{"id": "1/17", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/17/", "site": "bradwardine", "collection": "book-1", "title": "De causa Dei: Book I, Chapter 17", "title_alt": [], "author": "Thomas Bradwardine", "languages": ["la", "en"], "source_edition": {"title": "Thomae Bradwardini archiepiscopi olim Cantuariensis De causa Dei contra Pelagium, et de virtute causarum, ad suos Mertonenses, libri tres", "editor": "Henry Savile", "place": "London", "year": 1618, "volume": null, "locator": "219B–220C", "scan_url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}, "source_text": "CAP. XVII. Distinguit scita diuina, quia quaedam praecedunt quodammodo eius scientiam, et quaedam sequuntur; ostendit que haec esse causam quoquo modo diuinae scientiae, illa nusquam.\n\nNE tamen istud generaliter nimis intelligas, huiusmodi scitorum a Deo est quaedam distinctio aduertenda: quaedam enim horum scientiam Dei praecedunt quodammodo, et alia subsequuntur. Praecedunt ipsam diuina essentia omnipotentia, diuinus Intellectus, et his similia (Prius enim naturaliter Deus est, et habet omnipotentiam, et Intellectum,\n\nquam intelligat quid vel sciat) Alia vero hanc sequuntur. Illa igitur scita quae praecedunt naturaliter diuinam scientiam, sunt causa illius; Omne enim quod est prius naturaliter alio, est aliqua eius causa, sicut 13am praeostendit. Item omne necessario praesuppositum ad quodcunque videtur esse aliqua eius causa: si enim non esset aliqua eius causa, cur non posset existere sine illo, praeserum praesupposito, priusque necessario requisito? De necessario tamen sequente quodcunque aliter sentiendum, sicut effectus sequitur necessario effectorem, licet non sit causa illius: Sed Deum esse, habere potentiam, et intellectum, necessario praesupponuntur ad eius scientiam, ergo sunt aliqua causa eius. Item potentia intellectiua, siue Intellectus producit, sicut causa efficiens, omnemque suam intellectionem, et quemlibet suum actum; ergo Intellectus diuinus est causa cuiuslibet suae intellectionis, et scientiae cuiuscunque. Sic enim Deus producit et causat aeternaliter suum verbum, et Pater Filium suum sanctum, et est causa eius aeterna, sicut\n\nex secundo huius apparet: Reliqua vero intelligibilia, quae non sunt Deus, habent secundum Patrum sententiam, duplex esse; scilicet intelligibile, et existentiae, seu reale, id est, sunt intelligibilia priusquam existant in actu completo. Primum esse istorum praecedit quodam modo intellectionem diuinam; Prius enim quodammodo sunt intelligibilia, quam intelligantur a Deo, non per se (cum enim nihil sint omnino, nullam aptitudinem seu potentiam per se habent, vt constat ex prioribus) sed per Deum, et sic quodammodo sunt causae intellectionis diuinae, non autem vere ipsa (cum nihil sint omnino) sed sola essentia diuina, ex se primo omnium intelligibilium ideis et rationibus proprijs grauida et foecunda praeuenit intellectum diuinum, haec omnia ei clarissime, distinctissime, et quasi nominatissime offerendo, quam et quae intuens intelligit vniuersa, sicut 7um et 13um suadebant. Videtur enim mihi quod essentia diuina sit velut quoddam speculum intelligibile, clarissimum, infinitum, nihil ab obiectis patiens, recipiens, aut reflectens, sed actiue ex sua infinitissima claritate, distincte non confuse\n\nvultus proferens et ideas omnium intelligibilium obiectorum; in quod speculum oculus intellectus diuini prospiciens, haec omnia speculatur. Non autem opinor quod rationes huiusmodi seu ideae in diuina essentia ab ipsa essentialiter, et realiter distinguantur, sicut verba Patrum videntur sonare in auribus aliquorum, sed quod hae omnes sint realiter idem quod diuina essentia, imo quod haec essentia vnissima, et simplicissima ex se sola sic omnia intelligibilia repraesentet, sicut ex primo et 7o huius patet. Vnde et August. 6. de Trinit. vlt. loquens de Arte omnipotentis Dei plena omnium rationum, et Omnes, inquit, vnum in ea; Qui et de gaudijs iustorum et poenis malorum, siue de triplici habitaculo ita scribit; Omnia Dei vnum sunt in Deo, excepto quod ad relationem pertinet: Nam sapientia Dei et veritas, et aeternitas, non sunt diuersa inter se, sed vnum sunt, sicut caetera omnia. Sapientia Dei non magis sapientia est quam veritas, et non magis veritas quam sapientia, et non magis veritas quam aeternitas,\n\nquam caetera Dei omnia. Vnum enim sunt in Deo, et non magis, solum haec inter se eadem sunt in Deo, sed non aliud sunt quam ipse Deus, et mundus erat in Deo antequam in semetipso erat, non Mundus sed Deus. Cui et concordanter Anselmus Monol. 