{"id": "1/18", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/18/", "site": "bradwardine", "collection": "book-1", "title": "De causa Dei: Book I, Chapter 18", "title_alt": [], "author": "Thomas Bradwardine", "languages": ["la", "en"], "source_edition": {"title": "Thomae Bradwardini archiepiscopi olim Cantuariensis De causa Dei contra Pelagium, et de virtute causarum, ad suos Mertonenses, libri tres", "editor": "Henry Savile", "place": "London", "year": 1618, "volume": null, "locator": "220D–224C", "scan_url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}, "source_text": "CAP. XVIII. Distinguit diuinam scientiam incomplexam quodammodo et complexam: distinguit similiter scibilia complexa in priora quodammodo et posteriora voluntate diuina: et ostendit quod priora sunt Causa quoduomodo diuinae scientiae complexae, posteriora vero nequaquam, sed quod Deus per voluntatem suam scit illa.\n\nEST autem pro maiori notitia diuinae scientiae vlterius aduertendum, quod secundum Philosophum 3. de Anima, tres sunt operationes intellectus humani, scilicer simplicium apprehensio, compositio, et diuisio, ac discursus; quarum tertia Deo non conuenit, quia nihil est sibi ignotum, nec potest perficere nouam scientiam adquirendo, et quia talis operatio sine potentia et imperfectione esse non potest: Sed prima et secunda sibi conueniunt modo suo. Omnia enim incomplexa et simplicia comprehendit, et omnia complexa composita vel diuisa quodammodo componit et diuidit, affirmat et negat. Vocetur igitur prima sua scientia siue\n\nnotitia incomplexa, seu simpliciter apprehensiua aut intuitiua, vel simplex apprehensio aut intuitio: secunda vero vocetur complexa, compositiua vel diuisiua, affirmatiua aut negatiua vel adhaesiua; aut in abstracto compositio et diuisio, affirmatio vel negatio, siue adhaesio: non enim proprie distincte, sed similitudinarie balbutiendo vix tenus possum vel scio, ignarus homuncio, excelsa scientiae Dei mirabilis resonare: Confortata est enim, et non possum ad eam. Ostenso igitur quod Deus scit omnia scibilia scientia incomplexa, non per scita posteriora, sed per suam claram essentiam, sibi omnia distinctissime praesentantem, nunc restat consequenter ostendere quomodo Deus scit omnia scibilia complexa: Pro quo est primo sciendum, quod scibilia complexa et vera sunt duplicia: quaedam enim naturaliter praecedunt voluntatem diuinam, et quaedam eam naturaliter subsequuntur. Praecedit •am naturaliter Deum esse, Deum esse aeternum, Deum esse omnipotentem, et similia: Non enim quia Deus vult sic esse, ideo sic est, sed potius e contrario. Sequuntur autem eam mundum esse,\n\nquamlibet creaturam esse, et vniuersaliter omnia illa vera complexa, quorum veritas causatur et pendetab ipsa. Illa igitur vera complexa quae voluntatem diuinam praecedunt, scit Deus per suam solam essentiam, sicut alia vera incomplexa, sicut potest cognosci ex proximo huius scriptis: Illa vero quae voluntatem eius sequuntur, non scit Deus per illa complexa, neque per aliquid aliud voluntate eius semota, sed per suam voluntatem, vel per suam substantiam cum sua voluntate, ita quod ad scientiam eius complexam est sua voluntas necessario prius naturaliter requisita. Prima pars huius, videlicet Deum non scire complexe vera complexa posteriora per ipsa, potest ostendi, sicut ostensum est supra, ipsum non scire incomplexe aliqua posteriora per illa. Secunda vero potest sic ostendi; Deus praescit vera de futuro, et non per aliquas propositiones habitus aut actus existentes in eo realiter diuersos ab eo, per 26. partem corollarij primi huius. Per quid ergo nisi per suam propriam voluntatem? Nec potest quis dicere Deum praescire complexe Antichristum fore, per ipsummet Antichristum,\n\npropter capitula praelibata, cum etiam Antichristus in se nihil sit, nihil per se agit aut causat; Antichristus quoque non est de se determinatus ad fore, sicut 14. docuit. Quomodo ergo per se facit determinate hoc sciri? Nec etiam potest dici, quod Deus praescit futura per futuritionem eorum; Tunc etenim, vt videtur, res futurae essent causa, seu causae diuinae scientiae contra praemissa. Illa insuper futuritio, si nihil est, penitus nihil causat; si autem sit aliquid reale diuersum a Deo, arguitur, sicut prius. Illa insuper futuritio est aut fuit aliquando causata a Deo secundum priora: Quomodo ergo prius sciuit Deus illam esse futuram? quomodo etiam prius sciuit illa futura esse futura, aut illud futurum esse futurum? Adhuc autem illa futuritio vel facit rem esse futuram contingenter et indeterminate, vel necessario et determinate; si contingenter et indeterminate, quomodo scit Deus per illam determinate et certe rem fore? Nonne etiam illa futuritio nunc determinate et certe existit, et ex illa determinate et necessario sequitur, quod res erit? quomodo ergo vitabitur, quin omnia quae euenient, de necessitate\n\neuenient et nihil penitus contingenter? Si vero illa futuritio ponatur esse in Deo, maxime videtur quod sit ponenda in voluntate diuina, cum haec sit causa determinationis et futuritionis omnium futurorum. 14o. huius teste, sicque fundatur intentio principalis. Nec adhuc rationabiliter opinandum, quod Deus sciat futura per solam suam essentiam, eius voluntate remota: Ipsa enim de se sola indifferens est aequaliter et indeterminata ad repraesentandum diuino intellectui Antichristum fore, et Antichristum non fore, sicut vtrumque aequaliter potest fore et sciri a Deo. Neutrum igitur ex se sola sine determinatione aliqua praeuia repraesentat. Neque similiter arbitrandum, quod Deus sciat futura per intellectum eius solum, aut quod ipse determinet diuinam essentiam ad ostendendum hoc futurum vel illud, cum ipse de se sit indifferens ad vtrumque oppositorum contingentium, sicut et essentia ipsa Dei, cum etiam intellectus solus non sit practicus isto modo voluntate [eius] remota, sicut ex 8o. et 9o. huius apparet; cum insuper intellectus voluntate semota sit principium necessarium, sicut constat,\n\net per corollarium decimi huius patet, quodlibet futurum necessario esset futurum, et praescitum a Deo, sicque contingens aequaliter deperiret. Nec potest determinari vt quidam volunt per infinitatem seu immensitatem suae scientiae, quia posita immensitate suae scientiae, adhuc potest indifferenter scire Antichristum fore et non fore, sicut Antichristus potest indifferenter fore et non fore: ergo neutrum sciet sine alia determinatione praeuia limitante, aut terminante. Item determinatio qua Deus determinatur ad sciendum quicquam, prior est naturaliter quam illud scire, siue scientia ex tali determinatione proueniens: Sed Deus determinatur ad sciendum Antichristum fore per infinitatem suae scientiae; ergo infinita Dei scientia prior est naturaliter, quam ipsum scire Antichristum fore; et cum illa includat scientiam huius, Antichristus erit, sequitur quod scientia Dei, qua scit Antichristum fore, praecedat naturaliter semetipsam. Hoc confirmatur, quia Deus non\n\ndeterminatur ad sciendum Antichristum fore primo et adaequate per totam suam scientiam infinitam: Nullae enim sunt partes eius, vt burnellus rudit, eclipsis fuit, et similes infinitae, quas licet non haberet, non minus posset scire Antichristum fore. Imo vt videtur per nullam aliam partem suae scientiae infinitae determinatur ad sciendum Antichristum fore, nisi per scientiam propriam huius, quod est Antichristus erit, vel per scientiam causarum futuritionis Antichristi, sed non per scientiam propriam huius, quoniam tunc eadem scientia praecederet semetipsam. Nec per scientiam causarum secundarum suarum, quoniam tunc sciret discursiue talia a causis ad causata, quod est contra praedicta. Item, fiat argumentum de effectu futuro semper contingenter ad vtrumlibet donec fiat, sicut erit aliqua volutio libera creaturae; tunc de futuritione talis effectus futuri nulla potest esse determinatio per suas causas, vel per earum scientiam, cum illae sint omnino indeterminatae, et ad vtrumlibet ad illum causandum et non causandum. Idem est de futuritione Antichristi.\n\nNon enim necessario sed contingenter producetur a suis causis; Alias enim non esset contingenter futurus ad vtrumlibet, vt supponitur communiter, sed determinate et necessario euenturus: vel fiat argumentum de effectu futuro, quem sine alia causa Deus immediate faciet per seipsum. Quomodo insuper praesciuit res fore ante productionem et existentiam suarum causarum? Nunquid aliter quam nunc, aut nunc quam tunc contra sententiam quinti huius. Nec etiam potest dici, vt alij forsan vellent, quod Deus determinatur ad sciendum huiusmodi per infinitatem et immensitatem suae scibilitatis, seu scientiuitatis, non scientiae actualis. Posita namque et stante sua scibilitate, seu scientiuitate immensa, potest adhuc indifferenter scire Antichristum fore vel non fore, sicut ipse indifferenter potest fore, et non fore: Ergo neutrum determinate sciet, sine alia determinatione praeuia limitante. Eodem modo potest ostendi, quod Deus non determinatur ad sciendum huiusmodi per suam omnipotentiam, nec per suam perfectionem simpliciter infinitam: Quidam vero parum\n\npropinquius accedentes, affirmant quod Deus per solam permissionem voluntatis suae, per hoc scilicet quod vult permittere, seu permittet actiua posteriora agere haec aut illa, praescit futura. Sed hi supponunt actiua posteriora posse agere aliquid sine Deo, et voluntate diuina idem per se et proprie coagente, contra tertium huius, quartum, et nonum. Permissione quoque diuina sola supposita, si agens rationale et liberum posset quippiam libere agere, posset et vtrumque oppositorum aequaliter contingenter, et neutrum. Quomodo ergo per hanc solam scit Deus determinate et certe, quod hoc aget, et illud dimittet? Ex omnibus ergo his videtur, quod Deus praescit futura et non futura, fore et non fore per volutionem [et nolutionem] naturaliter quodammodo praeuiam voluntatis. Amplius autem per hoc scit Deus futura, per quod primo sunt futura; sed hoc est diuina voluntas, sicut decimumquartum ostendebat, et rationes pro illa conclusione adductae possunt conuerti similiter ad hanc probandam. Item testante Philosopho 1. Poster. 2. Scire est per causam cognoscere,\n\nDeus autem verissime scit futura, ergo per causam verissimam, omnes alias causas, et causationes earum virtualiter continentem, et haec est sua voluntas, sicut nono et decimo quarto est ostensum: et potest confirmari per Auerroem super de somno et vigilia, vbi inquirit causam somniorum diuinatiuorum, siue propheticorum de futuris; et ostendit quod est ex perfecta sollicitudine Dei circa homines; vlteriusque ostendens, quomodo Deus haec sciat, dicit quod scit ista per hoc quod sunt determinati esse, et habent causam determinatam, et naturam vniuersalem intellectam, quae est prima causa in esse eorum, sicque sunt intellecta apud naturam intellectiuam, a qua natura sensibilis recipit quaecunque et mouetur, sicut instrumenta mouentur a forma artificij, nec aliquod indiuiduum fit essentialiter a natura nisi per scientiam antecedentem, quoniam sicut allegat ab Aristotele, instrumentum artificis non mouetur, nisi secundum Artificem: secundum ipsum ergo Deus scit futura per causam determinantē hoc ad esse, et factiuam ipsorum, et haec est diuina voluntas, sicut 14um. et 9um.\n\nostendunt; et hoc videtur esse de mente sua; maxime cum super 12. comment. 