{"id": "1/11", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/11/", "site": "bradwardine", "collection": "book-1", "title": "De causa Dei: Book I, Chapter 11", "title_alt": [], "author": "Thomas Bradwardine", "languages": ["la", "en"], "source_edition": {"title": "Thomae Bradwardini archiepiscopi olim Cantuariensis De causa Dei contra Pelagium, et de virtute causarum, ad suos Mertonenses, libri tres", "editor": "Henry Savile", "place": "London", "year": 1618, "volume": null, "locator": "198A–199E", "scan_url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}, "source_text": "CAP. XI. Quod primum principium necessarium et verum incomplexum est Deus; et quod principium complexum primum simpliciter est de Deo: puta Deus est, Deus scit omnia, Deus vult omnia, vel aliquid simile.\n\nINuento siquidem primo principio libero, restat consequenter inquirere primum principium necessarium, et verorum omnium\n\nprimum verum. Est siquidem apud Philosophos duplex necessarium atque verum; Incomplexum scilicet et complexū; ex prioribus autem reputo manifestum; quod sicut Deus est primum ens omnium entium, et prima causa essendi quodcun que sic est primum verum et necessarium incomplexum, et prima causa essendi quodlibet necessarium siue verum. Nam sicut 2o. cap. fuerat allegatum; Primum in quolibet genere est causa omnium aliorum secundum quod sunt in illo genere, et maxime dignum nomine illius generis; Deus autem est primum in genere verorum incomplexorum, sicut ex praehabitis potest faciliter apparere. Hoc idem clare testari videtur Philosophus 2. Metaph. 4. et Auerroes in comment. Nec non Auicenna 8. Metaph. 6. sicut secundum huius plenius recitauit. Quibus et\n\nconcordat. August. 7. Confess. 15. ibi similiter recitatus. Vnde et Anselmus de veritate 7. Putas esse aliquid, aliquando, aut alicubi, quod non sit in summa veritate, et quod vim non acceperit quod est, in quantum est, aut quod possit aliud esse quam ibi est? Non est putandum: Est igitur veritas in omnium quae sunt essentia, quia haec sunt, quod in summa veritate sunt. Sed quia de primo vero incomplexo dubium non videtur, non aestimo circa illud vlterius immorandum; De primo autem vero complexo est dubitatior difficultas: Dicit enim Philosophus 4. Metaph. 9. quod hoc est primum principium complexorum, Idem simulinesse, et non inesse eidem, et secundum idem est impossibile; sed ne tanto Philosopho tantillus videar obgarrire, sciendum quod duplex est principium, cognoscendi scilicet et essendi, vel, quoad nos et quoad naturam; Ipse autem loquitur ibi de primo principio cognoscendi, et apud nos tantum, per quod generaliter in omnibus scientijs regulamur, sicut processus textus et comment. satis ostendit. Principium autem complexorum primum simpliciter est de Deo vt puta Deus\n\nest, vel Deus scit omnia, vel Deus vult omnia, vel aliud quicquam tale: Primum enim in genere verorum complexorum, sicut est in quolibet alio genere est causa, quare omnia posteriora sunt vera. Ergo est causa sic essendi realiter, sicut significat quodlibet verum sequens: Nam secundum Philosophum in praedicamentis, In eo quod res est vel non est, ratio vera vel falsa dicitur: et nullum verum posterius est causa quare primum sit verum. Sic ergo esse realiter, sicut significat primum verum, erat causa sic essendi realiter, sicut significat quodlibet verum sequens, et nullum verum sequens erit causa sic essendi realiter, sicut significat primum verum. Causa autem quare ita est realiter sicut significat, quodcunque verum non dictum de Deo, est in Deo, nec aliquod aliorum est Deo causa essendi, sicut ex praehabitis in isto capitulo et alijs satis patet. In Deo ergo, siue de eo est primum simpliciter principium totius generis complexorum. Item Deus est prima causa cuiuslibet essentiae, seu modi essendi, ergo et cuiuslibet veritatis. Item verum, quod potest esse verum sine alijs et non e\n\ncontra, est prius eis: sed sic se habet, Deus est, ad alia vera quaecunque. Item sicut illud quod est notissimum in cognitione apud nos, est sic, primum principium, vt patet per Philosophum vbi prius: sic illud quod est notissimum simpliciter et apud naturam, est primum principium correspondenter; Illud autem est, Deus est, licet propter corruptionem corporis animam aggrauantis hoc de difficili cognoscamus. Vnde Philosophus 2. Metaph. 1. Difficultate theoriae de veritate secundum duos existente modos, non in rebus, sed in nobis est eius causa. Sicut enim nycticoracum oculi ad lucem diei se habent, sic et animae nostrae intellectus ad us ad ea quae sunt omnium naturae manifestissima: Vbi Auerroes; Difficultas in rebus quae sunt in fine veritatis, scilicet in primo principio, et in principijs distinctis a materia,\n\nest ex nobis, non ex illis. Idem posset argui ex firmitate primi principij, quoniam sicut est primum sic est firmissimum, vt patet per Philosophum 4. Metaph. 