33. docet, quod Deus vno, eodem que verbo dicit seipsum, etc. et infra 34. Opus quod fit secundum aliquam artem, non solum quando fit, verum etiam et antequam fiat, et postquam dissoluitur, semper est in ipsa arte, non aliud quam quod est ars ipsa. Idcirco cum ipse summus spiritus dicit seipsum, dicit omnia quae facta sunt: Nam et antequam fierent, et cum iam facta sunt, et cum corrumpuntur, seu aliquo modo variantur, semper in ipso sunt, non quod sunt in seipsis, sed quod est idem ipse. Etenim in seipsis sunt essentia mutabilis secundum immutabilem rationem creata; In ipso vero sunt ipsa prima essentia, et prima existendi veritas. Esse vero existentiae et completum cuiuslibet creaturae non praecedit intellectionem diuinam, nec est causa illius, sed subsequitur eam, et causatur ab ea; Non enim insipienter, sed per suam sapientiam\n\ncuncta facit, ipsamet testante, Quando praeparabat Coelos, aderam; quando certa lege et gyro vallabat Abyssos, quando aethera firmabat sursum, et librabat fontes aquarum, quando circundabat mari terminum suum, quando legem ponebat aquis, ne transirent termines suos, quando appendebat fundamenta terrae, cum eo eram cuncta componens Parab. 18. et Psal. 103. Omnia in sapientia fecisti. Ista igitur haec praecedit vt princpale et instrumentale efficiens sua facta. Nec ista repugnant in aliquo duobus capitulis nunc praemissis: Illa enim loquuntur de scitis posteriobus diuina scientia in esse existere, et de scitis quae tantum sunt Intelligibilia, prout contra rationes et ideas essentiae diuinae praedictas imaginarie distinguuntur, quae secundum illa esse non sunt aliqualiter scientiae Dei causae.\n\nCOROLLARIVM.\n\nEt habet Corollarium, quod diuina scientia, quae est notitia eius simplex, est vere causa\n\ncuiuslibet rei factae, non solum causa sine qua non.\n\nVNde constare poterit euidenter quod diuina scientia quae est notitia eius simplex, est ve•e causa cuiuslibet rei factae, non solum causa sine qua non, vt dicit Pertus Lumbardus dist. 38. in suis sententijs vbi prius. Haec satis testantur Autoritates hic et 15 allegatae, et hoc probant similiter proximae rationes: Haec enim scientia Dei praecedit naturaliter quodlibet eius factum, et necessario praesupponitur ad quodcunque. Item intellectio et cognitio actualis mouet voluntatem, et est causa volutionis illius, vt posset probari per eadem argumenta, et per Philosophum 3. de Anima 54. et ante, et post; diuina volutio actualis est causa cuiuslibet rei factae, sicut capitulum nonum probat, et quicquid est causa causae, est causa causati. Sic enim et Filius est causa Spiritus Sancti, sicut et Pater Filij, sicut superius tangebatur.", "english": "CHAPTER XVII. He distinguishes the things God knows: some in a certain way precede his knowledge, and some follow it; and he shows that the former are in some way a cause of divine knowledge, the latter never.\n\nYet do not understand this too generally: a certain distinction must be noted in these things known by God. For some of them in a certain way precede God's knowledge, and others follow it. Those that precede that very knowledge are the divine essence, omnipotence, the divine Intellect, and the like (for God naturally is, and has omnipotence and Intellect, before he understands or knows anything). The others follow it. Now those things known which naturally precede divine knowledge are a cause of it. For whatever is naturally prior to another is some cause of it, as the 13th showed beforehand. Likewise everything that is necessarily presupposed to anything seems to be some cause of it: for if it were not some cause of it, why could the thing not exist without it, especially when it is presupposed and necessarily required beforehand? But what follows of necessity upon anything must be judged otherwise: an effect, for instance, follows its producer of