51. dicat quod ens non est scientiae Dei causa, sed e cōtra: cum ergo secundum eum Deus sciat futura per causam determinantē illa ad esse, et non per aliam causam extra se, ergo per causam sibi intrinsecam, quae non potest esse alia quā voluntas. Cui et concordanter Ammonius super 1. perihermenias vlt. Dicendum, inquit, Deos cognoscere omnia, facta, entia, et futura modo Dijs conuenienti; hoc autem est vna, et determinata, et infallibili cognitione, propter quod quidem et contingentium scientiam dicendum ipsos comprehendere, velut omnia quae in mundo producentes, et perpetuarum quidem substantiarum ipsos causas existentes, generabilium autem concausas, secundum suas proptias operationes, et velut videntes non ipsas solum\n\nsubstantias, sed virtutes ipsarum, et operationes eas quae secundum naturam, et eas quae praeter naturam; quod quidem praeter naturam simul intrauit cum necessario ordine subiecto, vel subiectum decurrentiae entium in his quae nata sunt hoc participare, non principaliter sed secundum modum qui dicitur parypostaseos, scilicet secus existentiae. Et infra dicit, Deos cognoscere contingentia modo nobiliori quam sit ipsorum natura, cognitionem illorum praeaccipientes determinate, et haec scire; sed vnde accipientes et praeaccipientes cognitionem illorum? ex quo praecedente principio, siue causa, nisi ex propria voluntate determinata, et indefectibili causa rerum, et consimili causa scientiae apud eos? Istam quoque sententiam videtur Dionysius de diuinis nominibus 7. efficaciter attestari, sicut 15o. huius plenius recitatur. Item Deus recte scit futura contingentia, ergo per aliquid quod realiter est certum; sed hoc non est aliquod futurum contingens, cum illud non sit certum, nec aliqua causa inferior sufficiens ad productionem illius in causatione eius est certa, sed contingens\n\nsimiliter vt effectus: Alias enim ille effectus esset certe et determinate futurus. Relinquitur ergo quod Deus ista sciat per suam voluntatem sibi certissimam, qua vult omnia illa fore. Istud posset confirmari per Auerroem super 9. Metaph. comment. 21. dicentem, quod scire illa, quae semper sunt, immutabiliter vno modo, est scire; sed scire essentiam mutabilem dicitur aestimare. Item haec vltima ratio, et conclusio principalis patet per Iohannem Scotum super 2. sentent. distinct. 37. quaest. 2. redarguentem opinantes quod voluntas creata sit causa totalis sui velle sine Deo coagente, per hoc, quod si sic esset, Deus non esset naturaliter praescius futurorum, quia non habet scientiam de futuris contingentibus, nisi quia certitudinaliter nouit determinationem voluntatis suae respectu eorum; quae voluntas est immutabilis, et impotentialis. Sed si voluntas creata sit causa totalis sui velle, et ipsa se habet contingenter ad illud velle, ergo quantumcunque ponatur voluntas diuina determinata ad vnam partem eorum quae dependent a voluntate creata, ipsa potest aliter velle, et ita non sequitur\n\ncertitudo ex cognitione determinationis voluntatis diuinae. Qui et super 1. sentent. distinct. 41. reprobans opinionem dicentem ideo Deum quenquam praedestinare ad vitam, quia praeuidet ipsum bene vsurum libero arbitrio ita scribit: Sed contra istud arguitur, Primo, quia Deus non praeuidet ipsum bene vsurum libero arbitrio, nisi quia vult et praeordinat istum bene vsurum, eo quod sicut dictum est dist. 39. Certa praeuisio futurorum contingentium, est ex determinatione voluntatis suae. Et infra, factis duabus instanrijs de Iuda siue Lucifero peccaturo, argutoque quod sola permissio non sufficit ad certitudinem diuinae scientiae, sic respondet: Primum istorum soluitur per hoc quod Deus praescit se cooperaturum ad substantiam illius actus qui erit peccatum, hoc autem praescit quia vult cooperari illi; si erit peccatum commissionis, vel praescit se non cooperaturum ad actum aliquem si non vult ipsum, et hoc, si erit peccatum omissionis; et sciendo se cooperaturum ad substantiam talis actus non cum circumstantijs debitis, vel non cooperaturum ei ad actum necessarum,\n\net per consequens, quod omittet, scit hunc peccaturum, non solum quia scit se permissurum hoc, sed quia scit se cooperaturum huic ad substantiam actus non circumstantionati, et per consequens iste committet; vel non cooperaturum ei ad actum necessarium, et per consequens iste omittet. Item Sanctus Thomas de Christiana religione siue de fide, spe, et charitate 138. dicit, quod contingentia effectuum causarum secundarum non potest certitudinem diuinae prouidentiae perturbare, quia efficacia voluntatis diuinae certitudinem sibi praestat: Voluntas enim Dei cum sit vniuersalis causa rerum, non solum vt aliquid fiat, sed vt sic fiat, ad efficientiam diuinae voluntatis pertinet, non solum vt fiat quod vult fieri, sed vt hoc modo fiat, quo illud vult fieri, vt sic diuina voluntas impleatur efficaciter. Idem quoque supra eodem 133. dicit, quod contingentia, prout sunt virtualiter in suis causis non sunt determinata ad vnum, vt de eis certa cognitio possit haberi, tamen prout sunt actu in suo esse in Dei aeterno, iam sunt determinata ad vnum, et potest de eis certa haberi cognitio. Qui et super 1.\n\nsent. dist. 38. qu. vlt. quaerente, Vtrum scientia Dei sit contingentium; et infra super dist. 40. qu. quarta quaerente, de certitudine praedestinationis ean dem sententiam plane tenet: sed contingentia talia determinari possunt nisi per voluntatem diuinā sicut 14. ostendebat, et pro ista determinatione posset allegari Autoritas Auerrois super de somno et vigilia abbreuiate superius memorata. Hoc idem videtur sentire Anselm. de casu diaboli 21. vbi vult, quod nihil vere scitur, nisi quod certa ratione intelligitur; Quate et Deus non proprie dicitur habere praescientiam futurorum, sed magis praesentium scientiam, quia omnia futura sunt ei praesentia. Et idem dicit de Concordia 7o et Boetius 5o de Consolat. Philosophiae prosa sexta quod videtur non posse intelligi aliter, nisi quod Deus per hoc sciat omnia futura, quia sunt ei praesentia, id est, per suam insuperabilem, et immutabilem voluntatem praesentialiter determinata, et decreta certitudinaliter, vt fiant in futuro. Vnde et de ipso Prophetice dicitur, Qui fecit quae\n\nventura sunt; Et Ecclesiastis 6. Qui futurus est, iam vocatum est nomen eius; sed hoc esse non potest nisi praeuia voluntate; et hoc videtur Deus innuere, Esaiae 46. sic dicens, Ego sum Deus annuntians ab exordio nouissimum, et ab initio quae nec dum facta sunt, dicens Consilium meum stabit, et omnis voluntas mea fiet: quasi velit innuere, quod per hoc annuntiet, vel annuntiare possit ab exordio nouissimum, quia omne suum Consilium et voluntas immutabiliter stabit, et fiet. Quomodo insuper melius posset intelligi Origines super Epistolam ad Romanos, quod non propterea aliquid erit, quia illud scit Deus futurum, sed quia futurum est, ideo scitur a Deo antequam fiat; quam quod quia aliquid est futurum in volutione et praedestinatione diuina, ideo causaliter praescitur a Deo notitia simplici, non e contra. Quare et Augustinus 26. contra Faustum 2. Potius, inquit, verum est quod Deus scit, quam quod opinatur homo. Vnde tam non possunt futura non fieri, quam non fuisse facta praeterita, quoniam non est in Dei voluntate, vt eo sit aliquid falsum quo verum est. Haec ergo\n\nsunt talia et scita a Deo per voluntatem ipsius. Idem de bono perseuerantiae 49. Castitas, Charitas, Pietas, etc. quae Dei esse aliqui confitentur, eaque ab illo praecognita, ac per hoc ipsa esse praedestinata negare non possunt. Et infra, eodem 53. Dei donaque dantur electis, si nulla est praedestinatio, non praesciuntur a Deo; Praesciuntur autem; est igitur praedestinatio quam defendimus: Omnis autem praedestinatio a voluntate procedit: Omnia ergo quae praecognita sunt a Deo, voluta sunt ab eo, et non simul nec post naturaliter, ergo prius; voluntas ergo Dei est causa eius scientiae sicut praehabita suaserunt. Istam quoque sententiam testari videntur illi praeclari 24. Seniores Apocalyps. 4. sicut 14. huius tangit. Et sicut argutum est de scientia Dei respectu contingentium futurorum, quod est per voluntatem diuinam, sic potest argui de eius scientia respectu omnium futurorum, praesentium, et praeteritorum, quae voluntatem ipsius naturaliter consequntur, decimoquarto et nono Capitulo ad iuuante, maxime cum non aliter sciat praesentia siue praeterita, quam futura, propter eius immutabilitatem\n\nomnimodam quinto Capitulo demonstratam. Hic autem per voluntatem intelligo omnem actum voluntatis, siue volutio, siue nolutio fuerit, siue actus alius qualiscunque. Haec pro illorum fatuorum quaestione non fatua, qui dixerunt, Quomodo scit Deus, qui forte propter perplexitatem eius ambiguam, et insolubilem apud ipsos, putabunt non esse scientiam in excelso.", "english": "CHAPTER XVIII. He distinguishes divine knowledge as in a way incomplex and complex. He likewise distinguishes complex knowables into those in a way prior, and those posterior, to the divine will. He shows that the prior ones are the cause in some way of divine complex knowledge, but the posterior ones by no means, and that God through his will knows them.\n\nFor a fuller understanding of divine knowledge it must be noted further that, according to the Philosopher, On the Soul 3, there are three operations of the human intellect: the apprehension of simples; composition and division; and discursive reasoning. The third of these does not belong to God, because nothing is unknown to him, he cannot perfect a new knowledge by acquiring it, and such an operation cannot exist without potency and imperfection. But the first and second belong to him, each in his own manner. For he comprehends all incomplex and simple things, and all complex things, composed or divided, he in a way composes and divides, affirms and denies. Let his first knowledge, then, be called incomplex notice, that is, simply apprehensive or intuitive; or, in the abstract, simple apprehension or intuition. Let the second be called complex, compositive or divisive, affirmative or negative, or adhesive; or, in the abstract, composition and division, affirmation or negation, or adhesion. For I cannot, an ignorant little man, nor do I know how to, echo the lofty things of God's wondrous knowledge properly and distinctly. I can scarcely do so even by stammering in similitudes: \"It has been made strong, and I cannot reach it.\" [n1]\n\nIt has now been shown that God knows all knowables by incomplex knowledge, not through posterior things known but through his own clear essence, which presents all things to him most distinctly. It remains, then, to show how God knows all complex knowables. For this it must first be understood that complex and true knowables are of two kinds. Some naturally precede the divine will, and some naturally follow it. Preceding it naturally are: that God is, that God is eternal, that God is omnipotent, and the like. For it is not because God wills it so that it is so, but rather the contrary. Following it are: that the world is, that every creature is, and universally all those true complexes whose truth is caused by it and depends on it.\n\nThose true complexes, then, that precede the divine will, God knows through his essence alone, as he knows other true incomplexes, as can be known from what has just been written in this book [n2]. But those that follow his will God does not know through those complexes, nor through anything else set apart from his will. He knows them through his will, or through his substance together with his will, so that for his complex knowledge his will is first required, necessarily and naturally. The first part of this, that God does not know posterior true complexes complexly through themselves, can be shown as it was shown above that he does not know any posterior things incomplexly through them. The second can be shown thus. God foreknows true things about the future, and not through any propositions, habits or acts existing in him that are really distinct from him, by the twenty-sixth part of the first corollary of this work. Through what, then, if not through his own will? Nor can anyone say that God foreknows complexly that Antichrist will be through Antichrist himself, on account of the chapters mentioned above. For Antichrist is nothing in himself, and does nothing and causes nothing by himself; nor is Antichrist of himself determined to being future, as the fourteenth taught. How, then, does he of himself make this to be known determinately?