8. et quia omnia alia vera innituntur veritati illius, vt originali radici, et primario fundamento: sed nulli dubium, quin, Deum esse, firmissimum sit verorum. Item verum incomplexum est prius naturaliter vero complexo, sicut simplex composito, et causa et principium eius; ergo principium ad principium huiusmodi proportionaliter se habebit; Deus autem est principium totius veri incomplexi, sicut prior pars huius capituli demonstrauit. Item in ordine verorum non est infinitus processus; sed est aliquod primum verum, quod est causa omnium aliorum: Sed illud est, Deus est, cum non habeat aliquod verum prius causam illius. Item illud verum quod est tantum causans alia vera, non causatum ab e•s, est primum: hoc autem est, Deus est. Item illud quod est verissimum omnium, est principium omnium: hoc autem est Deus, quia ipse maxime est, sicut praehabita docuerunt. Item Anselmus de Veritate 10. dicit, quod\n\nsumma veritas nulli quicquam debet, sed omnia debent illi, et ipsa est causa omnium altarum veritatum, et nihil est causa ipsius: Et distincta veritate in causantem et causatam, dicit quod veritas quae est in rerum existentia est effectus summae veritatis; Ipsa vero est causa veritatis, quae est cognitionis, et eius quae est in propositione. Idem infra eodem vlt. probat diffuse quod est vna veritas, et illa est summa veritas, qua omnia vera sunt vera. Idemque Monolog. 18. et Augustinus 1. Soliloquiorum 21. et 2i libri 20. ex aeternitate veritatis probant aeternitatem Dei. Veritatis vero aeternitatem sic probant, Hoc semper fuit verum, Aliquid est futurum, et hoc semper eut verum, Aliquid est praeteritum; ergo et aliqua veritate; quare et illa veritas nunquam incoepit, nec desinet: ergo veritas est aeterna. Haec autem probatio non concludit, si aliqua propositio possit esse vera per se sine superiore veritate in Deo causante veritatem in tali propositione, et illam continue sustinente; Vnde Anselmus de veritate 10. exponens hanc probationem, quam in suo Monologio recitat se fecisse, discipulo suo dicit;\n\nIam intelligere potes quomodo summam veritatem in meo Monologio probaui non habere principium vel finem per veritatem orationis. Cum enim dixi, quando non fuit verum, quod futurum erat aliquid? Non ita dixi, ac si absque principio ista oratio fuisset, quae assereret futurum esse aliquid, aut ista veritas esset Deus: sed quoniam non potest intelligi, quando, si oratio ista esset, veritas illi de esset; vt per hoc, quia non intelligitur quando ista veritas esse non potuerit, si esset oratio in qua esse posset, intelligitur illa veritas sine principio fuisse, quae prima causa est huius veritatis: quippe veritas orationis non semper posset esse, si eius causa non semper esset. Etenim vera non est oratio, quae dicit futurum esse aliquid, nisi reipsa aliquid sit futurum; neque aliquid est futurum si non est in summa veritate: Similiter intelligendum est de illa oratione quae dicit, quod praeteritum est aliquid. Nam si nullo intellectu veritas orationi huic si facta fuerit, deesse poterit; necesse est vt eius veritatis, quae summa causa est istius, nullus finis intelligi possit. Ideirco namque vere dicitur praeteritum esse aliquid, quia\n\nita est in re, et ideo est aliquid praeteritum, quia sic est in summa veritate. Quapropter si nunquam poterit non esse verum, futurum esse aliquid, et nunquam potuit non esse verum praeteritum esse aliquid, impossibile est principium summae veritatis fuisse, aut finem futurum esse. Item Augustinus 26. contra Faustum 2. Quicquid praeteritum est, iam non est; non ergo est, quod vere dicimus fuisse, sed ideo verum est illud fuisse, quia in nostra sententia, quippe qua dicimus aliquid fuisse, ideo vera est, quia illud de quo dicimus, iam non est. Hanc sententiam Deus falsam facere non potest, quia non est contrarius veritati. Quod si quaeras, vbi sit haec veta sententia, prius inuenitur in animo nostro, cum id verum scimus et dicimus: sed si et de animo nostro ablata fuerit, cum id, quod scimus, obliti fuerimus, manebit in ipsa veritate. Semper enim verum erit, fuisse illud quod erat, et non esse, et ibi verum erit iam fuisse quod erat, vbi verum erat antequam fieret, futurum esse quod non erat. Huic veritati Deus non potest aduersari, in quo est ipsa summa et incommutabilis veritas, qua illustratur vt verum\n\nsit, quicquid in quorumcunque animis et mentibus verum est. Idem super illud Psalmi quarti; Vt quid diligitis vanitatem, et quaeritis mendacium? sola veritas facit beatos, ex qua vera sunt omnia. Idem quoque super illud Psalmi 55. In Deo laudabo sermones meos, in Deo laudabo sermones, quia ibi est fons sermonum verorum. Est ergo in Deo vero primum principium cuiuslibet veritatis.", "english": "CHAPTER XI.\n\nThat the first necessary and true incomplex principle is God; and that the first complex principle simply is about God: for example, God exists, God knows all things, God wills all things, or something similar. [n1]\n\nNow that the first free principle has been found, it remains in consequence to inquire into the first necessary principle, and the first true thing among all true things. Among the philosophers, the necessary and the true are twofold: the incomplex, namely, and the complex. From what has gone before I judge it clear that God is the first being of all beings and the first cause of the being of anything whatever. In the same way he is the first true and necessary incomplex, and the first cause of the being of anything necessary or true. For as was alleged in the 2nd chapter, the first in any genus is the cause of all the others in so far as they are in that genus, and is most worthy of the name of that genus. But God is first in the genus of incomplex true things, as can easily be seen from what has been laid down. The Philosopher seems to bear clear witness to the same thing in Metaphysics 2, 4, and so does Averroes in the commentary. [n2] Avicenna does likewise, Metaphysics 8, 6, as the second of this book set out more fully. [n3] Augustine, Confessions 7, 15, agrees with these, and is likewise cited there.