necessity, though it is not the cause of it. Yet God's being, and his having power and intellect, are necessarily presupposed to his knowledge; therefore they are some cause of it. Again, an intellective power, or Intellect, produces as an efficient cause its every act of understanding and every act of its own; therefore the divine Intellect is the cause of each of its acts of understanding and of any knowledge whatever. For so God eternally produces and causes his Word, and the Father his holy Son, and is his eternal cause, as appears from the second of this book. But the remaining intelligibles, which are not God, have, according to the opinion of the Fathers, a twofold being: namely, intelligible being and the being of existence, or real being; that is, they are intelligible before they exist in complete act. The first being of these in a certain way precedes the divine act of understanding. For in a certain way they are intelligible before they are understood by God, not of themselves (for since they are nothing at all, they have no aptitude or potency of themselves, as is clear from what came before) but through God. And so in a certain way they are causes of the divine understanding, though not truly themselves (since they are nothing at all). Rather the divine essence alone, of itself first of all, pregnant and fertile with the ideas and proper reasons of all intelligibles, anticipates the divine intellect, offering all these to it most clearly, most distinctly and, as it were, most by name; and beholding this essence, and the things it offers, the intellect understands all things,[n1] as the 7th and the 13th urged. For it seems to me that the divine essence is like a kind of intelligible mirror, most clear and infinite, suffering, receiving or reflecting nothing from objects, but actively, from its own most infinite brightness, bringing forth distinctly and not confusedly the faces and ideas of all intelligible objects; and the eye of the divine intellect, gazing into this mirror, beholds all these things. I do not suppose, however, that such reasons or ideas in the divine essence are distinguished from it essentially and really, as the words of the Fathers seem to sound in the ears of some; but that all these are really the same as the divine essence, indeed that this essence, most unified and most simple, of itself alone so represents all intelligibles, as is clear from the first and the 7th of this book. Hence also Augustine, On the Trinity 6 (the last chapter), speaking of the Art of almighty God, full of all reasons, says, \"And all are one in it;\" and he writes thus also about the joys of the just and the punishments of the wicked, or about the threefold dwelling:[n2] \"All the things of God are one in God, except what pertains to relation. For God's wisdom and truth and eternity are not different from one another, but are one, like all the rest. God's wisdom is not more wisdom than it is truth, and not more truth than it is wisdom, and not more truth than eternity, than all the rest of God's attributes.\"[n3]\n\nFor they are one in God, and nothing more; these are not only the same among themselves in God, but they are nothing other than God himself, and the world was in God before it was in itself: not the World, but God. In agreement with this Anselm teaches in Monologion 33 that God says himself by one and the same word, etc.; and below, in 34: \"A work that is made according to some art is always in the art itself, not only when it is made but also before it is made and after it is dissolved, and is nothing other than what the art itself is. Therefore when the supreme spirit says himself, he says all things that have been made. For both before they came to be, and when they have been made, and when they are corrupted or in any way changed, they are always in him, not as what they are in themselves, but as what he himself is. For in themselves they are a mutable essence created according to an immutable reason; but in him they are the first essence itself and the first truth of existing.