\n\nNor can it be said that God foreknows future things through their futurity. For then, as it seems, future things would be the cause, or causes, of divine knowledge, against what was premised. Moreover, if that futurity is nothing, it causes nothing at all; but if it is something real distinct from God, the argument runs as before. Moreover, that futurity either is or at some time was caused by God, according to what was said earlier. How, then, did God previously know that it would be future? How, too, did he previously know that those things would be future, or that that thing would be future? Furthermore, that futurity either makes a thing to be future contingently and indeterminately, or necessarily and determinately. If contingently and indeterminately, how does God know through it, determinately and certainly, that the thing will be? And does not that futurity also now exist determinately and certainly, so that from it it follows determinately and necessarily that the thing will be? How, then, will it be avoided that all things that will happen will happen of necessity, and nothing at all contingently? But if that futurity is posited to be in God, it seems above all that it should be posited in the divine will, since this is the cause of the determination and futurity of all future things, as the fourteenth of this work attests; and so the principal intention is founded.\n\nNor, further, should it reasonably be held that God knows future things through his essence alone, his will being removed. For the essence, of itself alone, is equally indifferent and undetermined to representing to the divine intellect that Antichrist will be and that Antichrist will not be, just as each can equally be, and be known by God. Neither, therefore, does it represent of itself alone, without some prior determination. Nor, similarly, should it be thought that God knows future things through his intellect alone, or that he himself determines the divine essence to show this future thing or that. For the intellect is of itself indifferent to either of the opposite contingents, as is also the essence of God itself. Moreover, the intellect alone, with his [eius] will removed, is not practical in that manner, as appears from the eighth and ninth of this work. And again, the intellect with the will set aside is a necessary principle, as is evident,\n\nand, as is clear from the corollary of the tenth of this work, every future thing would be necessarily future and foreknown by God, and so the contingent would equally perish. Nor can it be determined, as some would have it, through the infinity or immensity of his knowledge. For with the immensity of his knowledge posited, he can still indifferently know that Antichrist will be and will not be, just as Antichrist can indifferently be and not be. Therefore he will know neither without some other prior determination limiting or terminating. Again: the determination by which God is determined to know anything is naturally prior to that knowing, or to the knowledge issuing from such determination. But God is determined to know that Antichrist will be through the infinity of his knowledge. Therefore God's infinite knowledge is naturally prior to the very knowing that Antichrist will be. And since that knowledge includes the knowledge of this, \"Antichrist will be,\" it follows that God's knowledge, by which he knows that Antichrist will be, naturally precedes itself. This is confirmed because God is not determined to know that Antichrist will be primarily and adequately through his whole infinite knowledge. For it has no parts such as \"Burnellus brays\" [n3], \"there was an eclipse,\" and infinitely many like them, which, even if he did not have them, he could know no less that Antichrist will be. Indeed, as it seems, he is determined to know that Antichrist will be through no other part of his infinite knowledge except the knowledge proper to this, namely \"Antichrist will be,\" or the knowledge of the causes of Antichrist's futurity. But not through the knowledge proper to this, since then the same knowledge would precede itself. Nor through the knowledge of his secondary causes, since then he would know such things discursively, from causes to caused effects, which is against what was said before.\n\nAgain, let the argument be made about a future effect that is always contingent to either alternative until it comes to be, as some free willing of a creature will be. Then of the futurity of such a future effect no determination can come through its causes, or through their knowledge, since these are wholly undetermined, open to either alternative, to causing that effect and to not causing it. The same holds of the futurity of Antichrist.\n\nFor it will be produced by its causes not necessarily but contingently; otherwise it would not be future contingently, open to either alternative, as is commonly supposed, but would come about determinately and necessarily. Or let the argument be made about a future effect that God will make immediately by himself, without any other cause. How, moreover, did he foreknow that things would be before the production and existence of their causes? Did he know otherwise then than now, or now than then, against the position of the fifth of this work?\n\nNor can it be said, as others perhaps would wish, that God is determined to know such things through the infinity and immensity of his knowability, or capacity for knowledge [n4], and not of his actual knowledge. For with his immense knowability or capacity for knowledge posited and standing, he can still indifferently know that Antichrist will be or will not be, just as Antichrist can indifferently be and not be. Therefore he will know neither determinately without some other prior determination limiting it. In the same way it can be shown that God is not determined to know such things through his omnipotence, nor through his simply infinite perfection.\n\nCertain others, coming a little closer, affirm that God foreknows future things through the permission alone of his will, namely through the fact that he wills to permit, or will permit, the posterior active things to do this or that. But these suppose that the posterior active things can do something without God, and without the divine will itself co-acting in the same thing per se and properly, against the third of this work, the fourth, and the ninth. Further, with divine permission alone supposed, if a rational and free agent could do anything freely, he could do either of the opposites equally contingently, and neither. How, then, through this alone does God know determinately and certainly that this one will do this and let that go? From all these considerations, then, it appears that God foreknows future and non-future things, that they will be and will not be, through a willing [and not-willing] of the will that is in a way naturally prior. Further, God knows future things through that through which they are first future. But this is the divine will, as the fourteenth showed, and the arguments brought forward for that conclusion can be turned in like manner to prove this one. Again, as the Philosopher attests, Posterior Analytics 1, 2 [n5]: to know is to know through the cause,\n\nand God knows future things most truly; therefore he knows them through the most true cause, which contains virtually all other causes and their causings. This is his will, as was shown in the ninth and the fourteenth. It can be confirmed by Averroes on On Sleep and Waking, where he inquires into the cause of divinatory dreams, or dreams prophetic of future things, and shows that it comes from God's perfect solicitude for human beings. Showing further how God knows these things, he says that he knows them through the fact that they are determined to be and have a determinate cause, and a universal nature that is understood, which is the first cause of their being. Thus they are understood in the intellective nature, from which sensible nature receives whatever it receives and is moved, as instruments are moved by the form of the craft. Nor is any individual made essentially by nature except through antecedent knowledge, since, as he adduces from Aristotle, the instrument of a craftsman is not moved except in accordance with the craftsman. According to him, therefore, God knows future things through the cause that determines them to be and makes them, and this is the divine will, as the fourteenth and the ninth show. This seems to be his mind, especially since on Metaphysics 12, comment 51, he says that being is not the cause of God's knowledge, but the contrary. Since, then, according to him God knows future things through a cause determining them to be, and not through another cause outside himself, he knows them through a cause intrinsic to himself, which cannot be anything other than the will.\n\nIn agreement with him is Ammonius on the last part of On Interpretation 1 [n6]. \"It must be said,\" he says, \"that the gods know all things, things made, things that are and things to come, in a manner fitting to gods. This is by one, determinate and infallible cognition, on account of which indeed it must be said that they also comprehend the knowledge of contingent things, as being producers of all things that are in the world, and themselves the causes of perpetual substances, but co-causes of generable ones, according to their own proper operations; and as seeing not only the substances themselves, but their powers, and their operations, both those that are according to nature and those that are beyond nature. What is beyond nature entered at the same time with the necessary order of the subject, or the subject of the running-down of beings in those things that are by nature apt to share in this, not principally but according to the mode called parhypostasis, that is, alongside existence [n7].\" And below he says that the gods know contingent things in a nobler manner than their own nature, receiving and anticipating the knowledge of them determinately, and know these things. \"But whence do they receive and anticipate the knowledge of them? From what preceding principle or cause, if not from their own determinate will, the unfailing cause of things, and the like cause of knowledge among them?\" Dionysius, On the Divine Names 7, also seems to attest this opinion effectively, as is more fully recited in the fifteenth of this work. Again: God rightly knows future contingents; therefore he knows them through something that is really certain. But this is not any future contingent, since that is not certain. Nor is any lower cause sufficient for its production certain in its causing, but is contingent\n\nin the same way as the effect. For otherwise that effect would be certainly and determinately future. It remains, therefore, that God knows these things through his will, most certain to him, by which he wills all those things to be. This could be confirmed by Averroes on Metaphysics 9, comment 21, who says that to know those things that always are, immutably in one way, is to know; but to know a mutable essence is called supposing.