter; et in summa loquendo, coelestis et terrestris appellandus a qualibet natura, et fortuna, velut ens ipse omnium causa; propter quod non male dicitur in Orphicis, Iupiter primogenitus est, Iupiter nouissimus, Iupiter caput, Iupiter medius. Ecce quomodo Philosophus 1o docet, Deum esse generaliter omnium rerum causam; secundo vero ostendit ipsum esse specialiter causam triplicem cuiuscunque, scilicet primam, vltimam, seu finalem, et mediam; Est, inquit, Iupiter primogenitus et caput pro causa prima;\n\nest Iupiter nouissimus pro causa vltima seu finali; est etiam Iupiter medius pro causa media quorumcunque: ideoque expressius sic adiungit; Deus itaque sicut antiquus sermo testatur, initium, medium, et finem habet omnium entium; Deus ergo secundum Philosophum quacunque causa secunda quomodocunque causante quodcunque causatum, est in causando prior, posterior, et immediatior omniquaque. Vnde Dionysius de diuinis nominibus 5. dicit, quod ipse est existendi omnium substantificum principium, medictas, et consummatio: quod et Autoritates praemissae, dicentes, quod Deus est omni re interior, sonare videntur. Nec ignoro responsiones quorundam fingentium, fingereue potentium Autores non ideo dicere Deum omnia conseruare, quia immediate per seipsum, et proprie ipsa seruat, sed tantum mediante Coelo, vel aliquo alio, et per illud, vel quia prohibet corruptiua, vel quia permittit rem esse, aut non desiruit rem cum possit; sed has omnes falsas insanias quas vanitas confingebat confringet faciliter veritas praemissorum.", "english": "It cannot properly be said, however, that the heaven always acts on an elemental body, though the elemental body acts by its power. Hence, besides the five modes of divine operation set out above, a sixth mode can be drawn out: that in any operation whatever, God works more immediately than any other worker. For this reason the Philosopher, too, in the last chapter of On the World, speaking of God, says: \"Since he is one, of many names, named from all the effects which he himself brings about, we call him Jove. He is also called lightning-wielding from lightning, rain-giving from rain, thundering, stormy, clear, and so on in turn. And, to speak in sum, he is to be called heavenly and earthly from every nature and fortune, as being himself the cause of all things. On this account it is not ill said in the Orphic verses: Jupiter is the firstborn, Jupiter the last, Jupiter the head, Jupiter the middle.\" [n68] See how the Philosopher teaches first that God is, in general, the cause of all things; and then shows that he is, in particular, the threefold cause of anything whatever, that is, first, last or final, and middle. \"Jupiter,\" he says, \"the firstborn and the head,\" stands for the first cause; Jupiter the last stands for the last or final cause; and Jupiter the middle stands for the middle cause of all things whatever. And therefore he adds more expressly: \"God, therefore, as the ancient saying attests, has the beginning, the middle and the end of all beings.\" Thus God, according to the Philosopher, whatever secondary cause is causing any effect in whatever way, is in causing prior, posterior and more immediate in every respect.\n\nHence Dionysius, On the Divine Names 5, says that he is the substance-making principle, the middle and the consummation of the existence of all things. The authorities cited above, who say that God is more interior than any thing, seem to sound the same note. I am not unaware of the replies of certain people who pretend, or can pretend, that the authors do not say that God preserves all things because he preserves them immediately, through himself and properly, but only by means of the Heaven or something else, and through that; or because he prevents the things that corrupt; or because he permits a thing to be, or does not destroy a thing when he could. But the truth of the foregoing will easily crush all these false follies which vanity was fabricating.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p167D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p167D", "locator_display": "167D–168B", "source_text": "Obijciunt autem quidam, Non videtur consonum rationi, quod quaelibet res creata, finita, paruula, et tantilla, tanta forma, et tanto conseruatore indigeat simpliciter infinito. Alij vero obijciunt aliter, Si Deus est omnipotens potest facere aliquid potens sufficienter existere per seipsum. Adhuc autem obijciet forte quisnam, Deum dignissimum, pulcherrimum, et honestissimum non decere, per seipsum et immediate quibuslibet obscaenitatibus immisceri, sicut nec quaeuis opera turpia facere, aut quaeque negotia vilia exercere; Imo tam sublimi maiestati potius conueniret in aliquo loco dignissimo, puta in summo coeli vertice residere, aliquam operationem nobilissimam sibique propriam exercendo, alijs operibus vniuersis, alijs causis secundis, velut subiectis sibi ministris gradualiter assignatis. Quare et Philosophus in De Mundo 11. sic ait, potius aestimandum est, et quod conueniens est et magis aptum Deo, vt virtus quae residet in coelo, et plurimum distantibus de vno loquendo, omnibus fiat causa salutifera, magis quam icus et perueniens quo non est bonum nec