\" But the being of existence, and the complete being, of any creature does not precede the divine act of understanding, nor is it the cause of it, but follows it and is caused by it. For he does all things not unwisely but through his wisdom, wisdom herself bearing witness: \"When he prepared the heavens, I was present; when with fixed law and compass he fenced in the abysses; when he made the sky firm above and balanced the fountains of waters; when he set about the sea its limit; when he laid down a law for the waters, that they should not pass their bounds; when he hung the foundations of the earth, I was with him, arranging all things\" (Proverbs 18 [8]);[n4] and Psalm 103 [104]: \"You have made all things in wisdom.\" Therefore this [knowledge],[n5] this one, precedes its own works as principal and instrumental efficient cause. Nor do these things conflict in any way with the two chapters just set before this: for those speak of things known that come to exist in being after divine knowledge,[n6] and of things known that are only Intelligibles, insofar as they are distinguished, in the imagination, over against the aforesaid reasons and ideas of the divine essence; and according to that being of theirs they are in no way causes of God's knowledge.\n\nCOROLLARY.\n\nAnd the Corollary holds that divine knowledge, which is his simple awareness, is truly the cause of any thing made, and not only a cause without which not.\n\nFrom this it can be established plainly that divine knowledge, which is his simple awareness, is truly the cause of any thing made, and not only a cause without which not, as Peter Lombard says, distinction 38 of his Sentences, where cited above.[n7] The authorities cited here and in the 15th bear sufficient witness to this, and the immediately preceding arguments likewise prove it. For this knowledge of God naturally precedes each of his works, and is of necessity presupposed to anything whatever. Again, actual understanding and cognition move the will and are the cause of its willing, as could be proved by the same arguments and by the Philosopher, On the Soul 3, 54, both before and after;[n8] and actual divine willing is the cause of any thing made, as the ninth chapter proves; and whatever is the cause of a cause is the cause of the thing caused. For so too the Son is the cause of the Holy Spirit, as the Father is of the Son, as was touched on above.", "apparatus": {"notes": [{"n": 1, "text": "quam et quae intuens intelligit vniuersa. The relative construction is awkward in the print. I take quam to be the divine essence and quae the ideas it offers, both objects of intuens; the sense (the intellect understands everything by beholding the essence and what it presents) is not in doubt."}, {"n": 2, "text": "The first quotation (the Art of God \"full of reasons\"; \"all are one in it\") is a loose citation of Augustine, De Trinitate 6.10.11. The second, on the joys of the just and the punishments of the wicked and the threefold dwelling, I have not been able to identify in Augustine; \"Qui\" is Augustine, as the margin shows."}, {"n": 3, "text": "The final clause repeats \"truth\" (\"no more truth than eternity, than all the rest\"); it is the print's wording. The sense is that none of the divine attributes is more than another, and all are one in God. Translated literally."}, {"n": 4, "text": "Savile prints \"Parab. 18\"; the passage is Proverbs 8:27–30. The Psalm reference is Ps 103 [104]:24."}, {"n": 5, "text": "Ista igitur haec praecedit. The pronouns are as printed. \"This\" refers to the divine wisdom or knowledge that has just been spoken of; I supply \"[knowledge]\" and keep both demonstratives."}, {"n": 6, "text": "The print has posteriobus diuina scientia (I read the first word as posterioribus). I construe the phrase as \"later than divine knowledge\", with diuina scientia standing for the dative or ablative of comparison."}, {"n": 7, "text": "Savile prints \"Pertus Lumbardus\" for Petrus Lombardus: Peter Lombard, Sentences I, d. 38."}, {"n": 8, "text": "\"3. de Anima 54\": Aristotle, De anima III, with the number 54 evidently the comment number in Averroes's Long Commentary. Savile's numbering is kept (Conventions §5.4)."