\n\nHence also Anselm, On Truth 7: Do you think that there is something, at any time or anywhere, that is not in the highest truth, and that has not received the force of what it is, in so far as it is, or that could be other than it is there? [n4] It is not to be thought. Therefore truth is in the essence of all things that are, because they are what they are in the highest truth.\n\nBut because there seems to be no doubt about the first true incomplex, I do not judge that we need linger over it further. About the first true complex, however, the difficulty is more doubtful. For the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 4, 9 that this is the first principle of complexes: that it is impossible for the same thing at once to belong and not to belong to the same thing, and in the same respect. But lest I, so small, seem to growl against so great a Philosopher, it must be known that principle is twofold: of knowing, namely, and of being; or, as regards us and as regards nature. He is speaking there of the first principle of knowing, and only as regards us, by which we are governed in general in all the sciences, as the course of the text and commentary shows well enough. But the first complex principle simply is about God, as for example, God exists, or God knows all things, or God wills all things, or anything else of the kind. For the first in the genus of true complexes, as in any other genus, is the cause why all the posterior ones are true. Therefore it is the cause of things being really so, as any following truth signifies. For according to the Philosopher in the Categories, from the fact that a thing is or is not, a statement is called true or false; and no posterior truth is the cause why the first is true. So, then, the real being as the first truth signifies was the cause of the real being as any following truth signifies, and no following truth will be the cause of the real being as the first truth signifies. Now the cause why it is so in reality as it signifies, for any truth not said of God, is in God, and none of the others is a cause of being to God, as is clear enough from what has been laid down in this chapter and others. In God, then, or about him, is the first principle simply of the whole genus of complexes.\n\nLikewise, God is the first cause of every essence, or mode of being, and therefore also of every truth. Likewise, a truth that can be true without the others, and not conversely, is prior to them; but that is how God exists stands to any other truths whatever. Likewise, as that which is best known in cognition for us is the first principle in that respect, as is plain from the Philosopher where cited above, so that which is best known simply, and for nature, is correspondingly the first principle. That, however, is God exists, though on account of the corruption of the body that weighs down the soul we know this only with difficulty. Hence the Philosopher, Metaphysics 2, 1: the difficulty of theory about truth existing in two modes, its cause is not in things but in us. For as the eyes of bats are disposed to the light of day, so is the intellect of our soul to those things that are by nature the most manifest of all. [n5] On this Averroes says: The difficulty in things that are at the end of truth, namely in the first principle and in principles distinct from matter, is from us, not from them. [n6]\n\nThe same could be argued from the firmness of the first principle, since as it is first so it is firmest, as is plain from the Philosopher, Metaphysics 4, 8. All other truths lean on the truth of this one as on their original root and primary foundation; and it is doubtful to no one that God exists is the firmest of true things. Likewise, the incomplex truth is naturally prior to the complex truth, as the simple to the composite, and is its cause and principle. Therefore principle will stand to principle in the same proportion; but God is the principle of the whole of the incomplex truth, as the earlier part of this chapter showed. Likewise, in the order of true things there is no infinite regress; but there is some first truth, which is the cause of all the others. That is God exists, since no truth prior to it has it as its cause. Likewise, that truth which only causes other truths, and is not caused by them, is first; and this is God exists. Likewise, that which is truest of all is the principle of all; and this is God, because he most of all is, as what has been laid down taught. Likewise Anselm, On Truth 10, says that the highest truth owes nothing to anyone, but all things owe to it; it is the cause of all other truths, and nothing is its cause. And having distinguished truth into causing and caused, he says that the truth which is in the existence of things is an effect of the highest truth, while the highest truth is itself the cause of the truth that belongs to cognition and of that which is in the proposition. Further on in the same work, in the last chapter, he proves at length that there is one truth, and that this is the highest truth, by which all true things are true. [n7] The same is done in the Monologion 18, and by Augustine, Soliloquies 1, 21, and in the second book, 20: they prove the eternity of God from the eternity of truth. And they prove the eternity of truth thus: This was always true: something will be; and this will always be true: something is past; therefore it is so by some truth also; hence that truth too never began and will never cease; therefore truth is eternal. [n8] This proof, however, does not conclude if some proposition could be true through itself, without