honestum\n\noperari per se in terra. Hoc enim nec hominum ducibus conuenit cuilibet insistere operi, vt principi exercitus vel ciuitatis seu domus, et si opus sit, supellectilem sarcire, vel aliquod vilius agere, quod in magno Rege non quodcunque mancipium exerceret; quod et probat a simili per Xerxem Regem, qui morabatur in Susis seu Bastanis, qui multa fecit in multis prouincijs, non tamen per seipsum, sed per officiarios varios ad varia deputatos. Ad primum autem istorum perspicue respondendum, quia quaelibet creatura est creata, finita, paruula, et tantilla, ideo per 17. partem Corollarij primi huius, est de se possibile esse et non esse. Quare secundum praemissa indiget necessario aliquo per se necesse esse ipsum continue sustentante, quare et Deo, eadem 17. parte teste. Secundum faciliter soluitur; quia etsi Deus sit omnipotens, non tamen potest facere aliquid impossibile simpliciter absolute, quare nec potest facere alium Deum, nec aliud necesse esse, sed tantum possibile\n\nesse per 17. partem dictam, etc. sicut supra. Istam responsionem confirmat Thomas superius memoratus. Tertium autem obiectum Petrus 1. Sentent. dist. 37. dicit esse tam friuolum vt nec responsione sit dignum; quod tamen soluit per duo exempla, quorum primum est, quod sicut spiritus creatus, scilicet Anima rationalis sordibus corporis leprosi et quantumcunque polluti nequaquam polluitur, sic nec Deus. Secundum est, quod sicut radius solaris per pollutionem quancum que diffusus, nequaquam polluitur; sic nec Deus. Augustinus quo que de Agone Christiano per idem exemplum eodem modo respondet. Vnde et Sapienttiae 10. dicitur de Sapientia increata; Attingit autem vbi que propter munditiam suam, vapor est virtutis Dei et emanatio quaedam est claritatis omnipotentis Dei sincera, et ideo nihil coinquinatum in illam incurrit. Candor est enim lucis aeternae, et speculum sine macula Dei maiestatis, et imago bonitatis illius. Est enim haec speciosior Sole, et super omnem dispositionem stellarum luci comparata, prior, seu aliter, purior inuenitur. Haec autem responsio sic poterit\n\nconfirmari. Perfectius est, omni deturpatiuo posse resistere, nequid deturpationis patiatur ab illo, et per consequens non posse penitus pollui, quam sic posse. Prima ergo Suppositio hoc dat Deo: Aliter autem, nec minus rationabiliter potest dici, quod sicut quaelibet res in quantum est, bona est, vt omnes Philosophi et Theologi simul docent; sic et omnis res in quantum est, pulchra est; Nam pulchritudo rei est eius dispositio naturalis: Vnde Philosophus 7. Phys. 17. in translatione quam Commentator exponit, sic ait; Pulchritudo et fortitudo sunt de cap. relationis; Sunt enim dispositiones Animalium in respectu nobilissimi Animalium; et dico laudabilissimam dispositionem illam, quae est naturalis sphaera. Super quod dicit Auerroes, quod pulchritudo, et fortitudo sunt dispositiones laudabiles in Animalibus, quae non intelliguntur nisi in respectu laudabilissimae dispositionis, sicut in respectu Animalis nobilissimi; dispositio enim laudabilissima Animalis est, vt in omnibus suis dispositionibus sit secundum cursum •aturae; et pulchritudo in aliquo Animali est dispositio in sua creatione considerata", "english": "Some, however, object: it does not seem consonant with reason that any created thing, finite, tiny and trifling, should need so great a form and so great a preserver, simply infinite. [n69] Others object otherwise: if God is omnipotent, he can make something able to exist sufficiently through itself. Still further, someone will perhaps object that it does not befit God, most worthy, most beautiful and most honorable, to be mixed up through himself and immediately with any obscenities, as it does not befit him to do any base works or to carry on any vile business. Rather, it would suit such sublime majesty to reside in some most worthy place, say on the summit of heaven, exercising some most noble operation proper to himself, while all other works and other secondary causes are assigned, in due degrees, as ministers subject to him. Hence the Philosopher too, in On the World 11, says: it must rather be judged both fitting and more apt for God that the power which resides in heaven should become a saving cause for all, speaking of one thing, even for those most widely distant, [n70] than that he should go and arrive where it is neither good nor honorable to work through himself on earth. For this does not suit even the leaders of men: to devote themselves to any work whatever, as a prince of an army or a city or a household might, and, if need be, to mend furniture or do something baser, since a great King would not undertake just any servile task. [n71] He proves this by a similar case, through King Xerxes, who dwelt in Susa or Bastana, [n72] and who did many things in many provinces, yet not through himself, but through various officials deputed to various tasks.