}], "errata": [{"address": "219C", "keyed": "13am", "print": "13um"}, {"address": "219C", "keyed": "praeserum", "print": "praesertim"}, {"address": "220B", "keyed": "termines", "print": "terminos"}, {"address": "220B", "keyed": "sines (margin)", "print": "fines"}, {"address": "220B", "keyed": "princpale", "print": "principale"}, {"address": "220B", "keyed": "posteriobus", "print": "posterioribus"}, {"address": "220C", "keyed": "ve•e", "print": "vere"}]}, "segments": [{"anchor": "p219B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/17/#p219B", "locator_display": "219B", "source_text": "CAP. XVII. Distinguit scita diuina, quia quaedam praecedunt quodammodo eius scientiam, et quaedam sequuntur; ostendit que haec esse causam quoquo modo diuinae scientiae, illa nusquam.", "english": "CHAPTER XVII. He distinguishes the things God knows: some in a certain way precede his knowledge, and some follow it; and he shows that the former are in some way a cause of divine knowledge, the latter never.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p219B-2", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/17/#p219B-2", "locator_display": "219B–219E", "source_text": "NE tamen istud generaliter nimis intelligas, huiusmodi scitorum a Deo est quaedam distinctio aduertenda: quaedam enim horum scientiam Dei praecedunt quodammodo, et alia subsequuntur. Praecedunt ipsam diuina essentia omnipotentia, diuinus Intellectus, et his similia (Prius enim naturaliter Deus est, et habet omnipotentiam, et Intellectum,\n\nquam intelligat quid vel sciat) Alia vero hanc sequuntur. Illa igitur scita quae praecedunt naturaliter diuinam scientiam, sunt causa illius; Omne enim quod est prius naturaliter alio, est aliqua eius causa, sicut 13am praeostendit. Item omne necessario praesuppositum ad quodcunque videtur esse aliqua eius causa: si enim non esset aliqua eius causa, cur non posset existere sine illo, praeserum praesupposito, priusque necessario requisito? De necessario tamen sequente quodcunque aliter sentiendum, sicut effectus sequitur necessario effectorem, licet non sit causa illius: Sed Deum esse, habere potentiam, et intellectum, necessario praesupponuntur ad eius scientiam, ergo sunt aliqua causa eius. Item potentia intellectiua, siue Intellectus producit, sicut causa efficiens, omnemque suam intellectionem, et quemlibet suum actum; ergo Intellectus diuinus est causa cuiuslibet suae intellectionis, et scientiae cuiuscunque. Sic enim Deus producit et causat aeternaliter suum verbum, et Pater Filium suum sanctum, et est causa eius aeterna, sicut\n\nex secundo huius apparet: Reliqua vero intelligibilia, quae non sunt Deus, habent secundum Patrum sententiam, duplex esse; scilicet intelligibile, et existentiae, seu reale, id est, sunt intelligibilia priusquam existant in actu completo. Primum esse istorum praecedit quodam modo intellectionem diuinam; Prius enim quodammodo sunt intelligibilia, quam intelligantur a Deo, non per se (cum enim nihil sint omnino, nullam aptitudinem seu potentiam per se habent, vt constat ex prioribus) sed per Deum, et sic quodammodo sunt causae intellectionis diuinae, non autem vere ipsa (cum nihil sint omnino) sed sola essentia diuina, ex se primo omnium intelligibilium ideis et rationibus proprijs grauida et foecunda praeuenit intellectum diuinum, haec omnia ei clarissime, distinctissime, et quasi nominatissime offerendo, quam et quae intuens intelligit vniuersa, sicut 7um et 13um suadebant. Videtur enim mihi quod essentia diuina sit velut quoddam speculum intelligibile, clarissimum, infinitum, nihil ab obiectis patiens, recipiens, aut reflectens, sed actiue ex sua infinitissima claritate, distincte non confuse\n\nvultus proferens et ideas omnium intelligibilium obiectorum; in quod speculum oculus intellectus diuini prospiciens, haec omnia speculatur. Non autem opinor quod rationes huiusmodi seu ideae in diuina essentia ab ipsa essentialiter, et realiter distinguantur, sicut verba Patrum videntur sonare in auribus aliquorum, sed quod hae omnes sint realiter idem quod diuina essentia, imo quod haec essentia vnissima, et simplicissima ex se sola sic omnia intelligibilia repraesentet, sicut ex primo et 7o huius patet. Vnde et August. 