a higher truth in God causing the truth in such a proposition and continually sustaining it. Hence Anselm, On Truth 10, expounding this proof, which he recounts having made in his Monologion, says to his pupil:\n\nNow you can understand how, in my Monologion, I proved that the highest truth has neither beginning nor end, by means of the truth of a statement. [n9] For when I said, 'When was it not true that something was going to be?', I did not say it as if that statement which asserted that something will be had existed without a beginning, or as if that truth were God. I said it because it cannot be understood when, if that statement existed, truth would be lacking to it. By this, then, since it is not understood when that truth could not have been, were there a statement in which it could be, that truth is understood to have been without beginning which is the first cause of this truth. For the truth of a statement could not always be, if its cause were not always. For the statement that says something will be is not true unless something is in fact going to be; and nothing is going to be if it is not in the highest truth. The same is to be understood of the statement that says that something is past. For if in no conceivable way could truth be lacking to this statement, should it be made, then of necessity no end can be conceived of that truth which is the highest cause of it. For it is said truly that something is past for this reason, that it is so in reality, and something is past for this reason, that it is so in the highest truth. Therefore, if it can never not be true that something will be, and it could never have been not true that something is past, it is impossible that the highest truth had a beginning or will have an end.\n\nLikewise Augustine, Against Faustus 26, 2: Whatever is past now is not; so what we truly say has been is not. But it is true that it was, because, in our statement, the very one by which we say that something was, it is true for this reason: that that of which we speak is now not. [n10] God cannot make this statement false, because he is not contrary to truth. And if you ask where this true statement is, it is found first in our mind, when we know and say that thing to be true. But if it is also taken away from our mind, when we have forgotten what we know, it will remain in truth itself. For it will always be true that what was has been and is not; and it will be true that what was has already been in the place where it was true, before it came to be, that what was not would be. God cannot oppose this truth; in him is the supreme and unchangeable truth itself, by which whatever is true in the souls and minds of any persons whatever is illumined, so that it may be true. The same, on that verse of Psalm 4: 'Why do you love vanity, and seek after lying?': Truth alone makes people blessed, and from it all true things are true. The same also, on that verse of Psalm 55 [56]: 'In God I will praise my words'; 'In God I will praise my words, because there is the source of true words.' Therefore in God, truly, is the first principle of any truth whatever. [n11]", "apparatus": {"notes": [{"n": 1, "text": "Complexum / incomplexum are the scholastic terms for what is signified with composition (a proposition, such as \"God exists\") and what is signified without it (a thing or term taken simply, here God himself as the first truth). I keep the transliterations \"complex\" and \"incomplex\" throughout the chapter."}, {"n": 2, "text": "Savile's Aristotle numbers follow the medieval Latin Metaphysics with Averroes's commentary: \"Metaph. 2\" is Book α, \"Metaph. 4\" is Book Γ, and the second number is the chapter of that Latin text, not the modern chapter. So \"2, 4\" is α 1, 993b23–31 (the cause of truth in others is itself most true); \"2, 1\" is α 1, 993a30–b11; \"4, 8\" and \"4, 9\" are both Γ 3, 1005b11–20. They are kept as Savile gives them (Conventions §5.4)."}, {"n": 3, "text": "secundum huius: the noun is elliptical. I supply \"chapter\", as the backward reference (\"in the 2nd chapter … there\") requires, and take huius as \"of this book\"."}, {"n": 4, "text": "Savile's marginal variant idem stands against vim. I keep the main reading. vim non acceperit quod est is awkward, and I take it as \"has not received the force of what it is\". The variant \"has not received the same thing that it is\" hardly construes, so it is not adopted."}, {"n": 5, "text": "nycticoracum (gen. pl. of nycticorax, \"night-raven\") is the medieval translators' rendering of Aristotle's νυκτερίς, the bat. I give \"bats\" because that is the animal of the comparison (Metaph. α 1, 993b9–11)."}, {"n": 6, "text": "Savile's sentence runs over the page turn (ma-|teria). It is completed here, at the end of this block, so that the English does not break mid-sentence. In the Latin its last words, est ex nobis, non ex illis, are the first words of 199A (unit 199A)."}, {"n": 7, "text": "Eodem vlt.: I take it as \"in the same [work], the last [chapter]\", that is, the last chapter of Anselm's De veritate, where he argues that there is one truth in all things. 2i libri 20 is read as \"of the second book, 20\", as in the preceding Soliloquies reference."}, {"n": 8, "text": "The print reads ergo et aliqua veritate (ablative). The sense is evidently \"so it is by some truth also\" (that is, there is a truth that makes it so), from which Bradwardine concludes that illa veritas never began. I translate the evident sense and have not emended the Latin."