\n\nAgain, this last argument, and the principal conclusion, are clear from John Scotus on Sentences 2, distinction 37, question 2. He refutes those who hold that the created will is the total cause of its own willing without God's co-acting, on the ground that if this were so, God would not be naturally foreknowing of future things. For he has no knowledge of future contingents except in that he knows with certitude the determination of his own will with respect to them, and that will is immutable and without potentiality. But if the created will is the total cause of its own willing, and itself stands contingently toward that willing, then however much the divine will is posited as determined to one part of those things that depend on the created will, it can will otherwise, and so certitude does not follow from knowledge of the determination of the divine will. The same author, on Sentences 1, distinction 41, rejecting the opinion that says God predestines anyone to life because he foresees that he will use free choice well, writes thus: \"But against this it is argued, first, that God does not foresee that he will use free choice well, except because he wills and preordains that he will use it well, since, as was said in distinction 39, the certain foresight of future contingents is from the determination of his will.\" And below, two objections having been raised about Judas or Lucifer who will sin, and it having been argued that permission alone does not suffice for the certitude of divine knowledge, he replies thus: \"The first of these is resolved by this, that God foreknows that he will cooperate in the substance of that act which will be a sin, and he foreknows this because he wills to cooperate in it, if it will be a sin of commission; or he foreknows that he will not cooperate in some act if he does not will it, and this if it will be a sin of omission. And knowing that he will cooperate in the substance of such an act, but not with due circumstances, or that he will not cooperate with him in a necessary act,\n\nand consequently that he will omit, he knows that this man will sin: not only because he knows that he will permit this, but because he knows that he will cooperate with him in the substance of an act lacking its circumstances, and consequently this man will commit it; or that he will not cooperate with him in a necessary act, and consequently this man will omit it.\"\n\nAgain, St. Thomas, in the book On the Christian Religion, or On Faith, Hope and Charity [n8], chapter 138, says that the contingency of the effects of secondary causes cannot disturb the certitude of divine providence, because the efficacy of the divine will provides certitude for it. \"For since the will of God is the universal cause of things, it belongs to the efficacy of the divine will not only that something come to be, but that it come to be in this way: not only that what he wills to be done be done, but that it be done in the way in which he wills it to be done, so that the divine will is thus effectively fulfilled.\" The same author, above in the same work, chapter 133, says that contingent things, as they are virtually in their causes, are not determined to one outcome, so that no certain cognition of them can be had; but as they are in act in their being in God's eternity, they are already determined to one outcome, and certain cognition of them can be had. The same author, on Sentences 1,\n\nsentences, distinction 38, last question, asking whether God's knowledge is of contingent things; and below, on distinction 40, fourth question, asking about the certitude of predestination, holds plainly the same opinion. But such contingents [cannot] be determined except by the divine will [n9], as the fourteenth showed, and for this determination the authority of Averroes on On Sleep and Waking, briefly mentioned above, could be alleged. Anselm seems to hold the same in On the Fall of the Devil 21, where he maintains that nothing is truly known except what is understood by a certain reason. Hence God too is not properly said to have foreknowledge of future things, but rather knowledge of present things, because all future things are present to him. The same is said in the Concordia, chapter 7, and by Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy 5, sixth prose [n10]. This seems unable to be understood otherwise than as meaning that God knows all future things by this, that they are present to him: that is, that they are presentially determined, and with certitude decreed, by his insuperable and immutable will, so as to come to be in the future. Hence it is said prophetically of him, \"Who made what\n\nis to come;\" and in Ecclesiastes 6 [6:10], \"Whoever is to be, his name has already been called.\" But this cannot be unless the will goes before. God seems to hint at this in Isaiah 46 [46:9–10], saying thus: \"I am God, declaring the last from the beginning, and from the start things not yet done, saying: My counsel shall stand, and all my will shall be done.\" It is as if he meant to intimate that he declares thereby, or is able to declare the last from the beginning, because all his counsel and will shall stand and be done immutably. How, moreover, could Origen on the Epistle to the Romans be better understood [n11], to the effect that something will not be because God knows it to be future, but because it is future it is therefore known by God before it comes to be, than that, because something is future in divine willing and predestination, it is therefore causally foreknown by God by simple notice, not the other way round? Hence Augustine too, Against Faustus 26, 2: \"What God knows,\" he says, \"is rather true than what man supposes. Hence future things can no more fail to come to pass than past things can fail to have been done, since it is not in God's will that something be false in that in which it is true.\" These things, therefore,\n\nare such, and are known by God through his will. The same, in On the Good of Perseverance 49 [n12]: \"Chastity, charity, piety, and the like, which some confess to be God's, they cannot deny to have been foreknown by him, and hence to have been predestined.\" And below, in the same work, 53: \"And God's gifts are given to the elect. If there is no predestination, they are not foreknown by God; but they are foreknown; therefore there is the predestination that we defend.\" But all predestination proceeds from the will. Therefore all things that are foreknown by God are willed by him, and willed not simultaneously nor afterwards in the order of nature, therefore before. The will of God, therefore, is the cause of his knowledge, as the points already established have urged. Those illustrious twenty-four Elders of Apocalypse 4 also seem to attest this opinion, as the fourteenth of this work touches on. And as it was argued about God's knowledge of future contingents that it is through the divine will, so it can be argued about his knowledge of all things future, present and past, which naturally follow his will, with the fourteenth and ninth chapters helping, especially since he knows present or past things no otherwise than future things, on account of his immutability in every way, demonstrated in the fifth chapter. Here, however, by \"will\" I understand every act of the will, whether it be a willing or a not-willing, or any other act whatever. These things are said in answer to the question, not foolish, of those fools who said, \"How does God know?\" [n13] Perhaps on account of its ambiguous perplexity, and its insolubility as they see it, they will think there is no knowledge on high.", "apparatus": {"notes": [{"n": 1, "text": "Ps 138 [139]:6 (Vulgate): \"Mirabilis facta est scientia tua ex me; confortata est, et non potero ad eam.\" Bradwardine alters the verb to the first-person present and removes the \"from me.\" The allusion is unflagged and not marked in Savile's margin."}, {"n": 2, "text": "ex proximo huius scriptis. The print has scriptis (ablative plural, \"from the nearest things written of this\"). I take it as \"from what has just been written in this book,\" meaning the preceding chapter. The phrase is awkward and may stand for scripti; the sense is not in doubt."}, {"n": 3, "text": "burnellus rudit: Burnellus (Brunellus) is the stock donkey of scholastic logical examples, taken from the Speculum stultorum; rudit is \"brays.\" Together with eclipsis fuit (\"there was an eclipse\") it stands for any particular contingent proposition that God's knowledge could be said to consist of \"parts.\""}, {"n": 4, "text": "scibilitas and scientiuitas are rare coinages, which I render \"knowability, or capacity for knowledge.\" Bradwardine uses them of God's capacity to know (as opposed to scientia actualis, his actual knowing), not of a thing's being knowable."}, {"n": 5, "text": "Posterior Analytics I.2, 71b9–12. Savile cites \"1. Poster. 2.\""}, {"n": 6, "text": "Ammonius, commentary on Aristotle's De interpretatione, in William of Moerbeke's Latin version. Ammonius speaks of the pagan \"gods\" (Dii); Bradwardine applies the passage to the one God. The Latin is a very close rendering of the Greek and is in places barely construable."}, {"n": 7, "text": "parypostaseos is the Greek parhypostasis, Neoplatonic for the incidental, \"by-the-way\" existence of what comes into being alongside something else, hence secus existentiae. The sentence before it (quod quidem praeter naturam … participare) is obscure in Moerbeke's rendering. I have translated it literally and without emendation."}, {"n": 8, "text": "Aquinas, Compendium theologiae, Part I (on faith), chs. 138 and 133. Savile's title is a descriptive one for the work \"on faith, hope and charity.\""}, {"n": 9, "text": "The print reads possunt nisi, which cannot stand: the sense requires non possunt nisi (\"cannot be determined except by the divine will\"). I translate the evident sense with [cannot] in brackets and leave the Latin as printed."}, {"n": 10, "text": "The sentence has three authorities as subjects: Anselm (De casu diaboli 21, then his De concordia, which Savile cites as chapter 7) and Boethius (Consolatio V, pr. 6). The final clause (quod videtur non posse intelligi aliter …) is Bradwardine's own gloss: he claims their doctrine of God's \"presentiality\" can be understood only as determination by the will."}, {"n": 11, "text": "The comparative melius … quam quod is rhetorical: \"how could Origen be better understood … than [as saying] that …?\" The second clause (quia aliquid est futurum in volutione … non e contra) is Bradwardine's own reading of Origen, which he offers as the best one. The comparison is not between two rival readings."}, {"n": 12, "text": "Augustine, De dono perseverantiae, chs. 49 and 53. Savile and the manuscript tradition he used call it De bono perseverantiae. For ch. 53 the margin has a variant, \"5. 3.\""}, {"n": 13, "text": "Ps 72 [73]:11 (Vulgate): \"Et dixerunt: Quomodo scit Deus, et si est scientia in excelso?\" The \"fools\" are the wicked of that psalm."}], "errata": [{"address": "220D", "keyed": "quoduomodo", "print": "quoquomodo"}, {"address": "220E", "keyed": "scilicer", "print": "scilicet"}, {"address": "221A", "keyed": "proprie distincte", "print": "proprie et distincte"}, {"address": "221A", "keyed": "•am (gap)", "print": "eam"}, {"address": "221B", "keyed": "pendetab", "print": "pendet ab"}, {"address": "222E", "keyed": "proptias", "print": "proprias"}, {"address": "222E", "keyed": "margin 222E·1: \"aliquam A • us.