6. de Trinit. vlt. loquens de Arte omnipotentis Dei plena omnium rationum, et Omnes, inquit, vnum in ea; Qui et de gaudijs iustorum et poenis malorum, siue de triplici habitaculo ita scribit; Omnia Dei vnum sunt in Deo, excepto quod ad relationem pertinet: Nam sapientia Dei et veritas, et aeternitas, non sunt diuersa inter se, sed vnum sunt, sicut caetera omnia. Sapientia Dei non magis sapientia est quam veritas, et non magis veritas quam sapientia, et non magis veritas quam aeternitas,", "english": "Yet do not understand this too generally: a certain distinction must be noted in these things known by God. For some of them in a certain way precede God's knowledge, and others follow it. Those that precede that very knowledge are the divine essence, omnipotence, the divine Intellect, and the like (for God naturally is, and has omnipotence and Intellect, before he understands or knows anything). The others follow it. Now those things known which naturally precede divine knowledge are a cause of it. For whatever is naturally prior to another is some cause of it, as the 13th showed beforehand. Likewise everything that is necessarily presupposed to anything seems to be some cause of it: for if it were not some cause of it, why could the thing not exist without it, especially when it is presupposed and necessarily required beforehand? But what follows of necessity upon anything must be judged otherwise: an effect, for instance, follows its producer of necessity, though it is not the cause of it. Yet God's being, and his having power and intellect, are necessarily presupposed to his knowledge; therefore they are some cause of it. Again, an intellective power, or Intellect, produces as an efficient cause its every act of understanding and every act of its own; therefore the divine Intellect is the cause of each of its acts of understanding and of any knowledge whatever. For so God eternally produces and causes his Word, and the Father his holy Son, and is his eternal cause, as appears from the second of this book. But the remaining intelligibles, which are not God, have, according to the opinion of the Fathers, a twofold being: namely, intelligible being and the being of existence, or real being; that is, they are intelligible before they exist in complete act. The first being of these in a certain way precedes the divine act of understanding. For in a certain way they are intelligible before they are understood by God, not of themselves (for since they are nothing at all, they have no aptitude or potency of themselves, as is clear from what came before) but through God. And so in a certain way they are causes of the divine understanding, though not truly themselves (since they are nothing at all). Rather the divine essence alone, of itself first of all, pregnant and fertile with the ideas and proper reasons of all intelligibles, anticipates the divine intellect, offering all these to it most clearly, most distinctly and, as it were, most by name; and beholding this essence, and the things it offers, the intellect understands all things,[n1] as the 7th and the 13th urged. For it seems to me that the divine essence is like a kind of intelligible mirror, most clear and infinite, suffering, receiving or reflecting nothing from objects, but actively, from its own most infinite brightness, bringing forth distinctly and not confusedly the faces and ideas of all intelligible objects; and the eye of the divine intellect, gazing into this mirror, beholds all these things. I do not suppose, however, that such reasons or ideas in the divine essence are distinguished from it essentially and really, as the words of the Fathers seem to sound in the ears of some; but that all these are really the same as the divine essence, indeed that this essence, most unified and most simple, of itself alone so represents all intelligibles, as is clear from the first and the 7th of this book. Hence also Augustine, On the Trinity 6 (the last chapter), speaking of the Art of almighty God, full of all reasons, says, \"And all are one in it;\" and he writes thus also about the joys of the just and the punishments of the wicked, or about the threefold dwelling:[n2] \"All the things of God are one in God, except what pertains to relation. For God's wisdom and truth and eternity are not different from one another, but are one, like all the rest. God's wisdom is not more wisdom than it is truth, and not more truth than it is wisdom, and not more truth than eternity, than all the rest of God's attributes.