}, {"n": 9, "text": "oratio here is Anselm's term for the statement or sentence that bears truth (the propositio of the schools). I render it \"statement\"."}, {"n": 10, "text": "The Latin is elliptical (quia in nostra sententia, quippe qua dicimus aliquid fuisse, ideo vera est, quia …). The subject of vera est is the statement itself, and I supply it as such. The point is that the truth of \"it was\" lies in the statement, not in the thing, which is now no more."}, {"n": 11, "text": "in Deo vero is ambiguous: it can be \"in God, truly\" or \"in the true God\". I take vero adverbially, as closing the argument of the chapter."}], "errata": [{"address": "198E", "keyed": "ad us ad ea", "print": "ad ea"}, {"address": "199A", "keyed": "e•s", "print": "eis"}, {"address": "199B", "keyed": "altarum", "print": "aliarum"}, {"address": "199B", "keyed": "eut", "print": "erit"}, {"address": "199C", "keyed": "de esset", "print": "deesset"}, {"address": "199C", "keyed": "Ideirco", "print": "Idcirco"}, {"address": "199D", "keyed": "veta", "print": "vera"}]}, "segments": [{"anchor": "p198A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/11/#p198A", "locator_display": "198A–198B", "source_text": "CAP. XI. Quod primum principium necessarium et verum incomplexum est Deus; et quod principium complexum primum simpliciter est de Deo: puta Deus est, Deus scit omnia, Deus vult omnia, vel aliquid simile.\n\nINuento siquidem primo principio libero, restat consequenter inquirere primum principium necessarium, et verorum omnium\n\nprimum verum. Est siquidem apud Philosophos duplex necessarium atque verum; Incomplexum scilicet et complexū; ex prioribus autem reputo manifestum; quod sicut Deus est primum ens omnium entium, et prima causa essendi quodcun que sic est primum verum et necessarium incomplexum, et prima causa essendi quodlibet necessarium siue verum. Nam sicut 2o. cap. fuerat allegatum; Primum in quolibet genere est causa omnium aliorum secundum quod sunt in illo genere, et maxime dignum nomine illius generis; Deus autem est primum in genere verorum incomplexorum, sicut ex praehabitis potest faciliter apparere. Hoc idem clare testari videtur Philosophus 2. Metaph. 4. et Auerroes in comment. Nec non Auicenna 8. Metaph. 6. sicut secundum huius plenius recitauit. Quibus et", "english": "CHAPTER XI.\n\nThat the first necessary and true incomplex principle is God; and that the first complex principle simply is about God: for example, God exists, God knows all things, God wills all things, or something similar. [n1]\n\nNow that the first free principle has been found, it remains in consequence to inquire into the first necessary principle, and the first true thing among all true things. Among the philosophers, the necessary and the true are twofold: the incomplex, namely, and the complex. From what has gone before I judge it clear that God is the first being of all beings and the first cause of the being of anything whatever. In the same way he is the first true and necessary incomplex, and the first cause of the being of anything necessary or true. For as was alleged in the 2nd chapter, the first in any genus is the cause of all the others in so far as they are in that genus, and is most worthy of the name of that genus. But God is first in the genus of incomplex true things, as can easily be seen from what has been laid down. The Philosopher seems to bear clear witness to the same thing in Metaphysics 2, 4, and so does Averroes in the commentary. [n2] Avicenna does likewise, Metaphysics 8, 6, as the second of this book set out more fully. [n3] Augustine, Confessions 7, 15, agrees with these, and is likewise cited there.", "margins": []}, {"anchor": "p198C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/11/#p198C", "locator_display": "198C–198E", "source_text": "concordat. August. 7. Confess. 15. ibi similiter recitatus. Vnde et Anselmus de veritate 7. Putas esse aliquid, aliquando, aut alicubi, quod non sit in summa veritate, et quod vim non acceperit quod est, in quantum est, aut quod possit aliud esse quam ibi est? Non est putandum: Est igitur veritas in omnium quae sunt essentia, quia haec sunt, quod in summa veritate sunt. Sed quia de primo vero incomplexo dubium non videtur, non aestimo circa illud vlterius immorandum; De primo autem vero complexo est dubitatior difficultas: Dicit enim Philosophus 4. Metaph. 9. quod hoc est primum principium complexorum, Idem simulinesse, et non inesse eidem, et secundum idem est impossibile; sed ne tanto Philosopho tantillus videar obgarrire, sciendum quod duplex est principium, cognoscendi scilicet et essendi, vel, quoad nos et quoad naturam; Ipse autem loquitur ibi de primo principio cognoscendi, et apud nos tantum, per quod generaliter in omnibus scientijs regulamur, sicut processus textus et comment. satis ostendit. Principium autem complexorum primum simpliciter est de Deo vt puta Deus\n\nest, vel Deus scit omnia, vel Deus vult omnia, vel aliud quicquam tale: Primum enim in genere verorum complexorum, sicut est in quolibet alio genere est causa, quare omnia posteriora sunt vera. Ergo est causa sic essendi realiter, sicut significat quodlibet verum sequens: Nam secundum Philosophum in praedicamentis, In eo quod res est vel non est, ratio vera vel falsa dicitur: et nullum verum posterius est causa quare primum sit verum. Sic ergo esse realiter, sicut significat primum verum, erat causa sic essendi realiter, sicut significat quodlibet verum sequens, et nullum verum