\n\nTo the first of these objections one must reply plainly. Since every creature is created, finite, tiny and trifling, it is therefore, by the 17th part of the first Corollary of this book, of itself possible to be and not to be. So, according to what was set out before, it necessarily needs something that is of itself necessary to be, continually sustaining it; and hence it needs God, with the same 17th part as witness. The second is easily answered: although God is omnipotent, he nevertheless cannot do anything simply and absolutely impossible. Hence he cannot make another God, nor another thing necessary to be, but only things possible to be, by the said 17th part, and so forth, as above. Thomas, mentioned above, confirms this reply. The third objection Peter, in Sentences 1, dist. 37, says is so frivolous as not to be worthy of a reply; [n73] yet he resolves it by two examples. The first is that just as a created spirit, namely the rational soul, is in no way polluted by the filth of a leprous body, however polluted, so neither is God. The second is that just as a sunbeam, diffused through any pollution whatever, is in no way polluted, so neither is God. Augustine too, in On the Christian Struggle, replies in the same way by the same example. Hence also Wisdom 10 says of uncreated Wisdom: \"It reaches everywhere because of its purity; for it is a vapor of the power of God and a pure emanation of the radiance of almighty God, and therefore nothing defiled runs into it. For it is the brightness of eternal light, and the spotless mirror of God's majesty, and the image of his goodness. For it is more beautiful than the sun, and when compared with light it is found, above every arrangement of the stars, prior, or otherwise, purer.\" [n74] This reply can be confirmed as follows. It is more perfect to be able to resist everything that defiles, lest any defilement be suffered from it, and consequently to be unable to be utterly polluted, than to be able to be polluted. Therefore the first Supposition grants this to God.\n\nBut it can be said otherwise, and no less reasonably, that just as every thing, insofar as it is, is good, as all Philosophers and Theologians teach together, so also every thing, insofar as it is, is beautiful. For the beauty of a thing is its natural disposition. Hence the Philosopher, in Physics 7, 17, in the translation which the Commentator expounds, says: \"Beauty and strength belong under the heading of relation; for they are dispositions of animals with respect to the noblest of animals; and I call that disposition most praiseworthy which is the natural sphere.\" [n75] On this Averroes says that beauty and strength are praiseworthy dispositions in animals, which are understood only with respect to the most praiseworthy disposition, as with respect to the noblest animal. For the most praiseworthy disposition of an animal is that in all its dispositions it be according to the course of nature; and beauty in some animal is a disposition considered in its creation,", "margins": [{"id": "168A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Augustine. The book of Wisdom."}, {"id": "168B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) The Philosopher."}, {"id": "168B·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Averroes."}]}, {"anchor": "p168C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/2/#p168C", "locator_display": "168C–168E", "source_text": "secundum suam dispositionem quam habet in comparatione nobilissimi Animalium in illa specie, et est illud quod in omnibus suis dispositionibus est secundum cursum naturae. Quod et testatur Auicenna 8. Metaphys. 7. sub his verbis, Pulchritudo omnis rei, et suus decor est, vt sit quemadmodum conuenit ei. Vnde et Plato 1. parte Timae. vbi secundum Chalcidium in Comment. agit de genitura mundi, sic ait; Nec fas erat bonitati praestanti quicquam facere nisi pulchrum, et secundum cum praestans Dei bonitas cuncta fecit; quare et secundum eundem cuncta fuerant pulchra: quare et simili ratione, cuncta quae sunt, in quantum sunt, pulchra sunt. Quare et Augustinus de Natura boni. 13. loquens de varijs modis rerum, sic ait; In his omnibus quaecun que parua sunt in maiorum comparatione contrarijs nominibus appellantur, sicut in hominis forma qua maior est pulchritudo, in eius comparatione simiae pulchritudo deformitas dicitur; et fallit imprudentes, tanquam id sit bonum et hoc malum. Et infra 15. probat quod turpitudo non sit omnino malum, sed bonum, et hoc specialiter de Simia,\n\nquia ipsa potest fieri turpior; ergo et in ea potest minui pulchritudinis bonum; quare et pulchritudinis bonum habet. Quid igitur dedecet pulchrum pulchris misceri? et pulchrius minus pulchris, vt sic magis pulchrum apparet, ea que sua pulchritudine in deturpabili illuminet et exornet? Quare et Philosophus in De Mundo •o. ait totam terram et mare, aetherem at que Solem, et Lunam decorauit vna, quae per omnia transit, virtus. Vnde et Dionysius de diuinis nominibus 4. ait, Bonum autem et pulchrum non separandum in ipsa, in vno omnia comprehendenti causa. Hoc enim in existentibus omnibus in participationes et participantia diuidentes, bonum quidem esse dicimus pulchri particeps, pulchrum vero participationem pulchrificae omnium bonorum causae; super essentiale autem bonum pulchrum quidem dicitur, propter ab eo omnibus existentibus traditam proprie vnicuique pulchritudinem, et velut omnium bene compactionis et claritais causale, instar lucis fulminans simul omnibus pulchrificas fontalis radij sui traditiones, et