\"[n3]", "margins": [{"id": "219B·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) scientia."}, {"id": "219D·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) ex."}, {"id": "219E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Augustine."}]}, {"anchor": "p220A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/17/#p220A", "locator_display": "220A–220B", "source_text": "quam caetera Dei omnia. Vnum enim sunt in Deo, et non magis, solum haec inter se eadem sunt in Deo, sed non aliud sunt quam ipse Deus, et mundus erat in Deo antequam in semetipso erat, non Mundus sed Deus. Cui et concordanter Anselmus Monol. 33. docet, quod Deus vno, eodem que verbo dicit seipsum, etc. et infra 34. Opus quod fit secundum aliquam artem, non solum quando fit, verum etiam et antequam fiat, et postquam dissoluitur, semper est in ipsa arte, non aliud quam quod est ars ipsa. Idcirco cum ipse summus spiritus dicit seipsum, dicit omnia quae facta sunt: Nam et antequam fierent, et cum iam facta sunt, et cum corrumpuntur, seu aliquo modo variantur, semper in ipso sunt, non quod sunt in seipsis, sed quod est idem ipse. Etenim in seipsis sunt essentia mutabilis secundum immutabilem rationem creata; In ipso vero sunt ipsa prima essentia, et prima existendi veritas. Esse vero existentiae et completum cuiuslibet creaturae non praecedit intellectionem diuinam, nec est causa illius, sed subsequitur eam, et causatur ab ea; Non enim insipienter, sed per suam sapientiam\n\ncuncta facit, ipsamet testante, Quando praeparabat Coelos, aderam; quando certa lege et gyro vallabat Abyssos, quando aethera firmabat sursum, et librabat fontes aquarum, quando circundabat mari terminum suum, quando legem ponebat aquis, ne transirent termines suos, quando appendebat fundamenta terrae, cum eo eram cuncta componens Parab. 18. et Psal. 103. Omnia in sapientia fecisti. Ista igitur haec praecedit vt princpale et instrumentale efficiens sua facta. Nec ista repugnant in aliquo duobus capitulis nunc praemissis: Illa enim loquuntur de scitis posteriobus diuina scientia in esse existere, et de scitis quae tantum sunt Intelligibilia, prout contra rationes et ideas essentiae diuinae praedictas imaginarie distinguuntur, quae secundum illa esse non sunt aliqualiter scientiae Dei causae.", "english": "For they are one in God, and nothing more; these are not only the same among themselves in God, but they are nothing other than God himself, and the world was in God before it was in itself: not the World, but God. In agreement with this Anselm teaches in Monologion 33 that God says himself by one and the same word, etc.; and below, in 34: \"A work that is made according to some art is always in the art itself, not only when it is made but also before it is made and after it is dissolved, and is nothing other than what the art itself is. Therefore when the supreme spirit says himself, he says all things that have been made. For both before they came to be, and when they have been made, and when they are corrupted or in any way changed, they are always in him, not as what they are in themselves, but as what he himself is. For in themselves they are a mutable essence created according to an immutable reason; but in him they are the first essence itself and the first truth of existing.\" But the being of existence, and the complete being, of any creature does not precede the divine act of understanding, nor is it the cause of it, but follows it and is caused by it. For he does all things not unwisely but through his wisdom, wisdom herself bearing witness: \"When he prepared the heavens, I was present; when with fixed law and compass he fenced in the abysses; when he made the sky firm above and balanced the fountains of waters; when he set about the sea its limit; when he laid down a law for the waters, that they should not pass their bounds; when he hung the foundations of the earth, I was with him, arranging all things\" (Proverbs 18 [8]);[n4] and Psalm 103 [104]: \"You have made all things in wisdom.