\" (one entry, typed as a variant)", "print": "two separate margins: variant \"aliquam\" (for aliam) and source \"Ammonius.\" (beside \"Cui et concordanter Ammonius\")"}, {"address": "223C", "keyed": "instanrijs", "print": "instantijs"}, {"address": "223C", "keyed": "non cum circumstantijs debitis", "print": "non circumstantijs debitis"}, {"address": "223C", "keyed": "necessarum", "print": "necessarium (line break \"ne-cessarium\")"}, {"address": "223E", "keyed": "Quate", "print": "Quare"}, {"address": "224B", "keyed": "consequntur", "print": "consequuntur"}, {"address": "224B", "keyed": "ad iuuante", "print": "adiuuante"}]}, "segments": [{"anchor": "p220D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/18/#p220D", "locator_display": "220D", "source_text": "CAP. XVIII. Distinguit diuinam scientiam incomplexam quodammodo et complexam: distinguit similiter scibilia complexa in priora quodammodo et posteriora voluntate diuina: et ostendit quod priora sunt Causa quoduomodo diuinae scientiae complexae, posteriora vero nequaquam, sed quod Deus per voluntatem suam scit illa.", "english": "CHAPTER XVIII. He distinguishes divine knowledge as in a way incomplex and complex. He likewise distinguishes complex knowables into those in a way prior, and those posterior, to the divine will. He shows that the prior ones are the cause in some way of divine complex knowledge, but the posterior ones by no means, and that God through his will knows them.", "margins": [{"id": "220D·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "variant: quodammodo"}, {"id": "220D·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "variant: omnia"}]}, {"anchor": "p220E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/18/#p220E", "locator_display": "220E–221A", "source_text": "EST autem pro maiori notitia diuinae scientiae vlterius aduertendum, quod secundum Philosophum 3. de Anima, tres sunt operationes intellectus humani, scilicer simplicium apprehensio, compositio, et diuisio, ac discursus; quarum tertia Deo non conuenit, quia nihil est sibi ignotum, nec potest perficere nouam scientiam adquirendo, et quia talis operatio sine potentia et imperfectione esse non potest: Sed prima et secunda sibi conueniunt modo suo. Omnia enim incomplexa et simplicia comprehendit, et omnia complexa composita vel diuisa quodammodo componit et diuidit, affirmat et negat. Vocetur igitur prima sua scientia siue\n\nnotitia incomplexa, seu simpliciter apprehensiua aut intuitiua, vel simplex apprehensio aut intuitio: secunda vero vocetur complexa, compositiua vel diuisiua, affirmatiua aut negatiua vel adhaesiua; aut in abstracto compositio et diuisio, affirmatio vel negatio, siue adhaesio: non enim proprie distincte, sed similitudinarie balbutiendo vix tenus possum vel scio, ignarus homuncio, excelsa scientiae Dei mirabilis resonare: Confortata est enim, et non possum ad eam. Ostenso igitur quod Deus scit omnia scibilia scientia incomplexa, non per scita posteriora, sed per suam claram essentiam, sibi omnia distinctissime praesentantem, nunc restat consequenter ostendere quomodo Deus scit omnia scibilia complexa: Pro quo est primo sciendum, quod scibilia complexa et vera sunt duplicia: quaedam enim naturaliter praecedunt voluntatem diuinam, et quaedam eam naturaliter subsequuntur. Praecedit •am naturaliter Deum esse, Deum esse aeternum, Deum esse omnipotentem, et similia: Non enim quia Deus vult sic esse, ideo sic est, sed potius e contrario. Sequuntur autem eam mundum esse,", "english": "For a fuller understanding of divine knowledge it must be noted further that, according to the Philosopher, On the Soul 3, there are three operations of the human intellect: the apprehension of simples; composition and division; and discursive reasoning. The third of these does not belong to God, because nothing is unknown to him, he cannot perfect a new knowledge by acquiring it, and such an operation cannot exist without potency and imperfection. But the first and second belong to him, each in his own manner. For he comprehends all incomplex and simple things, and all complex things, composed or divided, he in a way composes and divides, affirms and denies. Let his first knowledge, then, be called incomplex notice, that is, simply apprehensive or intuitive; or, in the abstract, simple apprehension or intuition. Let the second be called complex, compositive or divisive, affirmative or negative, or adhesive; or, in the abstract, composition and division, affirmation or negation, or adhesion. For I cannot, an ignorant little man, nor do I know how to, echo the lofty things of God's wondrous knowledge properly and distinctly. I can scarcely do so even by stammering in similitudes: \"It has been made strong, and I cannot reach it.\" [n1]\n\nIt has now been shown that God knows all knowables by incomplex knowledge, not through posterior things known but through his own clear essence, which presents all things to him most distinctly. It remains, then, to show how God knows all complex knowables. For this it must first be understood that complex and true knowables are of two kinds. Some naturally precede the divine will, and some naturally follow it. Preceding it naturally are: that God is, that God is eternal, that God is omnipotent, and the like. For it is not because God wills it so that it is so, but rather the contrary. Following it are: that the world is, that every creature is, and universally all those true complexes whose truth is caused by it and depends on it.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p221B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/18/#p221B", "locator_display": "221B–221D", "source_text": "quamlibet creaturam esse, et vniuersaliter omnia illa vera complexa, quorum veritas causatur et pendetab ipsa. Illa igitur vera complexa quae voluntatem diuinam praecedunt, scit Deus per suam solam essentiam, sicut alia vera incomplexa, sicut potest cognosci ex proximo huius scriptis: Illa vero quae voluntatem eius sequuntur, non scit Deus per illa complexa, neque per aliquid aliud voluntate eius semota, sed per suam voluntatem, vel per suam substantiam cum sua voluntate, ita quod ad scientiam eius complexam est sua voluntas necessario prius naturaliter requisita. Prima pars huius, videlicet Deum non scire complexe vera complexa posteriora per ipsa, potest ostendi, sicut ostensum est supra, ipsum non scire incomplexe aliqua posteriora per illa. Secunda vero potest sic ostendi; Deus praescit vera de futuro, et non per aliquas propositiones habitus aut actus existentes in eo realiter diuersos ab eo, per 26. partem corollarij primi huius. Per quid ergo nisi per suam propriam voluntatem? Nec potest quis dicere Deum praescire complexe Antichristum fore, per ipsummet Antichristum,\n\npropter capitula praelibata, cum etiam Antichristus in se nihil sit, nihil per se agit aut causat; Antichristus quoque non est de se determinatus ad fore, sicut 14. docuit. Quomodo ergo per se facit determinate hoc sciri? Nec etiam potest dici, quod Deus praescit futura per futuritionem eorum; Tunc etenim, vt videtur, res futurae essent causa, seu causae diuinae scientiae contra praemissa. Illa insuper futuritio, si nihil est, penitus nihil causat; si autem sit aliquid reale diuersum a Deo, arguitur, sicut prius. Illa insuper futuritio est aut fuit aliquando causata a Deo secundum priora: Quomodo ergo prius sciuit Deus illam esse futuram? quomodo etiam prius sciuit illa futura esse futura, aut illud futurum esse futurum? Adhuc autem illa futuritio vel facit rem esse futuram contingenter et indeterminate, vel necessario et determinate; si contingenter et indeterminate, quomodo scit Deus per illam determinate et certe rem fore? Nonne etiam illa futuritio nunc determinate et certe existit, et ex illa determinate et necessario sequitur, quod res erit? quomodo ergo vitabitur, quin omnia quae euenient, de necessitate\n\neuenient et nihil penitus contingenter? Si vero illa futuritio ponatur esse in Deo, maxime videtur quod sit ponenda in voluntate diuina, cum haec sit causa determinationis et futuritionis omnium futurorum. 14o. huius teste, sicque fundatur intentio principalis. Nec adhuc rationabiliter opinandum, quod Deus sciat futura per solam suam essentiam, eius voluntate remota: Ipsa enim de se sola indifferens est aequaliter et indeterminata ad repraesentandum diuino intellectui Antichristum fore, et Antichristum non fore, sicut vtrumque aequaliter potest fore et sciri a Deo. Neutrum igitur ex se sola sine determinatione aliqua praeuia repraesentat. Neque similiter arbitrandum, quod Deus sciat futura per intellectum eius solum, aut quod ipse determinet diuinam essentiam ad ostendendum hoc futurum vel illud, cum ipse de se sit indifferens ad vtrumque oppositorum contingentium, sicut et essentia ipsa Dei, cum etiam intellectus solus non sit practicus isto modo voluntate [eius] remota, sicut ex 8o. et 9o. huius apparet; cum insuper intellectus voluntate semota sit principium necessarium, sicut constat,", "english": "Those true complexes, then, that precede the divine will, God knows through his essence alone, as he knows other true incomplexes, as can be known from what has just been written in this book [n2]. But those that follow his will God does not know through those complexes, nor through anything else set apart from his will. He knows them through his will, or through his substance together with his will, so that for his complex knowledge his will is first required, necessarily and naturally. The first part of this, that God does not know posterior true complexes complexly through themselves, can be shown as it was shown above that he does not know any posterior things incomplexly through them. The second can be shown thus. God foreknows true things about the future, and not through any propositions, habits or acts existing in him that are really distinct from him, by the twenty-sixth part of the first corollary of this work. Through what, then, if not through his own will? Nor can anyone say that God foreknows complexly that Antichrist will be through Antichrist himself, on account of the chapters mentioned above. For Antichrist is nothing in himself, and does nothing and causes nothing by himself; nor is Antichrist of himself determined to being future, as the fourteenth taught. How, then, does he of himself make this to be known determinately?\n\nNor can it be said that God foreknows future things through their futurity. For then, as it seems, future things would be the cause, or causes, of divine knowledge, against what was premised. Moreover, if that futurity is nothing, it causes nothing at all; but if it is something real distinct from God, the argument runs as before. Moreover, that futurity either is or at some time was caused by God, according to what was said earlier. How, then, did God previously know that it would be future? How, too, did he previously know that those things would be future, or that that thing would be future? Furthermore, that futurity either makes a thing to be future contingently and indeterminately, or necessarily and determinately. If contingently and indeterminately, how does God know through it, determinately and certainly, that the thing will be? And does not that futurity also now exist determinately and certainly, so that from it it follows determinately and necessarily that the thing will be? How, then, will it be avoided that all things that will happen will happen of necessity, and nothing at all contingently? But if that futurity is posited to be in God, it seems above all that it should be posited in the divine will, since this is the cause of the determination and futurity of all future things, as the fourteenth of this work attests; and so the principal intention is founded.