sequens erit causa sic essendi realiter, sicut significat primum verum. Causa autem quare ita est realiter sicut significat, quodcunque verum non dictum de Deo, est in Deo, nec aliquod aliorum est Deo causa essendi, sicut ex praehabitis in isto capitulo et alijs satis patet. In Deo ergo, siue de eo est primum simpliciter principium totius generis complexorum. Item Deus est prima causa cuiuslibet essentiae, seu modi essendi, ergo et cuiuslibet veritatis. Item verum, quod potest esse verum sine alijs et non e\n\ncontra, est prius eis: sed sic se habet, Deus est, ad alia vera quaecunque. Item sicut illud quod est notissimum in cognitione apud nos, est sic, primum principium, vt patet per Philosophum vbi prius: sic illud quod est notissimum simpliciter et apud naturam, est primum principium correspondenter; Illud autem est, Deus est, licet propter corruptionem corporis animam aggrauantis hoc de difficili cognoscamus. Vnde Philosophus 2. Metaph. 1. Difficultate theoriae de veritate secundum duos existente modos, non in rebus, sed in nobis est eius causa. Sicut enim nycticoracum oculi ad lucem diei se habent, sic et animae nostrae intellectus ad us ad ea quae sunt omnium naturae manifestissima: Vbi Auerroes; Difficultas in rebus quae sunt in fine veritatis, scilicet in primo principio, et in principijs distinctis a materia,", "english": "Hence also Anselm, On Truth 7: Do you think that there is something, at any time or anywhere, that is not in the highest truth, and that has not received the force of what it is, in so far as it is, or that could be other than it is there? [n4] It is not to be thought. Therefore truth is in the essence of all things that are, because they are what they are in the highest truth.\n\nBut because there seems to be no doubt about the first true incomplex, I do not judge that we need linger over it further. About the first true complex, however, the difficulty is more doubtful. For the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 4, 9 that this is the first principle of complexes: that it is impossible for the same thing at once to belong and not to belong to the same thing, and in the same respect. But lest I, so small, seem to growl against so great a Philosopher, it must be known that principle is twofold: of knowing, namely, and of being; or, as regards us and as regards nature. He is speaking there of the first principle of knowing, and only as regards us, by which we are governed in general in all the sciences, as the course of the text and commentary shows well enough. But the first complex principle simply is about God, as for example, God exists, or God knows all things, or God wills all things, or anything else of the kind. For the first in the genus of true complexes, as in any other genus, is the cause why all the posterior ones are true. Therefore it is the cause of things being really so, as any following truth signifies. For according to the Philosopher in the Categories, from the fact that a thing is or is not, a statement is called true or false; and no posterior truth is the cause why the first is true. So, then, the real being as the first truth signifies was the cause of the real being as any following truth signifies, and no following truth will be the cause of the real being as the first truth signifies. Now the cause why it is so in reality as it signifies, for any truth not said of God, is in God, and none of the others is a cause of being to God, as is clear enough from what has been laid down in this chapter and others. In God, then, or about him, is the first principle simply of the whole genus of complexes.\n\nLikewise, God is the first cause of every essence, or mode of being, and therefore also of every truth. Likewise, a truth that can be true without the others, and not conversely, is prior to them; but that is how God exists stands to any other truths whatever. Likewise, as that which is best known in cognition for us is the first principle in that respect, as is plain from the Philosopher where cited above, so that which is best known simply, and for nature, is correspondingly the first principle. That, however, is God exists, though on account of the corruption of the body that weighs down the soul we know this only with difficulty. Hence the Philosopher, Metaphysics 2, 1: the difficulty of theory about truth existing in two modes, its cause is not in things but in us. For as the eyes of bats are disposed to the light of day, so is the intellect of our soul to those things that are by nature the most manifest of all. [n5] On this Averroes says: The difficulty in things that are at the end of truth, namely in the first principle and in principles distinct from matter, is from us, not from them. [n6]", "margins": [{"id": "198C·1", "kind": "variant", "text": "(variant) idem."}, {"id": "198E·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Averroes."}]}, {"anchor": "p199A", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/11/#p199A", "locator_display": "199A–199B", "source_text": "est ex nobis, non ex illis. Idem posset argui ex firmitate primi principij, quoniam sicut est primum sic est firmissimum, vt patet per Philosophum 4. Metaph. 