\" Therefore this [knowledge],[n5] this one, precedes its own works as principal and instrumental efficient cause. Nor do these things conflict in any way with the two chapters just set before this: for those speak of things known that come to exist in being after divine knowledge,[n6] and of things known that are only Intelligibles, insofar as they are distinguished, in the imagination, over against the aforesaid reasons and ideas of the divine essence; and according to that being of theirs they are in no way causes of God's knowledge.", "margins": [{"id": "220A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Anselm."}, {"id": "220A·2", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) existentia."}, {"id": "220B·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) fines."}]}, {"anchor": "p220B", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/17/#p220B", "locator_display": "220B–220C", "source_text": "COROLLARIVM.\n\nEt habet Corollarium, quod diuina scientia, quae est notitia eius simplex, est vere causa\n\ncuiuslibet rei factae, non solum causa sine qua non.\n\nVNde constare poterit euidenter quod diuina scientia quae est notitia eius simplex, est ve•e causa cuiuslibet rei factae, non solum causa sine qua non, vt dicit Pertus Lumbardus dist. 38. in suis sententijs vbi prius. Haec satis testantur Autoritates hic et 15 allegatae, et hoc probant similiter proximae rationes: Haec enim scientia Dei praecedit naturaliter quodlibet eius factum, et necessario praesupponitur ad quodcunque. Item intellectio et cognitio actualis mouet voluntatem, et est causa volutionis illius, vt posset probari per eadem argumenta, et per Philosophum 3. de Anima 54. et ante, et post; diuina volutio actualis est causa cuiuslibet rei factae, sicut capitulum nonum probat, et quicquid est causa causae, est causa causati. Sic enim et Filius est causa Spiritus Sancti, sicut et Pater Filij, sicut superius tangebatur.", "english": "COROLLARY.\n\nAnd the Corollary holds that divine knowledge, which is his simple awareness, is truly the cause of any thing made, and not only a cause without which not.\n\nFrom this it can be established plainly that divine knowledge, which is his simple awareness, is truly the cause of any thing made, and not only a cause without which not, as Peter Lombard says, distinction 38 of his Sentences, where cited above.[n7] The authorities cited here and in the 15th bear sufficient witness to this, and the immediately preceding arguments likewise prove it. For this knowledge of God naturally precedes each of his works, and is of necessity presupposed to anything whatever. Again, actual understanding and cognition move the will and are the cause of its willing, as could be proved by the same arguments and by the Philosopher, On the Soul 3, 54, both before and after;[n8] and actual divine willing is the cause of any thing made, as the ninth chapter proves; and whatever is the cause of a cause is the cause of the thing caused. For so too the Son is the cause of the Holy Spirit, as the Father is of the Son, as was touched on above.", "margins": []}], "provenance": {"method": "Machine translation drafted with Claude (Anthropic) under a set translation convention; the image of each Savile page was supplied to the translator, who logged differences between the keyed Latin and the print as errata. Not yet reviewed by a human scholar.", "corrected_against_scan": true, "verified_on": null, "status": "draft"}, "license_source": "CC0 1.0 (EEBO-TCP A16626); the underlying text is public domain", "license_translation": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "license_apparatus": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "credits": [{"name": "EEBO-TCP (Text Creation Partnership), A16626: the Latin", "license": "CC0 1.0", "url": "https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A16626.0001.001"}, {"name": "Internet Archive: the Minerva facsimile page images (linked, not hosted)", "license": null, "url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}], "generated": "2026-10-28", "version": "0.1-draft"}