\n\nNor, further, should it reasonably be held that God knows future things through his essence alone, his will being removed. For the essence, of itself alone, is equally indifferent and undetermined to representing to the divine intellect that Antichrist will be and that Antichrist will not be, just as each can equally be, and be known by God. Neither, therefore, does it represent of itself alone, without some prior determination. Nor, similarly, should it be thought that God knows future things through his intellect alone, or that he himself determines the divine essence to show this future thing or that. For the intellect is of itself indifferent to either of the opposite contingents, as is also the essence of God itself. Moreover, the intellect alone, with his [eius] will removed, is not practical in that manner, as appears from the eighth and ninth of this work. And again, the intellect with the will set aside is a necessary principle, as is evident,", "margins": [{"id": "221B·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "variant: suam"}, {"id": "221D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "source: 5. Opinio."}, {"id": "221D·2", "kind": "source", "text": "source: 6. Opinio."}]}, {"anchor": "p221E", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/18/#p221E", "locator_display": "221E–222A", "source_text": "et per corollarium decimi huius patet, quodlibet futurum necessario esset futurum, et praescitum a Deo, sicque contingens aequaliter deperiret. Nec potest determinari vt quidam volunt per infinitatem seu immensitatem suae scientiae, quia posita immensitate suae scientiae, adhuc potest indifferenter scire Antichristum fore et non fore, sicut Antichristus potest indifferenter fore et non fore: ergo neutrum sciet sine alia determinatione praeuia limitante, aut terminante. Item determinatio qua Deus determinatur ad sciendum quicquam, prior est naturaliter quam illud scire, siue scientia ex tali determinatione proueniens: Sed Deus determinatur ad sciendum Antichristum fore per infinitatem suae scientiae; ergo infinita Dei scientia prior est naturaliter, quam ipsum scire Antichristum fore; et cum illa includat scientiam huius, Antichristus erit, sequitur quod scientia Dei, qua scit Antichristum fore, praecedat naturaliter semetipsam. Hoc confirmatur, quia Deus non\n\ndeterminatur ad sciendum Antichristum fore primo et adaequate per totam suam scientiam infinitam: Nullae enim sunt partes eius, vt burnellus rudit, eclipsis fuit, et similes infinitae, quas licet non haberet, non minus posset scire Antichristum fore. Imo vt videtur per nullam aliam partem suae scientiae infinitae determinatur ad sciendum Antichristum fore, nisi per scientiam propriam huius, quod est Antichristus erit, vel per scientiam causarum futuritionis Antichristi, sed non per scientiam propriam huius, quoniam tunc eadem scientia praecederet semetipsam. Nec per scientiam causarum secundarum suarum, quoniam tunc sciret discursiue talia a causis ad causata, quod est contra praedicta. Item, fiat argumentum de effectu futuro semper contingenter ad vtrumlibet donec fiat, sicut erit aliqua volutio libera creaturae; tunc de futuritione talis effectus futuri nulla potest esse determinatio per suas causas, vel per earum scientiam, cum illae sint omnino indeterminatae, et ad vtrumlibet ad illum causandum et non causandum. Idem est de futuritione Antichristi.", "english": "and, as is clear from the corollary of the tenth of this work, every future thing would be necessarily future and foreknown by God, and so the contingent would equally perish. Nor can it be determined, as some would have it, through the infinity or immensity of his knowledge. For with the immensity of his knowledge posited, he can still indifferently know that Antichrist will be and will not be, just as Antichrist can indifferently be and not be. Therefore he will know neither without some other prior determination limiting or terminating. Again: the determination by which God is determined to know anything is naturally prior to that knowing, or to the knowledge issuing from such determination. But God is determined to know that Antichrist will be through the infinity of his knowledge. Therefore God's infinite knowledge is naturally prior to the very knowing that Antichrist will be. And since that knowledge includes the knowledge of this, \"Antichrist will be,\" it follows that God's knowledge, by which he knows that Antichrist will be, naturally precedes itself. This is confirmed because God is not determined to know that Antichrist will be primarily and adequately through his whole infinite knowledge. For it has no parts such as \"Burnellus brays\" [n3], \"there was an eclipse,\" and infinitely many like them, which, even if he did not have them, he could know no less that Antichrist will be. Indeed, as it seems, he is determined to know that Antichrist will be through no other part of his infinite knowledge except the knowledge proper to this, namely \"Antichrist will be,\" or the knowledge of the causes of Antichrist's futurity. But not through the knowledge proper to this, since then the same knowledge would precede itself. Nor through the knowledge of his secondary causes, since then he would know such things discursively, from causes to caused effects, which is against what was said before.\n\nAgain, let the argument be made about a future effect that is always contingent to either alternative until it comes to be, as some free willing of a creature will be. Then of the futurity of such a future effect no determination can come through its causes, or through their knowledge, since these are wholly undetermined, open to either alternative, to causing that effect and to not causing it. The same holds of the futurity of Antichrist.", "margins": [{"id": "221E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "source: 7. Opinio."}, {"id": "222A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "source: 8a. opinio."}]}, {"anchor": "p222B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/18/#p222B", "locator_display": "222B–222C", "source_text": "Non enim necessario sed contingenter producetur a suis causis; Alias enim non esset contingenter futurus ad vtrumlibet, vt supponitur communiter, sed determinate et necessario euenturus: vel fiat argumentum de effectu futuro, quem sine alia causa Deus immediate faciet per seipsum. Quomodo insuper praesciuit res fore ante productionem et existentiam suarum causarum? Nunquid aliter quam nunc, aut nunc quam tunc contra sententiam quinti huius. Nec etiam potest dici, vt alij forsan vellent, quod Deus determinatur ad sciendum huiusmodi per infinitatem et immensitatem suae scibilitatis, seu scientiuitatis, non scientiae actualis. Posita namque et stante sua scibilitate, seu scientiuitate immensa, potest adhuc indifferenter scire Antichristum fore vel non fore, sicut ipse indifferenter potest fore, et non fore: Ergo neutrum determinate sciet, sine alia determinatione praeuia limitante. Eodem modo potest ostendi, quod Deus non determinatur ad sciendum huiusmodi per suam omnipotentiam, nec per suam perfectionem simpliciter infinitam: Quidam vero parum\n\npropinquius accedentes, affirmant quod Deus per solam permissionem voluntatis suae, per hoc scilicet quod vult permittere, seu permittet actiua posteriora agere haec aut illa, praescit futura. Sed hi supponunt actiua posteriora posse agere aliquid sine Deo, et voluntate diuina idem per se et proprie coagente, contra tertium huius, quartum, et nonum. Permissione quoque diuina sola supposita, si agens rationale et liberum posset quippiam libere agere, posset et vtrumque oppositorum aequaliter contingenter, et neutrum. Quomodo ergo per hanc solam scit Deus determinate et certe, quod hoc aget, et illud dimittet? Ex omnibus ergo his videtur, quod Deus praescit futura et non futura, fore et non fore per volutionem [et nolutionem] naturaliter quodammodo praeuiam voluntatis. Amplius autem per hoc scit Deus futura, per quod primo sunt futura; sed hoc est diuina voluntas, sicut decimumquartum ostendebat, et rationes pro illa conclusione adductae possunt conuerti similiter ad hanc probandam. Item testante Philosopho 1. Poster. 2. Scire est per causam cognoscere,", "english": "For it will be produced by its causes not necessarily but contingently; otherwise it would not be future contingently, open to either alternative, as is commonly supposed, but would come about determinately and necessarily. Or let the argument be made about a future effect that God will make immediately by himself, without any other cause. How, moreover, did he foreknow that things would be before the production and existence of their causes? Did he know otherwise then than now, or now than then, against the position of the fifth of this work?\n\nNor can it be said, as others perhaps would wish, that God is determined to know such things through the infinity and immensity of his knowability, or capacity for knowledge [n4], and not of his actual knowledge. For with his immense knowability or capacity for knowledge posited and standing, he can still indifferently know that Antichrist will be or will not be, just as Antichrist can indifferently be and not be. Therefore he will know neither determinately without some other prior determination limiting it. In the same way it can be shown that God is not determined to know such things through his omnipotence, nor through his simply infinite perfection.\n\nCertain others, coming a little closer, affirm that God foreknows future things through the permission alone of his will, namely through the fact that he wills to permit, or will permit, the posterior active things to do this or that. But these suppose that the posterior active things can do something without God, and without the divine will itself co-acting in the same thing per se and properly, against the third of this work, the fourth, and the ninth. Further, with divine permission alone supposed, if a rational and free agent could do anything freely, he could do either of the opposites equally contingently, and neither. How, then, through this alone does God know determinately and certainly that this one will do this and let that go? From all these considerations, then, it appears that God foreknows future and non-future things, that they will be and will not be, through a willing [and not-willing] of the will that is in a way naturally prior. Further, God knows future things through that through which they are first future. But this is the divine will, as the fourteenth showed, and the arguments brought forward for that conclusion can be turned in like manner to prove this one. Again, as the Philosopher attests, Posterior Analytics 1, 2 [n5]: to know is to know through the cause,", "margins": [{"id": "222B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "source: 9a. opinio."}, {"id": "222B·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "variant: seu"}, {"id": "222B·3", "kind": "source", "text": "source: 10a. opinio. 11a. opinio. 12a. opinio."