8. et quia omnia alia vera innituntur veritati illius, vt originali radici, et primario fundamento: sed nulli dubium, quin, Deum esse, firmissimum sit verorum. Item verum incomplexum est prius naturaliter vero complexo, sicut simplex composito, et causa et principium eius; ergo principium ad principium huiusmodi proportionaliter se habebit; Deus autem est principium totius veri incomplexi, sicut prior pars huius capituli demonstrauit. Item in ordine verorum non est infinitus processus; sed est aliquod primum verum, quod est causa omnium aliorum: Sed illud est, Deus est, cum non habeat aliquod verum prius causam illius. Item illud verum quod est tantum causans alia vera, non causatum ab e•s, est primum: hoc autem est, Deus est. Item illud quod est verissimum omnium, est principium omnium: hoc autem est Deus, quia ipse maxime est, sicut praehabita docuerunt. Item Anselmus de Veritate 10. dicit, quod\n\nsumma veritas nulli quicquam debet, sed omnia debent illi, et ipsa est causa omnium altarum veritatum, et nihil est causa ipsius: Et distincta veritate in causantem et causatam, dicit quod veritas quae est in rerum existentia est effectus summae veritatis; Ipsa vero est causa veritatis, quae est cognitionis, et eius quae est in propositione. Idem infra eodem vlt. probat diffuse quod est vna veritas, et illa est summa veritas, qua omnia vera sunt vera. Idemque Monolog. 18. et Augustinus 1. Soliloquiorum 21. et 2i libri 20. ex aeternitate veritatis probant aeternitatem Dei. Veritatis vero aeternitatem sic probant, Hoc semper fuit verum, Aliquid est futurum, et hoc semper eut verum, Aliquid est praeteritum; ergo et aliqua veritate; quare et illa veritas nunquam incoepit, nec desinet: ergo veritas est aeterna. Haec autem probatio non concludit, si aliqua propositio possit esse vera per se sine superiore veritate in Deo causante veritatem in tali propositione, et illam continue sustinente; Vnde Anselmus de veritate 10. exponens hanc probationem, quam in suo Monologio recitat se fecisse, discipulo suo dicit;", "english": "The same could be argued from the firmness of the first principle, since as it is first so it is firmest, as is plain from the Philosopher, Metaphysics 4, 8. All other truths lean on the truth of this one as on their original root and primary foundation; and it is doubtful to no one that God exists is the firmest of true things. Likewise, the incomplex truth is naturally prior to the complex truth, as the simple to the composite, and is its cause and principle. Therefore principle will stand to principle in the same proportion; but God is the principle of the whole of the incomplex truth, as the earlier part of this chapter showed. Likewise, in the order of true things there is no infinite regress; but there is some first truth, which is the cause of all the others. That is God exists, since no truth prior to it has it as its cause. Likewise, that truth which only causes other truths, and is not caused by them, is first; and this is God exists. Likewise, that which is truest of all is the principle of all; and this is God, because he most of all is, as what has been laid down taught. Likewise Anselm, On Truth 10, says that the highest truth owes nothing to anyone, but all things owe to it; it is the cause of all other truths, and nothing is its cause. And having distinguished truth into causing and caused, he says that the truth which is in the existence of things is an effect of the highest truth, while the highest truth is itself the cause of the truth that belongs to cognition and of that which is in the proposition. Further on in the same work, in the last chapter, he proves at length that there is one truth, and that this is the highest truth, by which all true things are true. [n7] The same is done in the Monologion 18, and by Augustine, Soliloquies 1, 21, and in the second book, 20: they prove the eternity of God from the eternity of truth. And they prove the eternity of truth thus: This was always true: something will be; and this will always be true: something is past; therefore it is so by some truth also; hence that truth too never began and will never cease; therefore truth is eternal. [n8] This proof, however, does not conclude if some proposition could be true through itself, without a higher truth in God causing the truth in such a proposition and continually sustaining it. Hence Anselm, On Truth 10, expounding this proof, which he recounts having made in his Monologion, says to his pupil:", "margins": [{"id": "199A·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Anselm."}]}, {"anchor": "p199C", "url": "https://bradwardine.wrootpress.com/1/11/#p199C", "locator_display": "199C–199E", "source_text": "Iam intelligere potes quomodo summam veritatem in meo Monologio probaui non habere principium vel finem per veritatem orationis. Cum enim dixi, quando non fuit verum, quod futurum erat aliquid? Non ita dixi, ac si absque principio ista oratio fuisset, quae assereret futurum esse aliquid, aut ista veritas esset Deus: sed quoniam non potest intelligi, quando, si oratio ista esset, veritas illi de esset; vt per hoc, quia non intelligitur quando ista veritas esse non potuerit, si esset oratio in qua esse posset, intelligitur illa veritas sine principio fuisse, quae prima causa est huius veritatis: quippe veritas orationis non semper posset esse, si eius causa non semper esset. Etenim vera non est oratio, quae dicit futurum esse aliquid, nisi reipsa aliquid sit futurum; neque aliquid est futurum si non est in summa veritate: Similiter intelligendum est de illa oratione quae dicit, quod praeteritum est aliquid. Nam si nullo intellectu veritas orationi huic si facta fuerit, deesse poterit; necesse est vt eius veritatis, quae summa causa est istius, nullus finis intelligi possit. Ideirco namque vere dicitur praeteritum