velut omnia ad seipsum vocans. Imo\n\nnedum decet Deum esse vbique praesentem, sed indecentissimum, et impossibilissimum sibi esset, locis et locatis existentibus non sic esse, quia tunc Deus non esset, sicut in ostensione secundae partis praemissi Corollarij demonstrantur. Quod autem dicit Philosophus, Deum non per se operari in terra; verum est, non sic per se, quin per causam secundam, et per aliud agens inferius, sicut per se, et per nullum illorum operationem suam propriam operatur. Hanc autem materiam parumper diffusius persequebar propter pulchritudinem eius magnam, et quia videtur non paruum sequentium fundamentum.", "english": "according to the disposition it has in comparison with the noblest of the animals in that species; and that is what in all its dispositions is according to the course of nature. Avicenna attests this too, in Metaphysics 8, 7, in these words: \"The beauty of every thing, and its comeliness, is that it be as befits it.\" Hence Plato too, in the first part of the Timaeus, where according to Chalcidius in his Commentary he deals with the begetting of the world, says: \"Nor was it right for surpassing goodness to make anything but the beautiful; and according to him the surpassing goodness of God made all things.\" Hence, according to the same, all things were beautiful; and by like reasoning all things that are, insofar as they are, are beautiful. Hence Augustine too, in On the Nature of the Good 13, speaking of the various modes of things, says: \"In all these things, whatever are small in comparison with greater are called by contrary names; so, in the human form, whose beauty is greater, in comparison with it the beauty of an ape is called deformity; and this deceives the unwary, as if the one were good and the other evil.\" And further on, in 15, he proves that ugliness is not wholly evil but good, and this especially of the Ape, because it can itself become uglier; therefore the good of beauty can be diminished in it; and so it also has the good of beauty.\n\nWhat, then, is unbecoming in the beautiful being mixed with the beautiful? Or the more beautiful with the less beautiful, so that the beautiful thus appears more beautiful, and illumines and adorns them with its own beauty in what is capable of defilement? Hence the Philosopher too, in On the World 10, says that one power, which passes through all things, adorned the whole earth and sea, the ether, and the Sun and the Moon. Hence also Dionysius, On the Divine Names 4, says: \"The good and the beautiful are not to be separated in it, the one cause that comprehends all things. For in all existing things, distinguishing between participations and participants, we say that the good is a participant of the beautiful, and the beautiful a participation of the beautifying cause of all good things. But the superessential Good is indeed called the Beautiful, on account of the beauty that is given from it to all existing things, properly to each one; and as the cause of the good fitting-together and radiance of all things, it is like a light flashing forth, giving at once to all things the beautifying gifts of the ray that is its fountain, and, as it were, calling all things to itself.\"\n\nIndeed, it not only befits God to be everywhere present, but it would be most unseemly and most impossible for him not to be so with places and things located, since then God would not be, as is demonstrated in the proof of the second part of the aforesaid Corollary. As for what the Philosopher says, that God does not work through himself on earth: it is true, not so through himself that he does not work also through a second cause and through another, inferior agent, while he works his own proper operation through himself and through none of them. [n76] I was pursuing this matter for a little at somewhat greater length because of its great beauty, and because it seems to be no small foundation of what follows.", "margins": [{"id": "168C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Avicenna. Plato."}, {"id": "168C·2", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Augustine."}, {"id": "168D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) The Philosopher. Dionysius."}]}], "provenance": {"method": "Machine translation drafted with Claude (Anthropic) under a set translation convention; the image of each Savile page was supplied to the translator, who logged differences between the keyed Latin and the print as errata. Not yet reviewed by a human scholar.", "corrected_against_scan": true, "verified_on": null, "status": "draft"}, "license_source": "CC0 1.0 (EEBO-TCP A16626); the underlying text is public domain", "license_translation": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "license_apparatus": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "credits": [{"name": "EEBO-TCP (Text Creation Partnership), A16626: the Latin", "license": "CC0 1.0", "url": "https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A16626.0001.001"}, {"name": "Internet Archive: the Minerva facsimile page images (linked, not hosted)", "license": null, "url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}], "generated": "2026-10-28", "version": "0.1-draft"}