}, {"id": "222C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Philosophus"}]}, {"anchor": "p222D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/18/#p222D", "locator_display": "222D–223A", "source_text": "Deus autem verissime scit futura, ergo per causam verissimam, omnes alias causas, et causationes earum virtualiter continentem, et haec est sua voluntas, sicut nono et decimo quarto est ostensum: et potest confirmari per Auerroem super de somno et vigilia, vbi inquirit causam somniorum diuinatiuorum, siue propheticorum de futuris; et ostendit quod est ex perfecta sollicitudine Dei circa homines; vlteriusque ostendens, quomodo Deus haec sciat, dicit quod scit ista per hoc quod sunt determinati esse, et habent causam determinatam, et naturam vniuersalem intellectam, quae est prima causa in esse eorum, sicque sunt intellecta apud naturam intellectiuam, a qua natura sensibilis recipit quaecunque et mouetur, sicut instrumenta mouentur a forma artificij, nec aliquod indiuiduum fit essentialiter a natura nisi per scientiam antecedentem, quoniam sicut allegat ab Aristotele, instrumentum artificis non mouetur, nisi secundum Artificem: secundum ipsum ergo Deus scit futura per causam determinantē hoc ad esse, et factiuam ipsorum, et haec est diuina voluntas, sicut 14um. et 9um.\n\nostendunt; et hoc videtur esse de mente sua; maxime cum super 12. comment. 51. dicat quod ens non est scientiae Dei causa, sed e cōtra: cum ergo secundum eum Deus sciat futura per causam determinantē illa ad esse, et non per aliam causam extra se, ergo per causam sibi intrinsecam, quae non potest esse alia quā voluntas. Cui et concordanter Ammonius super 1. perihermenias vlt. Dicendum, inquit, Deos cognoscere omnia, facta, entia, et futura modo Dijs conuenienti; hoc autem est vna, et determinata, et infallibili cognitione, propter quod quidem et contingentium scientiam dicendum ipsos comprehendere, velut omnia quae in mundo producentes, et perpetuarum quidem substantiarum ipsos causas existentes, generabilium autem concausas, secundum suas proptias operationes, et velut videntes non ipsas solum\n\nsubstantias, sed virtutes ipsarum, et operationes eas quae secundum naturam, et eas quae praeter naturam; quod quidem praeter naturam simul intrauit cum necessario ordine subiecto, vel subiectum decurrentiae entium in his quae nata sunt hoc participare, non principaliter sed secundum modum qui dicitur parypostaseos, scilicet secus existentiae. Et infra dicit, Deos cognoscere contingentia modo nobiliori quam sit ipsorum natura, cognitionem illorum praeaccipientes determinate, et haec scire; sed vnde accipientes et praeaccipientes cognitionem illorum? ex quo praecedente principio, siue causa, nisi ex propria voluntate determinata, et indefectibili causa rerum, et consimili causa scientiae apud eos? Istam quoque sententiam videtur Dionysius de diuinis nominibus 7. efficaciter attestari, sicut 15o. huius plenius recitatur. Item Deus recte scit futura contingentia, ergo per aliquid quod realiter est certum; sed hoc non est aliquod futurum contingens, cum illud non sit certum, nec aliqua causa inferior sufficiens ad productionem illius in causatione eius est certa, sed contingens", "english": "and God knows future things most truly; therefore he knows them through the most true cause, which contains virtually all other causes and their causings. This is his will, as was shown in the ninth and the fourteenth. It can be confirmed by Averroes on On Sleep and Waking, where he inquires into the cause of divinatory dreams, or dreams prophetic of future things, and shows that it comes from God's perfect solicitude for human beings. Showing further how God knows these things, he says that he knows them through the fact that they are determined to be and have a determinate cause, and a universal nature that is understood, which is the first cause of their being. Thus they are understood in the intellective nature, from which sensible nature receives whatever it receives and is moved, as instruments are moved by the form of the craft. Nor is any individual made essentially by nature except through antecedent knowledge, since, as he adduces from Aristotle, the instrument of a craftsman is not moved except in accordance with the craftsman. According to him, therefore, God knows future things through the cause that determines them to be and makes them, and this is the divine will, as the fourteenth and the ninth show. This seems to be his mind, especially since on Metaphysics 12, comment 51, he says that being is not the cause of God's knowledge, but the contrary. Since, then, according to him God knows future things through a cause determining them to be, and not through another cause outside himself, he knows them through a cause intrinsic to himself, which cannot be anything other than the will.\n\nIn agreement with him is Ammonius on the last part of On Interpretation 1 [n6]. \"It must be said,\" he says, \"that the gods know all things, things made, things that are and things to come, in a manner fitting to gods. This is by one, determinate and infallible cognition, on account of which indeed it must be said that they also comprehend the knowledge of contingent things, as being producers of all things that are in the world, and themselves the causes of perpetual substances, but co-causes of generable ones, according to their own proper operations; and as seeing not only the substances themselves, but their powers, and their operations, both those that are according to nature and those that are beyond nature. What is beyond nature entered at the same time with the necessary order of the subject, or the subject of the running-down of beings in those things that are by nature apt to share in this, not principally but according to the mode called parhypostasis, that is, alongside existence [n7].\" And below he says that the gods know contingent things in a nobler manner than their own nature, receiving and anticipating the knowledge of them determinately, and know these things. \"But whence do they receive and anticipate the knowledge of them? From what preceding principle or cause, if not from their own determinate will, the unfailing cause of things, and the like cause of knowledge among them?\" Dionysius, On the Divine Names 7, also seems to attest this opinion effectively, as is more fully recited in the fifteenth of this work. Again: God rightly knows future contingents; therefore he knows them through something that is really certain. But this is not any future contingent, since that is not certain. Nor is any lower cause sufficient for its production certain in its causing, but is contingent", "margins": [{"id": "222D·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "variant: forte leg. artificis"}, {"id": "222E·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "variant: aliquam. (Savile's margin here also carries the separate source entry Ammonius., which stands beside \"Cui et concordanter Ammonius\"; see Errata.)"}]}, {"anchor": "p223B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/18/#p223B", "locator_display": "223B–223C", "source_text": "similiter vt effectus: Alias enim ille effectus esset certe et determinate futurus. Relinquitur ergo quod Deus ista sciat per suam voluntatem sibi certissimam, qua vult omnia illa fore. Istud posset confirmari per Auerroem super 9. Metaph. comment. 21. dicentem, quod scire illa, quae semper sunt, immutabiliter vno modo, est scire; sed scire essentiam mutabilem dicitur aestimare. Item haec vltima ratio, et conclusio principalis patet per Iohannem Scotum super 2. sentent. distinct. 37. quaest. 2. redarguentem opinantes quod voluntas creata sit causa totalis sui velle sine Deo coagente, per hoc, quod si sic esset, Deus non esset naturaliter praescius futurorum, quia non habet scientiam de futuris contingentibus, nisi quia certitudinaliter nouit determinationem voluntatis suae respectu eorum; quae voluntas est immutabilis, et impotentialis. Sed si voluntas creata sit causa totalis sui velle, et ipsa se habet contingenter ad illud velle, ergo quantumcunque ponatur voluntas diuina determinata ad vnam partem eorum quae dependent a voluntate creata, ipsa potest aliter velle, et ita non sequitur\n\ncertitudo ex cognitione determinationis voluntatis diuinae. Qui et super 1. sentent. distinct. 41. reprobans opinionem dicentem ideo Deum quenquam praedestinare ad vitam, quia praeuidet ipsum bene vsurum libero arbitrio ita scribit: Sed contra istud arguitur, Primo, quia Deus non praeuidet ipsum bene vsurum libero arbitrio, nisi quia vult et praeordinat istum bene vsurum, eo quod sicut dictum est dist. 39. Certa praeuisio futurorum contingentium, est ex determinatione voluntatis suae. Et infra, factis duabus instanrijs de Iuda siue Lucifero peccaturo, argutoque quod sola permissio non sufficit ad certitudinem diuinae scientiae, sic respondet: Primum istorum soluitur per hoc quod Deus praescit se cooperaturum ad substantiam illius actus qui erit peccatum, hoc autem praescit quia vult cooperari illi; si erit peccatum commissionis, vel praescit se non cooperaturum ad actum aliquem si non vult ipsum, et hoc, si erit peccatum omissionis; et sciendo se cooperaturum ad substantiam talis actus non cum circumstantijs debitis, vel non cooperaturum ei ad actum necessarum,", "english": "in the same way as the effect. For otherwise that effect would be certainly and determinately future. It remains, therefore, that God knows these things through his will, most certain to him, by which he wills all those things to be. This could be confirmed by Averroes on Metaphysics 9, comment 21, who says that to know those things that always are, immutably in one way, is to know; but to know a mutable essence is called supposing.\n\nAgain, this last argument, and the principal conclusion, are clear from John Scotus on Sentences 2, distinction 37, question 2. He refutes those who hold that the created will is the total cause of its own willing without God's co-acting, on the ground that if this were so, God would not be naturally foreknowing of future things. For he has no knowledge of future contingents except in that he knows with certitude the determination of his own will with respect to them, and that will is immutable and without potentiality. But if the created will is the total cause of its own willing, and itself stands contingently toward that willing, then however much the divine will is posited as determined to one part of those things that depend on the created will, it can will otherwise, and so certitude does not follow from knowledge of the determination of the divine will. The same author, on Sentences 1, distinction 41, rejecting the opinion that says God predestines anyone to life because he foresees that he will use free choice well, writes thus: \"But against this it is argued, first, that God does not foresee that he will use free choice well, except because he wills and preordains that he will use it well, since, as was said in distinction 39, the certain foresight of future contingents is from the determination of his will.\" And below, two objections having been raised about Judas or Lucifer who will sin, and it having been argued that permission alone does not suffice for the certitude of divine knowledge, he replies thus: \"The first of these is resolved by this, that God foreknows that he will cooperate in the substance of that act which will be a sin, and he foreknows this because he wills to cooperate in it, if it will be a sin of commission; or he foreknows that he will not cooperate in some act if he does not will it, and this if it will be a sin of omission. And knowing that he will cooperate in the substance of such an act, but not with due circumstances, or that he will not cooperate with him in a necessary act,", "margins": [{"id": "223B·1", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Averroes."}, {"id": "223B·2", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Johannes Scotus."