esse aliquid, quia\n\nita est in re, et ideo est aliquid praeteritum, quia sic est in summa veritate. Quapropter si nunquam poterit non esse verum, futurum esse aliquid, et nunquam potuit non esse verum praeteritum esse aliquid, impossibile est principium summae veritatis fuisse, aut finem futurum esse. Item Augustinus 26. contra Faustum 2. Quicquid praeteritum est, iam non est; non ergo est, quod vere dicimus fuisse, sed ideo verum est illud fuisse, quia in nostra sententia, quippe qua dicimus aliquid fuisse, ideo vera est, quia illud de quo dicimus, iam non est. Hanc sententiam Deus falsam facere non potest, quia non est contrarius veritati. Quod si quaeras, vbi sit haec veta sententia, prius inuenitur in animo nostro, cum id verum scimus et dicimus: sed si et de animo nostro ablata fuerit, cum id, quod scimus, obliti fuerimus, manebit in ipsa veritate. Semper enim verum erit, fuisse illud quod erat, et non esse, et ibi verum erit iam fuisse quod erat, vbi verum erat antequam fieret, futurum esse quod non erat. Huic veritati Deus non potest aduersari, in quo est ipsa summa et incommutabilis veritas, qua illustratur vt verum\n\nsit, quicquid in quorumcunque animis et mentibus verum est. Idem super illud Psalmi quarti; Vt quid diligitis vanitatem, et quaeritis mendacium? sola veritas facit beatos, ex qua vera sunt omnia. Idem quoque super illud Psalmi 55. In Deo laudabo sermones meos, in Deo laudabo sermones, quia ibi est fons sermonum verorum. Est ergo in Deo vero primum principium cuiuslibet veritatis.", "english": "Now you can understand how, in my Monologion, I proved that the highest truth has neither beginning nor end, by means of the truth of a statement. [n9] For when I said, 'When was it not true that something was going to be?', I did not say it as if that statement which asserted that something will be had existed without a beginning, or as if that truth were God. I said it because it cannot be understood when, if that statement existed, truth would be lacking to it. By this, then, since it is not understood when that truth could not have been, were there a statement in which it could be, that truth is understood to have been without beginning which is the first cause of this truth. For the truth of a statement could not always be, if its cause were not always. For the statement that says something will be is not true unless something is in fact going to be; and nothing is going to be if it is not in the highest truth. The same is to be understood of the statement that says that something is past. For if in no conceivable way could truth be lacking to this statement, should it be made, then of necessity no end can be conceived of that truth which is the highest cause of it. For it is said truly that something is past for this reason, that it is so in reality, and something is past for this reason, that it is so in the highest truth. Therefore, if it can never not be true that something will be, and it could never have been not true that something is past, it is impossible that the highest truth had a beginning or will have an end.\n\nLikewise Augustine, Against Faustus 26, 2: Whatever is past now is not; so what we truly say has been is not. But it is true that it was, because, in our statement, the very one by which we say that something was, it is true for this reason: that that of which we speak is now not. [n10] God cannot make this statement false, because he is not contrary to truth. And if you ask where this true statement is, it is found first in our mind, when we know and say that thing to be true. But if it is also taken away from our mind, when we have forgotten what we know, it will remain in truth itself. For it will always be true that what was has been and is not; and it will be true that what was has already been in the place where it was true, before it came to be, that what was not would be. God cannot oppose this truth; in him is the supreme and unchangeable truth itself, by which whatever is true in the souls and minds of any persons whatever is illumined, so that it may be true. The same, on that verse of Psalm 4: 'Why do you love vanity, and seek after lying?': Truth alone makes people blessed, and from it all true things are true. The same also, on that verse of Psalm 55 [56]: 'In God I will praise my words'; 'In God I will praise my words, because there is the source of true words.' Therefore in God, truly, is the first principle of any truth whatever. [n11]", "margins": [{"id": "199D·1", "kind": "source", "text": "(source) Augustine."}]}], "provenance": {"method": "Machine translation drafted with Claude (Anthropic) under a set translation convention; the image of each Savile page was supplied to the translator, who logged differences between the keyed Latin and the print as errata. Not yet reviewed by a human scholar.", "corrected_against_scan": true, "verified_on": null, "status": "draft"}, "license_source": "CC0 1.0 (EEBO-TCP A16626); the underlying text is public domain", "license_translation": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "license_apparatus": "CC BY-NC 4.0", "credits": [{"name": "EEBO-TCP (Text Creation Partnership), A16626: the Latin", "license": "CC0 1.0", "url": "https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A16626.0001.001"}, {"name": "Internet Archive: the Minerva facsimile page images (linked, not hosted)", "license": null, "url": "https://archive.org/details/decausadeicontra00braduoft"}], "generated": "2026-10-28", "version": "0.1-draft"}