}, {"id": "223C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Scotus."}]}, {"anchor": "p223D", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/18/#p223D", "locator_display": "223D–223E", "source_text": "et per consequens, quod omittet, scit hunc peccaturum, non solum quia scit se permissurum hoc, sed quia scit se cooperaturum huic ad substantiam actus non circumstantionati, et per consequens iste committet; vel non cooperaturum ei ad actum necessarium, et per consequens iste omittet. Item Sanctus Thomas de Christiana religione siue de fide, spe, et charitate 138. dicit, quod contingentia effectuum causarum secundarum non potest certitudinem diuinae prouidentiae perturbare, quia efficacia voluntatis diuinae certitudinem sibi praestat: Voluntas enim Dei cum sit vniuersalis causa rerum, non solum vt aliquid fiat, sed vt sic fiat, ad efficientiam diuinae voluntatis pertinet, non solum vt fiat quod vult fieri, sed vt hoc modo fiat, quo illud vult fieri, vt sic diuina voluntas impleatur efficaciter. Idem quoque supra eodem 133. dicit, quod contingentia, prout sunt virtualiter in suis causis non sunt determinata ad vnum, vt de eis certa cognitio possit haberi, tamen prout sunt actu in suo esse in Dei aeterno, iam sunt determinata ad vnum, et potest de eis certa haberi cognitio. Qui et super 1.\n\nsent. dist. 38. qu. vlt. quaerente, Vtrum scientia Dei sit contingentium; et infra super dist. 40. qu. quarta quaerente, de certitudine praedestinationis ean dem sententiam plane tenet: sed contingentia talia determinari possunt nisi per voluntatem diuinā sicut 14. ostendebat, et pro ista determinatione posset allegari Autoritas Auerrois super de somno et vigilia abbreuiate superius memorata. Hoc idem videtur sentire Anselm. de casu diaboli 21. vbi vult, quod nihil vere scitur, nisi quod certa ratione intelligitur; Quate et Deus non proprie dicitur habere praescientiam futurorum, sed magis praesentium scientiam, quia omnia futura sunt ei praesentia. Et idem dicit de Concordia 7o et Boetius 5o de Consolat. Philosophiae prosa sexta quod videtur non posse intelligi aliter, nisi quod Deus per hoc sciat omnia futura, quia sunt ei praesentia, id est, per suam insuperabilem, et immutabilem voluntatem praesentialiter determinata, et decreta certitudinaliter, vt fiant in futuro. Vnde et de ipso Prophetice dicitur, Qui fecit quae", "english": "and consequently that he will omit, he knows that this man will sin: not only because he knows that he will permit this, but because he knows that he will cooperate with him in the substance of an act lacking its circumstances, and consequently this man will commit it; or that he will not cooperate with him in a necessary act, and consequently this man will omit it.\"\n\nAgain, St. Thomas, in the book On the Christian Religion, or On Faith, Hope and Charity [n8], chapter 138, says that the contingency of the effects of secondary causes cannot disturb the certitude of divine providence, because the efficacy of the divine will provides certitude for it. \"For since the will of God is the universal cause of things, it belongs to the efficacy of the divine will not only that something come to be, but that it come to be in this way: not only that what he wills to be done be done, but that it be done in the way in which he wills it to be done, so that the divine will is thus effectively fulfilled.\" The same author, above in the same work, chapter 133, says that contingent things, as they are virtually in their causes, are not determined to one outcome, so that no certain cognition of them can be had; but as they are in act in their being in God's eternity, they are already determined to one outcome, and certain cognition of them can be had. The same author, on Sentences 1,\n\nsentences, distinction 38, last question, asking whether God's knowledge is of contingent things; and below, on distinction 40, fourth question, asking about the certitude of predestination, holds plainly the same opinion. But such contingents [cannot] be determined except by the divine will [n9], as the fourteenth showed, and for this determination the authority of Averroes on On Sleep and Waking, briefly mentioned above, could be alleged. Anselm seems to hold the same in On the Fall of the Devil 21, where he maintains that nothing is truly known except what is understood by a certain reason. Hence God too is not properly said to have foreknowledge of future things, but rather knowledge of present things, because all future things are present to him. The same is said in the Concordia, chapter 7, and by Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy 5, sixth prose [n10]. This seems unable to be understood otherwise than as meaning that God knows all future things by this, that they are present to him: that is, that they are presentially determined, and with certitude decreed, by his insuperable and immutable will, so as to come to be in the future. Hence it is said prophetically of him, \"Who made what", "margins": [{"id": "223D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "source: S. Thomas."}, {"id": "223E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Averroes. Anselmus."}, {"id": "223E·2", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Boetius."}]}, {"anchor": "p224A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/18/#p224A", "locator_display": "224A–224C", "source_text": "ventura sunt; Et Ecclesiastis 6. Qui futurus est, iam vocatum est nomen eius; sed hoc esse non potest nisi praeuia voluntate; et hoc videtur Deus innuere, Esaiae 46. sic dicens, Ego sum Deus annuntians ab exordio nouissimum, et ab initio quae nec dum facta sunt, dicens Consilium meum stabit, et omnis voluntas mea fiet: quasi velit innuere, quod per hoc annuntiet, vel annuntiare possit ab exordio nouissimum, quia omne suum Consilium et voluntas immutabiliter stabit, et fiet. Quomodo insuper melius posset intelligi Origines super Epistolam ad Romanos, quod non propterea aliquid erit, quia illud scit Deus futurum, sed quia futurum est, ideo scitur a Deo antequam fiat; quam quod quia aliquid est futurum in volutione et praedestinatione diuina, ideo causaliter praescitur a Deo notitia simplici, non e contra. Quare et Augustinus 26. contra Faustum 2. Potius, inquit, verum est quod Deus scit, quam quod opinatur homo. Vnde tam non possunt futura non fieri, quam non fuisse facta praeterita, quoniam non est in Dei voluntate, vt eo sit aliquid falsum quo verum est. Haec ergo\n\nsunt talia et scita a Deo per voluntatem ipsius. Idem de bono perseuerantiae 49. Castitas, Charitas, Pietas, etc. quae Dei esse aliqui confitentur, eaque ab illo praecognita, ac per hoc ipsa esse praedestinata negare non possunt. Et infra, eodem 53. Dei donaque dantur electis, si nulla est praedestinatio, non praesciuntur a Deo; Praesciuntur autem; est igitur praedestinatio quam defendimus: Omnis autem praedestinatio a voluntate procedit: Omnia ergo quae praecognita sunt a Deo, voluta sunt ab eo, et non simul nec post naturaliter, ergo prius; voluntas ergo Dei est causa eius scientiae sicut praehabita suaserunt. Istam quoque sententiam testari videntur illi praeclari 24. Seniores Apocalyps. 4. sicut 14. huius tangit. Et sicut argutum est de scientia Dei respectu contingentium futurorum, quod est per voluntatem diuinam, sic potest argui de eius scientia respectu omnium futurorum, praesentium, et praeteritorum, quae voluntatem ipsius naturaliter consequntur, decimoquarto et nono Capitulo ad iuuante, maxime cum non aliter sciat praesentia siue praeterita, quam futura, propter eius immutabilitatem\n\nomnimodam quinto Capitulo demonstratam. Hic autem per voluntatem intelligo omnem actum voluntatis, siue volutio, siue nolutio fuerit, siue actus alius qualiscunque. Haec pro illorum fatuorum quaestione non fatua, qui dixerunt, Quomodo scit Deus, qui forte propter perplexitatem eius ambiguam, et insolubilem apud ipsos, putabunt non esse scientiam in excelso.", "english": "is to come;\" and in Ecclesiastes 6 [6:10], \"Whoever is to be, his name has already been called.\" But this cannot be unless the will goes before. God seems to hint at this in Isaiah 46 [46:9–10], saying thus: \"I am God, declaring the last from the beginning, and from the start things not yet done, saying: My counsel shall stand, and all my will shall be done.\" It is as if he meant to intimate that he declares thereby, or is able to declare the last from the beginning, because all his counsel and will shall stand and be done immutably. How, moreover, could Origen on the Epistle to the Romans be better understood [n11], to the effect that something will not be because God knows it to be future, but because it is future it is therefore known by God before it comes to be, than that, because something is future in divine willing and predestination, it is therefore causally foreknown by God by simple notice, not the other way round? Hence Augustine too, Against Faustus 26, 2: \"What God knows,\" he says, \"is rather true than what man supposes. Hence future things can no more fail to come to pass than past things can fail to have been done, since it is not in God's will that something be false in that in which it is true.\" These things, therefore,\n\nare such, and are known by God through his will. The same, in On the Good of Perseverance 49 [n12]: \"Chastity, charity, piety, and the like, which some confess to be God's, they cannot deny to have been foreknown by him, and hence to have been predestined.\" And below, in the same work, 53: \"And God's gifts are given to the elect. If there is no predestination, they are not foreknown by God; but they are foreknown; therefore there is the predestination that we defend.\" But all predestination proceeds from the will. Therefore all things that are foreknown by God are willed by him, and willed not simultaneously nor afterwards in the order of nature, therefore before. The will of God, therefore, is the cause of his knowledge, as the points already established have urged. Those illustrious twenty-four Elders of Apocalypse 4 also seem to attest this opinion, as the fourteenth of this work touches on. And as it was argued about God's knowledge of future contingents that it is through the divine will, so it can be argued about his knowledge of all things future, present and past, which naturally follow his will, with the fourteenth and ninth chapters helping, especially since he knows present or past things no otherwise than future things, on account of his immutability in every way, demonstrated in the fifth chapter. Here, however, by \"will\" I understand every act of the will, whether it be a willing or a not-willing, or any other act whatever. These things are said in answer to the question, not foolish, of those fools who said, \"How does God know?\" [n13] Perhaps on account of its ambiguous perplexity, and its insolubility as they see it, they will think there is no knowledge on high.", "margins": [{"id": "224A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Ecclesiastes. Esaias [Isaiah]."}, {"id": "224A·2", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Origines [Origen]."}, {"id": "224B·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "variant: 5. 3."}, {"id": "224C·1", "kind": "source", "text": "source: Ps 72 [73]."}]}], "provenance": {"method": "Machine translation drafted with Claude (Anthropic) under a set translation convention; the image of each Savile page was supplied to the translator, who logged differences between the keyed Latin and the print as errata. 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